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Preface 
The present study forms part of a research project of the EC Commission in 
which consumer legislation in the nine EC countries is analysed and compared. 
The national reports have been prepared by jurists doing research in the 
respective countries; this is the report on the Federal Republic of Germany. 
The study is the first comprehensive analysis ofthis new field oflaw, based on 
a theoretical concept of consumer law. lt therefore penetrates deeply into areas 
of business law which, because of the prevailing separation of civil and public 
law, are still carefully distinguished both in practice and jurisprudence. In view 
of the wealth of legal rules, the main difficulty has been to make a proper 
selection and to analyse and evaluate the really relevant issues in Iaw. Whether 
we have always succeeded in so doing will be for the reader to decide. Numbers 
given in brackets refer to the respective reference numbers in the text and are to 
draw attention to the interlocking of the various functional areas of consumer 
Iaw. 
The study focuses on legislation and court practice. Special importance has 
been attached to the incorporation of reform. The actual law enforcement, 
whether by authorities, the courts or associations, has been studied very little so 
far; here it has often been possible only to point out loopholes, unless, by way of 
exception, appropriate empirical studies are available as in the case of unfair 
competition and advertising. It is this deficiency that renders a scientific 
evaluation of the existing law particularly difficult. 
In line with its structure, the study is confined to the commodity market 
(goods and services). The real property and capital markets, in which consumer 
protection is sure to be necessary and does exist, has not been included in the 
analysis. 
The study reflects the state of development of the Iaw as of late 1979. In some 
cases it has been possible to point out more recent trends. 
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CHAPTER 1 
General Remarks on the 
Consumer's Position in Gerrnan 
Law 
1 GENERALITIES 
1 lt can be noted that in the Federal Republic of Germany during the past 
decade the issue of consumer protection has increasingly been taken up by the 
legislator, the courts and jurists1• As a result of legislation, but also as a result 
of court practice, the traditional legal system of the Federal Republic as it 
manifests itself in the traditional distinction between civil law and public law is 
superimposed by a new field of law, consumer law. 
To many people it appears that the development and formation of consumer 
law these days constitutes a process as fundamental as the development of 
labour Iaw at the beginning of this century. This process does, of course, meet 
with resistance and criticism: advocates of a legal conception conforming to the 
traditional law offer fierce resistance to the development of consumer law and 
try to fit it into the traditional categories of civil law and public law2 • 
lt is the task of this study to give a comprehensive description and critical 
evaluation of consumer law in the Federal Republic of Germany. The main 
emphasis will be placed on !egislation, which is accorded a leading role in this 
context. However, it does not suffice to consider merely legislative acts. They 
are often put into concrete terms only through court practice and it is only then 
that their effects on consumers, enterprises and government institutions are 
readily grasped and that they become practicable. In addition, it is worth 
mentioning that the courts where they enjoy a wide scope of interpretation and 
regulation, e.g. in connection with general clauses (Nos. 104, 165, 265) under 
civil law and under the la w of competition, may pursue or, conversely, preclude 
a policy of consumer protection, although in principle here they also purport to 
administer and not to lay down the law3 • 
A comprehensive conception of consumer law also includes institutions 
which are not created by law, but flow from 'seif regulation ' 4 • The entire system 
of standardisation should be mentioned here: it was created as a 'self-help' of 
industry and contains quasi-government regulations in the area of labelling and 
product safety (Nos. 75, 161)5 • A similar process may be noticed in the area of 
what is known as 'self-control in advertising' (No. 126). Standard form 
contract conditions are often based on concerted action, e.g. recommendations 
by associations (No. 309). With respect to consumer Jaw two questions are of 
particular importance: the extent to which the state exercises or controls 'the law 
Iaid down by industry itself'; and in what way do consumer organisations as 
a collective participat.e in shaping the law6 • At this point it should be pointed out 
that - unlike the situation in labour law - collective regulation by way of 
coalitions seems hardly tobe developed. This is due to the Jack of representation 
of consumers by organisations (No. 6) and the poor ability of consumers to 
organise (No. 9). lt appears to us that, despite these problems of consumer 
representation, there should be here an important possibility of furthering the 
development of consumer law. 
Consumer law must also be evaluated in terms of its actual working. So far, 
little reliable information is available to us. That is why the following questions 
arise. Are the provisions of consumer law applied by those concerned (enter-
prises)? How is consumer law enforced? What gaps in enforcement are discern-
ible? Who benefits from the provisions of consumer law? Are there any findings 
as to whether the effects of regulations are specific to certain groups of the 
population? Are consumers, particularly those from the so-called marginal 
groups, in a position at all to make use of the regulations and remedies made 
available to them? Can proposals to reform the law be inferred from the 
knowledge of the actual working of consumer law? 
II REMARKS ON THE CONSUMER'S SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
FUNCTION IN THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
1 Consumption and consumer 
2 Consumer law as a new legal category owe.s its development to the shifts and 
changes that have occurred in the socio-economic system of the Federal 
Republic of Germany. The economic system in this country is characterised by 
the existence and prevalence of market mechanisms in the area of production, 
distribution and consumption 7• 
'Consumption' is a category which presupposes the existence of a market 
where buyers' wishes meet with offers made by manufacturers, traders and 
suppliers of services. Accordingly, a consumer is any person who as a buyer 
seeks to satisfy his needs in the market. 
A notion of consumption and the consumer as non-specific as that is of no 
use in explaining the economic peculiarity of consumer law. lt disregards the 
relation of 'consumption' to society and thus the consumer's position in the 
social community. lt is unable to explain why the legislator made this 'natural' 
function of consumption the pivotal point of his intervention. 
2 Consumer sovereignty 
3 More of a theory setting political standards is the theory that links the 
consumer's socio-economic function to the idea of consumer sovereignty8• 
This is in line with the classical market theory in so far as the consumer by 
deciding and shifting his requirements controls production and distribution. 
If this consumer sovereignty is impaired, e.g. through suppliers' or traders' 
market power, consumer sovereignty must be restored by means of consumer 
policy and possibly consumer law. The consumer's function, namely to control 
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market processes, and the right to governmental and political action, namely 
the restoration of consumer sovereignty, coincide as a tendency, even if in the 
process of economic concentration disparities are admitted. 
The thesis of consumer sovereignty pervades more or less clearly various 
political programmes for consumer protection and specific regulations9 , partic-
ularly in connection with measures relating to competition and information 
policy (Nos. 43, 100). However, modern consumer research has shown that the 
thesis of consumer sovereignty in its different varieties is 1argely a mere illusion 
and that it is impossible to restore it through political and legal measures 10• The 
relative causes have often been mentioned in the political economy of capitalism 
and can only be repeated: the process of concentration in the area of suppliers, 
of late also in the area of traders, tends to impair the consumer's choices 11 • In 
this connection it is not important to measure in detail the degree and forms of 
market power in particular markets, as, for instance, is done by the market 
theory. Rather, it is important that as a result of his isolated, passive and recep-
tive position the consumer is a priori inferior to producers and traders operating 
on the market. Hunzicker has rightly pointed out that the structure of commu-
nication on markets is carried into effect in an asymmetrical and unilateral way 
at the expense of the consumer 12 • This becomes the more critical, the higher the 
degree of concentration and the smaller the possibility for the consumer to exert 
an influence on suppliers by shifting his demand or even by refraining from 
satisfying it. 
In the area of marketing and advertising, enterprises have created instruments 
by which they try to influence the structure ofthe consumer's needs and prefer-
ences to their liking13 • Conversely, consumers have no opportunity of informing 
suppliers about their consumption interests and of articulating them 
politically 14 • 
Criticism of this thesis of consumer sovereignty does not exclude that in a 
particular case a clever consumer or a group of consumers, specifically in the 
higher income brackets, may succeed in securing himself or themselves 
optimum conditions to satisfy bis or their needs (it being quite possible for legis-
lation to back them up), in preventing suppliers from totally missing consumer 
needs in production andin ensuring competition, specifically competition based 
on substitutes, also on markets with high concentration ratios and the like. The 
consumer's partial encroachment on the structure of communication of the 
market does not alter in principle the one-sidedness and asymmetry of this 
communication structure. 
3 The need to protect the consumer 
4 If the thesis of consumer sovereignty does not get us any further on our way 
to clarify legal intervention in favour of the consumer, we may ask whether or 
not the consumer as the weaker party is in need of protection. Indeed, we con-
clude from many politica1 programmes and regulations that the consumer is 
being 'exploited' and therefore is in need of protection, a fact which is denied 
energetically by suppliers15 • In this global wording, the thesis of need for protec-
tion is certainly not tenable and has not been verified empirically. As under 
consumer protection legislation the rich and the poor, buyers of a luxury car as 
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weil as of a second-hand car 16, are all considered tobe consumers, it is hardly 
possible in terms of empirical sociology to speak of the same need for protection 
in each case. 
lt is at this point that a dilemma of consumer policy and consumer law 
becomes apparent that has not yet been solved to date. Research in America on 
the subject of 'The poor pay more' 17 has shown that poor consumers are specif-
ically detrimentally affected by the deficiencies of the market and that they are 
practically beyond the reach of the traditional instruments of consumer policy 18 • 
On the contrary, present consumer policy seems to be intended for the middle 
classes earning a good salary; this is proved by the reading oftest magazines and 
their readers19. 
Within the scope of this study it is impossible to show how to get out of this 
dilemm:.>. Taking into account this knowledge it seems at least possible, though, 
to point out present deficiencies under the existing Jaw and to describe those 
business practices which hit poor consumers especially hard, e.g. manipulative 
promotional activities (coffee party excursions - equivalent to Tupperware 
parties - and the like) (No. 105), unfair contract terms (No. 264), and 
usurious credit brokerage (No. 346). In this respect consumer law may weil 
work particularly to the benefit of the lower classes, provided it allows for their 
position and may thus also gain sociopolitical momentum. ln this regard 
consumer law is also of socio-political importance. 
Nevertheless, legally it does not yet seem possible in general to go on from the 
specific need for protection feit by an individual consumer or by a group of 
consumers in order to ask for regulations and determine their scope of applica-
tion. Rather, it turns out tobe necessaryto look for ageneral economic category 
demanding an independent consumer law and to differentiale under a consumer 
law so conceived, depending on a concrete case of need for protection. 
4 Satisfying consumer needs as a basis of consumer law 
5 As a central criterion in determining the consumer's socio-economic position, 
we shall employ the distinction to be found in political economy between the 
value-in-exchange (Tauschwert) and the value-in-use (Gebrauchswert)2°. In the 
sphere of production and distribution, values-in-use (goods, services and the 
like) are produced and turned over in order to flow back to the enterprises in the 
form of values-in-exchange (money and the like). However, this dialectic of 
conversion of the value-in-use to the value-in-exchange does not apply to the 
consumer. He acquires values in use for their sake and employs values-in-
exchange, specifically money, in making use of goods and services for the 
renewal of his own working capacity and that of the collective. To the 
consumer, in contrast to enterprises in the field of production and distribution, 
it is not the value-in-use as a subsequent value-in-exchange that matters, but the 
value-in-use of the merchandise or service as such. That is why the economic 
interests coming into play in such a process necessarily differ from those coming 
into play in the preceding exchange processes. 
There is a necessary (contradictory) contrast21 between enterprises offering on 
the market values-in-use to have them flow back as values-in-exchange and con-
sumers acquiring values-in-use as such in order to use them in the renewal of 
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their working capacity (household, leisure time and the like). Because of the 
existence of market mechanisms and the prevalence of interests of enterprises 
in values-in-exchange, the consumer's interest in values-in-use tends to be 
endangered. Consumer law tries to oppose this process by intervening in the 
structurally conditioned functional gaps in the market 22• lt wants to prevent 
enterprises from asking excessively high prices which may well be asked on the 
'market' (No. 29). lt wants to oppose a one-sided communication structure on 
the market by controlling advertising (No. 79) and contract terms (No. 264). lt 
wants to enable the customer to get objective information (No. 43). lt wants to 
maintain the customer's value-in-use interest in a safe product (No. 128), in his 
expectations as to quality (No. 194), in an after-sales service (No. 235) andin 
reasonable credit terms (No. 337). Lastly, it wants to make available to the 
consumer effective means to safeguard his interests judicially and extra-
judicially (No. 357). 
III CONSUMER ORGANISATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF 
GERMANY 
1 The principle of organisation on the basis of representation 
6 Consumer policy and consumer law generally assume that an individual 
consumer is isolated as regards his economic and legal interests. Consumption, 
as is apparent from the functional analysis made above, is at the same time also a 
collective, that is, a social phenomenon. The question is whether consumers 
maintain their rights also collectively and, if so, in what forms of organisation. 
In the Federal Republic of Germany there is no collective representation of 
consumer interests. Rather, the interests of consumers are safeguarded by way 
of organisations on the basis of representation (Fremdorganisation), i.e. con-
sumer institutions which are government subsidised or sponsored otherwise23 • 
Their legitimacy has recently come und er severe criticism, especially on the back-
ground of consumer research directed at the creation of a countervailing power24 • 
Organisations on the basis of representation may be found in five sectors25 • 
(aa) The Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Verbraucher (AgV) (Association of Con-
sumers) is an umbrella organisation domiciled in Bonn in which organisations 
participate that claim to represent the consumer's interest without, however, 
having to furnish proof to that effect in each case. That is why the Ag V consists 
of very heterogeneous associations; it is an organisation on the basis of indirect 
representation which receives government subsidies. The AgV is concerned 
mainly with articulating the consumer's interest in a political way and advises 
the government as well as various other organisations on these matters at a 
national and at a European level. 
(bb) The structure of the Verbraucherzentralen der Länder (consumer centres 
of the German Länder) is likewise that of an organisation on the basis of repre-
sentation. Usually, their members are associations only; individual members are 
an exception and are carefully selected by the boards. Consumer centres are, so 
to speak, entrusted with the work at the base: consumer counselling, consumer 
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education, and of late also legal advice as weil as bringing collective actions 
under the Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (UWG) (Act Prohibiting 
Unfair Competition) and the Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der Allgemeinen 
Geschäftsbedingungen (AGBG) (Standard Form Contracts Act). Consumer 
centres in the Germ an Länder, with the exception of the city-states, in addition 
maintain local advice centres to which individual consumers may turn with their 
problems. The emphasis of their work is on information and advice to the 
individual, the effectiveness of which is doubted26 ; also, these centres are largely 
working for the middle classes. With the exception of the Consumer Centre of 
Baden-Württemberg, they have not yet become active in the field of the collec-
tive action27 • Following some initial difficulties, they have generally been 
permitted to give legal advice which seems to be a matter of first priority 
(Nos. 358ff). More recently, they have participated in various complaint proce-
dures to settle consumer complaints (No. 367). Consumer centres are usually 
financed jointly by the German Federal and Länder Governments. This joint 
financing has recently been contested on constitutional grounds. 
(cc) A relatively independent and central consumer institution is the Verbrau-
cherschutzverein (Consumer Protection Association) in West Berlin. By way of 
delegation of functions, this institution attends to prosecution within the frame-
work of the collective action. lt is likewise an organisation on the basis of 
indirect representation and is government subsidised. 
(dd) Another institution on the basis of representation which is of relevance to 
consumer policy is the Stiftung Warentest in West Berlin. lt is a foundation 
under private law capable of acting as legal entity and is supported by the 
Federal Government and other consumer institutions. As evidenced by its by-
laws, it is in charge of the product test system, i.e. the determination of objectifi-
able, comparative criteria of the value in use of goods and of late also of services 
(travel, insurance and the like)28 • lt derives its funds largely from the proceeds of 
sale ofthe 'test' magazine. ln addition, it operates in the area ofstandardisation 
(No. 161) and product labelling (No. 76). 
(ee) To improve education and counselling, the Verbraucherinstitut (Con-
sumer Institute) was founded in West Berlin in late 1978 as a foundation under 
private law. The Institute is designed to develop advanced training programmes 
for personnel engaged in consumer counselling. The extent to which it will in 
addition become active in the entire area of consumer education, e.g. at schools 
and universities, is still open. We regret to say that the Institute is not competent 
to give legal advice to consumers (see Chapter 9, Nos. 358ff), not even in the 
sense of training consmrier advisers. 
2 Trade unions as consumer organisations? 
7 The position of trade unions, particularly that of the individual trade unions 
united in the Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund (DGB) (German Trade Unions' 
Federation), with regard to the representatiÖn of the consumer's interest is still 
largely undecided in the Federal Republic. Trade unions represent mainly 
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employees' interests and are constitutionally legitimised to do so pursuant to the 
freedom of association and collective bargaining as laid down in Art. 9, para. 3 
Grundgesetz (GG) (Basic Law). They exercise in particular autonomy in nego-
tiating wage rates and the right to strike. However, as the interests of employees 
and consumers often tend to go in the same direction, particularly as concerned 
with the value in use, it seems tobe a legitimate task for the DGB to speak also 
for the interests of consumers29• On the occasion of the 10th Federal Congress in 
1975, the DGB advanced pertinent demands in terms of consumer policy and 
included an appropriate wording in its by-laws 30 • In this way the DGB or its 
trade unions contribute to the consumer's political representation. Consumer 
counselling proper - the enforcement of individual or collective claims - is 
not handled by the DGB though, unlike the case in labour and social welfare 
law. lt cannot be predicted yet whether this will change in future. 
Although we are in favour of trade unions representing the consumer in terms 
of consumer policy, we should be well aware of the fact that conflicts may arise 
between the interests of employees and consumers 31 • This becomes obvious 
especially if, for example, car manufacturers with the consent of trade union 
representatives demand price increases which are contrary to the consumer's 
interest in low prices. Such conflicts of goals also exist in other areas of trade 
union activity and flow from the socio-economic bases of the market system. It 
seems possible to conceive them as merely 'contrary' but not as contradictory 
opposites, which may be reconciled in a particular case32 • 
3 Other representation of the consumer's interest 
8 In addition to the general bodies of consumer representation, there are in the 
Federal Republic of Germany numerous bodies representing special consumer 
interests. These are for example: 
(aa) The Organisation of tenants which will not be described here, because the 
real property market is not a subject of our study. 
(bb) A Special body representing consumer interests in the area of instruction 
and courses is the Aktion Bildungsinformation in Stuttgart. lt represents the 
interests of students, particularly in correspondence courses, andin this respect 
has exerted an influence on statutory provisions (Nos. 258ff) and prosecutes 
violations of the law by way ofthe collective action 33 • 
(cc) The associations of motorists, specifically the Allgemeiner Deutscher 
Automobilclub (ADAC) (General German Automobile Club) and the Auto-
mobilclub von Deutschland (AvD) (Automobile Club of Germany), also see 
themselves as consumer organisations so far as the interests of motorists are 
concerned. They exercise an influence on manufacturers, e.g. in car produc-
tion, testing, safety regulations and the like, and cooperate in the drafting of 
contracts for the sale or repair of motor cars (No. 309). On an increasing scale 
they also deal with complaints and conciliation matters (No. 367). However, 
they may be termed consumer associations in a very special sector only and 
apart from that see themselves as advocates of motorisation, as the 'lobby of 
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motorists', so to speak. This activity may clash with other consumer interests, 
e.g. in speed Jimits, safety cars, environmental protection and the like. That is 
why we can speak of consumer organisation to a very limited extent only. Also, 
they do not institute collective actions. 
4 Problems of self-organisation of consumers 
9 On the whole, the dilemma of consumer organisation in the Federal Republic 
of Germany is rightly pointed out in the sociological discussion. One reason is 
that consumer representation is largely determined by organisations on the basis 
of representation and in the theoretical sense of democracy is not assigned 
genuinely to articulate the consumer's interests. Here consumer interests are 
often equated with the interests of associations and functionaries. On the other 
hand, attempts at a self-organisation of consumers have so far ended in failure 
or because of the risk of failure have not been made at all. Exceptions are local 
consumer associations and spontaneous consumer initiatives33•. 
So far, there has been no way to get out of this dilemma, even if various initia-
tives in this direction are under discussion. Accordingly, Czerwonka, among 
others, suggests34 a policy of 'selective stimuli' to promote self-articulation of 
consumer interests, e.g. by providing shopping tips, assistance in law enforce-
ment, and the like. Biervert 35 , among others, argues for a model of self-
organisation enabling consumers to take part in the decision-making process, 
which by way of discussion will develop and articulate consumers' needs and 
demands. The AGBG (No. 294) also provides that associations with more than 
75 individual members may institute a collective action andin this regard calls 
on consumers to organise of their own accord. There is litt Je practical experience 
with all these proposals as yet. 
IV CONSUMER POLICY AS A GOVERNMENTAL ISSUE 
1 Consumer-policy programmes 
10 In the course of the discussion about consumer policy in the industrial states, 
but at the latest since President Kennedy's weil known State of the Union 
message in 196236 , consumer policy has also been considered a governmental 
issue of the utmost importance in the Federal Republic. In concrete terms this 
manifests itself in that the Federal Government, since the so-called coalition of 
Social Democrats and Liberals has come into power, has initiated a batch of 
measures and summarised them in two Consumer Reports of 1971 37 and 197538• 
(aa) The Consumer Report of 1971 makes some critical comments on the posi-
tion of the consumer, especially in view of the advanced concentration of enter-
prises. The consumer's market position will be improved by governmental 
measures enabling him to make better use of his chances. 
The Consumer Report of 1975 demands that the consumer be active and that 
freedom of consumption and contract be protected. The following objects of 
consumer policy are mentioned: 
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-strengthening of the consumer's position on the market through the main-
tenance and promotion of workable competition in all sectors of the 
economy; 
- information and advice to the consumer on basic economic connections, 
current market tendencies, proper market behaviour and economical 
house keeping; 
- improvement of the consumer's legal position and protection of the con-
sumer against deception, unfair sales practices and contract terms which 
are unreasonably prejudicial to him; 
- safeguarding the supply of foodstuffs which are optimal in terms of 
quality and quantity, at the best possible prices; 
- comprehensive protection of the consumer against risks to his health and 
an environmentally acceptable design of production and products; 
- best possible supply of the customer with public services; 
- safeguarding the supply of low-cost housing with optimum town planning 
conditions being taken into account; 
- strengthening and streamlining of the bodies protecting interests in terms 
of consumer policy and safeguarding the consumer's interest in the case of 
quality labelling and standardisation. 
The analysis of the text reveals three central elements in the area of legal 
consumer policy: competitive policy, informative policy and protective policy39• 
In addition, other highly heterogenous objectives are mentioned which have 
only little to do with consumer policy proper, but concern economic, social and 
other policies. 
(bb) The parties and political organisations have also submitted lists of con-
sumer policy objectives and measures which differ depending on the extent to 
which the market is relied upon to secure the consumer's freedom of choice or 
on whether policies of intervention are needed to enforce the consumer's inter-
ests. We shall not go into details here, but refer to the documentation presented 
by Czerwonka-Schöppe4o. 
(cc) So far, governmental consumer policy has hardly been reflected in the 
establishment of institutions. There is no central political authority in charge 
of consumer policy, but the ministries concerned in each case also deal with 
consumer policy which often has to be coordinated with other interests. The 
Ministry of Justice, for instance, is responsible for matters of unfair competi-
tion, advertising, unfair contract terms, consumer credit and law enforcement, 
unless special products or services (drugs, foodstuffs and correspondence 
course contracts) are concerned, which again belong to other departments. The 
Ministry of Economics deals primarily with antitrust law and consumer infor-
mation. The Ministry of Agriculture is in charge of the law of foodstuffs. The 
Ministry of Health deals with the law of drugs and related areas, e.g. advertising 
of cigarettes and cosmetics. The Ministry of Culture and Education centrally 
coordinates correspondence courses. The confusion over the division ofrespon-
sibilities not only creates problems of coordination which are to be solved 
through appropriate horizontal 'inter-ministerial consumer committees', but 
also results in noticeable deficiencies in policy. 
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Generally speaking, the Ministry of Economics in the German Federal and 
Länder Governments is regarded as being the primary institution responsible 
for consumer policy. As regards the machinery, this is underlined by the fact 
that one official from each, responsible for consumer affairs, is appointed at 
the ministry. So-called Consumer Advisory Counci/s (Verbraucherbeiräte) con-
stitute a sort of information representation of the institutions (Nos. 6ff) and 
competent scientists participating in consumer activities. The advisory councils 
attached to the Federal and some German Länder Governments make recom-
mendations and comment on general consumer policy problems and projects 
(e.g. in legislation). These recommendations are not in any way binding upon 
the ministries as may be demonstrated, for instance, by the example of the 
reform of the price recommendation law (No. 28): the consumer advisory 
council attached to the Federal Minister of Economics has for some time 
requested that this instrument be abolished, while the Minister of Economics 
has been speaking up vehemently for its retention. A further drawback of con-
sumer advisory councils is that they Jack both a formal legal basis and indepen-
dence. The minister concerned has a completely free hand to appoint the council's 
members and to determine the organisation of their work; the consumer 
organisations' right to propose members has to be taken into account only 
indirectly. 
2 Critical evaluation of present consumer policy - the need for alternative 
conceptions 
11 The consumer policy outlined above is based on the so-called market 
paradigm. According to that policy the market, while having tobe protected 
against defects and dysfunctions, is basically a workable instrument to safe-
guard the consumer's interest in an optimum way. In this respect consumer 
policy conforms to market principles41 ; it continues tobe protection in response 
to social grievances, as Biervert has set forth 42 • As far as that goes it will meet 
with a wide consensus, as it does not change anything in the economic system 
and ultimately also serves the true interests of suppliers43 • 
On an ever-increasing scale, however, the question is raised as to whether the 
restriction of consumer policy to competitive, informative and protective 
policies suffices in view of accelerated concentration ratios, a communication 
structure which continues tobe unilateral, the continued dispersion of the con-
sumer, and the like. This becomes very clear, for instance, in the discussion 
about advertising law (Nos. 92ff). Furthermore, it is questioned whether con-
sumer policy measures, particularly in the area of informative and protective 
policies, achieve their objectives in the first place, especially as regards the 
socially disadvantaged groups of consumers. If politicians, legislators and 
judges base their considerations on the prudent consumer, who in a particular 
case may also need protection (although the real situation is quite different), 
consumer policy encounters problems as regards its legitimisation. This calls 
for a consumer policy which is more of a market-regulating type44 and for an 
attempt to subject certain consequences of the market mechanism to stricter 
control in the interest of the consumer and to mobilise a countervailing power 
by consumers. Others speak of the need for a 'consumer policy which tries to 
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influence the consumer at an early stage', which means the attempt to Jet con-
sumers as a collective share as early as possible in the decision-making processes 
of industry45 , e.g. in the area of advertising control (Nos. l 19ff), standard form 
contract conditions (No. 309), standardisation (Nos. 133, 161), and law 
enforcement (Nos. 366ff). However, these tendencies are still in a state of flux. 
The constitutional legitimacy of such a market-correcting consumer policy 
flows from the idea oj the weljare state (Sozialstaat) as laid down in the Basic 
Law46 • It accords the state a wide scope of intervention and the socially relevant 
groups a wide scope of action which may weil collide with the market positions 
held by suppliers. Such collision must be weighed within the framework of the 
principle of reasonableness 47 on the basis of the so-called basic rights of the 
enterprises concerned in each case. The question becomes more pressing in 
connection with restrictions on advertising (Nos. lOOff). 
V PRINCIPAL DIRECTIONS OF CONSUMER LEGISLATION AND 
COURT PRACTICE IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
12 In the following, we shall point out briefly the most important directions in 
which consumer legislation and court practice have gone to develop a separate 
consumer law. The area of consumer education and consumer guidance must be 
disregarded in just the same way as the area of economic advice to the consumer. 
The main items in consumer legislation are competitive policy, informative 
policy and protective policy. Issues of consumer representation and promotion 
of the consumers' countervailing power are hardly tobe found (yet) in legis-
lative programmes. 
1 Competitive policy 
13 Consumer policy in the Federal Republic of Germany is based on the unad-
mitted premise that the maintenance and promotion of 'workable competition' 
best serves the interest of the consumer48 • Competitive policy in the Federal 
Republic of Germany rests on the two pillars of fight against restraints of trade 
(this is done by the Federal and Regional Cartel Offices) and prevention of 
unfair and misleading competition (this is done by means of the law of unfair 
competition and by supplemental acts). In the law prohibiting restraints of com-
petition, price competition plays a prominent part 49 • Legislative measures, e.g. 
to abolish resale price maintenance, to regulate price recommendations and 
fight abuses of market power, are of direct importance to consumer policy, even 
if antitrust law protects the consumer only indirect/ys0• 
According to German jurists, the law of advertising and trade practices is 
a sub-category of the law of unfair competition which recently, particularly 
through court practice, has incorporated in its system the idea of consumer pro-
tection. However, these systems collide with the traditional protective purposes 
of the law of unfair competition and German jurists have not yet been able to 
come to grips with these collisions for the purposes of consumer protection. 
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The main object continues to be the prevention of 'unfair' degenerated 
competition51 • 
2 Information policy 
14 In the past decade information policy in consumer Iaw has been the subject of 
numerous initiatives and has been an issue specially promoted wi thin the frame-
work of the EC. Its main purpose is to instruct the consumer about the com-
position, safety, value in use, etc., of goods or services as well as about his rights 
and duties. The emphasis here is on public law under which numerous so-called 
marking regulations have been issued. But the idea of information is also tobe 
found in the law of contract and law of torts, and associates with the aims of 
protective policy52 • In the law of advertising first signs pointing to the regulation 
of advertising along the lines of objective consumer information may be noted 
(No. 100). 
3 Protective policy 
15 Protective policy in favour of the consumer certainly accounts for the major 
part of legislative measures during the past decade. Protective policy has two 
objectives: it is designed to protect the individual consumer's economic and 
legal interests, e.g. protect him against harm, secure his contractual freedom, 
enable the enforcement of his rights, and prevent fraud; and at the same time it 
aims at influencing the behaviour of enterprises, which shall offer him only 
harmless products, put on the market high-quality goods or services, draw up 
contracts acceptable to him, instruct him about his rights and provide him with 
means to enforce his rights (with governmental agencies and consumer organi-
sations participating). The comprehensive means of intervention pervade prac-
tically all fields of law. What is striking, though, is that intervention takes place 
merely at certain points, e.g. in the case of certain types of contract, and that it is 
still far from regulating the consumer's interests in a comprehensive way. Even 
where the codification of parts of a consumer law is far advanced, there are few 
implementing regulations which are required in the interest of the consumer, 
e.g. concerning the definition of warning notices in the case of tobacco products 
and consumer goods (No. 55). 
4 Consumer representation 
16 Representation, not taking into account political participation, is not very 
advanced in the consumer Iaw of the Federal Republic of Germany and in 
practice is tobe found only in the design of the collective action in the UWG and 
AGBG (Nos. 118, 293). In other fields of Iaw, e.g. antitrust law, food Iaw, or 
the area of Iaw enforcement, there are no such instruments. Collective rights to 
enforce provisions under antitrust, food or safety laws do not exist either. This 
is a necessary consequence of the principle of consumer representation through 
organisations. In this respect there is a fundamental difference between German 
and American consumer laws. 
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VI THE CONCEPT OF THE CONSUMER IN LA W 
l Different statutory criteria 
17 In the consumer law ofthe Federal Republic ofGermany there is no uniform 
concept oj the consumer53 • This is already due to the blurred definition of the 
consumer's socio-economic function. German statutory provisions on con-
sumer protection, unlike British provisions, do not go on from the concept of 
'acting as consumer', but from other legal features. Often each act relevant to 
consumers obeys its own rules of application which results in considerable gaps. 
The different provisions on the application of the Abzahlungsgesetz (Instalment 
Sales Act) (Art. 8 AbzG), AGBG (Art. 24 AGBG) and of the Gerichtsstand-
novelle of 1974 (Act to Regulate Jurisdiction Clauses) (Art. 38 Zivilpro-
zeßordnung, ZPO, Code of Civil Procedure) may be recalled here. The essence 
of the relative statutory provisions is the legislator's decision to deny the trader 
(Kaufmann) within the frame~ork of his trade (commercial transactions) the 
protection of certain regulations. In this connection distinctions are made as to 
whether or not a trader is registered in the Commercial Register, whether he is a 
'full' or a 'minor' trader, whether other persons, e.g. public corporations, have 
to be treated as traders, to what extent professional men are equivalent to 
traders or rather to consumers, and the like. 
In the law of unfair competition and of price marking the concept of the 
ultimate consumer does exist but is not defined with regard to consumer policy. 
In this context the ultimate consumer is any person who does not 'turnover' 
goods any further; for instance, the craftsman who manufactures a product 
from the goods supplied to him, the minor trader who buys goods in a wholesale 
market for his own requirements, possibly even the big industry manufacturer 
who uses goods in his production process54 • 
Other acts again, for instance the food act, speak of 'household' (Art. 6 1, 
Lebensmittel- und Bedarfsgegenständegesetz (LMBG), Food and Consumer 
Goods Act) and determine the scope of application of food provisions 
accordingly. Finally, special acts regulate the scope of application relative to the 
individual case, for instance in the area of correspondence courses or in the law 
governing travel contracts (Nos. 247ff, 258ff). A participant in a correspon-
dence course or in a tour is for all practical purposes a consumer within the 
meaning of the Act, without being defined as such. 
2 The attempt to arrive at a uniform definition 
18 The extensive legislation relating to consumer law has caused people to con-
sider whether, despite the differences in the statutory concept of the consumer, 
it is possible to arrive at a concept of the consumer which is uniform in principle 
even if there are differences in the way it is applied. Since consumer Jaw is the 
result of certain socio-economic structures and intervention strategies reflecting 
the government's policy, it must also be possible in principle to formulate a 
general concept of the consumer as a basic concept in law. Despite all the differ-
ences in application, there is a core common to all concepts of the consumer in 
law. This core is as fo!lows. 
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(aa) Initially a consumer is a private person or a group of private persons 
striving to renew his or their working capacity through consumption in his or 
their private sphere. Thus there is a fundamental difference between the 
consumer and, for instance, enterprises which are governed by specific• 
economic regulations, e.g. in the field of antitrust law55 • 
(bb) If we talk of a consumer as a private person, we exclude any person who 
carries on a trade or business or supplies professional services. In a particular 
case, a consumer protection act may also be extended to include those activities, 
e.g. for the sake of protecting small and medium-sized firms. 
(cc) The position of a consumer exists if his contracting party is an enterprise 
as defined above, but not if he enters into a contract with another private person, 
i.e. with another consumer, for instance when buying a second-hand car56 • Here 
the socio-economic specifics of the position cf a consumer do not apply. Unlike 
British law, German law does not go as far as that, which may be explained by a 
still insufficient understanding of consumer law. 
(dd) The consumer's concrete need for protection, social status, income, etc„ 
is (still) of no importance to the application of an act of law under the existing 
law: in applying consumer law the rich and the poor are 'equal'. However, pro-
tection may vary in intensity, for instance under the AGBG when the require-
ments of incorporation pursuant to Art. 2 are determined57 • 
(ee) Consumer-law regulations concern the market-related activity of enter-
prises. Problems of internal business organisation, the enterprise/employee 
relationship and similar matters are not covered by consumer law. 
(ff) Government institutions come under consumer law only if they are active 
in a market-related way, e.g. when offering public services in the area of trans-
port and energy. Governmental control functions are subject to consumer law in 
so far as they affect the market-related activity of enterprises, e.g. the control of 
foodstuffs and drugs. 
3 Consumer law as an independent field of law 
19 The extent to which a special law for the consumer, a consumer law, does exist 
is a highly controversial issue in view of the government's active regulative 
activity58 • This question is of importance primarily in the field of legal theory 
and will not be dealt with in greater detail in this study. The extensive analysis of 
legislation and court practice has shown that a field of law has developed here 
which is beyond the reach of the traditional categories of the law. 
The special character of consumer law follows from the socio-economic 
specifics of the consumer's position. Arguments against the specific nature of 
consumer law do not take account of changes in the law which have occurred 
specifically in the past decade. In terms of application, the recognition of a 
special consumer law plays apart where it is a question of fitting the protective 
purpose of new consumer acts into the present law. If the special character of 
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consumer law is denied, legislative measures aiming at consumer protection 
must be subordinated to the general principles of legal construction, e.g. the law 
of standard form contract conditions must be fitted into the general law of con-
tracts59. Conversely, if the special character of consumer law is emphasised, it 
has to be construed in accordance with its protective purpose and not in accor-
dance with the general principles oflegal systematics. Throughout this study, we 
have attempted to demonstrate the special character and protective purpose of 
consumer law and to show the rules of its construction. 
VII SURVEY OF THE METHODS OF CONSUMER PROTECTION 
1 Starting point in the legal system 
20 In this study the methods of consumer protection will be explained and 
described in their factual connections. As regards legal systematics, classifica-
tion into civil-law, criminal-law and administrative-law means of consumer 
protection prevails6o. 
(aa) In the law of the Federal Republic of Germany, civil law occupies a 
prominent position. This is explained by the fact that civil law regulates and 
determines the contractual and non-contractual legal relations between con-
sumers and enterprises on the market. As it here became especially apparent that 
enterprises were guilty of gross abuses in relation to consumers, the need for 
legislative intervention was feit. Generally speaking, the consumer's economic 
and legal interests are directly affected by a transaction relevant to civil law. 
Therefore, it is only natural that civil law should play a prominent part in con-
sumer law. 
Less clear, though, is the part civil law plays where problems are concerned 
which exist prior to the formation of contractual relations, for instance in the 
case of advertising or the use of standard form contract conditions. Here, par-
ticularly in view of the idea of prevention, administrative regulations may be 
more appropriate than civil-law regulations61 . All the same, in the area of unfair 
competition, misleading advertising and unlawful standard form contract 
conditions, German law concedes civil law control mechanisms priority over 
administrative ones. This choice of methods, which is not very convincing from 
the point of view of consumer law, is attributable on the one hand to historical 
and on the other to economic and legal grounds. More recently it has also been 
connected with the promotion of consumer interests by associations on the basis 
of representation and has resulted particularly in the institution of the collective 
action (Nos. 118ff, 293ff). lt may, however, only take up grievances in certain 
cases, but is unable actually to eliminate unfair advertising techniques or illegal 
Standard form contract conditions from the market. 
(bb) Administrative law plays a part in the consumer law of the Federal 
Republic of Germany particularly where it is a matter of fighting against 
behaviour in restraint of trade and of enforcing measures to protect health, 
safety and the design of packaging. The provisions of antitrust law, on the one 
hand, and food law, the law of drugs, technical labour materials law, weights 
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and measures law, etc., on the other hand, are therefore of a public-law nature. 
They forbid or control, in general, practices which from the point ofview ofthe 
consumer's interest are considered harmful or prejudicial. In the interest of the 
consumer they impose certain legal duties on the enterprises concerned, for 
instance regarding the marking of products or proof of effectiveness of a drug. 
The sanctions available under administrative law must, however, be seen on the 
basis of the principle of reasonableness (Verhältnismässigkeit 62) in line with 
which they are to be kept as small as possible, usually being limited to fines for 
administrative offences. Further sanctions (bans on the marketing of products, 
duties to recall products) are viewed with scepticism und er Germ an as compared 
with American law (No. 132). 
(cc) Methods of criminal law in consumer protection, apart from the general 
provisions on fraud, usury and fraudulent conversion, are hardly developed or 
enforced in the law of the Federal Republic of Germany. Unlike the situation 
under French and English laws, criminal law has been almost completely unable 
to shape the discussion about consumer law, so we cannot speak of specific con-
sumer protection by criminal law. In the law of advertising it plays a negligible 
role (No. 125). In the law governing standard form contract conditions no 
criminal sanctions whatsoever exist. Criminal law as the law of petty offences 
merely serves to enforce administrative regulations. 
2 Subjects of law enforcement 
21 Another classification by methods of consumer protection may proceed from 
the subjects able to assert certain rights or enforce certain regulations. Accord-
ing to a preliminary analysis of the existing law, the following degrees of intensity 
may be distinguished which partly coincide with the criteria developed above, 
but are not identical with them: 
(aa) The individual consumer continues to be the most important subject in 
the enforcement of consumer law, particularly as regards contractual relations 
and other relations under the law of obligations. He is also expected actively to 
offer resistance to measures taken by enterprises and to take appropriate steps. 
Here the consumer is presumed in principle to be a citizen versed m 
law - irrespective of his social status, education or knowledge of the law. 
(bb) Consumers' associations have only limited possibilities of enforcing con-
sumer protection, i.e. under the UWG and the AGBG. Officially, they do not 
participate in the institution and implementation of administrative proceedings. 
(cc) State control is to be found within the framework of supervision of 
restrictive trade practices, general supervision of trade and supervision of 
certain branches of trade as weil as in food law and the law of drugs. lt often 
bears on the assertion of rights by individual consumers, particularly under the 
law of torts. 
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(dd) Under development are institutions of self-regulation and self-help in 
certain branches of the economy and a Joint effort by enterprises, consumer 
organisations and the government to achieve certain objectives which are 
important in terms of consumer policy, for instance in advertising, trade prac-
tices, voluntary measures of labelling and product information. In general, an 
indirect effort by the state makes itself feit here, for instance through exemption 
from the operation of antitrust Iaws, through subsidising and financing, and 
through political influence. The methods of self-regulation and participation of 
consumer organisations in such efforts will also be evaluated in detail within the 
scope of this study. 
3 The need for horizontal interlocking of the various methods of 
enforcement 
22 The various methods of enforcing consumer law which still exist side by side 
urgently require horizontal interlocking63• Under the existing law first signs 
pointing in that direction may be noted; for instance, if certain forms of forbid-
den advertising regarding food law are termed unfair within the meaning of the 
UWG, if statutory safety standards give rise to civil liability and terms recom-
mendations become controllable both under antitrust law and the law of 
standard form contracts. Through such horizontal interlocking it seems possible 
to improve the means oflaw enforcement altogether and systematically to make 
allowance for the unity of consumer law. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Consumers and Prices 
1 GENERALITIES 
1 Overall price policy and consumer protection 
23 The price at which goods or services are offered is the most important para-
meter of action to the consumer in addition to quality and safety. The price is an 
indication of whether certain goods can be consumed at all and by whom, an 
indication of how the consumer may shape his various needs and of what 
freedom of action he enjoys in actual fact. To him income and price policy are 
closely connected: any increase in his income in the form of wages, salary, 
pension or benefits will only have a positive effect on his real income unless such 
wage increases are 'eaten up' by increased prices. His interest in the value in use 
(No. 5) of consumer goods relates especially to the pricefactor. 
(aa) These remarks at the same time suggest that determining of the price 
factor in a country's economy is not only a problem of consumer protection, but 
in general concerns the basic principles of the economy. The prob lern of prices 
has been given priority from the point of view of exchange stability and the 
fight against inflation 1• This is also the starting point in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, i.e. in Art. 1 of the Gesetz über Stabilität und Wachstum (GStW) 
(Stability and Economic Growth Act) of 1967 andin Art. 3 of the Währungs-
gesetz (Currency Act) of 1948. Art. 1 GStW runs: 'In their financial and 
economic measures the German Federal and Länder Governments have to take 
into account the requirements of the macroeconomic equilibrium. Measures are 
to be taken in such a way that they, within the framework of the free-market 
system, contemporaneousJy contribute to the stability of the price level, a high 
degree of employment and the balance of payments equilibrium at a steady and 
appropriate economic growth'. This provision shows that price stability forms 
an integral part of the objectives of economic policy towards which the state 
may work through certain measures but which must never be seen as iso/ated 
objectives2 • That is why the consumer's interest in price stability cannot be 
considered the only goal, but must be seen in connection with full employ-
ment, economic growth and the balance of payments equilibrium. lt is also a 
decisive factor that, according to the German legal system, Art. 1 GStW does 
not include an actionable standard with-the aid of which, for instance, an indi-
vidual consumer and consumers 'as a whole' might force the state to pursue 
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a certain price policy. This provision is merely intended tobe an overall enabling 
provision making it possible for the state to pursue the economic policy it 
considers appropriate for its objectives, with the general constitutional limita-
tions to be observed. 
(bb) Art. 3 of the Währungsgesetz, which in particular prohibits price index 
clauses in long-term agreements, additionally backs a policy directed at price 
stability which is also in the interest of the consumer. However, the German 
Bundesbank may grant permission to include such clauses, which deprives the 
provision of some of its effectiveness3 • Furthermore, the courts have developed 
certain clauses escaping the prohibition, for instance for the purpose of adapting 
pension plans to changing economic conditions, which they do not measure 
against Art. 3 of the Währungsgesetz and which in a particular contract permit 
adjustment of the price to allow for inflation4 • 
2 The market and the limit of usury 
24 (aa) In terms of economic policy, the Federal Republic of Germany tries to 
satisfy the public interest and the consumer' s interest in stable prices through a 
consistent competitive po/icy5• Disregarding certain exceptions, the determina-
tion of the price factor is left to the market. Prices determined by the market 
become effective in contracts with final.consumers by way of appropriate agree-
ments. The market principle and freedom of contract supplement each other; 
they are the decisive regulator of price setting and are thus of direct importance 
in terms of consumer policy6• 
(bb) There is a general limit to the principle of the market and freedom of 
contract only under the prohibition of usury, Art. 138, para. 2 Civil Code, 
Art. 302a Penal Code, Art. 4 Wirtschaftsstrafgesetzbuch (Code of Penalties 
for Economic Offences). Tue provisions on usury have also been revised in the 
interest of the consumer by the first Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Wirtschafts-
kriminalität (Act to Fight Economic Criminality) of 19767• Usury exists only if 
two requirements are satisfied, one being of an objective, the other of a subjec-
tive nature. As regards the objective requirement, there must be an obvious 
disproportion between performance and consideration. There are no general 
guidelines, but this obvious disproportion must be established in each incident; 
in the final analysis the courts decide on this matter in line with market condi-
tions8. As regards the subjective requirement, the usurer must have exploited the 
other party's need, carelessness, inexperience or considerable lack of will power. 
Owing to this subjective element, the fact of usury will usually exist in the case 
of marginal groups of society, for instance foreigners, poor consumers, elderly 
people and the like; in this way consumer protection offsetting some of the 
social inequities is possible (No. 4). Attempts at deleting the subjective element 
of usury have not yet become law. The provision on usury under criminal law 
resembles that under civil law and additionally requires intent on the part of the 
usurer. 
All of this shows that the provision on usury does not in actual fact imply any 
restriction of the principle of price determination through the market and 
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through freedom of contract. On the contrary, this provision confirms freedom 
of contract and makes adjustments only in some extreme cases. That is why in 
legal practice the prohibition of usury, except for consumer credit transactions 
(No. 346), plays practically no rote. This is even confirmed by the fact that the 
courts in the case of usury refuse to continue the contract for an appropriate 
consideration, but demand that the contract be completely null and void 9• How-
ever, often it is not at all in the interest of the consumer to have a legal transac-
tion concluded for a higher consideration annulled; rather, the consumer is 
interested in an appropriate reduction ofthe excessive price which is not possible 
under the existing law. 
Consumer protection against excessive prices or price increases overall is 
based on the priority of the market principle and allows state intervention in 
exceptional cases only. This subject will be dealt with below. An accompanying 
factor for the purposes of consumer protection is clarity of price which is 
imposed as a legal obligation on enterprises competing in the market. The pecu-
liarities of supranational price controls, for instance over steel and agricultural 
products by authorities of the EC, will not be dealt with here, although espe-
cially in this area the aspect of consumer protection through a system of 
minimum prices for the sake of the producer is neglected dreadfully. 
II INDIRECT PRICE CONTROL THROUGH ANTITRUST 
LEGISLATION (GWH) 
1 Significance of the GWH in terms of consumer protection 
25 If the state as in the Federal Republic of Germany leaves price determination 
to market forces, it must take subsidiary measures to ensure that workable 
competition is maintained, especially price competition. Any determination of 
the price or of price elements outside the competitive system by means of agree-
ments, business concentration and similarly coordinated action of enterprises 
on the market must be either prohibited by way of appropriate legal instruments 
or checked for abuses. Such is the function of antitrust law which in this respect 
also pursues a protective purpose in terms of consumer policy. For all that, it 
seems worth mentioning that in the discussion about the protective purpose of 
antitrust law consumer protection has not so far been ranked. While people are 
willing to concede that antitrust law pursues an indirect protective purpose for 
the benefit of the consumer, they reject the idea that it has a direct protective 
purpose. As the author has elaborated elsewhere, this opinion seems no longer 
justified, particularly in view of the comprehensive antitrust reform legislation 
of 1973 10• At that time the legislator expressly noted that 'apart from the require-
ment of safeguarding the system of workable competition, priority had to be 
given to the promotion of competitive activities to restore economic stability 
and improve consumer protection' 11 • Likewise, individual provisions of the 
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB) (Act Prohibiting Restraints 
of Competition) reveal that consumer protection has become a prime objective 
of antitrust law. 
23 
The significance in terms of consumer policy of antitrust legislation with 
regard to the control of the price factor in the market manifests itself in the 
following directions. 
2 Prohibition of price agreements 
26 (aa) Pursuant to its basic regulation in Art. 1 GWB, antitrust law prohibits 
specifically price cartels, price agreements, quota agreements, competitive 
bidding and the like. Enterprises competing in the market are forbidden to make 
agreements concerning the price factor and thus to exclude or limit price 
competition in relation to the consumer. With some qualifications, this is also 
understood as a principle concerning variants of price competition, for instance 
discount competition (Art. 3 GWB), with the Rabattgesetz (Discount Act) in 
this case limiting the announcement of discounts to final consumers 12 • So-called 
cartels designed to secure uniform rationalisation, and marketing cartels 
designed to bring about a common price policy among competing enterprises 
are subject to strict regulations pursuant to Art. 5, para~. 2 and 3 GWB, and 
practically do not occur in relation to final consumers. 
(bb) The strict handling of the prohibition of horizontal restriction of price 
competition has even been extended through the Kartellnovelle (Amendment to 
the Antitrust Law) of 1973 and through court practice. Here we can mention 
only a few key words. The revised Art. 25, para. 1 also prohibits coordinated 
action in restraint of trade13 • The Amendment was occasioned by a ruling of the 
Federal High Court in the so-called coal tar cases, which did not submit coordi-
nated price increases by enterprises to the ban on cartels 14 • There continues tobe 
great uncertainty, though, about what exactly is coordinated action in antitrust 
law 15 , for instance in connection with the simultaneous price increases by car 
manufacturers agitating the German public quite regularly every spring. Since 
coordinated action requires a minimum of coordination, which reportedly does 
not exist in what are known as oligopoly situations, because the alleged 'market 
pressure' forces oligopolists to act in parallel, the prohibition is virtually ineffec-
tive in practice. Even recently such procedures by the Federal Cartel Office have 
not become known or have been unsuccessful. 
(cc) Other cases of indirect agreements among competing enterprises concern-
ing the price factor are so-called sales organisations which are under no obliga-
tion to sell exclusively through the organisation and so-called price information 
systems. A characteristic feature of these institutions is that, without a formal 
price agreement, it is possible to achieve, either by agreement to the effect that 
products will be sold exclusively through the sales organisation or by disclosure 
of the price to competitors, that all enterprises de facto offer their products at 
the same price, specifically if they form an oligopoly. The German courts have 
meanwhile subjected such institutions to the ban on cartels or the prohibition 
of coordinated action 16 • They have come to advocate principles similar to 
those advocated by the European Court of Justice under the European law of 
competition. 
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3 Vertical price fixing 
27 What is known as vertica1 price fixing, especia11y resale price maintenance, is 
prohibited pursuant to Art. 15 GWB. The most important result in terms of 
consumer policy of the Kartellnovelle of 1973 is the abrogation of resale price 
maintenance; only price fixing concerning books and published material is 
allowed 17 . This is to render possible the marketing of the same product at 
different prices, the consumer then being able, depending on his level of infor-
mation and his preferences, to select the offer most favourable to him. 
Price fixing concerning books and published material, which continues to 
exist, is quite a controversial issue In consumer policy18 . On the one hand, 
numerous circumventions and abuses are recorded, for instance through split 
prices, price cutting, different make-ups of an essentially identical product 
which already render price fixing almost meaningless and make the situation 
on the market for published material intricate for the consumer. On the other 
hand, consumer buying organisations structured like cooperatives have striven 
to pass on to consumers the high booksellers' discounts, but ha ve been prevented 
from doing so by publishers refusing to supply them, measures to which no 
objections were raised. lt is still unresolved whether in the course of the forth-
coming reform of antitrust law this legal situation will be changed. lt is to be 
expected, though, that the legislator for the sake of protecting the book trade 
will retain price fixing for books19 . 
4 Price recommendations 
28 The Kartellnovelle of 1973 revised the law of price recommendations. The 
new Art. 38a allows price recommendations only in the case of branded goods if 
such recommendations admit price competition, reflect fair market prices and 
are expressly marked as being non-binding. To prevent abuses in connection 
with price recommendations, the Act provides the Federal Cartel Office with 
certain powers to take action. Within the scope of its supervision to prevent 
abuses, the Federal Cartel Office has prohibited some price recommendations in 
a great number of cases, because they have resulted in overcharging or deception 
(Art. 38a, para. 3, items 1 and 3 GWB). However, the requirements of proof 
present difficulties in practice20 . 
In consumer policy price recommendations continue tobe a matter of argu-
ment21. In this connection two forms are cha11enged by consumers as being of a 
price-fixing nature: what is known as market price recommendation, and price 
recommendations within the framework of selective distribution. The market 
price recommendation (Handelspreisempfehlung) is not intended for the final 
consumer, but for the dealer22 . According to experience, dealers use it as a 
substitute for price fixing, especially if they deal in a !arge variety of goods. 
Thereis no reason why the dealer should deviate from the producer's price recom-
mendation, unless there is considerable competitive pressure which influences 
the consumer's preferences. In actual fact, the result achieved is the same as in 
the case of price fixing. An additional factor is that a price recommendation of 
that sort need not be disclosed to the consumer. In the case of so-called selective 
distribution, i.e. distribution being limited to a number of specialist dealers or 
25 
authorised dealers, for instance in the area of the motor-car market, price 
recommendations result in the producer's price ideas being kept to by the dealer 
in his own interest. Here price recommendation also actually implies price 
fixing23 • 
That is why consumer organisations, the Consumer Advisory Council 
attached to the Federal Economics Minister, and trade unions have demanded 
that price recommendations be prohibited altogether24 • In its report on price 
recommendations, which was submitted to the public in August 1977, the 
Federal Government could not as yet bring itself to take a decision as far-
reaching as that25 • Rath er, it considered price recommendations including those 
of market prices and recommendation~ in connection with selective distribution 
tobe a traders' means of rationalisation not tobe dispensed with. Here consumer 
interests are discriminated against in favour of trade interests. In its bill on a 
Fourth Kartellnovelle, which was submitted in 1978, the Federal Government 
intends merely to tighten the control of abusive practices regarding price recom-
mendations, while retaining the price recommendations26 • The bill (No. 29) has 
been enacted by Parliament. 
5 Abusive prices by market-dominating enterprises 
29 lt has been a matter of intense discussion under antitrust law whether the 
Federal Cartel Office may prohibit market-dominating enterprises from fixing 
abusive prices and is thus allowed to fix price ceilings on them. The legal basis is 
Art. 22 GWB. Pursuant thereto, market-dominating enterprises are subject to 
supervision to prevent abuses. In the meantime it has been established by the 
highest court that supervision may also relate to prices, so that the Federal 
Cartel Office may prohibit a market-dominating enterprise from asking 
improperly excessive prices27 • 
(aa) The interpretation of Art. 22 GWB continues to be highly controversial 
and its complexity can only be touched upon here. To begin with, the problem is 
how market domination (Marktbeherrschung) by an enterprise or several enter-
prises can be ascertained in the first place. To that end it has first of all to be 
established in which relevant market, in terms of product, time and region, the 
enterprise concerned occupies a market-dominating position. The courts deter-
mine the relevant market on the basis of the demand structure28 : hence, the 
market is determined by the needs of the opposite end of the market, and conse-
quently, in markets relevant to consumers, by the needs of consumers. For this, 
various tests have been developed, for instance in the case of drugs where 
subjective prescribing habits of doctors29 and the range of indication of certain 
products were considered to be decisive30• An enterprise occupies a market-
dominating position only if in a certain market it is either not exposed to signi-
ficant competition or has dominant market power. According to the courts, 
significant competition may also exist if there is no price competition31 • 
Dominant market power is determined by the range of market conduct which 
flows in particular from market shares. However, according to court practice, 
market shares cannot be considered separately, but competitive conditions have 
to be taken into account. If, for instance, quantitative market shares decline 
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while the market share in terms of sales of the enterprise concerned remains 
essentially the same, because of a high-price policy made possible by an atypical 
market structure, the courts do not consider this to be dominant market 
power 32 • On the other hand, the Federal High Court assumed dominant market 
power in the case of Valium-Librium if the products of the enterprise concerned 
accounted for about half the total market share of such products and if also for 
other reasons the enterprise exercised controlling influence over the market 33 • 
(bb) Finally, it has tobe examined in what way market-dominating enterprises 
abuse their position on the market. The Act does not define in detail what 
constitutes an abuse34; however, abuses may be taken up by the Cartel Office in 
the case of excessive prices. Meanwhile, it has become established practice to 
ascertain abusive prices by comparing them with prices on rejerence markets35 • 
We must distinguish between reference mar kets in terms of time and of region. 
The time reference market test establishes the limit of abuse by comparing the 
old price with the new one. lt is therefore appiicable mainly to theprice increases 
of market-dominating enterprises. However, this procedure has been widely 
criticised and has not so far been confirmed by the highest court 36 • 
The regional reference market test is applied more often. The price charged 
by a market-dominating enterprise is compared with prices on other markets 
characterised by significant competition or with prices charged by other com-
petitive enterprises. In so far as the markets are comparable, it is possible 
to establish a so-called competition-induced price. Foreign markets may also 
be included in the comparison 37 • However, the Federal High Court has made 
it clear that only structural and not business-induced factors may be included 
in the determination of the competition-induced price; in a particular case 
delimitation is extremely difficult and renders price control under antitrust law 
practically impossible38 • If the competition-induced price has been so deter-
mined, this does not, according to a recent ruling by the Federal High Court, 
mean that exceeding such a price constitutes an abuse. Only if such a price is 
exceeded in an excessive way is an abuse deemed to exist39• When this is the case 
can only be decided in particular instances. Moreover, enterprises are free to 
decide in which way they will submit to a possible price ceiling order by the 
antitrust authorities40 • The Kartellnovelle of 1980 (BGBI I 458) in Art. 22, 
pa,ra. 4, sentence 2 lists examples of abusive prices with regard to court practice. 
In item 2 the price asked by a market-dominating enterprise is considered to be 
abusive if it deviates from that which would most likely result in the event of 
workable competition. Here special attention must be paid to the behaviour of 
an enterprise on reference markets where there is workable competition. Thus 
the 'reference market concept' has been laid down by statute. The decisive 
difference compared with court practice is that the price need not be exceeded 
excessively any more; as demanded by the Federal Cartel Office a merely 
'noticeable' (spürbar) exceeding of the price is sufficient40•. ltem 3 concerns 
instances of price discrimination which have so far been taken up very little in 
relation to consumers; for example, those known to occur in the case of split 
distribution (where goods or services sold through various channels of trade at 
ultimately different prices) or in the case of regional markets forming part of a 
!arger market (e.g. petrol at motorway service stations being much more 
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expensive than at neighbouring service stations off the motorway). However, an 
abuse is deemed to exist only if the market-dominating enterprise is unable to 
give factual reasons in justification of discrimination. (For example, motorway 
service stations have different hours of opening and consequently different 
overheads, but also higher sales; that might justify a higher average price.) The 
newly formulated facts constituting an abuse do not make it clear as to how far a 
market-dominating enterprise may be said to be guilty of abuse in cases of 
discrimination because of different marketing systems. 
(cc) The brief survey of the practice of price control over market-dominating 
enterprises clearly shows that this instrument is not a genuine corrective of the 
price behaviour of powerful enterprises. This is also revealed by statements 
made by the courts that control over abusive prices charged by market-domi-
nating enterprises was not intended as control over their conduct in general41 • 
The requirements of proof for the purpose of applying the law are so high that 
the antitrust authorities have not so far succeeded in proving abusive prices42 • 
That is why the antitrust authorities have refrained from further procedures to 
fight such prices. An additional factor is that, even if a price ceiling order has 
been issued, the enterprise involved is by no means compelled to reduce its prices 
immediately: by appealing against the order it may prevent the order from 
taking effect and thus may secure itself monopoly profits for some years. Under 
the existing law, the retroactive skimming off of such profits was not possible, 
but is included in legislation in Art. 37b of the Fourth Kartellnovelle43 • 
The fight against abusive prices charged by market-dominating enterprises 
continues to be a central issue of consumer policy which apparently can be 
solved only through a comprehensive law reform. Two measures in particular 
are under discussion: an obligation on market-dominating enterprises to notify 
price increases, and a duty of enterprises to disclose their price calculation 44 • As 
yet, both proposals have little chance of becoming law. lt must be assumed that 
under the existing law in the Federal Republic of Germany there is a consider-
able gap of protection concerning market-dominating enterprises and their 
price policy. 
6 Problems of law enforcement 
30 The enforcement of the antitrust regulations described above is incumbent 
upon the Federal Cartel Office. Available to the Office are in particular two 
types of sanction: an administrative sanction (prohibition of a price cartel or of 
coordinated action pursuant to Art. 37a GWB; prohibition of abusive prices 
from a certain ceiling, Art. 22, para. 5 GWB45) and measures under the law of 
criminal offences pursuant to Art. 38 GWB (fines in connection with a price 
agreement and an illegal price recommendation, etc.)46 • Civil-lawsanctions, for 
instance by an action for damages for price fixing as may be imposed under US 
antitrust law (treble damage suit)47 , do not exist in German antitrust law48 • 
Generally speaking, consumers and their organisations participate neither 
indirectly nor directly in the various types of sanction. While they may suggest 
to the Federal Cartel Office that a certain conduct which is contrary to antitrust 
law be taken up, they do not enjoy a formal right to apply nor a right to participate 
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or be heard. However, pursuant to Art. 51 GWB, the Federal Cartel Office has 
occasionally granted consumer organisations a hearing49 • Contrary to the law of 
unfair competition and standard form contract conditions (Nos. 118, 293), 
consumer organisations do not enjoy any right either of action for a cease and 
desist order or for damages in connection with price conduct of enterprises 
which is contrary to antitrust law. Pursuant to Art. 35 G WB, consumers have 
no right to bring individual actions and consumer organisations have no right to 
bring collective actions 50 • This goes to show how weak the consumer's position is 
regarding abusive prices on the market. So far the consumer has benefited from 
the protective system of antitrust law only indirectly, although consumer 
protection is one of the purposes of antitrust law. 
The Federal Government is hopeful that law enforcement will be improved by 
two measures: an amendment of Art. 35 para. 2 GWB is to ensure that in the 
case of an inappealable price ceiling order issued by the Federal Cartel Office the 
party injured may charge the tortfeasor, i.e. the market-dominating enterprise, 
for the damage 51 • An amendment of Art. 63 GWB is to ensure that the appeal 
against a price ceiling order pursuant to Art. 22, para. 5 has no suspensory 
effect because in the past it was understood as a principle that if a complaint was 
made the market-dominating enterprise could continue asking its challenged 
prices unpunished, since the courts considered the complaint to have a suspen-
sory effect 52 • 
The Kartellnovelle of 1980 has rejected a new wording of Art. 63, i.e. a 
complaint against a price ceiling order usually has a suspensory effect. The 
extended right to claim damages for the time between the service of a (price 
ceiling) order and the latter's incontestability in Art. 35, para. 2 GWB new 
version, shall also be for the benefit of consumers 52a; however, the amendment 
does not provide for a collective action of consumer associations. In addition, 
the cartel authority may skim off excess proceeds, Art. 37b GWB, unless the 
damage has already been made good. Either form of improvement of law 
enforcement is effective only if the Federal Cartel Office is able to prove that the 
market-dominating enterprise charges abusive prices; since it has not so far 
succeeded in proving that, the reforms should for the time being exist only on 
paper. 
III DIRECT PRICE INTERVENTION BY THE ST ATE 
1 Significance of the Preisgesetz (Price Act) of 1948/52 
31 As already described above, fixing or even only supervision by the state of 
prices or price increases is the exception and not the rule under existing commer-
cial law in the Federal Republic of Germany. Neither have the trends towards 
increased consumer protection in recent years altered this state of affairs. Only 
in those areas where the market principle is officially considered to be impos-
sible or not to work sufficiently, that is to say, in those areas which antitrust 
legislation terms 'exceptional sectors' (agriculture, transport, guided energy, 
and in a certain way also banks and insurance companies), is there state inter-
vention in the price. 
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To begin with, it should be noted that the Preisgesetz of 10 April 1948/7 
January 1952, which is still in force, has created a general enabling provision 
regarding price control by the state. Art. 2 of the Preisgesetz reads: 'The 
authorities responsible for price control may issue orders and instructions under 
which prices, rents, charges and other considerations in respect of all goods and 
services, with the exception of wages, are established or approved or with the aid 
of which the price level is to be maintained'. 
The scope of application of the very far-reaching enabling provision under 
the Preisgesetz has, however, been reduced considerably by a ruling of the 
Federal Constitutional Court53 • We must note that the Federal Constitutional 
Court has inferred from the enabling provision included in Art. 80 Basic Law 
that price control is possible only with a view to price-stabilising measures. 
Accordingly, price orders may be issued only to ward off serious disturbances of 
the overall price level. An active economic poiicy transforming the price and 
market structure cannot be pursued on the basis of the enabling provision in 
Art. 2 Preisgesetz. Thus, considerable restrictions on an active consumer policy 
with respect to prices have been imposed. 
In current practice, the Preisgesetz plays hardly any role. Direct price con-
trolling measures, be it in the form of price orders, individual price decrees or 
price ceiling orders, have seldom been issued under the Preisgesetz for the past 
twenty years. The Federal Republic does not intend either to use the enabling 
provision under the Preisgesetz, for instance to fight inflation or to pursue an 
active consumer policy. Regulations on discounts in the book trade regarding 
omnibus orders for school books have been declared to be unconstitutional by 
the Federal Constitutional Court with reference to the limired scope of the 
enabling provision under the Preisgesetzs3a. 
Further enabling provisions on price formation are included in what are 
known as laws to ensure the functfoning of the economy in an emergency. They 
will not be dealt with here as they do not relate to measures in terms of consumer 
policy, but to measures to meet an emergency in which consumer policy in any 
case plays a minor role54 • 
2 Control of price elements in standard form contracts 
32 Certain indirect price controls are found in the AGBG. Pursuant to Art. 11, 
item l of the AGBG (No. 268), in standard form contracts, clauses in regard to 
non-traders (final consumers) providing for price increases regarding goods or 
services to be delivered or performed within four months of the conclusion of 
the contract are forbidden. This is to ensure that the customer who has been 
promised a certain price under the contract is not after a short while saddled 
with an increase. However, this prohibitory regulation applies only on two 
restrictive conditions: it does not include price increases if the commodity or 
service is to be delivered or performed only four months after the conclusion of 
the contract55 , and it does not apply if no fixed date has been stipulated in the 
contract and the entrepreneur reserves the right to fix the price56 • Furthermore, 
it is a controversial issue whether the prohibition of price increases applies if in 
the meantime certain price elements as, for instance, value added tax, have been 
increased; there is no uniform court practice so far. In two rulings by the 
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regional court of Cologne57v. the Central Association of the Motor Car Trade 
and the regional court of Frankfurt 58v. the Association of the German Car 
Industry and the Association of Car Importers it has been decided that a clause 
providing for the passing on of the increase in value added tax effective 1 
January 1978 infringes Art. 11, item 1 AGBG and therefore must not be recom-
mended for use in standard form contracts. The rulings are definitely to be 
welcomed from the point of view of the consumer's interest and the legislative 
objective. They have been approved by the Federal High Court 58•. Moreover, 
Art. 8 of the AGBG makes it clear that the law of standard form contract condi-
tions does not allow the control of prices or price elements. 
3 Price control over the energy market 
33 (aa) On the energy market, the price of electricity is controlled. Pursuant to a 
Price Freeze Order of 1936, which continues in force in connection with Art. 7 
of the Energiegesetz (Energy Act) of 1935/ 1961, increases in electricity prices 
require the approval of a supervisory authority59 • In this connection various rate 
categories are distinguished. Hcmsehold rates, which generally relate to house-
holds of private final consumers, are subject to approval both as regards the 
base price and the supply price. In the case of farms and industrial consumers, 
only supply prices are controlled. So-called special rates allowed to bulk 
consumers are not subject to any approval. An amendment of the Bundestarif-
ordnung Elektrizität (Federal Rate Scale for Electricity) of 30 January 1980 
(BGBl I 122) has brought about several structural changes in the system of rate 
scales for the purpose of energy conservation. Art. 12a provides for a power to 
the competent authority to approve increases in rates. Approval is made contin-
gent upon the cost and revenue situation of the public utility concerned and 
upon the requirements of as safe and low-cost an electricity supply as possible. 
With respect to household rates, the different rate categories are retained, with 
the consumer automatically being conceded invoicing at most favourable rates. 
Art. 3a introduces a so-called linear factor into the rate for household bulk 
consumers which in the past had been characterised by a degressive factor 
(inviting waste of energy). That is to introduce into the rate system not only 
the consumer's interest in low-price electricity, but also in the conservation of 
energy. 
(bb) Another subject of discussion is whether in addition to official price 
control supervision to prevent abuses under antitrust law is possible according 
to principles similar to those described above in the case in Art. 22 GWB60 • 
Art. 104a G WB has made it clear that energy supply companies are also subject 
to the general prohibition of abuse and discrimination as regards the shaping 
of their rates. The antitrust powers are ofimportance, though, only concerning 
special consumers (described as industrial bulk consumers, government agen-
cies, etc.) where the free shaping of rates, i.e. practically the unilateral fixing of 
rates by electricity supply companies, is possible, but not concerning private 
final consumers. Because of the concept of the consumer used here, we shall not 
go into further details (No. 18). 
Other sources of energy are basically subject to price formation by the market 
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andin the case of abuses merely come under antitrust regulations. This applies 
both to gas and long-distance heat and to petroleum products (gasoline, fuel 
oil)61 • With respect to petroleum products, an enabling provision exists covering 
price regulation in an emergency62. 
4 Transport 
34 By Art. 99 GWB, transport services have largely been exempted from anti-
trust law. Here rates and prices are fixed by means of official orders. Particu-
larly relevant to the consumer are the provisions of the Personenbeförder-
ungsgesetz (Carriage of Passengers Act) which in Arts. 39, 45 and 51 provides 
for official price control in the case of regular transport services, bus services 
and taxis63 • Specifically, the provisions of the Personenbeförderungsgesetz 
imply that increases in rates must be submitted to the supervisory authority for 
approval. In the control procedure, allowance is made not only for consumer 
interests in being charged reasonable prices, but also for the interests of the 
enterprises concerned in being able reasonably to cover their costs. There is thus 
a conflict of interests which has not yet been resolved, but has additionally been 
aggravated by the deficits in public local transport. 
Further provisions on the approval of rates exist in long-distance goods 
traffic inclusive of removals, air traffic and inland navigation64 • Rates in long-
distance goods traffic are shaped with regard to the German Federal Railways 
and serve less consumer protection than the public interest in the continued exis-
tence ofthe German Federal Railways. We shall not go into further details here. 
5 Banks, savings banks 
35 Banks and savings banks may basically shape charges for their services 
according to their discretion. Although pursuant to Art. 102 GWB credit 
institutions are largely exempted from the ban on cartels, they are no Jonger 
subject to official control as regards the formation of their 'prices'. However, 
abuses may be prosecuted by antitrust authorities. In detail the following cases 
may be distinguished. 
As far as credit institutions grant consumers loans, they may shape the debtor 
interest rate under the general law of credit; this matter will be dealt with below 
in connection with consumer credit (No. 345). 
The credit interest payable by banks and savings banks to consumers as 
depositors of savings and the like is in theory determined by the laws of competi-
tion, but in practice by the German Bundesbank's current discount rates in 
connection with the pertinent recommendations of the associations of banks 
and savings banks. The very practice of the top organs of banks and savings 
banks of recommending certain so-called credit interest rates to the institutions 
associated with them has called the Federal Cartel Office into action, which 
presumes an abuse of the exemption under antitrust law65 • However, the Federal 
Cartel Office was unable to carry its legal point, because either agreement with 
the Federal Banking Supervisory Office concerned, required pursuant to 
Art. 102 GWB, could not be reached or abuse pursuant to Art. 104 GWB could 
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not be proved66 • The top organisations of banks 'voluntarily' gave up credit 
interest recommendations; in practice there is, of course, no competition. Con-
certed action to keep the interest rates down could not be proved by the Federal 
Cartel Office in proceedings brought against the major banks in 1979. 
Bank charges for other services, for instance account keeping, bookkeeping 
transactions, administration of deposited items and the like, are in theory like-
wise subject to free agreement and the market principle67 , but in practice were 
initially determined by pertinent recommendations of the central associations. 
Here also the question arose as to whether or not such recommendations consti-
tute an abuse within the meaning of Art. 102 GWB. In response to the Federal 
Cartel Office's remonstrances, banks and savings banks, in shaping their 
charges, have discarded the practice of recommendations by their associations, 
so that theoretically the customer is in a position to choose the bank offering the 
services he desires on the most favourable terms. However, in practice the 
customer will largely be dependent on the bank as soon as he opens an account 
with it and only very rarely will he be able to change his bank if the cost level 
changes. The Jack of elasticity of demand in this area bars price competition for 
banking services. 
6 lnsurance companies 
36 lnsurance companies are in principle free to shape their rates in the various 
categories of the insurance system; however, they are subject to supervision by 
the Federal Supervisory Office for Insurance Companies as regards their 
business conditions and business programmes. With respect to the majority of 
insurances, Arts. 5, 8 of the Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz (VAG) (Insurance 
Supervision Act) of 1931 provide for approval of the business programme by the 
supervisory authority. This also relates to the structure of charges68 inclusive of 
changes thereto. In approving the business programme, the supervisory 
authority gives consideration not so much to the insured's interest in as reason-
able a rate as possible combined with, for instance, high refunds, but to the 
fact that the level of premiums shall be calculated in such a way that contracts 
can be performed in the long run and the insurance company can get back its 
costs, Art. 8, para. 1, item 2 V AG. Instead of the consumer's interest in closely 
calculated insurance services, the safety requirement is at the centre of the 
supervisory authorities' activity. Combined with an obligation to accord equal 
treatment, 'price competition' in insurance is thus paralysed or concentrates on 
other factors69. 
In the area of motor insurance, Art. 8 of the Pflichtversicherungsgesetz 
(PflichtversG) (Compulsory Insurance Act) of 1965 introduced more far-
reaching official supervision70 • Under Art. 8 a detailed scale of charges of 20 
November 1967 was issued which lays down the principles governing the 
approval of charges in motor insurance. Commissions to insurance agents, 
which in the final analysis are payable by the consumer, are limited in amount to 
11 % for full-time and 5% for part-time agents. Also, the insurance supervisory 
authorities here pursue less consumer protection, but rather protection of those 
already carrying on a business (cf. Art. 8, para. 2 PflichtVersG), combined 
with the requirement for insurance companies tobe able to cover at any time all 
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risks accruing to them und er liability insurance 71 • We shall not go into further 
details of insurance supervision here. 
7 Agriculture 
37 In the area of agriculture, Art. 100 of the GWB and the relevant regulations 
of the EC Treaty provide for exemptions from the ban on cartels. In practice 
producer prices of farm products are not determined by the market mechanism, 
but by the relative market regulations, whether at a supranational or at a 
national level. We shall not go into the details of these very particular and 
complicated regulations here72 • The system of guiding prices created by the 
market regulations governing farm products is to ensure a minimum income to 
producers of farm products within the EC and at the same time prevent a depres-
sion of the price level in consequence of surpluses and imports. From the 
consumer's point of view, this system of intervention is, of course, extremely 
prejudicial, since prices within the EC are kept at an artificially high level. By 
contrast, the system of competition applies to the further processing stages of 
farm products, but is workable in part only because of the fixing of producer 
prices of farm products. 
8 The professional classes 
38 Certain 'professional' services, for instance services rendered by physicians 
and dentists, lawyers, architects, tax consultants and similar professional 
classes, are subject to more far-reaching governmental price regulation. We 
shall not go into details of the various scales of charges here. A characteristic 
feature they all have in common is that they do not safeguard the consumer's 
interest in a competitive structure of services offered at favourable prices, but 
try to ensure adequate revenues to the professional classes in each case. To what 
extent in addition to these scales of charges the general antitrust regulations 
apply, has been a matter of argument in recent years in the commercial law of 
the Federal Republic. Basically, it may be said that the enterprise concept under 
antitrust law by no means exempts liberal professions from the ban on cartels. 
However, antitrust law applies only as far as the scales of charges of the relative 
professions are not applicable73 • For instance, if a certain scale of fees fixes the 
honorarium for a service, as in the case of a lawyer, there is no room for applica-
tion of the ban on cartels. However, if scales of charges fix only the limits within 
which an honorarium may be charged, the ban on cartels remains applicable if a 
certain professional dass by agreement tries to achieve a situation in which only 
the highest rat es are charged in each case. 
9 Reform of the 'exceptional sectors' of the GWB 
39 Price supervision concerning the exceptional sectors (Ausnahmebereiche) 
(Nos. 33-37) of the GWB has for decades been a matter of economic-policy 
dispute, particularly because of the restraints of competition accepted in this 
connection, because of the principle of adequate revenues which is hostile to 
competition (above all, the enterprises concerned are to be enabled to generate 
adequate profits), and because of insufficient supervision by antitrust authori-
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ties and specialised agencies. Consumers ha ve deplored in particular the lack of 
price competition which results in the demand that these exceptional sectors be 
abolished or restrained extensively74 • In its report on the exceptional sectors of 
1975 75, the Federal Government did not share this point of view. lt suggested 
only minor corrections, for instance to stimulate competition (based on substi-
tutes) in the energy sector and to improve cartel supervision. The Fourth Kartell-
novelle76 provides in Art. 103 GWB for a definition of abuses in the area of 
public utilities which does not relate to facts relevant to consumers (No. 33). 
Moreover, it is planned to render cartel supervision, especially in the banking 
and insurance sector, more effective. Any exemption from the ban on cartels 
and the ban on recommendations applies only after notification to the super-
visory authority and after the expiry of a three-month term; supervision to 
prevent abuses continues tobe possible. According to the wording of the Act, it 
is not yet clear whether interest and cost recommendations by bankers' associa-
tions will continue to be possible under the new legislation. 
IV DUTIES TO FURNISH INFORMATION 
40 In the Federal Republic of Germany in recent years the duties of traders and 
services companies to furnish information have been improved in many respects 
in favour of the consumer. Under the present law, these duties exist in two ways: 
firstly, the duty to indicate the price of basically all transactions for goods or 
services which an entrepreneur enters into with final consumers, and secondly, 
the duty to indicate additionally the unit price of certain goods specified by law. 
The legislative purpose of the price-marking obligation, as expressly stated in 
Art. 1, para. 7 of the amended Preisangabenverordnung (Price Marking Order) 
of 10 May 1973, is the enforcement of the principles of clarity and truth in 
pricing77 • The obligation to indicate the unit price under the Eichgesetz (Weights 
and Measures Act) is intended to enable the consumer to compare prices of 
certain products and to provide a clearer view of the market. In detail the 
following can be said regarding statutory regulation. 
1 Obligation to indicate prices to final consumers 
41 (aa) The obligation to indicate the price to final or ultimate consumers under 
the present law results from the Preisangabenverordnung of 10 May 1973 which 
superseded the Order of 18 September 1969. The new Act has been extended to 
include services as weil as goods. The indication of the price must in particular 
include value added tax. In the case of split prices, the final price must be shown 
(in any way), Art. 1, para. 7, sentence 3 of the Preisangabenverordnung. A 
distinction must be made between individual offers and advertising. In the case 
of individual offers in writing, final prices must always be given, but not in the 
case of verbal offers, Art. 7, para. 1, sentence 4 Preisangabenverordnung. 
Prices need not be given in advertisements; if they are used, however, the enter-
prise must state final prices, otherwise the advertisement will be regarded as mis-
leading. According to the Federal High Court's new practice, an obligation to 
indicate the price is also imposed on an entrepreneur if his offers not only 
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contain a general advertisement, but convey willingness to enter into a 
contract77•. This is important with respect to consumer credit (No. 348). In 
addition to prices, as far as this is in line with the dominant view, units of sale 
and of performance as well as grade labels must be given; as far as that goes, 
the Preisangabenverordnung supplements the general marking obligations 
(Nos. 64ff). 
The price marking obligation is placed upon any person who regularly offers 
goods or services to ultimate consumers. In recent years in connection with self-
service supermarkets for retailers (so-called cash and carry markets), the 
question has arisen whether 'ultimate consumers' within the meaning of the 
Preisangabenverordnung includes industria/ consumers who acquire goods to 
meet their requirements outside their business78 ; in this case particularly, V AT 
should not have been indicated separately, as is done by self-service wholesalers. 
In a leading decision, the Federal High Court has taken as a criterion less the 
consumer concept than the economic purpose of the Preisangabenverordnung; 
accordingly, prices need not be indicated if the self-service supermarket by 
means of appropriate controls ensures that only industrial consumers gain 
access; to a limited extent they are also permitted to .buy for their 'private' 
purposes. From the consumer concept advocated above a similar view results, 
because buyers in a self-service supermarket do not need the information 
required under the Preisangabenverordnung and here a consumer interest is- not 
taken into account. 
The price marking obligation exists also regarding particularly cheap or 
expensive goods; however, certain goods and services are exempted from price 
marking under Art. 7, for instance objets d'art, demonstration cars and goods 
in respect of which the entrepreneur acts as agent only. 
As expressly stipulated in the Act, the final price shall include V AT and other 
price elements, irrespective, however, of the granting of a discount. Indications 
of prices must be in harmony with trade practices and the principles of clarity 
and truth in pricing, must clearly refer to the offers advertised and must be 
clearly legible or otherwise easily noticeable, Art. 1, para. 7 Preisangaben-
verordnung. In contrast to the former law, it is no longer prohibited to break 
down the price, but the final price must be rendered prominent. The admissi-
bility of breaking down the final price, primarily in the case of services by crafts-
men, is to enhance clarity as to price. 
For the sake of clarity and truth as to price, Art. l, para. 5 forbids what are 
known as clauses on current prices, i.e. clauses permitting the entrepreneur to 
raise his prices within a period of four months. Reservations to adjust the prices 
of goods or services are admissible only if the terms of delivery or performance 
exceed four months. 
(bb) Detailed regulations on theform of price marking are included in Art. 2 
(retailers), Art. 3 (services ), Art. 4 (restaurants) and Art. 5 (service stations). In 
the case of goods displayed visibly in shop windows and the like, the price must 
be marked by means of price tags or labels on the goods. Goods which are kept 
at hand in the sale-room in any other way must also be marked in such a way that 
the containers or shelves housing the goods are labelled or price lists are 
displayed for inspection. In the case of sales of goods by catalogue or !ist of 
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goods, particularly in the mail-order trade, prices must be indicated next to the 
illustrations or descriptions of the goods. In the case of offers of services, the 
prices of essential services must be included in the price lists to be displayed on 
the business premises. However, an exception to Art. 3, para. 2 gives rise to 
criticism. According to this, it suffices to keep at hand a price !ist for inspection 
in the place where the service is offered if, according to generally accepted 
standards, the prices and accounting rates of all services offered are included in 
price lists and the display of such price lists cannot reasonably be expected owing 
to their volume. This applies particularly to repair shops and practically results 
in the consumer not having the faintest notion of prices, at least as regards essen-
tial services. Here a reform would );Je needed to the effect that at least the most 
important services pursuant to Art. 3, para. 1 must be included in the price !ist 
and must be displayed. 
In the case of restaurants and service stations, the legislator has made very 
detailed regulations, in particular serving the purpose of providing the consumer 
with information on prices at a stage where he decides whether or not to use the 
services offered by a restaurant or service station in the first place. That is why 
price lists of restaurants must be displayed outside the premises. Indications of 
prices at service stations must be perceptible to the motorist driving past the 
service station. This regulation ensures that price competition is possible, and 
that it is easy for the consumer to compare prices. 
(cc) The legal consequences of an infringement of the Preisangabenver-
ordnung result from the general principles of the law of administrative offences. 
Infringements of obligations under the Preisangabenverordnung are punished 
by fines; imprisonment, although possible, does not occur. Especially in this 
area, the percentage of undetected offences and a great number of unpunished 
infringements of the price marking obligation is greatly deplored. 
Nevertheless, in court practice it is assumed that sanctions under civil law or 
under the law of unfair competition basically do not come into question. With 
respect to the prohibition of current price clauses in the Preisangabenver-
ordnung, the Federal High Court has stated that an infringement thereof does 
not result in nullity of the contract under civil law80• Thus the prohibition largely 
lacks sanctions and is ineffective in regard to the consumer. However, if the 
entrepreneur in his standard form contract uses current price and other adjust-
ment clauses which relate to a term of performance or delivery of less than four 
months, that clause is ineffective (No. 32); the reservation to increase prices is 
not effective; the entrepreneur cannot plead the price increase clause in regard to 
the consumer. This has meanwhile brought about a certain congruity of the law 
of the Preisangabenverordnung with the civil law. 
In the law of unfair competition it was above all a controversial issue whether 
an infringement of the obligations under the Preisangabenverordnung at the 
same time implied an unfair act of competition under Art. 1 UWG. The Federal 
High Court has denied this in several rulings, since the price marking obligation 
merely implies a regulatory provision which is 'neutral in content'; by contrast, 
infringements are not per se contrary to public policy unless the entrepreneur 
acts with the intention to gain an advantage over his competitors81 • Numerous 
authors have rejected this view, pointing out the common objective of consumer 
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protection under the Preisangabenverordnung and under the UWG 82 • 
However, wrong price marking, and as far as that goes there is agreement, 
may imply an act of misleading competition within the meaning of Art. 3 UWG 
(No. 85). This will be the case particularly if the entrepreneur does not give the 
final price in his advertisement, but a different one which tends to mislead the 
consumer. 
2 Unit pricing 
42 (aa) The obligation to indicate unit prices was introduced into German law for 
the first time by the Eichgesetz of 1969. lt has been altered by the Act amending 
the Eichgesetz of 20 January 1976, in force since l July 1977, and has in 
particular been adapted to EC directives. The objective of both the old and the 
new Act was: 'lt should be emphasised specifically that new regulations on unit 
pricing ... shall enable the consumer easily to compare prices and to get a 
clearer picture ofwhat is offered on the market' 83 • 
The duty to indicate unit prices exists in addition to the price marking obliga-
tion as expressly stated in Art. l, para. 6 Preisangabenverordnung. Further-
more, it must be seen in connection with standardisation and the indication of 
net weights on prepacked goods (No. 67). 
(bb) Under Art. 17 of the amended version ofthe Eichgesetz, the obligation to 
indicate unit prices exists in the following way: 'Any person who offers for sale 
to final consumers prepacks with foods, feedstuffs for domestic animals and 
birds living in freedom, detergents and cleaners, cosmetics, polishes and preser-
vatives, adhesives, ready-to-use varnishes and coating compounds, petroleum 
products and fuels, in nominal net weight volumes of no less than l 0 gor ml and 
not more than 10 kg or l, offers goods by catalogue or advertises them giving 
prices must indicate the price asked by him for 1 kg or 1 l or, if the nominal net 
weight does not exceed 250 gor ml, the price of 100 gor ml of the product (unit 
price)'. Art. 15 of the Fertigpackungsverordnung (Order Concerning Pre-
packed Goods), as amended on 20 December 1976, provides that the unit price 
in the case of prepacked goods held for sale must be indicated on the package or 
on a price tag on or next to the package; if packages are offered by catalogue, the 
unit price must be found next to the picture or description of the goods, in notes 
or in price lists connected with catalogues. Furthermore, the unit price must be 
indicated so as to be readily discernible and legible directly next to the price of 
the product. 
A fact about the amendment of Art. 17 which is worth mentioning is the 
general tendency of the Eichgesetz to subject both small packages and large 
containers to unit pricing. The obligation to indicate unit prices was extended 
regarding adhesives and feed stuffs for domestic animals and birds. Polishes 
and preservatives are now generally included. A controversial issue during the 
debates in parliament has been whether fruit and vegetable tins should also be 
subject to unit pricing. The legislator has rejected this, because he felt that this 
would result in an excessive burden on small retailers 84 • 
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(cc) Art. l 7b Eichgesetz includes essential exceptions to the obligation to 
indicate unit prices, the practical consequence of which is that the statutory 
requirement is hardly ever satisfied85 • This obligation does not, for example, 
apply to packages with cosmetics used exclusively to dye or beautify the skin, 
hair or nails. Neither does it apply to packages which may be put on the market 
only in certain net weights or in containers of certain volumes. As far as 
packages are standardised, unit pricing is not required86 • This is problematic 
because standardisation is by no means uniform and the consumer cannot be 
expected to convert the price readily into a certain unit. Pursuant to Art. l 7b, 
para. 4, the indication of a new unit price may be omitted if the price asked for is 
reduced by a uniform amount and packages of different nominal net weights of 
the same unit price are concerned; the same is true of packages with highly 
perishable foodstuffs if the price asked for is reduced because of imminent 
spoilage. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Law of Consumer 
Information 
1 GENERALITIES 
43 Governmental measures to improve consumer information are nowadays an 
uncontested instrument of consumer policy (No. 14). In this connection not the 
principle, but its design and use to the consumer is a debatable question. Trade 
and industry demand freedom to shape the consumer information to be 
furnished by them; information is thus an element of freedom of advertising 
which follows the principle of the enterprises' autonomy (No. 78). Enterprises 
are willing to cooperate in voluntary information systems (No. 75), but view 
extensive statutory duties to furnish information critically. Conversely, what 
matters in terms of consumer policy is that the consumer in addition to or con-
trary to one-sided advertising in the interest of enterprises is provided with 
objective and factual counter-informationt. Here it is a matter of argument, 
though, whether the information made available or required by law is actually 
useful to the consumer. As a criterion in this connection the US Federal Trade 
Commission has established the principles of 'useful', 'usable' and 'used'2 • 
Consumer research has found that information may be useful, but is not neces-
sarily usable or used in actual fact3• This is all the more true if the information is 
directed at socially weak consumers, for instance elderly people, foreigners, 
marginal groups of society. 
For Jack of empirical investigations, the jurist cannot (yet) answer the ques-
tion of what information is 'useful' to the consumer, or 'usable' and 'used' by 
him. Of greater importance are problems of the legal bases of consumer infor-
mation as weil as of possible constitutional barriers to the imposition of duties 
to furnish information. Numerous labelling obligations are based on law, in 
particular the specific product labelling obligations or prospectus requirements 
in the case of services (Section II); in addition, there exists a general labelling 
obligation concerning weights and measures (Section III). The information 
activity of consumer organisations (price comparisons, testing of products and 
services, criticisms, etc.) is based not on law, but on constitutional freedoms of 
action which must, however, remain within certain general civil-law bounds 
(Section IV). Information systems by suppliers originate from their auto-
nomous decision on which the consumer does not exert a direct influence; here 
limits exist primarily in the law of competition (Section V). 
In a ruling of 25 October 19774, the Federal Constitutional Court has for 
constitutional purposes held the detailed labelling obligations concerning 
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margarine with a medium-fat content (compulsion to use a specified form and 
symbol, to include a warning, to use specified indicators) tobe compatible with 
the basic right of freedom to practise a profession and the principle of equal 
protection of rights 5• Thereby the Federal Constitutional Court in the interest of 
consumer protection has permitted far-reaching statutory intervention through 
labelling obligations. 
The information activity of consumer organisations in terms of constitutional 
Jaw implies the use of freedom of opinion and jreedom of speech pursuant to 
Art. 5 Basic Law 6• Its Iimits stem from general legislation, for instance tort-law 
and criminal-law regulations on defamation, which in the case of reasonable 
and objective information are, however, not usually applicable. 
II LABELLING OF PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 
44 Over the past ten years, the law of labelling in the Federal Republic of 
Germany as in other countries of the European Economic Community has been 
characterised by a rapid development7. EC draft directives to harmonise certain 
labelling regulations have likewise influenced national legislation8• 
lt should be noted that the labelling of goods and services as an obligation on 
the supplier to provide the customer with objective and verifiable information 
about the product, relates to very different questions relevant to consumers. 
This will be described in detail below. Depending on the type of product, label-
ling may pertain to the following areas: 
- composition of the product 
- dangerousness of the product 
- side effects 
- additives and foreign substances in the product 
- perishability, perhaps date of manufacture of the product 
- use of the product 
- product quality, for instance within the framework of certain standard-
ised groups or objectified criteria of the value in use 
- nutritional values in foodstuffs. 
In the case of services, the 'labelling obligation' is replaced in prospectuses 
by references to the various elements of the service, the duties incurred by the 
customer, etc. 
This listing of the different criteria of labelling goes to show that it is prac-
tically impossible to create a general labelling regulation. The German legislator 
has therefore decided to introduce labelling specific to the product or, in the case 
of certain services, an obligation to provide a prospectus in the most different 
fields of law. Here food law is most important 9• In other product areas labelling 
of goods is little developed as yet. Labelling of services is only in its infancy. 
In addition to statutory labelling, theremay also be voluntarylabelling 10, either 
on the entrepreneur's initiative, or by agreements specific to the different trades 
exempted from the operation of antitrust laws; for example, labelling of the tar 
and nicotine content in cigarettes which despite the existing enabling provisions 
has not been brought about by statutory order, but by appropriate agreements 
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among cigarette manufacturers although with the Federal Cartcl Office's 
support 11 • 
In thc following we shall deal first with the law of labelling regarding food-
stuffs and other goods subject to food law. Then we shall describe the labelling 
of other goods. Finally, we shall make reference to the obligation to provide a 
written statement in the case of services, as far as this obligation has been 
realised through legislation or is in process of realisation. 
1 Labelling obligations in food law 
45 (aa) The overall reform of food /aw by the LMBG of 17 August 1974 has also 
established extensive enabling provisions with respect to labelling regulations 12• 
The LMBG itself includes Iabelling regulations only in exceptional cases, for 
instance in Art. 16 regarding the marking of additives in foodstuffs, Art. 17, 
para. 1, item 2 regarding the marking of atypical foodstuffs, and Art. 28 
regarding the labelling of cosmetics. These are only minimum standards which 
under the extensive enabling provisions may, however, be supplemented to give 
rise to statutory orders. 
Art. 19, item 1 includes a general enabling provision with respect to food-
stuffs authorising the issuance of statutory orders to the effect that certain state-
ments as to the contents, manufacturer or person otherwise marketing such 
foodstuffs, be made on the packings, containers or other wrappings in which the 
foodstuffs are put on the market or eise on the foodstuffsthemselves. ltem 2 
extends this obligation to include certain other labels, for instance concerning 
manufacture and perishability, the origin of a foodstuff or contents of storage 
bins. Art. 21, para. l, item 1 includes an enabling provision with respect to 
tobacco products which provides for the marking of smoke components. 
Art. 29 with respect to cosmetics includes an enabling provision authorising the 
issuance of statutory orders under which certain statements as to the contents, 
dates (in particular of manufacture or packing), or imperishability and direc-
tions for use must be made on the packagings or containers in which cosmetics 
are put on the market or on the inserts or leaflets accompanying them. Finally, 
Art. 32, para. 1, item 9 in the case of consumer goods provides for an enabling 
provision to the effect that the following must be marked: the content of certain 
substances in certain consumer goods, any limitation on their intended purpose 
and, regarding certain goods, the fact that they are unfit tobe used as consumer 
goods in connection with foodstuffs. Furthermore, food legislation provides 
for the issuance of warnings, Art. 21, para. l, item lg, and Art. 32, para. l, 
item 8 in the case of foodstuffs, tobacco products and consumer goods. 
These enabling provisions have in some cases been exhausted. We shall refer 
in the following to some of the important more recent labelling regulations on 
food law and related fields of law. 
46 (bb) The basic regulation on external labelling of foodstuffs is the 
Lebensmittelkennzeichnungsverordnung (Food Labelling Order) of 25 January 
1972 including amendments 13 • As far as it provides for the labelling of weights 
and measures, this will be described below. In addition to the quantitative 
labelling of foodstuffs specified in Art. 1, which we shall not enumerate here, 
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Art. 2 provides in particular for the following statements which must be made in 
a conspicuous place in the German language and in readily discernible, easily 
legib/e characters: the name of the manufacturer and company, an indication of 
the contents according to the description customary in trade, and the like. In the 
case of certain foodstuffs additional statements must be made; for instance, in 
the case of meat and sausages, the species of animal, and in the case of meat 
products, the date of production, or alternatively, the minimum keeping date. 
Such labelling must clearly indicate to the consumer which date is referred to. If 
the term of imperishability of a certain product is given, an appropriate state-
ment must be made if such a term is contingent upon certain temperatures. Such 
statements need not be conspicuous, though. In the case of meat products, 
Art. 3 supplements the labelling obligation by the obligation to indicate that the 
product, even if cooled, will keep for a limited period only. 
As regards statements of perishability, special regulations apply in the case of 
special foodstuffs, which we shall comment on below. 
The labelling obligation is safeguarded by sanctions to the effect that without 
the prescribed labelling, foodstuffs subject to the labelling order must not be 
held for sale, sold or otherwise put on the market in packagings or containers, 
Art. 1, para. 2. An infringement of the labelling obligation or of the ban on 
marketing gives rise to an administrative offence, Art. 3b. 
47 (cc) Dairy products are subject to a strict labe/ling ob/igation which originates 
from the Milchgesetz (Milk Act) of 1952 14• lt is supplemented by the Butter-
verordnung (Butter Order) of 10 August 197015 • Art. 9 extends the labelling 
obligation to include indications of classes of quality, weight, additives, and of 
late the date of manufacture and packing and indications of the minimum 
keeping quality. The data must be uncoded, viz. easily discernible to the con-
sumer; they may, however, be given on the bottom of the packaging. 
The Käseverordnung (Cheese Order) of 19 February 1976 16 also includes 
extensive labelling regulations concerning cheese and cheese products. Art. 8 
of the Käseverordnung includes the principle that cheese must not be put on 
the market without due labelling. The labe! must be in the German language, 
clearly visible and applied in an indelible way andin readily legible characters. 
Regarding cheese products, Art. 9 lays down that the fat content, the produc-
tion and minimum keeping dates must be given. For products manufactured 
from cheese, depending on the type of product, the dry matter, fat content and 
control number must be given, but not the minimum keeping date. Finally, 
Art. 24 provides for the marking of foreign substances. We shall not go into 
details here. 
A special labelling obligation exists under the Konsummilchverordnung 
(Milk Order) of 19 June 1974 regarding the fat content 17 • The date of production 
and the keeping date must also be marked. 
48 (dd) Margarine products have for some time been subject to an especially 
strict labelling obligation which serves less the interests of consumer protection 
than the purpose of warding off competition from milk products (butter, etc.). 
The Margarinegesetz (Margarine Act) of 1 July 1975 18 extended that develop-
ment to include low-fat margarine. In particular, Art. 2 of the Act provides for 
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a special form of packaging for margarine products. The product must be 
labelled 'margarine' or 'low-fat margarine'; in the case of low-fat margarine, a 
warning is also necessary. The date of production and the keeping date must 
also be given. This is to protect the consumer against mistaking margarine for 
butter and to provide him with certain precise product information. 
49 (ee) Meat products, as mentioned above, are subject to special labelling 
requirements under the Lebensmittelkennzeichnungsverordnung regarding 
production and minimum keeping quality. Art. 4 of the Fleischverordnung 
(Meat Order) of 6 June 1973, as amended on 10 May 197619, regulates the 
marking of additives; if certain additives are marked, this does not constitute an 
adulteration of the meat and the otherwise applicable ban on marketing does 
not apply. Additives that are admissible but must be identified are, for instance, 
lactoprotein for boiling sausages and corned beef, blood protein, bread rolls 
and the like for certain meat preparations. The labe! must be provided in easily 
discernible characters on the product, on the packaging or on the menu. 
Pursuant to Art. 4a, products with meat as additive are excepted; here such 
labelling is not necessary. 
The Hackfleischverordnung (Minced Meat Order) of 10 January 197620 
Art. 7 regulates label-ling as regards description of the product, species of 
animal, meat weight, production, perishability and manufacturer. In addition, 
there must be a note that the product is intended for immediate consumption 
(following purchase of a fresh product, or after thawing a frozen product). 
Under the EC directive of 15 February 197l21, the Geflügelfleischhygiene-
gesetz (Poultry Meat Hygiene Act) of 12 July 1973 was issued regarding poultry, 
which in Art. 12 requires labelling in accordance with the official investigation 
of poultry. 
50 (ff) With respect to cocoa products and confectionery, the Kakaoverordnung 
(Cocoa Order) of 30 June 197522 was issued on an EC basis. Art. 6 provides for 
the labelling of additives. 
51 (gg) Since 1 June 1978, fruit juices have been labelled better as regards their 
production and composition under the Fruchtsaftverordnung (Fruit Juice 
Order) of 25 November 197723, which was issued pursuant to EC directives. In 
fruit juices made 100% from the juice of fresh ripe fruit, additives such as sugar, 
carbon dioxide or citric acid must be indicated. Juices made from concentrates 
must be designated as such. In the case of non-alcoholic refreshing drinks con-
taining fruit juice, the minimum content of fruit juice must be stated. Fruit 
nectar - a new description of drinks - and fruit syrup are products con-
taining fruit juice or fruit pulp which do not come under the term fruit juice. 
Fruit nectar contains no less than 50% fruit juice, or fruit pulp and fruit juice to 
which water and sugar has been ·added. The minimum content of fruit ingre-
dients and admixtures of fruit pulp, honey, lemon juice, tartaric acid or lactic 
acid must be indicated. 
52 (hh) The Nährwertkennzeichnungs-VO (Order concerning Labelling of Nutri-
tional Values) of 12 December 197724 does not require general labelling of 
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nutritional values, but regulates merely the form and type of labelling related to 
nutritional values, with the description 'kilojoule' having been introduced in 
accordance with the harmonisation of nutritional values within the EC. Only 
dietary foodstuffs are excepted pursuant to Art. 14a of the revised version of 
the Diätverordnung (Diet Order) with regard to changes in nutrients and the 
type and quantity of ingredients reducing nutrients. 
53 (ii) Dietary f oodstuffs are regulated in detail in the Diätverordnung of 24 
October 197525 • Arts. 15 et seq. contain extensive labelling regulations which 
relate in particular to additives, sweetening agents and the like. General 
labelling must include specifically either the date of production or the minimum 
keeping date. In the case of special dietary foodstuffs, additional labelling is 
required which cannot be reported herein detail. Art. 25 includes the general 
principle of labelling law, viz. that labels must be applied in the German lan-
guage in a conspicuous way andin readily discernible and easily legible writing. 
54 (jj) Further labelling regulations are included in the Weingesetz (Wine Act) of 
14 July 1971 26 , especially with regard to geographical data and grades of quality. 
Numerous other acts concern the marking of preserving agents, classes oj 
quality and the like27 • We shall not go into details here. 
55 (kk) Gaps in the label/ing obligation. The by no means complete enumeration 
of labelling regulations under food law must not obscure the fact that the 
enabling provisions concerning the labelling of products have not at all been 
exhausted. Thus, with the exception of the general labelling regulations under 
the Lebensmittelkennzeichnungsverordnung, there is no special regulation on 
the labelling obligation regarding bread and bakery products; the Brotgesetz 
(Bread Act) of 9 June 1931 is completely inadequate in terms of consumer 
protection. In the case of sausages and similar meat products it is, for instance, 
not required that the fat content be marked as in cheese products because of the 
suppliers' opposition; here there are voluntary labelling systems (No. 75). In 
any case, German food law does not include the principle of complete identifica-
tion oj the composition of a product28 • In the area of tobacco products, the 
labelling obligation has not so far been regulated by an order, but by voluntary 
agreement cancellable at any time by the manufacturers (No. 76). As regards 
consumer goods, labelling is so far completely inadequate; the scope of statu-
tory authorisation has not yet been exhausted. 
Also, the authority issuing orders has not yet availed itself of the oppor-
tunities provided under food law to prescribe warnings (except for low-fat 
margarine and certain dietary foods). This applies to both tobacco products and 
consumer goods, although such warnings are often required for the purpose 
of effective consumer protection and are already used in other countries. By 
'voluntary agreement' between the tobacco industry and the Federal Health 
Ministry, packagings and advertising material will carry warnings effective 
1981. 
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2 Labelling of other products 
Labelling regulations on other products exist in isolated cases only; as was 
stated earlier, a general labelling obligation for goods does ·not exist. The exist-
ing statutory regulations essentially relate to the labelling of textiles, cosmetics 
and drugs. 
56 (a) Labelling of textiles 
In respect of the labelling of textiles, the Act of 25 August 197229 is decisive. lt 
is the outgrowth of an approximation of laws within Europe. The Textilkenn-
zeichnungsgesetz (Textile Labelling Act) is a compromise between the different 
wishes of consumers in the various EC countries and the likewise diverging 
interests of trade and industry. The basic features of the present regulation are 
as follows: all textiles that are a subject of business dealings or are offered for 
sale in the Federal Republic of Germany must bear a labe! indicating the type 
and percentage by weight of the textile raw material used (declaration of raw 
material content). Here only the descriptions designated by law may be used. 
Labelling is required at all levels of the textile and clothing industry and trade. 
Mail-order businesses are in addition required to ensure the labelling of textile 
goods offered in their catalogues. If a textile product contains only one raw 
material at the rate of no less than 85% of its net weight, only that raw material 
need be indicated, for example 85% cotton. If in the case of blended products 
none of the textile raw materials used accounts for 85 OJo of the net weight of the 
textile product, only the percentage by weight of the fibre prevai!ing in terms of 
weight need be stated, while the remaining fibres shall be enumerated merely by 
type. The allowable variation on the declaration of the mixing ratio is no more 
than 30Jo. The presence due to the method of manufacture of fibres not named in 
the declaration of raw material content is tolerated at the rate of no more than 
2% of the textile net weight. In the case of textile goods manufactured by the 
carded yarn process, the allowable variation in terms of foreign fibres is 
increased to 5%, and with the use of the description 'shorn wool' decreases to 
0.30Jo. 
The declaration of raw material content must show uniform characters and 
must contain only the prescribed and expressly permitted descriptions. Trade-
marks and company names may be incorporated directly with the declaration of 
raw material content, but may also be used separately therefrom. 
An amendment of the Textilkennzeichnungsgesetz of 8 September 197830 
will reintroduce the labelling of materials sold by the metre, which had been 
rendered impossible by a ruling of the Federal High Court of 6 June 197731 • 
57 (b) Cosmetics 
Composition and labelling of cosmetics are regulated uniformly at an EC 
level under the Verordnung über kosmetische Mittel (Order on Cosmetics) of 16 
December 197732 • Arts. 4 and 5 regulate in detail the labelling obligations, speci-
fically regarding admissible components, warnings and latest dates of sale or 
consumption. The declarations must be made on the packaging or on an insert. 
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The long transitional period as laid down in Art. 10, para. 2 is disquieting, 
though; only as from 1 August 1979 has the order become fully effective. 
58 (c) Drugs 
The Arzneimittelgesetz (AMG) (Drugs Act) of 24 August 1976, which has 
been in force since 1 January 197833, adopting previous regulations, has in 
Arts. 10 et seq. also standardised labelling as far as drugs are concerned. In 
detail, Art. 10 requires that prepacked drugs must include the following data 
in clearly legible writing in the German language and indelibly: the name and 
company of the manufacturer, description of the drug, registration number, 
batch number, form of administration, contents, method of application, active 
substances, latest date of sale or consumption, reference to the fact that the drug 
is sold only on prescription and, if necessary, reference to the fact that it is a 
doctor's sample. Warnings may be ordered by the Federal Health Authority 
(Bundesgesundheitsamt). The various forms of labelling are explained in detail 
in the following regulations. Art. 11 lays down that the drug shall be accom-
panied by an insert which shall contain information in particular on the fields of 
application, contra-indications, side effects, reciprocity, dosage prescription, 
possibly the term of application and shall include a reference to the fact that the 
drug should not be used after the latest date of sale or consumption. Art. 12 
contains an enabling provision to the effect that the labelling obligation rnay be 
extended to include other drugs and that warnings may be issued. 
The scope of application of the law of labelling presents problems specifically 
outside drugs in the proper sense. This applies, for instance, to so-called 'pseudo-
drugs', to foodstuffs causing effects similar to those caused by drugs, and to 
semi-luxuries. Here the law of drugs does not apply 34 unless pursuant to Art. 12 
it is extended by statutory order to include other drugs. The food law to be 
applied does not contain a special labelling obligation (except in the case of 
cosmetics and dietary food), for instarice regarding ineffectiveness or a warning 
of contra-indications. lt remains tobe seen how this gap in consumer protection 
will be filled. 
59 (d) Other products 
As regards other products, particularly technical products, there is no statu-
tory labelling obligation. The Gesetz über technische Arbeitsmittel, the so-called 
Maschinenschutzgesetz (Technical Labour Materials Act) of 24 June 196835 
does not contain labelling regulations, but only minimum standards for product 
safety and product use. 
By the arnending law of 13 August 1979, the Maschinenschutzgesetz was 
renamed 'Gerätesicherheitsgesetz' (Safety of Appliances Act)35a. In addition to 
regulations under the law of safety, which concern primarily the dealer's inclu-
sion in the statutory powers of intervention (No. 159), the amendment contains 
provisions on a 'GS-geprüfte Sicherheit' (safety tested) label. The test label is 
awarded if the appliance has been subjected to a design test by a technical 
inspection agency. There is no legal obligation to conduct a test or to affix a test 
label. However, in the case of medical apparatus and instruments it may be 
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required under an order that they must not be put on the market without a test 
labe!. The unauthorised application of the 'GS-geprüfte Sicherheit' labe! con-
stitutes an offence against public order. In the legislator's opinion the labe! is to 
serve primarily the purpose of consumer information 35 b. 
3 Services 
60 (aa) The law of 'labelling' of services is still in its infancy and has not actually 
been perceived as a problem in terms of consumer policy. Servicesare generally 
provided for by contract in accordance with standard form conditions. Since the 
principle of freedom of contract applies, which in the case of standard form 
contracts is restricted only in certain extreme cases (No. 258ff), it is for the 
supplier in shaping his contracts and advertising his services to give to or with-
hold from the customer the information he deems fit. In this connection, only 
the regulations on deceptive and misleading advertising apply. In addition, the 
supplier must inform the customer about the contents of his standard form con-
tract conditions pursuant to the law of standard form contracts. Beyond that the 
supplier is not required to 'labe!' his services. As services are intangible goods, 
special difficulties are encountered as regards the type and form of labelling. To 
reach the customer, such labelling should be included either in the contract form 
itself or in the advertisement or prospectus. Apart from a few exceptions, such 
regulations do not exist in the law of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
61 (bb) An exception is the Gesetz zum Schutz der Teilnehmer am Fernunterricht 
(FUSG) (Correspondence Course Protection Act) of 24 August 197636 • ln Art. 3 
the Act imposes detailed duties on the organiser to furnish information which 
must bc included in the written contract. In particular, the contract must 
include: the name and address of the organiser, a description of the subject, 
goal, commencement and term of the correspondence course, the final examina-
tion and its recognition, details of the tuition fees and dates of payment thereof 
and also reference to the right of cancellation. Furthermore, the document shall 
include the structure of the correspondence course as weil as statements about 
the delivery dates of educational material, additional material, requirements ·as 
to educational background, etc. lf the statements prescribed are not included, 
the contract is null and void. In the case of optional data, the consumer may 
exercise a right of notice, without details being provided by law (No. 260). 
Art. 16 regulates advertising by distributing information material which must 
provide a clear survey of the contract terms and standards the participant has to 
meet. Here the labelling obligation existing in the case of products is replaced by 
a corresponding obligation to provide a prospectus. 
62 (cc) A bill on the travel contract, which had been submitted to the German 
Bundestag37 , contained certain labelling obligations tailored to the type of con-
tract involved. The basis here was the travel document which must in particular 
include all data on the travel services envisaged. lf these data are included in a 
prospectus, reference to that effect may be made in the travel document. These 
provisions were not enacted by the Reisevertragsgesetz (Travel Contract Act) of 
1979 (No. 247). 
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63 (dd) In the law of insurance, a general obligation to provide a prospectus 
does not exist. Pursuant to Art. 3 of the Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (VVG) 
(lnsurance Contracts Act) there exists merely an obligation to surrender an 
insurance policy later38 • Under the law of supervision of insurance companies, 
standard insurance conditions must be combined with the application for insur-
ance or the insurance policy. 
(ee) Obligations to provide a prospectus in connection with the sale of invest-
ments and closed-end investment funds 39 will not be dealt with here. Duties to 
furnish information in the law of consumer credit will be dealt with elsewhere 
(No. 323). 
III MEASURES, WEIGHTS, P ACKAGINGS 
1 Generalities 
64 The present section deals primarily with the law of labelling of weights and 
measures. Detailed regulations in the interest of the consumer became necessary 
when manufacturers and traders departed more and more from the classical 
method of selling loose goods, of filling containers in the presence of the cus-
tomer, by counting the volume or length, by weighing, bottling, etc. Prepacked 
goods are dominant in trade today. They offer considerable advantages to 
manufacturers and traders in terms of rationalisation and advertising: they 
allow industrial packaging, facilitate planning and stock-keeping, standardise 
sizes and volumes and are particularly suited to present product characteristics 
through appropriate advertising and design. To the consumer, though, the 
advantages of prepacked goods are less obvious. They may obscure market con-
ditions and often render price comparisons impossible, for instance if different 
net weights, non-standardised packages, product differentiation by means of 
package design or even slack-fill packagings occur in the market40• The use of 
packages as advertising media makes the consumer (children ! ) a potential victim 
of suggestive advertising. On the other hand, the consumer may also benefit 
from prepacked goods, since certain goods, such as deep-frozen foods and 
tinned products are put on the market prepacked only. For aesthetical reasons 
the consumer may also be interested in prepacked goods, for instance in the case 
of cosmetics and sweets. Detrimental to the consumer may be the fact that pre-
packed goods are more expensive and that they may involve a Ioad on the envi-
ronment, for instance as a result of non-returnable bottles. 
The German legislator recognised the importance of prepackaging in terms of 
consumer policy at a relatively early stage. In the amended Eichgesetz of 196941 
the idea of consumer protection as regards prepackages appeared for the first 
time. Also, at an EC level, the relevance of regulations on prepacked goods in 
terms of consumer policy and competition policy soon became apparent: the 
approximation of Iaws on prepacked goods and their Iabelling in the member 
countries is designed to remove at the same time trade barriers which may result 
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from different weights and measures, different sizes, different labelling, the use 
of linguistic symbols, etc. 
Under the Amending Act of 20 January 1976, which has been in force in the 
Federal Republic of Germany since 1 July 197742 , the law of prepacked goods 
has undergone a fundamental revision, being geared to the requirements of 
modern trade in the Common Market, and has been improved from the point of 
view of consumer protection. In particular, the limited application of the law 
to packagings containing between 50 and 5000 g or ml has been abolished. 
Initially, the Federal Government had intended to refix the limits between 25 
and 10 000 g or ml. At the suggestion of the Bundesrat such a fixed limit was 
abandoned in favour of a more flexible regulation, which in each individual case 
may be determined through statutory orders43 • 
The law of labelling of net weights was extended to the effect that a mean net 
weight must be observed and that filling variations are regulated in a certain 
way. This is to make the state of the market more easy to grasp and to regulate 
filling accuracy in the interest of the consumer. Packages sold by dimensions 
other than weight and volume are also included in the regulation. 
Through the law of labelling of net weights and the law of filling accuracy, the 
legislator has imposed an obligation to indicate unit prices, which was dealt with 
elsewhere (No. 42). Finally, the prohibition of slack-fill packages was extended, 
particularly in the case of so-called extra-small packages and !arge containers. 
The present law of quantitative labelling is included in the amended provi-
sions of Arts. 14 et seq., Eichgesetz, in the Lebensmittelkennzeichnungsver-
ordnung of 25 January 1972 andin the Fertigpackungsverordnung as amended 
on 20 December 197644• We shall go into the details of these regulations below. 
First, the basic concept of the prepackage as defined in the Eichgesetz should 
be clarified. Art. 14 of the Eichgesetz says that prepackages are products in 
packagings of any type which are packed and closed in the absence of the buyer, 
the quantity of the product contained therein not being alterable without opening 
or materially changing the packagings. Prepackages are also such packages as 
are easy for the customer to open, for instance jars with screw caps. Art. l 7d 
includes in addition the concept of 'open packages', for instance fruit baskets. 
Moreover, refillable and non-refillable prepackages are distinguished. To open 
packages, the regulations on quantitative Jabelling and unit pricing are appli-
cable in principle; however, the regulation concerning net weights is different, 
depending on whether or not the packages are refillable45 • 
2 The law of quantitative labelling 
65 (aa) Art. 16 Eichgesetz contains the basic provision on the quantitative label-
ling of prepackages, irrespective of whether they are closed or open prepackages. 
Pursuant thereto, prepackages may be put on the market on a commercial basis 
only if they include an easily discernible and clearly legible declaration of 
quantity by weight, volume or number of pieces or'by any other dimension. The 
Eichgesetz furthermore regulates certain exceptions or modifications of the 
labelling obligation and permits detailed regulations on quantitative labelling 
to be issued by means of statutory order. These provisions ate now included 
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in the Fertigpackungsverordnung and in the Lebensmittelkennzeichnungsver-
ordnung46. 
A distinction is made between labelling by weight, volume, length, and area 
and labelling by pieces. As a rule, labelling is by weight, for instance labelling of 
foodstuffs, feedstuffs for domestic animals, detergents and cleaners, cosmetics, 
polishes and preservatives, adhesives, ready-for-use varnishes and coating com-
pounds as well as mineral oils and fuels. Declarations of length or area come 
into question in the case of textile products, wire, cable, hoses, waJJpaper, etc. 
There must be quantitative labelling by length and area also if the products are 
unpacked. Compared with these, labelling by pieces is the exception which must 
be expressly provided for in the Fertigpackungsverordnung and in the Lebens-
mittelkennzeichnungsverordnung. Pursuant to the Fertigpackungsverordnung, 
labelling by pieces is admissible only in the case of bath tablets and bath pearls, 
mouthwash tablets, cleansing tissues and pads, as well as adhesive sticks and 
coloured pencils, Art. 7. The Lebensmittelkennzeichnungsverordnung permits 
labelling by pieces as regards some products, particularly shaped chocolates, 
large-size uniform cakes and biscuits that keep, chewing gums and also fruit and 
vegetables. 
As regards the type and place of labels to be affixed it has been provided that 
they must be in the German language, readily discernible and clearly legible. 
They must be affixed in a conspicuous place. 
lt is a matter of the individual case and of trade standards - which are 
mostly determined by suppliers - when the requirements of being readily dis-
cernible, clearly legible and affixed in a conspicuous place have been satisfied47 . 
The Fertigpackungsverordnung prescribes in Art. 16 certain type sizes. An 
additional factor is that the type must stand out against the background. Incon-
spicuous labelling exists, for instance, if the labelling is provided on the bottom 
of the package and the consumer cannot reasonably be expected to lift the 
package in order to be able to read the quantitative labelling. 
Art. 5 Fertigpackungsverordnung contains in addition general basic prin-
ciples of the declaration of net weights to the effect that they must not be vague, 
limited to a range of net weights, or indicate the gross weight. With respect to 
!arge quantities, Art. 5 II provides that in addition to the declaration of nominal. 
net weight on the individual packages, the !arger wrapping must also include the 
number of individual packages and their nominal net weight. This does not 
apply if all individual packages are visible and may be easily counted and the 
declaration of net weight is discernible on at least one of the packages. 
The Lebensmittelkennzeichnungsverordnung also regulates that labels on 
packages or containers must be affixed in a conspicuous place, in the German 
language andin readily discernible, easily legible writing, particularly regarding 
the manufacturer or weight of the various foods contained in the prepackage, 
for instance in the case of tinned meat or tinned fruit. Furthermore, the Lebens-
mittelkennzeichnungsverordnung requires that in the case of certain goods, for 
instance baking powder and pudding powder, the volume of flour or liquid 
necessary to prepare the contents of the package should be stated. 
66 (bb) In the law of drugs, there also exists a quantitative labelling obligation 
although here it is less important than in the area of other prepackages. 
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Pursuant to Art. 10, para. 1, item 6 AMG, the contents by weight, volume 
and/or number of pieces of the prepacked drug must be marked on the package. 
Para. 8 then contains some detailed provisions on the application of labels; 
Art. 12 authorises the extension of the labelling obligation. 
3 Accuracy of data on prepackages 
67 In the case of prepackages, not only must certain labelling obligations be met, 
but at the same time certain values regarding filling accuracy and allowed varia-
tions must be observed. The provisions laid down in Art. 15 Eichgesetz andin 
the supplementary provisions of the Fertigpackungsverordnung relate only 
indirectly to the information of the consumer, but are designed to protect the 
consumer against overcharging and deception. As far as that goes, it is appro-
priate to deal with them in this context. 
Here Art.15 is the basic standard. lt requires that prepackages of equal 
nominal net weight must be produced on a commercial basis only in such a way 
that the net weight at the time of production on an average does not fall below 
the nominal net weight and does not exceed the established minus variations 
provided for in the Fertigpackungsverordnung. Prepackages of equal nominal 
net weight, when put on the market on a commercial basis for the first time, 
must contain a net weight which at that time does not exceed a Jowest minus 
variation as defined in the Fertigpackungsverordnung. With respect to open 
packages the special regulation of Art. l 7d applies. 
The distinction made in Art. 15 between mean net weight and the regulation 
of allowed variations is of great significance in terms of regulative policy48 • The 
requirement that the mean value be observed means that the manufacturer has 
to offset minus variations from the actual net weight by adding the deficient 
quantity. He is thus forbidden to realise a special pro fit by regularly letting the 
contents fall short of the nominal net weight. The requirement of allowed varia-
tions by contrast relates to individual packages. In connection with the require-
ment of mean value it guarantees to the consumer that nominal net weight and 
actual net weight are usually the same. 
The regulation of allowed variations is laid down in Arts. 17 et seq. of the 
Fertigpackungsverordnung. To begin with, the allowable variation, depending 
on the product 's capability of being put into containers, is given as far as weight 
or volume are concerned. In the case of net weight labelling of a product by 
length or area, the minus variation is 20Jo with Jengths and 30Jo with areas. In the 
case of labelling by number of pieces, no variations are allowed in packages con-
taining 30 pieces or less, in the case of any fraction of 100 pieces, the allowed 
variation is one piece. 
Pursuant to Art. 15, para. 3, it is sufficient that the allowed variations exist at 
the time the products are first put on the market. This means in particular that 
traders cannot be held responsible for subsequent losses by desiccation. The 
Federal Government's comment thereon is: 'The debatable question ofwhether 
an established lowest minus variation shall be observed upon marketing at any 
marketing stage or only upon marketing for the first time has been decided in 
favour of the latter' 49 • Thus under the Eichgesetz traders cannot be held respon-
sible for subsequent losses by desiccation, since they cannot reasonably be 
56 
expected to refill closed packages. In the case of open refillable packages, for 
instance fruit baskets, traders must make up for deficiencies. 
4 So-called slack-fill packagings 
68 Slack-fill packagings are all forms of packagings having the outward 
appearance of a prepackage that Il\flke the consumer believe that the net weight 
is greater than the actual contents. Examples are, for instance, thick-walled 
bottles in the case of alcoholic drinks, cosmetics packagings with hollow spaces, 
voluminous wrappings in the case of toothpaste. A package may constitute a 
slack-fill packaging and deceive the consumer even if it is labelled correctly and 
the respective mean values and allowed variations pursuant to Arts. 15, 16 Eich-
gesetz are observed. That is why Art. l 7a Eichgesetz as amended includes a 
general clause concerning the prohibition of slack-fill packagings and Art. 35 
provides for fines in caseofinfringement. The provisionruns: 'Prepackages must 
be designed so as not to delude the consumer into believing that they contain 
more than their actual net weight'. 
The provision is formulated along the lines of a general clause and does 
not state the precise details of delusion. Rather, it has to be established in each 
individual case when such delusion exists, although meanwhile certain guide-
Iines issued by the Federal Economics Ministry and standard specifications 
exist which are not legally binding50 • Also, in the case of so-called extra-small 
packagings, Art. 17a applies. 
Art. l 7a requires two things: firstly, that there be a disproportion between the 
contents and the size of the packaging and, secondly, that the packaging makes 
the consumer believe that it contains more than it actually does. Three types of 
slack-fill packaging can be distinguished, namely: deception through measures 
of design and make-up, disproportion between the contents and size of the 
packaging, and prohibited hollow spaces51 • Some examples of such slack-fill 
packagings are: raised bottoms, hollow bottoms ofbottles; thick walls or double 
walls with hollow spaces; excessively !arge stoppers, caps, lids; double packag-
ings; !arger packagings than technically required; reduction of the nominal net 
weight while the packaging is retained unchanged; incomplete filling. 
Meanwhile the Federal Economics Minister has issued special regulations on 
chocolates, cosmetics, tinned small sausages and plastic cups. This is designed 
to remedy grievances regarding slack-fill packaging especially in these markets. 
However, as these are but ministerial directions to the authorities in charge of 
weights and measures, the regulations are not binding upon manufacturers 52 • 
A contravention of Art. l 7a may be punished by fines. Slack-fill packagings 
may constitute an act of misleading advertising pursuant to Art. 3 UWG, since 
declarations are made also if they appear on the product or on the wrapping. 
They are the responsibility of the manufacturer or trader. The simulation of a 
greater net weight may also constitute unfair advertising. Under civil law, a 
slack-fill packaging is no cause for rescission of the contract. However, the 
consumer may be entitled to claim damages pursuant to Art. 823, para. 2, Civil 
Code because the provision of Art. l 7a is also a protective law in the individual 
consumer's favour. He must prove the damage sustained, causation not being 
excluded by the fact that the quantitative labelling is correct 53 • 
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IV CONSUMER INFORMATION THROUGH CONSUMER 
ORGANISATIONS 
1 Economic significance and legal bases 
69 However comprehensive a regulation of labelling may be, it is unable to 
ensure that the customer in his economic planning is provided with the informa-
tion he needs to use his income in an optimum way and to decide what he will 
consume. The law of labelling is Jimited to 'basic information ', for instance 
regarding prices, classes of quality, product components, and weights and 
measures, but does not enable comparative evaluation of the range of goods 
offered in terms of price and quality, and does not satisfy the need for informa-
tion separate from the product which the consumer may use before making a 
purchase decision. 
Hence it is undisputed among people in the Federal Republic discussing 
problems of consumer policy that the creation of a system of information sepa-
rate from the product is a central task of consumer policy. This has repeatedly 
been pointed out both by the Federal Government and the EC Commission in 
their respective consumer reports 54• 
70 (aa) The concept of consumer information must not be conceived in too 
narrow a sense. The consumer is interested not only in being provided as best as 
possible with information about the price and quality of goods offered on 
markets, so that he may compare and evaluate supply, but also in public criti-
cism of harmful or useless products, manipulative sales methods, and unfair 
trade practices. Since the process of consumption in the current economic 
system of the Federal Republic of Germany is public, suppliers have to face 
public criticism. The consumer's decision and thus consumer information must 
not be reduced to the conduct ofprivate households, but must include the public 
element as wen ss. 
This at the same time describes the legal approach to the proper appraisal of 
consumer information. Consumer information inclusive of consumer criticism 
takes its bases from the constitutional guarantee of freedom of opinion, of 
information and of the press in Art. 5, paras. 1 and 2 Basic Law56• The Consti-
tution itself lays the foundation for the legal regulation of consumer infor-
mation. In its weil known Blinkfüer decision, the Federal Constitutional Court 
had previously recognised this principle regarding the appeal to boycott for non-
economic reasons: 'Anappeal to boycott the basis of which is theexpression of a 
certain opinion is protected under Art. 5, para. l, sentence 1 Basic Law, partic-
ularly if it is used as a means of public argument in a matter materially affecting 
the public, viz. if at its base there is not the promotion of private interests, but 
the concern for political, economic, social or cultural interests of the public' 57 • 
What has been said about the most powerful means of consumer information, 
namely boycott in the widest sense as described above, applies all the more to 
other forms of consumer information. 
Apart from that there are no special statutory rules regulating consumer 
information and consumer criticism that include boycott. Rather, the general 
principles of the law of torts and the law of unfair competition must be taken 
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into consideration. Here it was initially a matter of argument whether consumer 
information furnished by consumer associations, consumer institutions and 
organisations and by public agencies is subject to the provisions of the law of 
unfair competition or of torts. Since consumer organisations in the widest sense 
do not act with the intention to compete (that is, do not provide information for 
the purpose of promoting their own or somebody else's business) the courts 
have made it clear that the regulations and limits under the law of unfair com-
petition do not apply to objective and independent consumer information 58 • An 
exception to this rule may be the borderline case that a consumer Organisation 
itself pursues business purposes, for instance as a buying ring within the meaning 
of Art. 6b UWG, or asks consumers to buy at a certain shop; then it promotes at 
least somebody else's business and is subject to the provisions under the law of 
unfair competition pursuant to Art. 1 and pursuant to Art. 3 UWG as weil as 
Art. 14 UWG (prohibition of disparagement) and Arts. 25, 26 GWB (partic-
ularly prohibition of boycotts)59 • This is a matter of argument only as far as price 
comparisons are concerned (No. 73). 
71 (bb) The basis of consumer information in terms of civil liability is therefore 
the law of torts in the Civil Code. Here the function of the law of torts is not so 
much to regulate responsibility for consumer information, but rather to mark 
its barriers and limits in terms of liability. The German law of torts, in accor-
dance with what has meanwhile become established court practice, distinguishes 
between consumer information by means of representations and consumer 
information by means of statements of opinion60• 
Representations are regulated in Art. 824 Civil Code asregards their admissi-
bility under the law of liability. Civil liability for damages in the case of endan-
gering credit arises also if somebody is guilty of negligent misrepresentation. He 
is not liable for damages, though, if he pursues a legitimate interest. The provi-
sion of Art. 824 means that consumer organisations in furnishing information 
may generally plead the pursuance of legitimate interests. In the event of 
negligent misrepresentations they do not therefore incur civil liability for 
damages. However, also in this case, court practice admits of a claim for retrac-
tion (not a claim for damages) which is independent of fault; nobody can plead 
that misrepresentations are spread to safeguard legitimate interests 61 • 
In the case of statements of opinion, a distinction is made by intensity of the 
value judgment. If the statement of opinion takes the form of malicious or 
defamatory criticism, it may constitute an intentional act against public policy 
which renders a consumer organisation liable for damages pursuant to 
Art. 82662 • If the criticism is defamatory or insulting, for instance if a certain 
trader is claimed to cheat customers, it is a criminal offence and at the same time 
gives rise to civil liability for damages and a claim for injunction pursuant to 
Arts. 823, para. 2, 1004 Civil Code. These extreme instances of criticism are 
hardly of importance at all and are not in accordance anyway with the con-
sumer's interest in objective and factual information and criticism. 
Much more difficult to judge under German law are those cases where a 
consumer organisation makes statements of opinion (value judgments), for 
instance regarding the quality or good value of a product or several products or 
regarding competitive practices, without acting wilfully or in an insulting way. 
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Under certain circumstances these statements of opinion are for civil law 
purposes regarded as an infringement of the right to an established and 
operative business (eingerichteter und ausgeübter Gewerbebetrieb) pursuant to 
Art. 823, para. l Civil Code. Negligent statements of opinion may also give rise 
to liability pursuant to Art. 823, para. 1, which, if successful, may considerably 
obstruct the activity of a consumer organisation63 • 
This is not the proper place for a critical reconstruction of court practice 
relating to the interpretation of Art. 823, para. l 64 • Rather, we should mention 
only the most important grounds that may give rise to civil liability of consumer 
organisations for statements of opinion. Such liability first of all presupposes 
that the infringement related to a business65 • Such a business-related infringe-
ment exists only if the consumer organisation 's statement of opinion refers to a 
particular supplier or to an identifiable, concrete group of suppliers66 • General 
statements of opinion not referring to a particular business do not therefore 
result in the applicability of Art. 823, para. 1. This business-related infringe-
ment must also be unlawful. The unlawfulness does not result from the mere 
fact of a statement of opinion, but only from a test of reasonableness, with the 
constitutional guaranty of freedom of information and opinion as mentioned 
above being taken into account. In the Federal High Court's practice a central 
principle has been established to the effect that in a contribution to a controver-
sial issue materially affecting the public, the admissibility of freedom of speech 
is presumed67 • There is a limit to this only where a statement of opinion ceases to 
be fair. Then a consumer organisation must expect to be made civilly liable by 
the enterprise concerned68 • 
Consumer information that constitutes a tort within the limits outlined above 
gives rise to claims for damages which are determined by the damage the enter-
prise concerned has suff ered as a result of incorrect, unobjective or even immoral 
consumer information. In a particular case, this may involve considerable risks 
of liability69 • In addition, enterprises may advance claims for injunction and 
removal against consumer organisations. Negligence is not required on the part 
of the consumer organisation. However, there must be unlawful interference or 
the apprehension of such interference. Then the en terprise may have recourse to 
a claim for injunction. Such a claim may also take the form of a claim for retrac-
tion or correction. A right of the opposer to reply does not exist under civil law, 
but may flow from the law of the press. The opposer's right to reply comes into 
play when consumer organisations make representations in the press prej-
udicing the rights of enterprises. Unlawfulness or fault are not required70 • 
2 Comparative testing 
72 In the Federal Republic of Germany, comparative testing has no statutory 
basis but is carried out in the public interest by the Stiftung Warentest, a founda-
tion under private law. The founder of this institu tion is the Federal Govern-
ment, which makes available to the Stiftung Warentest the funds required by the 
latter in performing its duties. Meanwhile the Stiftung Warentest generates its 
funds at the rate of two thirds through the sale of its magazine Test and at the 
rate of one third through government subsidies. In Art. 2, para. 1 of the bye-laws 
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of the Stiftung Warentest its task is defined as follows: 'Information of the 
public about objectifiable features of the value in use of goods and services 
which are offered everywhere in major areas in basically the same quality andin 
a manner sufficient to render them identifiable' 71 • Pursuant to Art. 2, para. 2, 
the Stiftung shall test comparable goods and services according to scientific 
methods and shall publish the test results. The Stiftung publishes its results in its 
own magazine in the form of a test compass comparing the test results of several 
similar products or services by rating the product tested according to a partic-
ular scale (very good, good, satisfactory, less satisfactory, unsatisfactory) and 
giving the average price asked for them on the market. Unlike its French coun-
terpart, the Stiftung Warentest does not compare prices asked and quality judg-. 
ments. In addition to the Stiftung Warentest, there are other private testing 
institutions, particularly in the area of motor vehicles. For example, the big 
automobile clubs conduct comparative goods tests with respect to cars and 
accessories and publish the results in magazines for their members. 
Since there is no statutory basis for the activity of the Stiftung Warentest and 
other testing institutions and organisations, their position in legal transactions 
and particularly their responsibility under the law of torts is determined by the 
principles of civil law outlined above. Since in general the activity ofthe Stiftung 
Warentest, of associated testing institutes and of other testing institutions does 
not serve business purposes, the law of unfair competition is not applied. Liabil-
ity is then determined either pursuant to Art. 824 Civil Code, if the test report is 
to be regarded as factual information, or pursuant to Art. 823, para. 1 Civil 
Code, because of a possible interference with the tested enterprise's established 
and operative business, if the test report is regarded as a value judgment and 
statement of opinion. 
lmportant questions of civil liability of the Stiftung Warentest were clarified 
particularly by a leading decision of the Federal High Court of 9 December 
1975 72 • The Federal High Court first of all emphasises that test reports, because 
they are mostly of the nature of a value judgment, should be qualified as state-
ments of opinion and not as statements of fact. Liability is thus determined by 
Art. 823, para. 1 Civil Code. The Court attaches importance to the fact that not 
every negative rating of a product or service by the Stiftung Warentest should be 
considered unlawful interference with an enterprise's business; in this connec-
tion the basic right of Art. 5 Basic Law plays apart pursuantto which the com-
parative test contributes to issues materially affecting the public. According to 
the Court the Stiftung Warentest is engaged in consumer guidance which is 
imperative to provide a clear view of market conditions, not only in the interest 
of the consumer but from the viewpoint of the economy in general. lt also serves 
the true interests of manufacturers and suppliers. That is why it is necessary that 
the Stiftung Warentest should enjoy an adequate scope of action, which is 
ensured by the performance of its testing projects in line with its bye-laws. Only 
in the case of malicious, defamatory criticism and unobjective disparagement 
should liability arise. 
In its decision, the Federal High Court then states the requirements a com-
parative test has to satisfy in order that it will not be subject to civil liability. The 
test must be conducted in a neutral, objective and expert way. Here it is less 
important whether the result is correct from an objective point of view; rather 
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what matters is the effort in arriving at a correct result. The testing institute, the 
Court holds, enjoys a considerable scope as regards the adequacy of testing 
methods, selection of objects tobe tested and presentation of test results. Only if 
the path of action and the conclusions drawn from the tests conducted appear 
no langer defensible (debatable) does unlawful interference exist. A compara-
tive test may also be performed in such a way that merely a single product is 
tested, as far as branded articles are concerned. For in a branded article a 
product of unchanging quality is presented to the consumer (Cf. Art. 38a, 1 
GWB). 
In a comparative test it is also admissible particularly to point out a product 
made by one manufacturer as against that of another; such pointing out, 
according to the Court, does not constitute unlawful interference with the pre-
judiced enterprise. 
On account of the Federal High Court's decision the Stiftung Warentest has 
been largely exempted from risks of liability73. Meanwhile it has also been estab-
lished that the testing institute may make price comparisons74• In addition, it 
may be assumed that the testing institute is also allowed to compare the price 
and quality of a product, as far as is reasonable (price comparisons are, for 
example, based on misleading or incorrect data). Claims for retraction cannot 
be enforced against the testing institute, because such claims exist only in the 
case of factual representations, but not in the case of value judgments. Lastly, 
the Federal High Court has rejected direct liability on the part of testing insti-
tutes enlisted by the Stiftung Warentest 75 • 
Thus the risk of liability of the Stiftung Warentest is reduced to those cases in 
which it uses testing methods that are not defensible and where its tests are based 
on misrepresentations. As the testing procedure. of the Stiftung Warentest is 
designed in such a way that suppliers are informed beforehand on several occa-
sions, this remaining risk of liability is practically excluded76 • 
A point still unclear according to the new legal position is in how far other 
testing organisations and testing institutes also enj oy the privilege of non-liability 
which the Federal High Court developed in respect of the Stiftung Warentest. 
Basically, the principles are the same which must then be verified in an indi-
vidual case on the basis of the structure of the testing institute involved, its 
testing methods, its rating, etc77 • lt may be assumed that these requirements are 
satisfied in tests conducted by automobile clubs. 
The privilege of non-liability does not exist if 'testing organisations' of trade 
and industry submit comparative goods tests to the public. Here generally a 
business purpose exists, so that the stricter principles of the law of unfair com-
petition apply. 
3 Price comparisons and other information systems 
73 Apart from comparative testing, consumer information systems are the 
regional price surveys and price comparisons conducted by consumer advice 
centres and other consumer organisations. Shopping hints, hints at new pro-
ducts, guidance as to special offers, etc., by consumer organisations may also 
include additional information systems. The Federal Government supports 
such price comparisons by granting subsidies78 • 
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Here, too, it is understood as a principle that the establishment and conduct 
of such information systems by independent consumer organisations bears no 
relation to competition and is not therefore subject to the regulations under the 
law of unfair competition. This must hold true also if, for instance, certain 
enterprises are recommended to the consumer as charging particularly moderate 
prices or as being particularly quality-conscious. However, this principle of law 
is quite controversial79 • lt is assumed in some cases that the naming of individual 
shops in the form of a recommendation where to buy already bears a relation to 
competition. For the same reasons as those given in the Federal High Court's 
decision on comparative testing, this cannot be accepted: recommendations as 
to where to buy serve primarily to inform about market conditions and to guide 
the consumer, but not to promote business. Therefore there is no act of competi-
tion. Civil liability for such information systems will generally flow from 
Art. 824 Civil Code, since price comparisons, hints to quality and the like are 
based on facts. In the case of negligent misrepresentations, the consumer organi-
sation may thus generally refer to its legitimate interest in consumer guidance; 
however, it must expect a claim for retraction or correction to be raised should 
the information be false, incomplete or misleading. Again, this holds true only 
if in its price comparisons individual suppliers are mentioned by name. General 
price surveys, price trends, quality information and the like are not subject to 
civil liability. 
If the information systems contain opinions instead of facts, liability under 
Art. 823, para. 1 arises. Generally speaking, there will be no liability, unless 
concrete names are given, for instance in the form of shopping hints. However, 
if names are mentioned, the principles of court practice concerning comparative 
testing must be obeyed. 
4 Consumer criticism, consumer boycott 
74 Public criticism of goods and services by consumer organisations and appeals 
to boycott do not constitute legal problems to be judged on the principles of 
unfair competition, since consumer organisations do not act to promote busi-
ness. The principles of the law of torts as described above are applicable. Lia-
bility for public criticism and appeals to boycott arises the sooner, the more 
intense the form of criticism (so-called defamatory criticism) and the more the 
criticism affects specifically a particular supplier 80 • In the case of defamatory 
criticism, liability will already arise because of intentionally unfair damage or 
because of defamation. In the case of criticism based on representations, the 
basis of liability is Art. 824. As described above, in the case of negligent misrep-
resentations, liability for damages does not arise if the consumer organisation 
can plead the safeguarding of legitimate interests. There is a legitimate interest 
in general consumer information on grievances, for instance, in trade. How-
ever, the consumer association may have to retract its representations if they are 
incorrect or cannot be proved (claim for retraction or correction). 
Liability pursuant to Art. 823, para. 1 Civil Code comes into play if the criti-
cism is based predominantly or exclusively on value judgments or is expressed in 
value judgments. This is generally the case with appeals to boycott. Criticism 
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and appeals to boycott on the part of consumer organisations, as has been estab-
lished by court practice, are generally allowed by the basic right of freedom of 
opinion 81 • In the case of general criticism of goods, an appeal to boycott, for 
instance, a product marketed by several producers (meat boycott, boycott of 
cigarettes) there will be no business-related interference, so that the precondi-
tions of Art. 823 do not exist. If the boycott hits a particular supplier or a partic-
ular product, more exacting standards have occasionally been applied in court 
practice. Here often a weighing of interests is taken as a criterion; consumer 
interests are weighed against business interests of the criticised or boycotted 
enterprise. Thus, in a case where a certain automobile brand had come under 
severe public criticism from a consumer self-help institution the Regional Court 
of Berlin82 has stated that in this case the criticism was justified, because the 
consumer had come forward with his negative experiences which were in 
contrast to the manufacturer's advertising. Moreover, the manufacturer had 
come under public criticism already from other quarters, so that it was only fair 
for those injured to 'follow the matter up', as it were. Whether from that the 
converse conclusion may be drawn that other forms of criticism are inadmissi-
ble, has not been decided by the court. 
In another case, the Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart83 had to consider a 
consumer boycott on the occasion of what is known as 'camouflaged adver-
tising' on television. While the court assumed that generally such criticism of the 
manufacturer had to be accepted, this was meant to apply only as long as 
camouflaged advertising on television was not in general feit to be offensive. 
Since meanwhile there had been a change in the attitude towards camouflaged 
advertising, particularly as it is practised openly by television companies, an 
appeal to boycott, it was argued, was no longer admissible, because the facts 
challenged were lacking in offensiveness. The decision gives rise to doubts 
because it compels consumer organisations to accept without criticism grievances 
that have 'become a habit'. 
In the weighing of interests in connection with the judgment of appeals to 
boycott it is also taken into account whether the boycott is based on incorrect 
facts, whether it keeps within the limits of what is necessary and required, 
whether it is leveled at persons uninvolved and whether it is arbitrary. On 
balance, this means that the selective boycott for a certain enterprise or a certain 
product by consumer organisations involves considerable risks of liability. 
V VOLUNTARY LABELLING AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 
1 Actual occurrence 
75 In addition to the introduction of statutory labelling obligations and the 
promotion of counter-information through consumer organisations, voluntary 
labelling by suppliers plays an important part in the consumer policy of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. In the Federal Government's Second Report on 
Consumer Affairs of 1975 it says: 'The Federal Government also attaches con-
siderable importance to voluntary informative labelling of goods'84 • Through 
economic and legal measures, the Federal Government induces trade and 
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industry to enhance voluntary informative Iabelling. The following systems of 
information may be mentioned. 
(aa) In the area of safety labelling, enterprises associated with the Deutsche 
Institut für Normung (DIN) (German Institute for Standardisation)85 may use 
the DIN labe! if their product corresponds to the institute's guidelines; the labe! 
'DIN tested' is used if the merchandise before being put on the market was 
tested by an independent testing agency recognised by the DIN for compliance 
with the standard concerned86 • However, manufacturers are under no obliga-
tion to test and/or labe! their products. 
A similar practice is followed in the area of testing and labelling of electrotech-
nical goods (VDE Iabel)87 , technical equipment (TÜV-maschinenschutzgeprüft, 
mechanically tested and approved by the Technical Inspection Authority)88 , gas 
and water installations (DIN-DVGW inspection Iabel)89 • In addition, the 
Federal Government has demanded that a general safety labe! protected under 
trade mark Iaw be introduced. This is tobe done by the 'Trägergemeinschaft 
Sicherheitszeichen e. V.' (Industrial Federation 'Safety Iabels')90 • The activity of 
the Federal Government has been discontinued after the introduction of the 
safety labe! 'GS-geprüfte Sicherheit' (No. 59). 
(bb) Of greater importance to the consumer is what is known as quality labe/-
fing. Examples are the Deutsche Weinsiegel (German wine labe!), the Badische 
Weinsiegel (wine label of Baden), the RAL label of producers who are members 
of the RAL, for instance producers of furniture and windows91 • However, 
consumers also level criticism at quality labelling: in most cases it is a matter of 
minimum requirements only, so that for the consumer a comparison of qualities 
is impossible; the labe! serves to promote sales. Its design, use and testing is the 
responsibility of manufacturers92 • 
(cc) Furthermore, the Federal Government supports what is known as product 
information. Such information is to explain to the consumer in a brief and 
intelligible way the main qualities of a product and, if necessary, arrange them 
in a reference scale, for instance energy consumption, performance, loading 
capacity. Consumer representatives'13 take part in the preparation of product 
information which is currently being tested in the area of electrical household 
appliances (refrigerators, washing machines, etc.). 
(dd) In the case of products injurious to health, for instance tobacco 
products, the Federal Government exerts an influence on manufacturers 
endeavouring to induce them to labe! harmful substances. The declaration oftar 
and nicotine components in cigarettes may serve as an example94 • Particularly, 
the Federal Government was successful in persuading suppliers to introduce 
warning notes; (but not before 1980); the statutory authorisation was not 
utilised (No. 55). 
A development similar to the above is beginning to appear in the case of 
sausages, where manufacturers and traders are beginning 'voluntarily' to indi-
cate the fat content. In other respects the obligation to indicate harmful side 
effects follows from the law of manufacturer's product Iiability (Nos. 165ff). 
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As far as that goes, labelling may be uniform for certain groups of products, for 
example inflammable or toxic household goods. 
(ee) In the discussion about these questions, more far-reaching proposals are 
being maintained. The Commission of Economic and Social Changes has 
demanded that quality labels and at the same time quality classes of products be 
introduced to make it possible for the consumer to compare prices and qualities 
on an objective basis95. A minority of the Commission members even demanded 
that the test results of the Stiftung Warentest be indicated when the goods are 
sold 96• lt is not clear, though, whether such labelling should be on a voluntary or 
on a statutory basis. 
2 Legal bases and consequences of voluntary labelling 
76 Since labelling is perforrned on a voluntary basis, legal regulations play only 
an indirect part regarding participation in an information system as weil as in its 
design and consequences. Without claiming completeness, we may refer to the 
following points. 
(aa) A safety or quality labe! may be registered as a collective trade mark and is 
then subject to trade mark protection97 • The holder of the labe! - the Trägerge-
meinschaft (industrial federation) - under trade mark law may take action 
against the use of the labe! contrary to the holder's statute (for instance, non-
compliance with the testing criteria). At the same time a consumer association 
may challenge a manufacturer making unauthorised use of a safety or quality 
labe! for misleading advertising (No. 118). 
(bb) An association for a collective mark is subject to certain antitrust 
barriers, particularly if it is used as a means of regulation of the market. As far 
as the requirements made by the association are the same in respect of all com-
petitors it is exempted from the ban on trusts98 • 
(cc) If it is a matter of public interest, the Federal Cartel Office or the Minister 
of Economics may exempt uniform labelling from the operation of antitrust law 
if it tends to restrain competition, e.g. in advertising. This has been done in the 
case of an agreement of cigarette manufacturers on the marking of smoke 
components99 • 
(dd) Under civil law, the use of labels does not entail any legal consequences. 
A safety or quality labe! does not imply any promise to assume liability to third 
parties, particularly to final consumers 100• Because of such court practice, 
voluntary labelling has lost much of its practical importance to the consumer; it 
remains a means of sales promotion for manufacturers and may therefore 
hardly be considered to be in the interest of consumers. 
(ee) The application of the test results of the Stiftung Warentest on products 
- possibly demanded under a voluntary or statutory labelling system - is 
subject to the prohibition of misleading advertising 101 • Deception will always 
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exist if a certain time has elapsed between the test and the labelling, since then 
the bases of evaluation no longer apply. The indication of the results of 
comparative testing valuations within the framework of a labelling system may 
be subject to the prohibition of comparative advertising (No. 91). 
3 The future of voluntary labelling systems 
77 The brief survey of the actual and the legal position is not encouraging as 
regards voluntary labelling. lt serves primarily the sales interest of manufac-
turers, traders and suppliers of services. lt is based on the voluntary decision of 
enterprises and on the voluntary cooperation ofindividual suppliers. Consumer 
representatives participate in information systems only in exceptional cases. 
They do not enable the consumer to make genuine price and quality comparisons. 
In other areas 'voluntary' labelling - Iike 'voluntary' restrictions on adver-
tising (No. 126) - serves to prevent state intervention, for example in the 
tobacco industry. 
For all these reasons - in contrast to the Federal Government's 
opinion - voluntary labelling should no langer be promoted. Instead, counter-
information by consumer organisations should be improved. 
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CHAPTER4 
Advertising and Sales Promotion 
1 PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
78 The complexity of legislation and court practice in the Federal Republic of 
Germany dealt with here comprises a !arge variety of regulations on consumer 
protection and trade practices. The starting point in terms of consumer policy is 
the fact observed in all industrial countries of the European Community that 
advertising and 'marketing' take a prominent position in the wor/d of consump-
tion 1. For the manufacturer, they are the decisive means of putting his products 
or services on the market, of keeping them on the market, of winning additional 
market shares at the expense of his competitors and of 'courting the customer's 
favour'. Traders, at least outside the sale of branded articles, are also largely 
using advertising and their own marketing, by pointing out the advantageous 
shopping opportunities they offer, by emphasising the supply of products they 
have on sale or by creating their own brands (so-called dealer's brands 
- Handelsmarken). As has been shown by numerous empirical investigations, 
for the consumer, advertising and marketing cum grano salis continue tobe the 
main incentive and information as regards the purchase decision. Generally, 
the consumer is introduced to a new product through advertising, viz. through 
the supplier. Advertising is desigiied to determine his preferences, whether 
for certain brands, certain outlets or certain demand priorities. Advertising 
gives him an idea of price and quality, and, at least in branded goods, pro-
vides him with the image, the so-called 'additional benefit' of a product or 
service2• Marketing makes him familiar with a product by means of prize com-
petitions, promotional activities, etc„ and confronts him with new marketing 
methods. 
The types and shapes of advertising and marketing are so numerous, 
constantly evolving and characterised by rapid change that it is hardly possible 
to give a general definition. However, about three main types of advcrtising may 
be distinguished which are reflected in the so-called marketing mix of enter-
prises3: advertising in the form of product and packing design, in the case of 
services through the layout of prospectuses (so-called product accompanying 
advertising), media advertising including outdoor advertising, and advertising 
in the form of sales promotion (sales promotion methods, trade practices in the 
narrow sense as, for instance, door-to-door sales, gifts, discounts and the like). 
The constitutional starting point for consumer protection /egislation in the 
Federal Republic of Germany is the admissibility of all types of advertising and 
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marketing not infringing 'public order'. This follows from the basic right of 
freedom to choose and practice a profession which allows the entrepreneur, 
regardless of the level of trade, freedom to use the necessary methods to 
promote the sale of his products or services4 • Other constitutional provisions 
guarantee cum grano salis this kind of 'freedom of advertising', without 
defining their limits in a particular case tobe outlined here. lt is a matter of 
argument, though, whether the admissibility of (media) advertising should be 
based on the principle of freedom of opinion and of the press pursuant to Art. 5 
Basic Law5: we should not forget that the freedom of the press was granted for 
the sake of political and social communication, but not for the sake of sales 
promotion in the interest of enterprises. Basically, this also applies to media 
advertising with, however, the peculiarity emphasised by the Federal Constitu-
tional Court regarding the advertisement section of a newspaper, that this 
section is also subject to the protection of freedom of the press and of opinion6• 
The basic constitutional freedom of advertising in this broad sense is not, 
however, guaranteed by the Constitution without limit. Since advertising 
usually concerns the practice of a profession, more precisely of a trade or 
business, and not its commencement as such, Art. 12 Basic Law largely allows 
statutory restrictions and interventions in the freedom of advertising. The 
constitutional barrier in this case is merely the principle of reasonableness, as 
the Federal Constitutional Court has ruled in connection with the ban on adver-
tising in road traffic7• Intervention must not be an excessive burden on the 
advertiser; less intensive forms of intervention should be preferred to those 
aiming at stricter regulation. On the other hand, the interests of the pub/ic 
affected by advertising must also be considered. These should meanwhile also 
include consumer interests8 if the Constitution is interpreted in line with the idea 
of the welfare state. This is no doubt recognised in the area of subjects relating 
to the consumer's health and safety, for instance in food and drug law: here the 
legislator on account of his constitutional obligation is even obliged to take steps 
against abuses in advertising, for instance health-related advertising. As has 
meanwhile been recognised, in many placeS' the legislator has exercised bis right 
to issue appropriate regulations. Furthermore, the legislator is called upon to 
protect the consumer's freedom of choice which follows from Art. 2 Basic Law. 
This is of importance particularly to the regulation of trade practices, for 
instance those invading the customer's privacy, trying to deceive him or to 
manipulate his purchase decision9• 
Thus the Federal Constitutional Court considered the ban under the law of 
unfair competition on calls by gravestone solicitors a constitutionally admis-
sible restriction of the freedom to practice a profession w. This principle may 
well be generalised. lt also applies mutatis mutandis to media advertising and 
to advertising on or attached to a product, which in particular must not be 
deceptive and misleading. The prohibition to deceive and mislead the consumer 
therefore has afirm constitutional basis. 
For the customer's purchase decision it is also important that hebe provided 
with expert, objective and neutral information to enable him to use his freedom 
of decision concerning economic issues in the first place 11 • In the author's 
opinion this principle, too, derives from the conception of our state as a welfare 
state and therefore, beyond the scope of public health regulations, may justify 
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restrictions of the freedom of advertising. The obligation to furnish informa-
tion may either be placed on the advertiser himself or be fulfilled by the estab-
lishment of appropriate counter information systems which independent of 
supplier advertising provide the customer with criteria for his purchase deci-
sions; this has already been discussed in Chapter 3. At the same time this defines 
the constitutional scope of more recent consumer legislation and court practice 
concerning the informative value of advertising. Hence, regulations on 
consumer information and on advertising overlap. 
In addition to the aspect of information, the aspect of control, specifically in 
terms of the objectivity of marketing, plays a prominent part. Depending on the 
scope of the trade practice involved, control of varying intensity may constitu-
tionally be required or allowed. Lastly, theprotection of the individual consumer 
must not be forgotten: since advertising in the broad sense as described above, 
particularly aggressive, manipulative or deceptive forms of advertising, often 
results in the customer binding himself under a contract, he must be given an 
opportunity to free himself from decisions which are prejudicial to him and 
which he would not have taken had he had second thoughts. The principle of 
pacta sunt servanda which is 'sacred' to civil law, requires restrictions for the 
sake of consumer protection. 
This presentation will deal first with the law of advertising messages (adver-
tising in the narrow sense), then with the Iaw of sales promotion (trade practices 
in the narrow sense) and lastly with the control mechanisms inclusive of self-
control and proposals for reform. Because of the wealth of German case law, 
the presentation will be confined to consumer affairs. 
II ADVERTISING MESSAGES 
79 In the law of the Federal Republic of Germany, there have been no regula-
tions so far controlling and restricting advertising messages specifically from the 
viewpoint of consumer protection. Rather, matters of advertising are regulated 
in the UWG of 1909 andin numerous special acts. The UWG was not initially a 
consumer protection act, but an act for the protection of competitors 12• Only 
recently, particularly through the introduction of the collective action by con-
sumer organisations in 1965 and as a result of more recent court decisions, has 
consumer protection come to be considered one of the objectives of the Iaw of 
unfair competition 13 • The new codifications in the area of drugs and foodstuffs 
expressly claim to protect the consumer against deceptive advertising 14• Other 
special acts, for instance the Weingesetz, aim more at the protection of pro-
ducers and traders and provide consumer protection only indirectly. 
In the following, the existing Iaw of advertising under aspects of consumer 
protection will be described first on the basis of the law against unfair competi-
tion and then on the basis of special acts. 
1 The general prohibition of misleading advertising 
80 The basic standard of any advertising measure is Art. 3 UWG, which 
prohibits misleading advertising. Because of its importance, the regulation is 
quoted Iiterally below: 
73 
Any person who in the course of any trade or business for the purpose of 
competition makes misleading statements about business circumstances, 
particularly about the condition, origin, production method or price deter-
mination of individual goods, commercial services or of the supply in 
general, about price lists, the method of supply or source of supply of goods, 
the possession of awards, the occasion or purpose of the sale, or about the 
quantity of stock, may be sued for an injunction. 
In the opinion of most people, Art. 3 contains a prohibition of misleading 
advertising and therefore requires truth in advertising 15 • The importance and 
scope ofthis prohibition is revealed only on the basis of court practice which will 
be evaluated here through an analysis of cases typical of consumer affairs. 
However, beforehand the essential legal aspects of Art. 3 will be briefly 
reported on. 
81 (aa) The prohibition to mislead relates only to statements about circumstances 
made in the course of business for the purpose of competition. The concept of 
acting in the course of 'business for the purpose of competition' is administered 
by the courts under Art. 3 UWG in a similar way as under Art. 1. lt is always 
required that the advertising measure should promote one's own or somebody 
else's business16• Such a promotion of business (wettbewerbsbezogene Hand-
lung) always exists in the case of advertising measures of enterprises on the con-
sumer goods market. Difficulties of delimitation are encountered only if, for 
instance, trade associations, other organisations and similar institutions engage 
in advertising. The 'rule of thumb' is that advertising measures by industrial 
associations, for example consumer guidance, come under the prohibition of 
Art. 3 UWG, but statements by consumers' associations, political parties or 
trade unions 17 do not. Also, broadcasting corporations and the press are not 
subject to the provision of Art. 3 UWG as regards their editorial sections, but 
enjoy the privilege of Art. 5 Basic Law in connection with the law of the press 
and the law of torts 18• Problems of delimitation can be imagined, for instance as 
regards the misleading design of a pub/ic relations measure in the form of 
editorial contributions 19 • In such cases freedom of the press as a protected basic 
right may not be invoked. Rather, the provisions of the law of unfair competi-
tion apply. The state participates in competition if it engages in business 
activity, but not if it enters on the market in its official function or serves basic 
needs20. Thus advertising measures by, for instance, the German Federal Rail-
ways, the Federal Postal Administration and public utilities must conform to 
the provisions of Art. 3 UWG. 
lt is more complicated to determine what the law means by 'statements' 
(Angaben) about business circumstances. To begin with, such statements are 
defined in a very wide sense in court practice. Specifically, the form in which 
such statements are made does not matter. Statements in writing, by word of 
mouth, in pictorial form or audio declarations come under the prohibition to 
mislead just as descriptions of goods, company names, packages, labels, etc21 • 
However, as far as the description of goods and traders' names and addresses 
are concerned, generally speaking special protective provisions have priority 
which in turn include a special prohibition to mislead, for instance in Art. 4, ll, 
item 4 Warenzeichengesetz (Trade Marks Act)22• If the trade mark or distinctive 
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sign is apt to mislead the consumer, the courts do not apply Art. 3 UWG, 
because they do not want to destroy the goodwill23 - a type of court practice 
which is very prejudicial to the consumer. 
As far as special labelling provisions exist, they do not exclude the general 
prohibition to mislead. On the other hand, a merchandise labelled in accordance 
with the statutory provisions will be unable to mislead the consumer24 • 
However, statements coming under Art. 3 must, and there is agreement to 
this effect, contain a certain factual content 25 • Mere expressions of opinion, 
vaJue judgements, puffs and the Iike are not generally considered statements, 
unless a factual core can be singled out. This differentiation is of great impor-
tance to suggestive advertising which will be dealt with below: advertising which 
appeals primarily to the unconscious or subconscious, for instance by linking a 
merchandise with certain status symbols, does not generally contain 'state-
ments' and according to existing court practice does not come under Art. 3 
UWG26 • The extent to which this fact is still acceptable today will be investigated 
below. 
82 (bb) The contents of such statements is described by way of examples in 
Art. 3. There is agreement to the effect that basically all statements are subject 
to the prohibition to mislead27 • For example, this also applies to the public rela-
tions measures of an enterprise. According to the present state of legislation, it 
does not matter to whom the statements are made. The amendment of the UWG 
of 1965 also rnade it clear that staternents made to private parties, for instance in 
private sales talks, by canvassing, etc., come under the prohibition to mislead28. 
Statements may be addressed both to an unlimited number of persons, for 
instance in the case of media advertising, and to a group of people, for instance 
in a sales talk, on the occasion of a Tupperware party (Kaffeefahrt) or by accost-
ing people in the street29• 
According to established court practice, statements about contractual rights, 
for instance the right of canceJlation in an instalment transaction, are also 
subject to the prohibition to mislead 30 • The Federal Government's bill to amend 
the UWG of 26 May 1978 expressly provides for such practice in the amended 
version of Art. 3 UWGJ1. 
83 The core of Art. 3 is the concept of deception. According to the predomi-
nating view of legal writers, it contains the principle of truth in advertising, 
which is also found in special statutory provisions. Thus, the question of how to 
determine the extent to which an advertising message is misleading becomes a 
central problem of consumer protection32 • 
The principle followed in court practice here is that the concept of deception is 
assessed not by objective, but by subjective criteria33 • This means in particular 
that in case of disputes the truth of a statement is not verified by objective 
standards: deception is assessed and determined in each case by the consumers 
and business people ajfected by the advertising measure. This leads to the 
initially paradoxical but quite consistent result on the basis of the subjective 
criterion of deception, that true statements may also be misleading, while, on 
the other hand,false statements need not be misleading34 • For example, an inde-
pendent service station had advertised the sale of 'branded petrol'. In court 
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proceedings it was able to prove that it was buying its petrol from one of the 
major oil companies. The petrol sold by the service station was thus of the same 
grade as the 'branded petrol' offered for sale by the big oil companies at their 
service stations. Yet the courts held that it was a matter of deception and an act 
of unfair competition: the consumers and business people concerned expected 
the description 'branded petrol' not only to stand for the same origin and 
quality as the petrol sold by the big oil companies, but also to justify the sale as a 
'branded product' 35 . An example of the reverse case, i.e. that false statements 
need not be misleading, is that of spruce-needle extract, which is made not, as 
the description suggests, from spruce needles, but from spruce bark. The courts 
denied that this was misleading, since consumers and business people do not go 
by the·exact composition of the product as regards its ingredients and are not 
therefore apt tobe misled by the statement, which was actually false 36• Much the 
same is true of the descriptions 'Bauernbrot' (home-made bread), 'Holzofen-
brot' (bread baked in an old-fashioned oven), and the like: while this type of 
bread was neither 'home made' nor was a wood stove used in its production, 
consumers are not misled, since this is merely a generic description. 
However, the courts do not· handle the principle of deception quite consis-
tently, but also use objective standards, for instance in advertising making 
reference to experts, in advertising claiming an exclusive position, andin health-
related advertising37• 
To mislead, the likeliness or dang er of misleading the consumers and business 
people concerned is sufficient38 . The prohibition to mislead must not be 
confused with the requirement of objectivity nor with the requirement of infor-
mativeness in advertising. Advertising is not necessarily misleading even if it is 
unobjective or not informative39. 
The courts have established definite principles to determine the extent of 
deception. Firstly, advertisements are distinguished according to the people to 
whom they appeal. Advertising appealing to experts must satisfy standards 
different from those of general consumer advertising4o. The relevant view in this 
connection is not determined by extremely tolerant, extremely strict or critical 
attitudes, but by an average standard. The perfunctory observer who is typically 
affected by an advertising measure is the decisive criterion of deception4'. 
However, it does not suffice that a completely irrelevant portion of the public is 
apt tobe misled. Conversely, neither is it necessary that the majority of potential 
consumers is misled. Rat her, it is assumed that it is sufficient if about 10-15% 
of the consumers concerned are misled by an advertising measure42 • 
The standards of deception may be ascertained by the court itself or estab-
lished through a public opinion pol!. The advertising measure must always be 
considered as a whole, but from the point of view of those to whom it appeals 
and not from the advertiser's point of view4J. If the standards have changed, this 
is of importance in deception. If they have been fixed by legislation, particularly 
in the law of labelling, this does have an effect on deception. 
However, if the standards so established result in certain statements being 
considered misleading, before a prohibition of advertising is issued there must 
be a weighing of interests against the advertiser's interests warranting protec-
tion44. Here especially the protection of goodwill plays a great role in practice. 
The buyer or consumer's interests in advertising that is not misleading shall not 
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result in the destruction of goodwill which has been attained through many 
years of advertising45 • The result in such a case may be that in spite of deception 
no injunction is granted or that through an appropriate addition a possible 
danger of misleading is removed. 
2 Cases to be distinguished 
84 As regards deception, the following cases play a part in practice from the 
consumer's point of view: 
(aa) Incomplete advertising: from Art. 3 UWG the courts do not infer the 
requirement of completeness in advertising46 • The advertiser is in no way obliged 
to point out disadvantages of his product, unless a special obligation is placed 
upon him by law or on account of the generally accepted standards. Such an 
obligation to furnish information may exist by way of exception if the conceal-
ment of disadvantages is of importance to consumers and in turn results in 
deception. If incomplete advertising creates a wrong overall impression, an 
indirect obligation to provide complete data may exist. This principle is of 
importance, for instance, in health-related advertising, as the courts have 
repeatedly established in the case of coffee advertising: in the case of semi-
luxuries 'any doubts about the effects of a product on health require a restric-
tion of advertising' 47 • Statutory labelling obligations result in an obligation to 
furnish information only if the omission of such information is relevant to 
consumers 48 • Otherwise, the appropriate sanctions und er the law of labelling are 
applicable. 
(bb) In the case of so-called ambiguous statements, the courts judge each 
statement on the basis of the extent to which it is misleading49 • An example was a 
razor advertisement: 'best-selling safety razor in the world'. lt was a fact that 
the advertised razor sold best all over the world, but not in the Federal Republic. 
The courts assumed in this case an ambiguous statement and therefore 
considered it tobe misleading, because the razor was not the best-selling safety 
razor in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
(cc) Advertising using seif-evident facts may be misleading if the competitor 
points out things he is obliged to do anyway; for example, if he emphasises that a 
certain product does not contain any contaminations, although such additives 
are illegal and all competitors observe the statutory regulationss0• 
( dd) According to prevailing court practice, puffs are not usually misleading. 
Advertising is conceded a certain degree of 'puffing' and a limit is practically set 
only where gross deception begins. lt is understood as a principle that 
consumers do not take puffs seriously and that therefore an advertising measure 
need not be measurable in the light of the truthfulness of its message 51 • The 
limits are more liberal in slogan advertising than in pictorial advertising: since 
the language of advertising has necessarily a 'puffing' quality it is not the task 
of the prohibition to mislead to reduce such language to anormal standard. On 
the other hand, pictorial advertising has a greater influence on the consumer, so 
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here a stricter standard is applied to puffs52 • Much the same is true of advertising 
with a scientific slant (toothpaste, margarine). 
3 Price advertising 
85 Statements about pricing, price lists, etc„ must be in accordance with the 
prohibition to mislead as expressly stated in Art. 3. lt should be noted that in 
this context Art. 3 is invoked only in cases where other standards are not 
applied, while the price marking obligation follows from the Preisangaben-
verordnung and the obligation to indicate the unit price follows from the Eich-
gesetz (Nos. 40ff). Moreover, special regulations apply to the allowance of 
discounts, wholesalers' advertising and the like. lt should also be noted that the 
cases of misleading price advertising decided in practice do not always relate to 
facts relevant to consumers, but are often used to extend the protection of 
branded goods. In practice, Art. 3 has developed into a typical instrument for 
combating outsiders, which may be particularly detrimental to the consumer if 
it prevents aggressive but correct price advertising, for instance through price 
reductions53 • 
In practice the following cases may play a part. 
(aa) So-called bait advertising (Lockvogelwerbung) may be prohibited as 
being misleading advertising pursuant to Art. 3s4. Four cases of prohibited bait 
advertising are recognised: 
- price advertising of a product not available to the advertiser; 
- advertising of a product available to the advertiser in insufficient quan-
tities only; 
- advertising of a product available to the advertiser in sufficient volumes 
with the intention of persuading the customer in a sales talk to buy a 
different, more expensive product; 
- advertising of the specially favourable pricing of a product, thus creating 
the wrong impression that the advertiser's overall assortment of goods is 
as closely calculated. 
The first three cases play hardly any role in practice because of the difficulty of 
producing proof. More problematical, though, is deception as to the overall 
supply in the form of misleading bait advertising. According to court practice, it 
is a matter of deception if the exceptionally favourable pricing of a product is 
advertised in such a way that the consumers concerned consider such a price to 
be an example of the pricing of the overall assortment of goods, while in acrual 
fact the other articles are normally or even excessively priced. The more obvious 
it is to the customer that it is a special offer detached from the other products, 
the less there is a <langer of deception as to the market value of the overall 
supply. However, if a dealer offers only a few goods, the price of which the con-
sumer knows, at strikingly favourable prices without pointing out that they are 
special offers, the <langer of deception increases55 • From this decision several 
lower courts as weil as trade associations have taken the idea that price adver-
tising below the factory price or cost price should be considered misleading56 • 
However, the Federal High Court has opposed this opinion in a recent decision 
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and has pointed out that the danger of deception must not be inferred from in-
company factors as, for example, the falling below the cost price or the arbi-
trariness of price making 57 • Hence it becomes clear that advertising of prices 
below costs does not constitute misleading advertising. Generally speaking, 
price cutting cannot therefore be opposed pursuant to Art. 3, which is a devel-
opment tobe welcomed from the point of view of the consumer58 • 
(bb) A second form of misleading advertising takes place throughfalse price 
comparisons. According to court practice, such advertising is prohibited if the 
higher price was not previously charged by the dealer at all or was not charged 
seriously. The courts allow the enterprise to advertise price reductions and use 
them as advertising media. However, a price reduction must not merely be 
invented. The courts, therefore, decide in each individual case when a price is to 
be considered seriously charged59• 
The CDU/CSU parliamentary group in a proposal for amendment made in 
1978 wanted to prohibit all comparative price advertising in a new Art. 3a 
UWG60 • Such a prohibition must be rejected on grounds of legal policy, since it 
aims at withholding from the consumer useful (and not misleading) data in 
advertising 61 • 
(cc) Another aspect is the advertising of so-called Mondpreise (fictitious 
prices) or Mondpreisempfehlungen (recommendations of fictitious prices). Fic-
titious prices exist if the price asked is not guided from the start by market condi-
tions, but serves primarily to make a 'price reduction' possible to the dealer for 
the purpose of deluding customers into believing that it is an attractive offer. 
Fictitious prices, as far as they occur in the form of price recommendations, are 
controlled under antitrust law (No. 28). lf a supplier or trader has violated the 
provisions of the law of restrictive trade practices (recommendations of fic-
titious prices, false descriptions, No. 29), he may be liable under Art. 3 UWG 62 • 
( dd) As regards the way in which the price is quoted and presented the courts 
see to it that the consumer is not misled. This applies to descriptions such as the 
manufacturer's price, wholesale price, discount price and cost price. We shall 
not go into details here63. 
4 Advertising of the quality and condition of goods or services 
86 To the consumer it is a matter of importance that he should buy goods or 
services of as high a quality as possible at favourable prices, while conversely the 
advertiser is interested in claiming the superiority of his products or services. 
The basic standard employed to resolve conflicts of interests arising in this con-
nection is again Art. 3 UWG. As a principle it may be noted that the courts 
assume misleading advertising of the quality of goods only if the actual condi-
tion differs from the advertised condition to a material degree64 • Here the dis-
advantage that the advertiser is not required to ensure that his advertising is 
objectively correct becomes particularly apparent. 
From court practice a few examples may be cited: hyperbolic claims con-
cerning the quality and condition of a product are generally accepted within 
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certain limits; 'puffing is part of the trade' 65 • There is a limit only where, for 
instance, an exclusive position (Alleinstellung) is claimed, average performance 
is passed off for maximum performance, used goods are claimed to be brand-
new, and goods are provided with fictitious or seif-evident guarantees 66 • On the 
other hand, the courts also see to it that quality advertising does not infringe any 
other interests of competitors warranting protection, for instance in the case of 
the addition 'genuine Skai', which the courts prohibited as misleading because 
the product simulated leather67 • lf certain quasi-drugs or medicinal products not 
subject to the law concerning drugs are said to have certain effects which in 
actual fact cannot occur, the prohibition to mislead does not as a rule apply68 • 
The same is true of cosmetics, potency drugs and tonics, tranquillisers, etc. 
However, here the pertinent provisions of food and drugs law must be observed 
which will be dealt with below. lt may also be noted that recently the courts have 
applied stricter standards. 
5 Other cases 
87 (aa) By contrast, advertising which misleads as to geographical origin or 
origin in terms of a particular manufacture plays a great role in court practice69 • 
Here the courts have developed strict principles which contrast sharply with the 
rules regarding the advertising of quality. Misleading advertising of origin exists 
already if, for instance, symbols or linguistic reminiscences create the impres-
sion that a product comes from a certain region as, for instance, the bocksbeutel 
flask in the case of wine from Baden10. Furthermore, in court practice the 
change in meaning regarding a description of origin is considered a criterion, 
so that a description of origin formerly considered misleading for the purposes 
of advertising need no longer be misleading11. Also, the advertiser's interest in 
preserving his goodwill is weighed against the interest of consumers in correct 
statements of originn. 
Special regulations exist particularly concerning statements of origin in the 
case of wine and similar products. This does not follow from the UWG, but 
from the provisions of special legislation 73. 
88 (bb) Advertising of an exclusive position (Alleinstellungswerbung), which is 
prohibited because it is misleading, exists according to court practice if the 
advertising enterprise claims a top position (quality, turnover, pricing, etc.) 
which it does not actually occupy. However, such advertising also requires that 
there be a factual content 74• lf meaningless statements are used in advertising, 
for instance 'white, whiter is impossible', this is not prohibited. Not so in the 
case of the description: 'this one and no other' 75 • 
The form of advertising does not matter 76 • The most common case will be 
advertising using superlatives, but other means may also be used. Likewise, the 
circumstances in which an enterprise engages in advertising or how the relevant 
consumers and business people understand the advertisement may amount to a 
claim of exclusive position. 
Prohibited advertising of an exclusive position may also take the form of 
comparative advertising. However, specific reference to other competitors is a 
precondition which is ascertained depending on a particular case. 
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Actions against advertising of an exclusive position usually concern not con-
sumers but diverging interests of competing enterprises. 
89 (cc) Particularly misleading are advertisements that are wrongly based on 
somebody else's authority, opinions, comparative testing, etc. Here the courts 
start from the premise that the advertiser also makes claims by third parties his 
own if they are described as such in his advertisement. The advertiser has to bear 
the full risk of any incorrectness involved in using someone else's authority. 
Advertising may be misleading both if it is false and if it is objectively correct 77 • 
Of Jate, advertising using the results of comparative testing78 has played a par-
ticular role. As far as the problem of comparative advertising is touched upon 
here, it will be dealt with below (No. 91). Deception within the meaning of 
Art. 3 UWG exists if the comparative test is reproduced incorrectly or incom-
pletely. Deception may also exist if the product referred to in the test is not the 
sarrie as the advertised product. Other cases of test advertising which may be 
misleading depend very much on the circumstances in an individual case. Thus, 
test advertising may be misleading if it emphasises characteristics that are of 
little importance but have been assessed in a positive way, while the overall test 
result is negative rather than positive. In no way do the courts require the adver-
tiser to reproduce the comparative test completely. lt suffices, for instance, that 
the overall result is advertised, even if some of the characteristics tested were not 
satisfactory. Also, the advertiser has not so far been required to state the com-
parative test result in respect of his product, which consumer organisations 
demand him to do. 
6 Supplemental application of Art. 1 UWG 
90 Art. 1 UWG, which prohibits acts of competition that are against pub/ic 
policy, is of importance primarily to trade practices such as sales promotion. 
For the legal evaluation of advertising, Art. 1 UWG is used only subsidiarily. In 
particular, the principle of fairness concerning trade practices in a narrow sense 
(Werbemethoden - No. 104), which was developed in court practice, has not 
yet been extended to include all advertising messages. 
Pursuant to Art. 1 UWG, for instance, the following statements may be pro-
hibited, with the circumstances in each individual case tobe weighed carefully. 
Thus, for example, advertising in the press or in any other medium in the form 
of editorial publicity infringes not only Art. 3, but also Art. 1 UWG. According 
to more recent court practice, this is true of all public relations measures79 • 
Grossly unsubstantiated advertising claims may also be against public policy. lt 
is regarded tobe against pub/ic policy to deceive the customer about his statu-
tory rights, for instance the right of cancellation in the AbzG 8o. Certain types of 
advertising exploiting fear, appealing to chi!dren, abusing pity or exciting 
prejudices may be against public policy, a gross infringement being required in 
this case also 81 • The legal evaluation of what is known as 'camouflaged adver-
tising' on television (during the broadcasting of sports events advertising 
messages displayed in the sports fields are broadcast simultaneously) is a 
debatable question. While initially it appeared that this type of camouflaged 
advertising infringed Art. 1 UWG, more recent court practice has essentially 
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dismissed these doubts. As a result, the commercialisation of camouflaged 
advertising is in practice recognised by the courtss2• Consumer associations 
merely have the possibility of criticising these forms of advertising (No. 74). 
7 Comparative advertising 
91 We speak of comparative advertising if the advertiser through his true adver-
tising messages simultaneously refers to properties, prices, etc., of somebody 
else's products, particularly those of a competitor83 • Here again a distinction 
is made according to the content of the advertising message: comparative 
advertising may be positive or negative. In the case of positive comparative 
advertising, an offence against public policy may exist inasmuch as an advertiser 
passes off the good reputation of somebody else's product 84 • Of greater impor-
tance in practice is what is known as negative or critical comparative adver-
tising. In its early rulings, the Supreme Court of the German Reich has initially 
assumed the general inadmissibility of comparati ve advertising85 • The ad vertiser 
should not be judge in his own cause. Competitors need not accept the (bad!) 
results of their performance being used in promoting somebody else's competi-
tion. In the practice of the Supreme Court of the German Reich and later on of 
the Federal High Court, certain exceptions to the prohibition were developed, 
for instance in the case of comparison of different technical systems, in defence 
against attacks by a competitor, in the furnishing of information upon a con-
sumer's request andin the description of technical progress. 
In its recent rulings, the Federal High Court has extended this !ist of excep-
tions to the effect that it considers comparative advertising admissible if in a 
particular case there is sufficient cause for such advertising and if it keeps within 
the limits of reasonableness. Sufficient cause may also be consumer guidance. 
However, the full burden of proofthat there is such cause and that the compara-
tive advertisement is not reasonable is imposed on the advertiser. lf he is unable 
to furnish proof to that effect, he must bear the risk of paying damages86 • 
In reality, the Federal High Court 's decisions, specifically in the area of 
advertising relevant to consumers, have brought about hardly any changes. 
Correct comparative advertising, despite its possibly informative nature, today 
continues tobe an exceptional situation. Conversely, numerous rules of compe-
tition pursuant to Art. 28 GWB endeavour to impose in certain branches of 
trade 'self-control' and a prohibition of comparative advertising, for example in 
insurance advertising 87 • Moreover, recent decisions by the Federal High Court 
have shown that it continues to adhere to the exceptional nature of comparative 
advertising despite its admissibility under a general clause88 • This legal position 
can be changed only by the legislator. 
From the point of view of consumer policy it may be noted that comparative 
advertising has ambivalent features. lt may serve to throw more light upon 
market conditions if it provides the consumer with the information he requires 
for his purchase decision. Conversely, it may cause confusion if it unduly 
emphasises certain characteristics of a product as compared with other products 
and thus leads to a potential <langer of deception. As long as the prohibition of 
misleading advertising is conceived in a subjective rather than in an objective 
way, in particular not placing any obligation on the advertiser as to complete-
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ness and objectivity of advertising messages, the consumer is more likely to 
suffer than benefit from any liberalisation of comparative advertising. 
8 Suggestive advertising 
92 Despite much uncertainty and controversy in marketing research we define 
suggestive advertising as advertising that appeals less to the value in use of a 
product than to additional quasi-benefits, for instance status symbols, certain 
social prejudices, ungratified desires and sexuality89• From the point of view of 
the consumer, suggestive advertising is thus characterised by an unobjective 
influence which does not provide him with the information required for his pur-
chase decision, but diverts from such information, intentionally or uninten-
tionally, conceals it, in a slogan: manipulates the consumer90 • 
This is not the proper place to discuss suggestive advertising in the social 
sciences. While representatives of consumer organisations, in particular, 
strongly challenge suggestive advertising as being manipulative or unreason-
able, advertisers point out that the consumer has become critical and that even 
suggestive advertising does not impair his sovereignty as consumer. 
For legal purposes, it may be noted that the prohibition of deception pursuant 
to Art. 3 is not usually effective in the case of the common types of suggestive 
advertising, since the latter Jack any factual content. However, this opinion is 
completely dependent on a construction of Art. 3 UWG criticised here. Through 
stricter handling of deceptive advertising no doubt certain types of suggestive 
advertising would be reached, specifically if additional quasi-benefits have been 
promised w hich the prod uct does not have, primarily in the area of heal th-related 
advertising (cosmetics, foodstuffs and semi-luxuries, etc.). 
The application of Art. l UWG remains tobe examined. So far the courts 
have declined to consider forms of suggestive advertising to be contrary to pub-
/ic po/icy, unless it is an extreme case as described above (advertising exploiting 
fear, pity and the like) 91 • More recently, legal writers have tried to develop 
criteria which make the general clause of Art. l UWG applicable also in connec-
tion with suggestive advertising. Schricker and Lehmann develop lists of exam-
ples of unobjective advertising92 • Löwenheim, for instance, considers a decisive 
factor to be how far the consumer is ab Je to control advertising messages. If the 
perfunctory average observer either fails to recognise the suggestive influence of 
an advertising message (cognitive sphere) or is no longer able to judge its rank in 
the motivation process and is no longer able to activate counteracting forces 
(voluntary sphere), the tolerance Iimit is exceeded. lt must then be established in 
an individual case where the tolerance limit is, with due regard to the findings of 
social psychology93. In the final analysis, only the legislator is able to solve these 
problems, for instance through prohibitions of certain forms of advertising, 
quantitative restrictions on the extent of advertising or a general prohibition of 
unobjective advertising94. 
9 The burden of proof 
93 In advertising, it is understood as a principle that the person who challenges 
an advertising message as being misleading or against public policy has to prove 
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the correctness of his claim9s. If he does not succeed in doing so, i.e. if it remains 
open whether or not an advertising measure is misleading or contrary to public 
policy, the plaintiff will lose his case and have to pay considerable litigation fees. 
This regulation of the burden of proof is particularly prejudicial to consumer 
organisations. 
In recent years one of the main subjects of the discussion about legal-policy 
problems in the Federal Republic of Germany has therefore been whether a 
reversal of the burden of proof should be advocated by law. Proposals to that 
effect have been submitted, for instance, by consumer organisations or the Con-
sumer Advisory Council96. These proposals have been severely criticised and 
rejected by advertisers in trade and industry who claim that this would amount 
to a general verdict on advertising as being misleading and would expose the 
advertiser to a risk no langer tolerable. Such far-reaching intervention into 
advertising, it was claimed, was not constitutionally admissible97 • 
The courts have meanwhile adopted a solution trying to reconcile the con-
flicting interests. They accept exceptions to the general rule of the burden of 
proof, if deception has occurred within the advertiser's sphere of influence and 
he can reasonably be expected to prove the correctness of his advertising claim. 
Also, ifthe plaintiff encounters difficulties in furnishing proof, a reversal ofthe 
burden of proof to the detriment of the advertiser may occur98 • 
In practice the courts have developed several cases where they presume a 
reversal of the burden of proof, or handle the general rule more subtly in 
obliging the defendant to substantiate his advertising message. The first and 
most important case is that known as advertising of an exclusive position99 • Any 
person who claims an exclusive position has to prove that such a position 
actually exists and that consumers are not misled by his claim. If he does not 
succeed in furnishing proof to that effect, he has to bear the full litigation risk. 
The courts have meanwhile developed the same principle concerning price 
comparisons 100• Whether or not the previous price was actually asked can of 
course be proved only by the advertiser and not by the person challenging the 
advertising measure. Difficulties in furnishing proof suffice for the presump-
tion of a reversal of the burden of proof. Another field of application is adver-
tising using expert opinions, authorities, comparative tests and the like 101 • Here, 
too, the advertiser has to prove that the opinions, tests, etc., cited by him are 
true. lf an advertising measure was initially misleading and the advertiser asserts 
that it became correct at a later date, for instance through product development, 
the advertiser has to prove correctness 102• lt is still an open question how to 
proceed in the case of uncertain and contested claims, such as in the area of 
health advertising. The courts have not committed themselves to a strict rule 
on the burden of proof, but may presume an advertisement tobe against public 
policy if the advertiser takes up contested or uncertain claims in his advertise-
ment without further examination 103. 
Whether apart from this an extension of the reversal of the burden of proof 
should be recommended is first of all contingent on a change of the substantive 
law of advertising, an aspect often disregarded in the discussion. A reversal of 
the burden of proof makes sense if deception is assessed only on the basis of 
objective and not predominantly on the basis of subjective criteria t04, As long as 
the courts assess deception predominantly on the basis of subjective criteria, a 
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reversal of the burden of proof does not help the consumer much, since false 
statements need not be misleading. Only after an objective test of deception has 
been introduced may a reversal of the burden of proof be considered. Such 
objective tests exist only in special legislation, where it does make sense to 
reverse the burden of proof. 
Furthermore, it should be considered that a reversal of the burden of proof 
presupposes government control of advertising, as exists, for instance, in the 
USA andin France 105 • For only this ensures that the reversal of the burden of 
proof is not abused by competitors to ward off undesirable advertising. 
In the discussion about a reform of the UWG, not the Government, but the 
CDU/CSU parliamentary group has suggested that a new Art. 13a UWG 
should provide for a reversal of the burden of proof combined with certain 
obligations on the advertiser to furnish information 106• This suggestion, which 
essentially fixes court practice, is tobe welcomed. 
10 Special prohibitions of misleading advertising in the UWG 
94 By legislation in 1969, the general prohibition to mislead was supplemented 
by new provisions of Arts 6a and 6b UWG, which in relation to the ultimate con-
sumer prohibit advertising in cases where the status of a manufacturer or a 
wholesaler is particularly emphasised; they also forbid the issuance of admis-
sion cards to certain low-price shops (Kaufscheinwerbung) available for repeated 
purchases. These provisions try to protect the consumer against misleading 
bargain offers whether or not the consumer is deceived in actual fact. In reality 
they are used mainly in fighting self-service wholesale and other modern types of 
distribution in favour of the established retail trade and hence do not promote 
the consumer interest 107• The provisions also raise doubts as to whether the term 
'ultimate consumer' relates to persons conducting a trade or business who use 
the products purchased to meet their own requirements, i.e. do not turn over the 
goods any further 108 • The courts showed a tendency towards interpreting the 
matter in broad terms, thereby negating the protective purposes of Arts 6a, 
6bl09, 
In a leading decision, the Federal High Court has meanwhile considerably 
restricted the sphere of application of Arts 6a and 6b UWG. Accordingly, 
traders and bulk consumers who purchase goods for use in their operations are 
not 'ultimate consumers'. A tolerance limit of 10% of the sales made by a self-
service wholesaler is allowed ifthe ultimate, i.e. commercial consumer, uses the 
goods for private purposes. The burden of proof to the effect that this limit was 
exceeded is on the plaintiff who objects to the advertising 110• Consequently, self-
service wholesalers are scarcely hindered in their business activity by Arts 6a and 
b UWG 111 , but a dass of privileged 'consumers' is created which may avail itself 
exclusively of the favourable shopping opportunities offered by self-service 
wholesalers. 
11 Comparison between German law and the planned EC approximation of 
laws on misleading and unfair advertising 
95 In the EC, work has for some time been under way concerning the approxima-
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tion of advertising laws112 • Meanwhile, the draft directive by the EC Com-
mission has been submitted 113 , which in the section dealing with substantive law 
conforms mostly to German law, but at the same time develops it further. It 
should be noted that in the draft greater importance is attached to the idea of 
consumer protection. This is reflected in the objective test used in determining 
deception (No. 83), with a view to covering specifically the advertising of 
product properties as well as incomplete advertising (Art. 3). The idea of fair-
ness is developed further (Art. 2) and may be used to fight suggestive adver-
tising. True and fair comparative advertising is allowed in Art. 4 beyond the 
scope of German law. Lastly, Art. 6 provides for a reversal of the burden of 
proof. On the whole it may be said that the draft will constitute an improvement 
of German law as regards consumer protection. 
III SPECIAL REGULATIONS ON THE PROHIBITION OF DECEPTIVE 
AND MISLEADING ADVERTISING 
96 As outlined above, the prohibition of misleading advertising is to be found 
not only in the general law of unfair competition, but also in numerous new 
codifications, such as the food and drugs acts. The law has developed the 
general idea of prohibition of misleading advertising. This is the leading prin-
ciple of consumer protection under advertising law. 
The following presentation is a survey of the provisions in specific acts and is 
essentially confined to explaining common features and differences in each par-
ticular case. Case law cannot be dealt with in detail here, especially ifit has been 
developed bef ore the new legislation was enacted. Duties to furnish information 
and special prohibitions of advertising will be dealt with elsewhere (Nos. 100, 
101). 
1 Food law 
97 The new codification of food law by the Act of 15 August 1974 in Arts 17, 23 
and 27 LMBG contains the general prohibition of misleading advertising of 
foodstuffs, tobacco products and cosmetics 114 • The basic standard is Art. 17, 
para. l, item 5 whose exact wording is: 
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lt is prohibited ... to put foodstuffs on the market in the way of business 
using a misleading description, indication or make-up, or to advertise food-
stuffs either generally or in a particular case using misleading representations 
or other statements. Deception is deemed to exist in particular 
(l) if foodstuffs are said to have effects which according to scientific 
findings they do not have or which have not been sufficiently proved 
scientifically, 
(2) if descriptions, indications, make-ups, representations or other state-
ments about the origin of foodstuffs, their quantity, weight, date of 
manufacture or latest date of consumption, or about any other impor-
tant circumstances are used which are apt to deceive, 
(3) if foodstuffs are made to look like drugs. 
Art 23 LMBG declares that prov1s10n applicable to tobacco products. 
Art. 27, para. 1 LMBG contains an appropriate prohibition of misleading 
advertising of cosmetics, which in line with the peculiarities of cosmetic 
products forbids especially indications creating the wrong impression that 
success is safe to be expected. 
(aa) According to the unanimous opinion of legal writers and the courts, the 
concept of deception is about the same in food law as in the law of unfair com-
petition 115 • However, it should be noted, as is explained by the wording of the 
law, that the concept of deception in food law is objectified to a greater extent 
and thus makes it easier to furnish proof of misleading advertising than Art. 3 
UWG. 
Here also it is understood as a principle that deception must arise from state-
ments having a certain factual content, while mere expressions of opinion do not 
suffice. lt is sufficient, though, that the advertisement contains a certainfactual 
content even if this is not expressly mentioned. Such statements may, for 
example, be included in the packaging, in connotations of the advertisement, in 
overt or hidden references, etc. 116• Thus it is, for instance, inadmissible to make 
advertising of coffee or of liqueur flavoured with herbs appear as if these were 
products furthering health 11 7• 
In food law, as in the law of unfair competition, deception is determined on 
the basis ofthe generally accepted standards (Verkehrsauffassung), with greater 
weight being attached to consumer expectations than in the law of unfair 
competition. lt is sufficient that a minority of consumers is deceived, unless a 
completely insignificant section is affected by the advertisement. lt is assumed 
in food law that the limit is between 5 and 10% of the consumers concerned, 
which is below the standard of the law of unfair competition. Here also the 
average consumer is taken as a criterion and not radical views, be they especially 
tolerant or especially critical of advertising 11 s. 
Also, the meaning certain terms or prefixes, such as 'pure', 'unadulterated ', 
'excellent quality', 'specially treated', 'choice', 'full', etc., have acquired, 
through pertinent labelling and other regulations, is taken into consideration in 
food law to a greater extent than in the general law of competition. Here the 
advertiser may not claim that his advertising message is irrelevant to those to 
whom it appeals if it has infringed the labelling regulations concerned 119• This, 
too, is in line with the trend towards greater objectification of the standard of 
deception in food law. 
In food law as in the law ofunfair competition, the concealmentof statements 
does not constitute a deception, unless there exists a statutory labelling obliga-
tion or the consumer may reasonably demand disclosure 120• The obligations to 
disclose are again stricter in food law than in the law of unfair competition. This 
does not mean that the advertiser may not emphasise the positive characteristics 
of a foodstuff, tobacco product or cosmetics. lf a product is said to have certain 
effects that are insufficiently tested, this may be a deceptive statement. The 
entirefollow-up advertising is beyond the reach of the law anyway, as is shown 
in particular by tobacco advertising. According to established court prac-
tice, suggestive advertising does not generally come under the food law regula-
tions; for example, in cigarette advertising suggesting 'youthfulness', 'love of 
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adventure', 'leisure time', etc., measures of seif regulation try to correct things 
in a certain way (No. 126). Despite the strictness of the regulations on adver-
tising in food law, here there is a considerable loophole. 
(bb) A special norm concerning misleading advertising is included in Art. 18 
LMBG, which provides for a general prohibition of health-related advertising 
of foodstuffs. This is to avoid foodstuffs being made to appear as if they were 
drugs or quasi-drugs. Thus, for example, there is a general prohibition of adver-
tising exploiting fear, advertising using connotations of diseases, members of 
the medical profession, etc. 121 . Of late, health-related advertising of margarine 
has become a controversial issue122. In reality, this regulation is interpreted in a 
restrictive way, disease being taken only in the medical sense and not in the sense 
of any abnormal situation in life. In particular, according to the dominant view, 
advertising of baby food, tonics and the like, which concerns psychic ailments, 
certain periods oflife, symptoms of a disease, etc., shall not come under the pro-
hibition of Art. 18. 123 Another problematic aspect seems tobe that the legislator 
set aside the prohibition of health-related advertising in the case of dietary 
foods124. 
(cc) In addition, the LMBG in Arts. 19, 21, 29 and 32 contains certain enabling 
provisionsfor the protection against deception. These powers have been used in 
isolated cases, for instance in Art. 7, para. l Nährwertkennzeichnungsverord-
nung of 9 December 1977125 with respect to advertising of slimming diets (with 
the exception of dietary foodstuffs). 
2 Advertising of drugs 
98 Advertising of drugs has always been subject to the general reservation that 
misleading advertising is prohibited. The Gesetz über die Werbung auf dem 
Gebiet des Heilwesens (HWG) (Advertising of Drugs Act) of 11 July 1965, as 
amended by the AMG of 24 August 1976, contains in Art. 3 a general pro-
hibition of misleading advertising of drugs126. The present wording of Art. 3 is: 
Misleading advertising is forbidden. Deception exists in particular 
(1) if drugs, processes, treatments, appliances or other means are claimed to 
be therapeutically effective or to have effects they do not have; 
(2) if the wrong impression is created that 
(a) success is safe to be expected, 
(b) use as provided or over an extended period of time is not harmful, 
(c) advertising is not performed for business purposes; 
(3) if untrue statements or statements apt to deceive are made 
(a) about the composition or quality of drugs, appliances or other means 
and about the type of process or treatment, or 
(b) about the person, educational background or qualification or success 
of a manufacturer or inventor or about the persons who had acted on 
their behalf. 
The prohibition of misleading advertising is put into still more detailed 
regulations by the following provisions of the HWG. 
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Art. 8 of the AMG includes an appropriate prohibition of deception as 
regards the description, indication or make-up of drugs. Since advertising and 
make-up will often overlap, in a particular case both regulations may be appli-
cable. Art. 8 reads: 
lt is prohibited to manufacture or market drugs which ... 
(2) are characterised by a misleading description, indication or make-up. 
Deception is deemed to exist in particular if drugs are claimed tobe thera-
peutically effective or to have effects which they do not have ... 
(a) the wrong impression being created that success can safely be 
expected or that use as provided or over an extended period of time is 
not harmful, 
(b) descriptions, indications or formulations being used which are a 
factor in the evaluation of drugs and which are apt to deceive as to 
their quality. 
From the legislative history it should be stated that the Federal Government had 
intended to extend this prohibition to include cases where a misleading descrip-
tion refers to the fact that success may be expected. The Bundestag (Parliament) 
rejected this proposal as being too uncertain 127• 
A feature peculiar to the regulations on deception in both the law of drugs and 
food law is the fact that they go more by objectified criteria. Here it is also less 
important how consumers in a particular case understand an advertisement, but 
it is decisive whether there is a discrepancy between the advertising promise or 
product Statements, on the one hand, and the medical success that can actually 
be achieved, on the other. The principle und er the law of competition that false 
statements need not be misleading should not therefore be applicable to the law 
governing advertising of drugs. Established court practice does not yet exist, 
which is indirectly also due to the amendment of the AMG and the HWG effec-
tive 1 January 1978. 
The HWG in addition includes certain requirements of information in adver-
tising which will be dealt with below. 
3 Weingesetz 
99 The prohibition to mislead is also tobe found in Art. 46 Weingesetz of 14 July 
1971. The regulation reads 12s; 
Products with misleading descriptions, instructions, other statements 
or formulations must not be marketed, imported or exported or made 
the subject of advertising. 
II In particular it is considered to be misleading if 
(1) descriptions, instructions, other indications or formulations are 
used without the product meeting the requirements of the state-
ments or make-ups concerned as laid down in or on account of this 
Act, 
(2) indications are used that are apt to create a wrang impression of 
special quality. 
III Considered to be misleading are furthermore: 
(1) formulations, representations or true statements which are apt to 
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give wrong ideas about geographic origin; this shall apply even if 
the country of origin is indicated properly; 
(2) true statements that are apt to give wrong ideas about manufacture, 
bottling or storage, quality, prod ucts, grape variety, vintage or 
other circumstances which are important for an evaluation; 
(3) fancy names that 
(a) are apt to create the wrang impression that they stand for an 
indication of geographical origin, or 
(b) contain a geographical indication if the requirements of use of 
such geographical description as provided for under this Act 
are not satisfied. 
lt should be noted here that the Act proceeds from a more objective concept of 
deception and continues to include certain forms of 'suggestive advertising' 
(No. 92). 
IV TENDENCIES TOWARDS OBJECTIFICATION IN THE LAW OF 
ADVERTISING 
1 Disclosure and information requirements 
100 A prime concern of modern consumer protection in both the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany and other EC countries is to provide the consumer with the infor-
mation he needsfor his purchase decisions. The numerous regulations under the 
law of labelling outlined above especially serve the purpose of information 
(No. 44ff). However, such disclosure does not suffice to make the supply in 
terms of quality, quantity, price, etc., clearly intelligible to the consumer, since 
it virtually sticks to the product and in general there is no obligation to satisfy 
the statutory labelling requirements through advertising going beyond product 
characteristics as such. That is why there is an urgent need in terms of consumer 
policy for giving advertising itself, especially media advertising, an appropriate 
informative content, so that the consumer may take his time to compare differ-
ent offers, products, etc. 129• 
In the law of unfair competition and in special legislation, the prohibition to 
mislead includes an obligation of disclosure and objectivity in advertising only 
in exceptional cases. ln that respect a really strict prohibition to mislead leaves a 
considerable gap from the point of view of consumer policy if it is considered 
important that advertising must provide the consumer in a proper way with the 
information he needs for his purchase decision. 
(aa) Requirements as to disclosure in advertising are relatively new in German 
legislation, still highly controversial as regards their wording, and not yet tested 
as regards their effect. A clear landmark in this context is put up by Art. 3a of 
the HWG as amended by the AMG of 1976. The provision reads: 
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(1) Any advertisement of drugs ... must include the following statements: 
(a) the name, business name and registered office of the pharmaceutical 
undertaking; 
(b) the name of the drug; 
(c) the composition of the drug by type and quantity of effective 
ingredients; 
(d) fields of application; 
(e) contra-indications; 
(f) side-effects; 
(g) warnings in so far as they are prescribed for the labelling of con-
tainers and wrappings. . . 
(3) In advertisements for the general public, the statements as per para. 1, 
item (c) may be omitted. If the statements as per para. l, items (e) and (f) 
cannot be made, they may be omitted. 
(4) The statements required by para. l must be clearly discriminated from 
the other advertising messages and must be easily recognisable. Para. l 
applies to advertising messages in audiovisual media mutatis mutandis. 
(5) Para. 1 does not apply to follow-up advertising. Follow-up advertising is 
a type of advertising using exclusively the name of the drug or addi-
tionally the company name or trademark of the pharmaceutical 
undertaking. 
In its memorandum, the Federal Government states that the provision is to 
objectify advertising of drugs not only with regard to advertising aimed at 
doctors and pharmacists, but also with respect to advertising for the general 
public. 'To that end an obligation is imposed on anybody who engages in adver-
tising of drugs to include in the advertisement a minimum of information about 
the drug. That is to enable the person to whom the advertisement is directed to 
form a clear idea of the value of the drug' 130• Much as that provision is to be 
welcomed as a step in the right direction, it is disquieting that certain pieces of 
information, especially on contra-indications and side-effects, may be omitted 
ifthey cannot be furnished. Here it is open to question whether or not the omis-
sion of statements is left to the discretion of the drug manufacturer 131 • The Act is 
ambiguous on that point, so further interpretation will have to be left to the 
courts. 
(bb) Other more recent legislation on consumer protection likewise begins 
to point towards disclosure requirements in advertising, although not as clearly 
as in the HWG. Thus Art. 16 of the Gesetz zum Schutz der Teilnehmer am 
Fernunterricht (Fern USG) demands that in commercial advertising of corres-
pondence courses the organisers should give a complete survey of the terms of 
the contract and the requirements the participant has to meet by transmitting 
information material. If a correspondence course has not yet obtained final 
approval, this must be clearly indicated in the information material. In the 
Federal Government's view, the purpose of this provision is to so design the 
information material, because of the different types and the anonymity of 
correspondence courses, as to enable the participant to take an appropriate deci-
sion 132• However, the provision relates only to a certain section of advertising, 
namely the transmission of information material. In other respects, apart from 
the prohibition to mislead, the organiser is not subject to any restrictions on his 
advertising. 
91 
(cc) The LMBG does not yet contain any such disclosure requirements, but 
provides for powers to the Federal Government to issue pertinent orders. Of 
particular importance here is the power to prescribe warnings for tobacco 
products. Furthermore, the government is empowered to require that certain 
smoke components be indicated. The Federal Government has not so far used 
these powers, but supports 'self-regulation' agreements by trade and industry 133 • 
lt remains for the future political development of advertising law to provide for 
an appropriate advertising requirement in this context. 
Similar powers pursuant to Art. 32 exist (so far on paper only) for so-called 
consumer goods (for instance cleaning agents, polishes, detergents); it is not 
clear from the Act whether this covers (media) advertising as well 134 • Lastly, 
informative advertising is demanded under appropriate legislative initiatives in 
the area of the sale of shares in propertyiis. 
2 Prohibitions of advertising relative to certain media, products and 
marketing methods 
101 In addition to the general regulations under advertising law mentioned above, 
the legislator has increasingly imposed specific prohibitions of advertising. 
(aa) First of all, the Heilmittelwerbegesetz must be mentioned here. This Act 
distinguishes between advertising f or specialists ( doctors, pharmacists, etc.) and 
advertising for the general public1 36• Whereas advertising for specialists, apart 
from the above-mentioned regulations on the prohibition to mislead and some 
disclosure requirements, is not subject to any restrictions, many are imposed on 
advertising to the general public. Art. 8 HWG relates to the basic prohibition of 
advertising to the general public of prescription drugs or sleeping pills. Art. 9 
HWG forbids certain types of advertisements for drugs to the general public, 
which create or exploit feelings of anxiety, refer to medical authorities, human 
suffering, etc., or appeal specifically to children and young persons under 18 
years of age. Lastly, pursuant to Art. 10 HWG, advertising of drugs to the 
general public must not refer to certain diseases enumerated in the Act, such as 
epidemics, cancer or mental diseases. 
In line with its objective, the Act serves to protect public health, and is thus 
rather a police regulation than a regulation in terms of consumer protection. 
Wh et her the tight restrictions imposed by the HW Gare absolutely necessary for 
the sake of consumer protection has to be examined more closely, which is 
impossible in this context. Constitutional objections to the prohibition of adver-
tising under the HWG have not been voiced by the courts. 
In addition to the special regulations of the HW G, the provisions of the UWG 
are fully applicable. Here the courts proceed from the assumption that an 
infringement of the regulations of the HWG on health protection are gener-
ally speaking also contrary to public policy pursuant to Art. 1 UWG 137 • So 
competitors and their associations usually defend themselves against prohibited 
drugs advertising by using remedies available under the law of unfair 
competition. 
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102 (bb) Another special (though product-related) prohibition of advertising is 
contained in Art. 22 LMBG. Pursuant thereto it is prohibited to advertise 
cigarettes, tobacco products resembling cigarettes, and loose tobacco designed 
tobe made into cigarettes by the consumer over the radio or on television. That 
prohibition of advertising of cigarettes and cigarette-like products was highly 
controversial during the debates on the bill. The tobacco industry had rejected 
the prohibition, because it feit it would be able to check public criticism of ciga-
rette advertising in the mass media through self-imposed restrictions on adver-
tising. The legislator nevertheless resolved to include such a prohibition in the 
Act because of the particularly dangerous nature of media advertising of 
cigarettes 138 • 
lt seems worth mentioning that the prohibition is confined to cigarettes, i.e. 
does not include other tobacco products, such as cigars and pipe tobacco. Also, 
it applies only to radio and television, with the controversial question remaining 
of whether or not advertising by German enterprises in foreign media broadcast 
into the Federal Republic of Germany is prohibited 139• In line with the dominant 
view it is assumed that because of the territoriality principle the prohibition of 
advertising is limited to German broadcasting and television companies only. 
This constitutes a considerable gap in the practical enforcement of such a 
prohibition. Another question is whether so-called 'camouflaged advertising' 
of cigarettes on the radio and specifically on television is prohibited. From the 
context of Art. 22 LMBG such a prohibition may be inferred. The prohibition 
of advertising applies only to the media specified therein and in particular does 
not apply to major magazines, billboard advertising and the Iike. Here, cigarette 
manufacturers are trying to establish a system of self-imposed restrictions on 
advertising 140• 
102a (cc) Apart from the prohibition relative to certain media provided for in 
Art. 22 para. 1, Art. 22 para. 2 LMBG includes a prohibition on health-related 
advertising of tobacco products. In addition, the Federal Government may by 
way of statutory order issue regulations to enforce the prohibition, in particular 
to regulate the type, extent or design of advertising in certain media or places, or 
to prohibit or restrict the use of representations or expressions by members of 
certain classes of persons. These may, for example, be prohibitions of adver-
tising of tobacco products in magazines using symbols which appeal specifically 
to young people. The Federal Government has used these powers in one case 
only. lt has prohibited the terms 'unadulterated' and 'nicotine-free' and instead 
permits only the term 'with very little nicotine'. There are no other restrictions 
on advertising. This seems to be disquieting, particularly because cigarette 
advertising continues to create the impression of youthfulness, freshness, 
sportiness, gregariousness and the like, all of which are objectives standing in 
marked contrast to Art. 2214 1. 
102b (dd) Besides the prohibitions on advertising of drugs and tobacco products 
mentioned above, there are a great many restrictions on advertising regarding 
certain professions, for instance doctors, lawyers, tax consultants, certified 
public accountants, consulting engineers and architects. The vocational regula-
tions in each case will not be dealt with here. lt should be noted that they were 
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not issued for the purpose of consumer protection but exclusively with regard to 
professional interests. Whether from the point of view of consumer policy these 
restrictions on advertising relative to certain professions should be modified will 
not be discussed here 142. 
On the other hand, there are no binding restrictions on advertising of 
alcoholic beverages, although this has been demanded in reform discussion for 
some time. lt is doubtful whether the existing agreements on self-imposed restric-
tions 143 provide sufficient protection. 
Lastly, restrictions on advertising in the so-called outdoor area should be 
pointed out; for instance, on federal motorways pursuant to Art. 9 Bundes-
fernstraßengesetz (Act on Federal Trunk Roads) and regarding traffic in towns 
and cities pursuant to Art. 33 Straßenverkehrsordnung (Road Traffic Regu-
lations}144. They serve 'safety and ease of traffic' rather than consumer 
protection. 
V MARKETING METHODS AND SALES PROMOTION (TRADE 
PRACTICES IN THE NARROW SENSE) 
1 Generalities 
103 In contrast to the advertising described above, marketing methods and sales 
promotion campaigns in all trade practices (Vertriebsmethoden) aim at influ-
encing the consumer's preferences and at inducing him to enter into a contract. 
Marketing methods thus relate to the method of selling and less to the presenta-
tion of a particular product in the media. Admittedly, in a particular case, espe-
cially if enterprises use a so-called marketing mix and brand names, the 
boundaries between advertising and trade practices are not easy to determine. 
In German law the basic standard for the regulation of marketing methods, 
also in terms of consumer protection, is the general clause of Art. 1 UWG. Its 
general aspects and construction by the courts from the angle of consumer 
protection will be discussed in detail later. 
In addition, there are a great many special regulations which in terms of their 
legal form may be distinguished as to whether they belong to the law of unfair 
competition, administrative, criminal or civil law. Additional regulations under 
the law of unfair competition are to be found, on the one hand, in the UWG 
itself, specifically regarding admission cards in Art. 6b, which was discussed 
earlier (No. 94), seasonal sales and clearance sales in Arts. 7 et seq. UWG, as 
weil as special sales in Art. 9a and a statutory order of 4 July 1935 on 'Sonder-
veranstaltungen' issued thereunder 145 . Special provisions are included in the 
Zugabeverordnung (Order concerning Collateral Gifts) of 3 March 1932, and 
the Rabattgesetz of 25 November 1933. 
Administrative rules are to be found especially in the Industrial Code 
(Gewerbeordnung), for instance on itinerant peddling (Reisegewerbe). The law 
of drugs contains certain regulations on marketing methods and additionally on 
outlets. We should also mention the FernUSG, which makes sales calls for the 
purpose of concluding correspondence course contracts subject to restrictive 
conditions. 
In crimina/ law the decisive standard is the general provision on fraud con-
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tained in Art. 263 Penal Code, which plays only a small role froin the point of 
view of consumer protection, even if consumers often fall victim to fraudulent 
deceit. No special mention will be made here. 
Civil law indirectly plays a role where it reserves to the deceived purchaser 
a right of cancellation (Anfechtungsrecht), Art. 123 Civil Code. A special 
cooling-off period is granted by the Iaw of instalment sales (No. 324), the law 
of foreign investments and the law of correspondence courses. This is to be 
extended to door-to-door transactipns. We should mention that civil law does 
not prohibit such marketing methods directly, but provides for a right of with-
drawal on the part of the consumer which may result in an indirect restriction on 
such marketing methods. We shall go into details of these questions later 
(No. 11 lff). 
2 The general clause of Art. 1 UWG 
(a) Significance of the general clause 
104 Art. l U WG reads: 
A person who in the course of business for purposes of competition commits 
an act which is contrary to public policy may be sued for an injunction 
(Unterlassung) and damages. 
The general clause in the German law of unfair competition has been in exis-
tence since 1909. lt covers many trade practices which are of importance by no 
means only from the point of view of consumer protection; for instance, labour 
poaching, passing off and boycott 146• Originally, the courts used the general 
clause not for the purpose of consumer protection, but for the protection of 
competitors. However, since the thirties the general clause has been interpreted 
in such a way as to protect not only the interests of competitors, but also those of 
the general public. Of late there has been no doubt that both the general clause 
and Art. 3 UWG intend to provide consumer protection, a controversial ques-
tion being, however, whether consumer protection is the primary aim of that 
standard or, as it were, flows only indirectly from the existence of the general 
clause 147 • While according to the dominant view consumer protection is guaran-
teed only indirectly by Art. 1, according to modern writers consumer protection 
has eqtial priority. Consumer protection should be viewed both in terms of the 
collective and of the individual: it is a matter of protecting both consumers as a 
whole and the individual consumer potentially injured or endangered by a 
certain trade practice. 
The idea of consumer protection against trade practices is most clearly 
revealed in the princip/e of fairness (Sachlichkeitsgrundsatz) developed by the 
Federal High Court in its ruling 148• On the whole, trade practices must be fair; 
they must not influence the consumer in an undue way, restrain his freedom of 
decision, persuade him in an improper way to make a buying decision or molest 
him. Here there is a striking difference as compared with the prohibition to 
mislead, which in no way includes the principle of fairness. 
However, as will be explained by analysing the case law, court practice is by 
no means uniform. On the contrary, the courts often argue in a multi-faceted 
95 
way in which·consumer proteclion is only one among many points of view. 
Thus the protection of worka~le competition (Leistungswettbewerb) is often 
regarded as a starting point for putting the general clause into specific terms in 
a particular case 1s0• Also, the courts want to prevent trade practices from 
'degenerating' and to preclude other competitors from imitating unfair prac-
tices151. Another factor taken into account, although not as a main point, is the 
effect a certain trade practice may have on competitive structures, especially in 
terms of protection of small and medium-sized firms 1s2• However, there is great 
uncertainty and controversy about details; the majority of legal writers reject 
the protection of small and medium-sized firms on the basis of Art. l UWG'53 • 
The scope of application of the general clause resembles that of Art. 3 UWG: 
there must always be an act in the course of business f or the purpose of com-
petition. In this respect reference may be made to the above statements. 
As was mentioned above, trade practices coming under Art. 1 are numerous 
and complex. Because of the constant changes in the area of competition it is 
hardly possible to shape general rules. Certain directions of case law can, how-
ever, be distinguished which may serve as a guide in determining which trade 
practices pursuant to Art. 1 UWG are considered detrimental to competition in 
terms of consumer protection and which are not. 
(b) Trade practices impeding the consumer's freedom of choice (belästigende 
Werbung) 
105 lt is a central idea of the law of unfair competition developed in the Federal 
High Court 's more recent practice that trade practices that put the consumer in a 
psychological predicament, molest him, invade his privacy or endanger his 
personality should be prohibited pursuant to Art. 1 UWG as being contrary to 
public policy and unfair 154. Here it is less a matter ofthe protection of consumers 
collectively than of the individual consumer who through certain marketing 
methods is more or less forced to enter into a contract. A criminal act is not 
required. lt is sufficient that only a few consumers be affected ifthere is a danger 
that such a marketing method will be used again or will be imitated. 
To put these prohibited trade practices into more concrete terms, the follow-
ing cases have been developed in court practice 155 • 
(aa) Touting in the street ('Anreißen') andin general anywhere outside regular 
salerooms,.for instance sales through agents, and sales representations for book 
and record clubs, is forbidden in principle's6. This does not apply to places 
where the consumer knows that he will be approached to make a buying deci-
sion. At markets, at fairs, in specially marked sales promotion ·campaigns, etc., 
he must expect to be accosted for the purpose of concluding a contract. If he 
does not want tobe accosted, he should not frequent such places 157• 
(bb) What constitutes touting is allied to canvassing by telephone and telex' 58 • 
The use of the telephone as a device for canvassing constitutes an invasion of 
privacy, even if it need not result in a decision to enter into a contract. According 
to the courts, the consumer is free as regards his telephone connection which is 
not to be 'turned into' a sales promotion instrument. Here the courts use as a 
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strong argument the danger of imitation which might result in any businessman 
resorting to telephone canvassing and the consumer never being free from 
harassment. The same applies to what is known as telex canvassing, although 
this hardly affects private consumers. Inadmissible telephone canvassing does 
not become admissible by the fact that it is announced in writing beforehand, 
unless the consumer has so requested. 
(cc) To a !arge extent there is clarity in court practice to the effect that the 
unsolicited sending of goods is prohibited pursuant to Art. 1 UWG as being 
against public policy 159• The courts give as a reason the molesting effect of such 
trade practices if the consumer is requested to return the goods in the event that 
he does not want them. Meanwhile this prohibition has been extended to include 
subtler forms of unsolicited sending, for instance in connection with the pro-
cessing of films where the mere fact that an order form is not sent in is taken to 
be an order for a new film 160• Here the consumer's normal behaviour is prac-
tically reversed and silence is construed to signify acceptance of an offer. 
The courts except certain cases on the principle that the unsolicited sending of 
goods is detrimental to fair competition; for instance, if the sending was 
announced beforehand and the consumer is under no obligation to return the 
goods, or if the consumer made it clear that he wanted the goods tobe sent 161 • 
Therefore the trader may easily circumvent the ban on unsolicited goods. The 
courts have reacted only very hesitantly to these circumventions. 
(dd) By comparison, according to present court practice there are practically 
no limits to the sending of advertising and information material. Exceptions 
exist only if a consumer made it clear that he does not want to havesuch material 
sent to him or ifthe sending serves to pave the way for another prohibited sales 
promotion measure, for instance the unsolicited sending of goods as described 
above. Also, it is inadmissible to pave theway for an unwanted sales call by such 
trickery 162• 
(ee) The courts have recently developed clear principles regarding what is 
known as marketing activities at the scene of an accident: in line therewith it is 
inadmissible under the law of unfair competition for a towing company 
requested to help in an accident to hand out forms of an agency renting cars. 
Here a shock situation on the part of the consumer, in which he is not psycho-
logically free to decide, is exploited for the purpose of sales promotion 163 • 
(ff) Likewise forbidden is what is known as subliminal advertising, even 
though it plays only a minor role in practice. As distinct from suggestive adver-
tising, here advertising techniques are used which the customer is unable to 
recognise and which induce him to make a certain contract, e.g. fade-ins in tele-
vision and film spots which the consumer does not recognise but which impair 
his freedom of decision 164. 
(gg) A very controversial issue both in theory and practice is the treatment of 
unsolicited sales calls under the law of unfair competition. Door-to-door trans-
actions will be dealt with elsewhere (No. 111). The courts stick to the principle 
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that sales calls are basically admissible, because sales representatives are a pro-
fessional dass which has been in existence for quite some time and because such 
calls are not in general prohibited in the Industrial Code. All the same, the 
courts set certain limits: thus, in the event of the death of a member of the 
family, calls by gravestone solicitors are generally inadmissi ble even after the 
expiry of a waiting time 165• This again is an invasion of privacy which the con-
sumer need not tolerate. This rule does not apply, however, if members of the 
family have asked for a visit by such a solicitor. lt is here that the possibility of 
abuse and cirvumvention becomes apparent, if for instance through letters of 
sympathy the consumer is encouraged to see a gravestone solicitor. 
Furthermore, the courts recognise that certain practices used by solicitors are 
prohibited. To begin with, it is already an infringement of criminal regulations 
if a solicitor gains access to a consumer's dwe!ling without the latter's consent. 
If this is done regularly and if there is a danger of repetition, it is also an offence 
under the law of unfair competition 166. On the other hand, the selective accost-
ing by groups of solicitors of certain socially handicapped persons, for instance 
elderly people in old people's homes, young persons or persons in need of care, 
is not considered tobe contrary to public policy. The courts recognise, however, 
that a solicitor should not pay a visit under false pretences by making the 
customer believe that it is a talk for the purpose of information or that there is a 
chance of winning in a game, while in actual fact it is a sales calll 67 • In a par-
ticular case it will, of course, be very difficult to prove unfair methods on the 
occasion of a sales call. 
(c) Gift-giving as a trade practice - so-called 'psychological obligation to 
buy' 
106 Another principle developed by case law in recent years concerns gifts 
creating a 'psychological obligation to buy' (Wertreklame, psychologischer 
Kaufzwang) 168 • In this case the courts go beyond the law of collateral gifts 
(Zugaben) or discounts. Gifts will be subject to stricter interpretation under the 
law of unfair competition once they have exceeded the limits of merely attract-
ing attention. The courts likewise start from the explicit or at least implied 
premise of f airness which requires that the consumer should not be influenced in 
his purchase decision by the often marginal or unimportant additional benefit 
derived from the gift or by a 'feeling of gratitude'. Here also, the courts advance 
many reasons in shaping the law: they refer to the tempting effect of certain 
gifts, criticise the effects of exaggeration and degeneration in competition, and 
are afraid of imitation and concentration effects which would practically result 
in small and medium-sized firms no langer being able to compete in handing out 
gifts 169 • 
Here, too, the significance of the facts is revealed only in particular cases 
which may roughly be grouped as follows. 
(aa) In court practice games play a great part. lt is understood as a principle 
that games, prize competitions, etc., are not generally contrary to public policy, 
but only on certain additional conditions. For example, agame is prohibited if a 
so-called pyramid system is used 170 • In the case of prize competitions, it must be 
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made clear that the. customer's order has no influence on his chances of win-
ning171. Furthermore, it is inadmissible to make a visit to a saleroom a precondi-
tion of the right to participate. For this would mean practically that the 
customer buying a lottery ticket would see himself compelled indirectly to buy a 
number of other things at the same time 172 • It is inadmissible to veil the chances 
or hold out exaggerated hopes of winning to the customer173 . Perhaps this also 
constitutes misleading advertising pursuant to Art. 3 UWG. According to court 
practice, it is not generally contrary to public policy to include children in prize 
competitions and games; the trader may well take advantage of a child 's play 
instinct. Such trade practices are considered tobe contrary to public policy only 
if the inexperience or carelessness of children is employed intentionally in the 
advertising method 174 . 
(bb) Related to games, although occurring in a slightly different form, are 
gifts having pecuniary value even if these are not prohibited collateral gifts (Zuga-
ben). Thus the courts have considered it inadmissible to make available free of 
charge to consumers buying a Volkswagen a so-called Volkswagen diagnosis175 . 
They claim that usually a trader has 'nothing to give away', the gift in such a case 
being against public policy. The distribution of coupons upon the purchase of 
detergents was judged in a similar way. In this case, the courts say, there is a 
dang er of the customer making his purchase decision because of the coupon and 
not because of the product. Besides, this is an undesirable imitation effect176. 
(cc) The giving away of goods in original packages is generally inadmissible 
for the same reason. Also in this context the factor of degeneration and imita-
tion, combined with considerations of protection of small and medium-sized 
firms, plays a greater role than consumer protection. The giving away of goods 
in original packages is admissible only if a new product is being launched on the 
market or tested177 • The extent to which goods in original packages are given 
away is determined by the purpose of testing the market. Usually the competitor 
is obliged to manufacture special packages not for sale elsewhere, because 
samples of goods are not intended to satisfy normal requirements. An excessive 
giving away of trial packages may also be detrimental to competition if it 
reaches proportions practically equivalent to the giving away of goods in 
original packages178 • 
A highly controversial issue in this context is the treatment under the law of 
unfair competition of so-called newspapers running mostly advertisements 
(Anzeigenblätter). These cases bear a special relation to the law ofthe press, and 
therefore cannot be discussed adequately here. Where a newspaper publisher or 
publishing firm distributing free of charge an Anzeigenblatt including a certain 
editorial section to households in a certain region, this practically amounts to 
the 'giving away' of an editorial service, if only a minor one, to the detriment of 
other press organs. On the advertising market this contemporaneously has an 
undesirable effect of concentration on a few advertising pages and supra-
regional daily papers which practically results in the disappearance of regional 
daily papers179 • However, in the discussion about the admissibility of adver-
tising pages under the law of unfair competition, considerations of consumer 
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protection have played hardly any role so far. The consumer's position is ambiv-
alent here: on the one hand, there are no objections to additional, free informa-
tion material; on the other hand, the consumer is interested in a workable local 
press whose existence is often threatened by such advertising pages. 
(dd) In the court practice of recent years, so-called tie-in and leader offers 
(Koppelungs- und Vorspannangebote) have been the subject of animated dis-
cussions180. We speak of tie-in offers if a certain performance is sold together 
with another performance in such a way that the second is to be had more 
favourably if bought together with the first. Tie-in offers are usually admissible 
if they keep within the limits of what is usual in trade, particularly if they do not 
link objects with each other which to the consumer have no connection what-
soever. We speak of 'leader offers' if competitors outside their sales proper sell a 
different product which is especially attractive to the consumer on particularly 
favourable terms and thus create an additional enticement for the product 
actually sold by them. In this context particularly, the coffee trade is of impor-
tance, where leader offers in the form of low-priced books, gift articles and 
articles to take away have been used to promote the sale of coffee. 
So far, the courts have been very strict with respect to leader offers. They have 
claimed that so-called leader offers involving goods foreign to the trade are 
inadmissible 181 : shops selling coffee must not seil other goods foreign to their 
trade at a seemingly particularly favourable price if they seil those goods only 
together with the main commodity, in this case coffee. There is an exception to 
this rule only where there is a 'proximity of use' between the main commodity 
and the collateral commodity, for example if the collateral commodity can be 
used as a container for coffee. According to recent court practice it is also a 
leader offer if a commodity foreign to the trade is offered at a price higher than 
that of the commodity whose sale is to be promoted by the tie-in arrangement 
(so-called 'top-heavy leader offer')182. This case also relates to coffee sellers who 
sold a certain attractive book on animals at a very favourable price to customers 
buying their coffee. 
The problematical side to these decisions is that they fail to take as a criterion 
the customer's freedom and ability of decision and instead protect established 
channels of trade. Particularly in the case of so-called 'top-heavy leader offers' 
we do not see why an average consumer should not be able to make his purchase 
decision objectively and independently. Any proof to that effect has not yet 
been furnished by the courts. There is also the question of whether in this case 
the strict regulation of gifts may be advanced. Furthermore, price competition is 
not restrained but promoted by such leader offers - a positive result for the 
consumer. In actual fact it is a matter of protecting established channels of 
trade, here particularly the book trade, and of fighting outsiders. This is not the 
task of consumer protection 1s3. 
In the new decisions of the Federal High Court a more liberal treatment of 
leader offers therefore seems to gain ground: if there is no direct or indirect link 
between the sale of the main commodity (for instance, coffee) and the so-called 
'leader commodity', i.e. if the consumer may acquire the two commodities 
separately, this is a diversification to which there are no objections under the 
law of competition184, even if the price of the 'leader commodity' (a book on 
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animals) is particularly attractive and ju~t covers the prime cost. 
(ee) Also of importance in court practice are advertising excursions, coffee 
party excursions, sightseeing tours and similar 'advantages' to the consumer185 • 
In such cases a certain convenience, for instance transport by bus or aeroplane, 
is always offered for the purpose of persuading the customer to conclude a 
certain contract or to take him near a place where such a contract will be con-
cluded. Here also the courts go very much by the circumstances of a particular 
case. Accordingly, sightseeing tours are considered detrimental to fair competi-
tion if, for instance, for the purchase of property in Spain the sightseer's wife is 
taken along free of charge; this, they claim, is an excessive incitement 186 • Trans-
port free of charge to the advertiser's business premises is usually inadmissible; 
however, the courts permit exceptions, particularly to offset a disadvantage in 
terms of location, provided the name of the carrier is not disclosed and the ride is 
short and of a temporary nature187 • Coffee party excursions for the sake of sales 
promotion, i.e. excursions exploiting the consumer's wish for entertainment 
and fondness of company for the purpose of sales promotion, are considered 
contrary to public policy188 • lt should be recognised that the courts tend to apply 
stricter standards, especially if such coffee party excursions serve the exclusive 
purpose of launching a sales promotion drive. 
3 Special provisions under the law of unfair competition 
107 Certain trade practices are also regulated in terms of the law of unfair competi-
tion by the Zugabeverordnung and the Rabattgesetz as well as by the regulations 
on clearing sales and special offers189• In this context only the Zugabeverord-
nung and the Rabattgesetz are ofimportance; the Acts date back to the economic 
crisis of 1932/33 and are not characterised by a protective purpose in terms of 
consumer policy. Rather, their distinct feature is the protection of small and 
medium-sized jirms, which is revealed by the fact that neither the Zugabever-
ordnung of 1932 nor the Rabattgesetz of 1933 include the right of consumer 
associations to bring a collective action pursuant to Art. 13 para. 1 a UWG. 
They are intended to prevent small and medium-sized enterprises from suffering 
setbacks as a result of the fact that large enterprises, by engaging in the distribu-
tion of collateral gifts or announcing and promising discounts and similar price 
reductions secure themselves competitive advantages, thus ousting small com-
petitors from the market. 
The courts continue to adhere to these considerations of the protection of 
small and medium-sized firms, so the question has arisen of whether or not for 
the very purpose of promoting competition and the interest of the consumer 
these Acts should be abolished or at least interpreted in a restrictive way190• As 
they continue to be in force, we shall briefly discuss their essential points in the 
following. 
108 (aa) The Zugabeverordnung does not purely and simply prohibit all gifts, 
but only certain forms of them. The prohibition takes effect only if there is a 
collateral gift. According to court practice, this presupposes three circum-
stances: the gift must be sold as a collateral commodity together with the main 
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commodity or service, there must be a close relationship between the main com-
modity and the collateral commodity, and either no or only a sham considera-
tion may be asked for the collateral gift 191 . The notion of a close relationship 
presents the greatest difficulties. In more recent court practice the view con-
tinues to prevail that the mere 'hope' of striking a bargain does not turn an 
allowed gift into a prohibited collateral gift. As a result, the very popular prac-
tice of giving away, for instance, so-called Christmas gifts, special gifts and 
the like is not covered by the Zugabeverordnung 192. No consideration may be 
asked for a collateral gift. Thus the sale of a particularly low-priced commodity 
together with the main commodity does not infringe the Zugabeverordnung. 
This has been made clear by the courts particularly in connection with 'leader 
offers ', in which a commodity foreign to the trade is sold at a favourable price 
together with the main commodity, specifically in the coff ee trade. These do not 
therefore infringe the prohibition of collateral gifts193, but may be prohibited by 
Art. 1 UWG (No. 106). In consequence of this narrow interpretation, the 
Zugabeverordnung has lost much of its importance in the legal treatment of 
gifts. According to more recent court practice, the prohibition of Art. 1 UWG 
outlined above is of greater importance. 
There is no collateral gift either, if merely advertising articles of low value are 
given away; however, in niore recent court practice the feature of low value is 
not only determined on the basis of the objective value, but also on the basis of 
the properties pointed out in advertising which may turn a valueless thing into a 
valuable one 194• 
We shall not go into further details here. lt should be noted though, that 
collateral gifts are forbidden not only if given to final consumers, but at all levels 
of trade and industry. 
109 (bb) The Rabattgesetz of 25 November 1933 on the one hand covers the 
announcement or granting of discounts as a trade practice and on the other hand 
simultaneously aims at precluding deception of the consumer which may typi-
cally occur in the granting of discounts and special prices 195. Thus the Rabatt-
gesetz stands between the regulation of misleading advertising, on the one hand, 
and the control of certain unfair trade practices on the other. The regulative 
purpose of the Act is subject to even greater controversy than that of the Zuga-
beverordnung. Thus, for example, the Consumer Advisory Council attached to 
the Federal Minister of Economics has come out in favour of abolishing the 
Rabattgesetz altogether196. 
The prohibition of discounts refers to two restrictive requirements: it relates 
only to goods for everyday consumption and applies only to final consumers. 
Both criteria are highly controversial. Generally speaking, goods for everyday 
consumption are n<lt only foodstuffs and semi-luxuries, but also big purchase 
items, such as motor vehicles. Only typical articles of luxury do not come under 
the prohibition of discounts 197 . Ulmer, in particular, has found fault with that 
interpretation; he holds that a prohibition of discounts, for instance regarding 
motor vehicles, results in an intolerable restraint of competition 198• Goods for 
everyday consumption, he claims, are not only goods the consumer uses every 
day, but also goods he has to buy every day. Here the prohibition of discounts 
might mislead consumers. 
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Furthermore, the prohibition of discounts applies only to final consumers, 
but not to retailers, wholesalers and the like. This criterion is interpreted by the 
courts to the effect that a final consumer is any person who does not turn over 
goods any further; he need not be a private consumer as developed above 
(No. 18)199 but may also be an industrial consumer. This very interpretation of 
the concept of the consumer by case law has resulted in the fact that specifically 
so-called self-service wholesalers selling goods to industrial consumers to meet 
not only their business requirements and resale purposes but also their personal 
requirements coming under the prohibition of discounts. Especially in the case 
of mixed purposes of use it is often difficult to see whether or not goods are 
typically sold to the 'final consumer' 200• The Federal High Court has expressed 
its view approximately to the effect that industrial consumers may buy goods for 
'private use' at the rate of 10% only. lt is for the self-service wholesaler to con-
trol observance of that percentage rate. If he permits sales exceeding that rate, 
he may be sued for violation of the prohibition of discounts 201 • 
Within the meaning of Art. 1, para. 2 Rabattgesetz, discounts are deductions 
from those prices an entrepreneur announces or generally asks or special prices 
granted because the consumer is a member of certain groups of consumers, pro-
fessions, associations or societies. Discounts are granted not only if a percentage 
deduction from the price is announced, but also if, for instance, special pric.es 
are allowed to specific groups or other price discounts are granted202• lt is recog-
nised, though, that the Rabattgesetz does not restrict the entrepreneur's free-
dom of price shaping and does not forbid him to advertise price reductions203 • 
The Rabattgesetz does not forbid price cutting, tie-in offers and the like in 
general, but only the announcement or granting of price discounts. A mere price 
reduction is not a price discount. Price comparisons, for instance, unless they 
are misleading as outlined above (No. 68), are not forbidden by the Rabatt-
gesetz. Here again, we cannot go into details204 • 
The Rabattgesetz permits certain exceptions to the granting of discounts, 
specifically the 3% cash discount granted by commercial enterprises and 
cooperatives. The Rabattgesetz does not apply if the profits from purchases 
at reduced prices are repaid to consumers having joined to form a society and 
they get a refund on their shares. According to court practice, this is not 
an announcement or granting of a discount which is inadmissible under the law 
of competition, but a form of sharing in profit, admissible under company 
Jaw 205 • As a result of this pattern it is possible in most cases to evade the regula-
tions of the Rabattgesetz, which has been done on an increasing scale recently; 
however, in antitrust court practice it is taken that such enterprises need not be 
supplied 206 • 
4 Trade practices concerning specific products 
110 Legal restrictions on trade practices exist primarily in the case of drugs. How-
ever, considerations of consumer protection have been decisive in the formu-
lation of the restrictive provisions of the HWG and AMG in some cases only. 
Rath er, what is of prime importance to the legisJator is the protection of pharma-
cies organised in small and medium-sized enterprises. This is very often justif~ed 
by reason of public health and consumer protection, but is not a compellmg 
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reason in each case. Actually, restrictions on the marketing of drugs subject to 
sale by pharmacists result only in a considerable increase in prices and are not 
therefore in the interest of the consumer, unless they are imperative from a 
medical point of view. 
(aa) Art. 6 HWG forbids trade practices inducing consumers to buy drugs 
that are subject to sale by pharmacists only by mail order. Art. 7 forbids adver-
tising of teletheraphy. Art. 9, item 13 forbids advertising involving prize com-
petitions, lotteries and other methods whose result is due to chance, item 14 
forbids the unsolicited giving of specimens, samples or coupons therefor · 
Certain forms of gift also falling under the law of unfair competition are strictly 
forbidden under the law of drugs, Art. 5 HWG as amended 207 • 
(bb) The new AMG, like the previous one, lays down in Art. 47 that drugs 
may be sold by pharmacists only. Art. 50 confines the sale of drugs not tobe 
sold exclusively by pharmacists to expert persons. Art. 51 forbids the offering 
for sale of drugs and the soliciting of orders for drugs through peddling. Art. 52 
contains a prohibition of self-service or sale through vending machines. 
(cc) With respect to other products there are no corresponding restrictions on 
trade practices, particularly not in respect of tobacco products. In view of the 
noxious nature of tobacco products, though, restrictions on marketing of 
tobacco products should at least be considered, for instance concerning prize 
competitions. Art. 22, para. 3, item 1 LMBG contains an enabling provision to 
that effect, not yet put into force. 
VI DOOR-TO-DOOR SALES 
111 Door-to-door sales and similar transactions made outside an entrepreneur's 
regular business premises, for instance on the occasion of coffee party excur-
sions, by accosting passers-by, etc„ are a special subject of consumer protection 
from several points of view. One point of view stems from the law of unfair 
competition or trade law, the other from the law of contract. The starting point 
of trade law (Gewerberecht) or the law of unfair competition is that this trade 
practice restricts the consumer's freedom of decision; direct selling confronts 
the often inexpert consumer with a trained salesman for whom it is much easier 
to talk the consumer into closing a deal than would normally be the case. From 
the point of view of trade law, such marketing methods result in annoyance to 
consumers and competitors, possibly even in the sale of products that should 
not be marketed by way of peddling. From the point of view of the law of con-
tract, the problem is whether the consumer is bound by such a contract or 
whether he may withdraw therefrom2os. 
1 Regulations on door-to-door sales under trade law and the law of unfair 
competition 
112 (aa) The most important provisions on the regulation of door-to-door sales 
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and similar transactions are to be found in the Industrial Code of 1869 as 
amended. Under title 3 'Itinerant Trade' ('Reisegewerbe'), Arts. 55 et seq. 
Industrial Code, certain restrictive conditions are imposed on itinerant trade for 
the protection of public order, indirectly also for the protection of the con-
sumer. lt is understood as a principle that a trader who wants to engage in 
itinerant trade has to register and requires a pedlar's certificate. The Act regu-
lates in detail the conditions prerequisite to the granting and cancellation of a 
pedlar's certificate. We shall not go into details here. Art. 56 excludes certain 
activities from itinerant trade, in particular the soliciting (offering for sale and 
inviting orders) of: 
- goods insofar as their sale is forbidden in non-itinerant trade; 
- poisons and poisonous goods; 
- orthopaedic appliances; 
- electromedical appliances; 
- appliances and objects which are designed to protect against rays (except 
light and heat); 
- securities, etc., 
- alcoholic beverages (except beer and wine); 
-watches; 
- used clothes, etc., 
- brokerage of credit transactions unless they are linked with a sales trans-
action or the conclusion of a building society savings contract. 
The activities forbidden in the Industrial Code have been included in the Act 
on different considerations. One consideration is that certain goods, by reason 
of their potential dangerousness, should not be marketed by way of peddling; 
for instance, poisons, any kind of medical appliance, high-proof alcoholic 
beverages. In the case of other objects, the prohibitions in the Industrial Code 
are designed to protect the non-itinerant trade, for instance concerning the 
marketing of watches and the like. A number of other prohibitions concern 
transactions that typically involve special risks to the consumer and that if con-
cluded through itinerant peddling might result in the consumer inflicting 
damage on himself in a way unacceptable und er our legal system, for instance in 
connection with credit transactions, which will be discussed later (No. 343). 
From the !ist of exceptions it may also be gathered that the Industrial Code 
does not consider door-to-door sales and similar marketing methods to be 
dangerous to the consumer in principle and does not therefore forbid them in 
generaJ2°9• This becomes quite clear in connection with the provision that 
expressly excepts from the prohibition of itinerant peddling sales transactions 
linked with a credit transaction. This case is certainly an issue of consumer pro-
tection, because the trader sells a commodity by instalments, while the con-
sumer is hardly able to realise the Iiabilities he incurs. In such a case only the 
protective provisions of the Abzahlungsgesetz (discussed elsewhere - No. 322) 
can be of any help. 
113 (bb) Beyond the Industrial Code a limited prohibition of door-to-door sales 
exists under Art. 17 of the Gesetz zum Schutz der Teilnehmer am Fernunterricht 
of 24 August 1976. Art. 17 reads: 
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Para. l: 
For advertising purposes or guidance on correspondence courses offered by . 
an organiser, the organiser or his agents may call on persons only if such 
persons: 
(1) have received beforehand information material answering the require-
ments of Art. 16, and 
(2) after receipt of such information material have asked for advice in 
writing. 
The organiser or his agents shall be qualified to offer guidance pursuant to 
sentence l. 
Para. 2: 
The organiser or his agents must be instrumental neither in making a declara-
tion of intention to conclude a contract nor in the transmission of the declara-
tion of intention outside the organiser's business premises. 
The government's comment on this provision is as follows: 'A high proportion 
of grievances in the correspondence course system is attributable to the fact that 
persons eager to learn but not accustomed to Iearning are caused by agents or 
traders working on a commission basis to enter into contracts for correspon-
dence courses without having the necessary educational background and 
without being able to judge their own learning capacity. The regulation of 
Art. 17 does not exclude all personal advice, but only the calling on parties inter-
ested in correspondence courses without the latter's express request and without 
prior instruction through information material. Furthermore it excludes the 
organiser's or his agents' assistance in the making of a declaration of intention 
to conclude a contract210 • 
Thus Art. 17 does not forbid door-to-door transactions involving correspon-
dence courses altogether, but provides for guidance and protects the par-
ticipant's freedom of choice. The customer shall be offered only such expert 
guidance as he expressly requested. He shall not be 'advised' against his will. 
The prohibition of assistance in the conclusion of a contract shall contempora-
neously ensure that the customer may take his decision to enter into a contract 
unbiased by a sales call or a guidance talk. The regulation reveals much greater 
appreciation of the psychological situation of a customer who has been visited 
by an agent than, for instance, the Industrial Code and deals in detail with the 
trade practices peculiar to correspondence courses. 
114 (cc) In addition to these administrative provisions, considerations under the 
law of unfair competition must be taken into account in the regulation of door-
to-door sales. This has already been discussed above (No. 105). Generally 
speaking, the courts consider door-to-door sales to be unobjectionable under 
the law of unfair competition, unless additional circumstances give rise to an 
infringement of public policy211 • In this connection the courts base their views in 
particular on the admissibility of itinerant trade under trade law and thus of 
door-to-door sales, which generally forbids sanctions against door-to-door 
sales under the Jaw of unfair competition. The only exception developed by the 
courts is the unsolicited calling by gravestone solicitors, because this constitutes 
unfair annoyance pursuant to Art. 1 UWG. In so far as the Jaw of unfair com-
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petition is applicable, no penalties are imposed but actions for injunction 
(No. 118). 
2 Contract law provisions 
115 The (limited) prohibition under trade law or the law of unfair competition of 
certain forms of door-to-door sales does not say anything about the handling 
of contracts made between a customer, of the one part, who in violation of the 
statutory regulations is induced to make a contract, and a trader, of the other 
part, who himself or through his agents has concluded an illegal door-to-door 
transaction. This question is regulated in the law of contract and is highly con-
troversial. According to established court practice, it is assumed that a violation 
of the provisions under trade law and the law of unfair competition does not 
automatically void the contract under civil law 212 : this, the courts claim, is 
possible only if the consumer cancels the contract because of error or fraud, 
which is not usually the case in forbidden door-to-door sales or cannot be proved 
by the customer. Generally speaking, a transaction violating a statutory pro-
hibition under Art. 134 Civil Code, a transaction against pub/ic policy under 
Art. 1381 or a usurious transaction under Art. 138 II Civil Code, does not exist 
because these articles relate only to the subject matter of the transaction, not to 
the way in which the contract is concluded. Prohibitions under trade law and the 
law of unfair competition, the courts claim, refer to certain trade practices, but 
not to the conclusion of such transactions in the first place. 
This opinion must be criticised on the very principles of the existing law. If it is 
correct that the prohibitions under trade law and the law of unfair competition 
of certain forms of door-to-door sales intend to protect the consumer, such 
protection cannot be confined to the prohibition of a certain trade practice only, 
but must also include consequential contracts; otherwise the protection will be 
largely ineffective. Therefore it must be assumed that a door-to-door trans-
action prohibited under trade law or the law of unfair competition at the same 
time violates a statutory prohibition pursuant to Art. 134 Civil Code, and there-
fore results in nullity213 • lt may also be argued that any ignoring of such a pro-
hibition by the entrepreneur or his agents already constitutes fraud and that the 
conclusion of a contract has therefore been caused by such fraud; hence the con-
sumer may cancel the contract. 
Others argue that a violation by the enterpreneur or his agents of the provi-
sions under trade law or the law of unfair competition at the same time consti-
tutes a tort pursuant to Art. 823, para. 2 Civil Code. The consumer may claim 
damages. In line with the principles of compensation for damage, the claim for 
damages first and foremost includes the right to withdraw from the contract214 • 
lnteresting as this argument may be, it has little persuasive power dogmatically, 
for in this case it is a matter not of claims for damages, but of the validity of a 
contract under civil law. However, this is not a question of the law of torts, but 
of the general law of contract and thus can be solved pursuant to Art. 134 Civil 
Code. 
The planned reform of the UWG215 (No. 121) intends to give the consumer in 
door-to-door sales violating the law of unfair competition a special right to 
claim damages, which also includes a claim for cancellation. This, however, 
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covers only gross breaches, not door-to-door sales in general. The planned right 
of cancellation does not thereby become superfluous. 
3 Introduction of a general right of cancellation in door-to-door sales 
116 In addition to the regulation under trade law or the law of unfair competition 
of door-to-door sales, a question taken up in legal discussions in the Federal 
Republic in recent years has been whether the customer could be helped more 
effectively if a right oj cance/lation (Widerrufsrecht) were introduced with 
respect to door-to-door sales and similar transactions 216• The civil-law solution 
to the problem would offer the advantage that, on the one hand, door-to-door 
sales would not be subjected to a general sanction under trade law or the law of 
unfair competition and, on the other band, the introduction of a right of 
cancellation would enable the customer to withdraw from contracts that are a 
nuisance to him (because of either their contents or the way in which they were 
concluded) and would enable him to stick to contracts that he would still have 
concluded after careful consideration. 
Under existing law, a right of cancellation exists in three cases: one case is 
regulated in the law of instalment sales and will be discussed in connection with 
consumer credit (No. 324), a special case of the right of cancellation is con-
tained in Art. 11 of the Gesetz über den Vertrieb ausländischer Investment-
anteile (Act on the Sale of Foreign Investment Fund Shares), and a third case is 
regulated in Art. 4 of the FernUSG 217 • The right of cancellation in the law of 
instalment transactions and in the law of correspondence courses is not 
restricted to door-to-door sales, but applies irrespective of the way and place in 
which the contract was made. Here the right of cancellation is justified by the 
long-term commitment undertaken by the customer involving considerable 
financial means. The right of cancellation in Art. 11 of the Act on the Sale of 
Foreign Investment Fund Shares starts from the facts of door-to-door selling. 
Attempts to introduce a right of cancellation concerning door-to-door sales 
and similar transactions have been dealt with by the German Bundestag during 
the last term in connection with reform of the law of instalment transactions. 
However, for reasons of equality and possibly unconstitutional discrimination 
against itinerant merchants, the legislator has not yet been able to decide in 
favour of the introduction of such a general right of cancellation in door-to-
door sales. Rather, he has given preference to the solution confined to the law of 
instalment transactions and similar transactions 218• lt has turned out, though, 
that the solution under the law of instalment transactions does not suffice, 
specifically not in the case of transactions made on the doorstep that do not 
satisfy the requirements of an instalment transaction or a similar transaction. 
So, at the beginning ofthe new term of the Bundestag, a new bill on thecancella-
tion of door-to-door and like transactions was introduced by the Bundesrat 
(Upper House of Parliament)219 • 
Also, there are endeavours within the EC to accomplish an approximation of 
laws on consumer protection with respect to contracts concluded outside regular 
business premises. In the meantime the Commission of the European Commu-
nities has submitted a draft directive to that effect 220 • The bill submitted by the 
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Bundesrat will be compared below with the draft directive submitted by the 
Commission. 
(aa) Both drafts start out from the desirable introduction of the right of cancel-
lation in door-to-door sales and similar transactions. In Art. 1 of the German 
draft, door-to-door sales are defined as representations of entering into a con-
tract which the customer was caused to make as a result of negotiations con-
ducted with the other contracting party (the trader) or his agent outside the 
latter's regular business premises. Art. l ofthe EC draft includes the same con-
cept of business premises, which is defined as a permanent business establish-
ment from where a person conducts his business or practices his profession; this 
includes stalls at fairs and on markets. Such contracts outside regular business 
premises need not necessarily be made on the doorstep, but can also be made at 
the place of work, in the street, and in places other than fairs and markets. 
However, it is this very aspect that the Federal Government has criticised in its 
comment on the Bundesrat bill. The Government holds that the wording 
'outside regular business premises' is too wide and that it is sufficient to name 
positively those types of contract that are subject to the right of cancellation, 
such as transactions on the doorstep or at the place of work 221 • The wide wording 
of the Bundesrat draft and the EC draft offers the advantage, though, that it 
also includes possible forms of circumvention and thus makes it easier for the 
agencies entrusted with consumer protection to handle matters of consumer 
protection. 
The drafts also agree in that the right of cancellation is applicable not only to 
business activities, but also to what are known as professional services (irrespec-
tive of their admissibility in terms of professional ethics) outside regular 
business premises. 
(bb) There is also largely agreement between the two drafts as to what types of 
transaction should not be subject to a right of cancellation: in particular, 
contracts concluded exclusively on the customer's initiative, declarations certi-
fied by a notary public, real estate transactions and petty transactions. Whereas 
the German draft does not give any details as to when a consideration is 
regarded as small, the draft directive prepared by the EC Commission tries to fix 
the consideration in terms of quantity at 25 European units of account. The 
German draft requires in addition that in the case of petty transactions the 
services/goods be supplied immediately and the small consideration be paid 
immediately. According to both drafts the person conducting a trade or 
business (including professional services) has to prove that the requirements of 
the exceptional cases mentioned exist. 
(cc) A striking difference between the Bundesrat draft and the EC draft lies in 
the fact that the latter requires that the contract be in writing, while the German 
legislator feels that he can do without such a requirement. The legal position 
pursuant to Art. Ja AbzG may be recalled here, where in the case of instalment 
sales writing is required and certain statements, for instance about the instal-
ment price and the eff ective annual rate of interest must be made to the customer 
in the written contract. The German draft results in a material gap in consumer 
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protection by waiving the requirement of writing. For this reason a regulation 
pursuant to Arts. 3 and 4 of the EC draft seems advisable. 
(dd) In both drafts, the exercise of a right of cancellation is made contingent 
upon the customer giving the entrepreneur, or persons equal in status to him, 
notice of cancellation within one week. Under German law, cancellation must 
be in writing, while the EC draft says that any notice will suffice, leaving it to the 
individual member countries whether or not they choose to attach to it any addi-
tional formal requirements. In any case it seems sensible to refrain from 
requiring writing for the notice of cancellation as is shown by practical expe-
rience with the law of instalment sales. Through conclusive behaviour the 
customer must also be able to exercise his right of cancellation, for instance by 
returning the goods222. 
Both drafts provide that the customer must be instructed in writing as to how 
to exercise his right of cancellation and as to when the cooling-off period starts 
to run, i.e. not until after a pertinent instrument of instruction has been 
delivered to him. In addition to that, the EC draft is intended to provide the 
customer with a printed form of cancellation, if possible upon conclusion of the 
contract, in order that he can actually exercise his right of cancellation and does 
not refrain from doing so out of ignorance of formalities and the like. lt is 
advisable also to incorporate such a proposal into German law which may, 
however, be done in the form of a recommendation only. 
Lastly, both drafts provide that, in the event of disputes about the beginning 
of the cooling-off period, the burden of proving that the right of cancellation 
was not exercised in time shall be on the person conducting the trade or business · 
This regulation is of particular importance in the case of predated instruments. 
Art. 12 of the EC draft in addition provides that in such a case the law of the 
member countries may require that the consumer should date door-to-door con-
tracts in his own hand or that the door-to-door contract should be registered 
with an appropriate public agency. Such provisions are not included in the 
German proposal. 
According to both drafts the consumer cannot waive his right of cancellation. 
Pursuant to the German draft, the right of cancellation lapses one month after 
both parties to the contract have fully met their obligations of performance. 
This regulation clearly deviates from the right of cancellation under the law of 
instalment transactions, in which case the right of cancellation lapses upon the 
performance of the contract. As the explanatory memorandum correctly points 
out, the difference lies in the fact that otherwise it would be easy to circumvent 
the right of cancellation. For door-to-door sales are not credit transactions, 
often performance is effected immediately; also in such a case the customer 
(apart from petty transactions) shall retain his right of cancellation. 
(ee) Regulating the legal consequences, both drafts ensure that the customer is 
not practically forced to refrain from exercising his right of cancellation because 
of any obligation to pay conventional penalties or damages, to accept liability 
for deterioration or wear and tear as provided, or to make a compensation for 
use. Here the EC draft goes even further than the Bundesrat draft. Pursuant to 
the EC draft, the consumer is not obliged to pay a consideration for ordinary use 
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of goods during the cooling-off period, while under German law he will have at 
least to pay for the value of use, but will not be required to compensate for a 
reduction in value. 
In terms of persons benefitting from the regulations it is made clear that the 
right of cancellation applies only to transactions under what is known as con-
sumer law (No. 19). If the customer acts in the course of business or as a profes-
sional, he has no right of cancellation. Conversely, ifthe other contracting party 
is not engaged in a business activity, there is no right of cancellation either. This 
ensures that a right of cancellation exists only in the case of consumer contracts 
proper, not in the case of transactions between consumers and consumers, and 
not between traders or the professional classes, respectively. 
(ff) In addition to the civil-law regulation, the EC draft includes a power 
to issue regulations under trade law or the law of unfair competition on door-
to-door sales and similar transactions. This ensures in particular that in those 
countries where door-to-door sales are regulated by more restrictive criteria 
under trade law than under German law; such a legal position is not precluded 
by EC law. 
VII CONTROL SYSTEMS 
117 The legal regulation of advertising and trade practices in the narrow sense 
exists on paper only as long as there are no appropriate law enf orcement 
mechanisms to implement the prohibitions and requirements contained in the 
statutory regulations in an effective and rapid way in the interest of the 
consumer. In the area discussed here, German law provides for differenr control 
systems. These will be evaluated side by side first, with proposals in terms of 
legal policy being taken into account. In a further section we shall try to describe 
the horizontal interlocking of the various control mechanisms. 
l The system of sanctions in the Iaw of unfair competition 
118 In so far as German advertising law is based on the law of unfair competition, 
the latter provides for elaborate law enforcement instruments created in decades 
of court practice. Under German law, sanctions under the law of unfair com-
petition play a leading role in contrast to the law in other EC countries, so they 
will be discussed first. These sanctions are applied primarily to misleading 
advertisements and to prohibited trade practices, pursuant to Arts. 1 and 3 
UWG and special legislation on unfair competition. 
Sanctions under the law of unfair competition are of a civil-law nature. Pur-
suant to Art. 1 and Art. 3 UWG the party injured by an unfair or misleading 
advertising measure may, to begin with, apply for an injunction. Within the 
meaning of those articles, such parties are the other competitors whose business 
is impaired by a competitor's measure. In the event of unfair acts of competi-
tion, the injured competitor may in addition sue for damages; the injured con-
sumer has no such righ122J. 
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The objective of the law of unfair competition - there can be no doubt 
about this any more - is not only the protection of the individual businessman, 
but also the maintenance of workable competition in the interest of the general 
public and for the good of consumers, collectively and individually. So, in 
Art. 13 UWG, the right to sue has been extended in two directions. To begin 
with, associations of traders may assert claims for removal and for injunction. 
This type of action is now very common in the Iaw of unfair competition and 
accounts for the majority of disputes. In addition, in 1965 the collective action 
by consumers was also incorporated into the Act 224, but was Iinked to restrictive 
requirements; a claim for injunction may be asserted without restriction only in 
cases of misleading advertising. Infringements of the prohibition of unfair acts 
of competition may be taken up by consumer associations by an action for 
injunction only in so far as the claim relates to misleading statements about 
goods or industrial services or other trade practices for the purpose of competi-
tion which materially affect consumer interests. The consumer associations' 
right of action in these cases does not refer to all infringements of the rules of 
fair competition, but only to those affecting consumer interests. The forbidden 
trade practices discussed above may be taken up by an action of consumer 
associations. Not every consumer association enjoys a right of action, but only 
those whose by-laws provide for the safeguard of the consumer's interests 
through education and guidance and those that actually safeguard these 
interests through appropriate advisory services225 • As expressly provided by 
statute, consumer associations may not ask for damages. lt is the intention of 
the government bill to am end the UWG of 26 May 1978226 to make the collective 
action more 'serious' through some technical changes. Pursuant to a new 
Art. 13 para. 5 UWG, the association shall be subject to government super-
vision, so that not every consumers' association may claim tobe safeguarding 
consumer interests. In addition, associations on a membership basis having 75 
members may bring an action as under the law of standard form contract condi-
tions (No. 294ff), but likewise require registration. 
In the beginning, consumer organisations made use of the possibility of 
bringing a collective action only with hesitation 227 • This was attributable to the 
restrictive handling of such matters by the coutts, which were reluctant to grant 
associations, for instance so-called 'anwaltliche Gebührenvereine' (associations 
of lawyers founded for the sole purpose of getting fees), the right of action 
without close examination of their activities as Iaid down in their by-laws. The 
de facto restriction results from the limited funds available to consumer associa-
tions. As disputes arising from issues of unfair competition generally involve 
high values in dispute and a considerable Iitigation risk, consumer associations 
are forced to take up only clear-cut contraventions of the law without the possi-
bility of having borderline cases clarified, for instance through test cases 228 • 
Only recently has there been a change since consumer associations have made 
more active use of their right of action. Moreover, the question is still unsettled 
as to what extent a trader infringing the rules on fair competition can be asked to 
reimburse the cost of extrajudicial proceedings, for instance lawyers' and 
experts' fees, to the consumer association. The risk to which consumer associa-
tions are exposed, of paying damages under the law of torts for unsuccessful 
litigation, is also considered to be very high 229• Overall, v. Fa/ckenstein in an 
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empirical study has pointed out some cases where a collective action has been 
successful, but has also shown serious deficiencies, for instance concerning 
widespread trade practices and direct selling. 
Another inadequacy of a collective action brought by consumers lies in the 
risk of litigation costs. True, Art. 23a UWG provides that the value in dispute 
(Streitwert) in issues of unfair competition may be reduced if the burden of the 
full amount of litigation costs considerably jeopardises the financial situation of 
either party (so-called split value). Bur the courts interpret this provision restric-
tively as regards the granting of a reduction of the value in dispute to consumer 
organisations. The courts hold that consumer organisations should comply with 
the general litigation rules governing the law of unfair competition and if neces-
sary should go to court less often. Moreover, they say, it is the task of those 
agencies financing consumer organisations to provide the necessary funds for 
taking cases to court. According to the courts, costs cannot be awarded against 
the opponent and the lawyer should not get his fees based on a lower value in 
dispute230• 
The government bill mentioned earlier wants to clarify in a new Art. 23a 
UWG that the funds granted by public authorities should not be taken into 
account in the evaluation of the constimer association 's financial situation 231 • 
Moreover, a standard value in dispute of DM 5000 shall be introduced if the 
association is exclusively dependent on public funds, as are consumer advice 
centres and the Consumer Protection Association in Berlin (No. 6). 
Overall, German court practice in the area of prosecution of infringements 
of the law of unfair competition is thus distinctly asymmetrical, in favour of 
associations of trade and industry and to the disadvantage of consumer organi-
sations. This finding cannot be disproved on the grounds that allegedly associa-
tions of trade and industry also safeguard consumer interests indirectly or that 
consumer associations are equivalent to trade organisations232 • After all, 
pursuant to the Gesetz über Prozeßkostenhilfe (No. 370), consumer associa-
tions may be granted aid if they are unable to defray the costs and failure to 
prosecute the case would be contrary to the 'public' interest (Art. 116, item 2 
Code of Civil Procedure, new version). 
2 lmprovement of law enforcement through a claim for damages under the 
law of unfair competition 
119 The decisively weak point of a collective action brought by consumers -
apart from its limited practicability so far - lies in the fact that law enforcement 
is confined to a claimfor injunction. The injunction imposed on an advertiser or 
a trader - by way of a warning carrying a penalty, interlocutory injunction 
(einstweilige Verfügung) or (less often) cease and desist order233 - cannot 
repair the damage the consumer has suffered through an act of unfair competi-
tion and cannot really foil the impression created by the advertising measure. 
Three new types of sanction are therefore presently under discussion: the collec-
tive claim for damages, the claimfor damages by an individual consumer and 
corrective advertising. The draft directive of 1 March 1978 submitted by the EC 
Commission expressly provides for these types of sanction, although their 
shaping is largely left to the laws of the member countries. 
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Meanwhile it has been confirmed by empirical investigations that the 
consumer may suffer considerable lasses through acts of unfair competition and 
misleading advertising234. Various potential types of damage are distinguished: 
damage from enticement or expenses, damage from entering into a contract, 
differential damage, damage resulting from misleading prices, incidental and 
consequential damage, and law enforcement costs. Of greatest importance in 
practice are damage resulting jrom entering into a contract and differential 
damage. lt is a case of damage resulting from entering into a contract if a 
consumer, for instance through an unfair door-to-door sale, is induced to make 
a contract which he would not have made under normal circumstances. These 
types of damage occur primarily in the case of acts of unfair competition under 
Art. l UWG (No. 103ff) and account for about 50% of all empirically ascer-
tained cases of damage. By differential damage we mean a loss of property on 
the part of the consumer which he has suffered primarily as a result of mis-
leading advertising: a commodity is claimed to have certain properties which it 
does not actually have (sale of cheap German whisky as expensive Scotch 
whisky: the difference in price between the two constitutes the damage to the 
consumer). Differential damage may also occur in such a way that in an 
advertisement a commodity or service is claimed to have a particular quality 
which it does not have in actual fact (for instance, slimming agents), without 
therefore being sold at a higher price than comparable products. According to a 
probability analysis, the sum total involved in the above mentioned types of 
damage is 1.5 to 2 billion D-marks per annum. The other types of damage could 
either not be specified in the investigation or were negligible. 
So far, under the existing law, compensation for damage as described above 
has hardly been possible for factual or legal reasons. Damage stemming from 
entering into a contract is accepted in line with the principle pacta sunt servanda 
unless, by way of exception, there is a reason for nullity or cancellation pursuant 
to the Civil Code (No. 115). No compensation whatsoever is provided for 
differential damage, either under the law of contract or under the law of torts, 
unless properties are warranted in a contract of sale or services (No. 239ff). 
Often the damage suffered by an individual consumer is so negligible that he will 
scarcely try to enforce a claim by way of litigation. This calls for the possibility 
of collective assertion of claims through consumer associations. 
(a) Collective claimsfor compensation 
120 The demand for a collective claimfor compensation has in the first instance 
been developed by legal writers235 • So far, there has been an imbalance in the law 
of unfair competition, because competitors and to a limited extent also their 
organisations, but not consumer organisations may claim damages from the 
party engaging in misleading advertising measures, although it is often the 
consumer who is adversely affected by an advertising measure. The courts have 
rejected the idea of extending the de lege lata situation by awarding a right to 
claim for damages in tort236. 
The problems presented by a law reform are, on the one hand, a definition 
of the group of parties injured and, on the other, a definition of the damage. 
Currently, consumer organisations are not run on a membership basis and 
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therefore are hardly authorised to assert a claim for damage suffered by a third 
party (except for the rare case oftaking up claims assigned to them - No. 6). 
Their own damage includes only the cost of law enforcement237 • Even if these 
difficulties are surmounted, for instance by the creation of consumer organisa-
tions on a membership basis, the problem of assessing the damage remains. 
Class actions, as und er US law, do not exist in the law of the Federal Repu blic. 
The Germ an law of torts compensates only individual damage. In the case of a 
collective claim for damages, such compensation plays a minor role. The pro-
posals submitted by the Commission to Fight White'-·Collar Crimes, inter alia, 
include considerations to the effect that here statistical data should suffi~e to 
ascertain the loss (difference between hypothetical market value and decrease in 
value)238 • 
(b) Withdrawaljrom contract 
121 Of far greater importance to the individual consumer is a remedy enabling 
him to withdraw from the contract. According to prevailing though not undis-
puted court practice, the contract entered into by a consumer by means of mis-
leading advertising or unfair trade practices continues to be effective even if 
the trader by way of an injunction was forbidden to continue such practices 
(No. 115)239 • Only in exceptional cases will the consumer be able to advance 
fraud or an infringement of public policy. The consumer remains bound by the 
contract - an untenable result in terms of legal policy. 
The new proposals submitted by the Commission to Fight White-Collar 
Crimes and by the Consumer Advisory Council now envisage for the individual 
consumer a right to withdraw from the contract240 • Accordingly, if a contract 
with a final consumer is the result of a misleading advertising measure, the 
consumer shall have a right to withdraw from the contract. Such a right must 
not be confused, though, with the reform attempts to introduce, for instance, a 
right of cancellation in the case of door-to-door sales, since that eventual right 
of cancellation exists irrespective of damage and merely requires that a time 
limit be observed (No. 241). In reality, the scope of application of the right to 
withdraw from the contract and the right of cancellation in door-to-door sales 
and similar transactions will overlap. lt is therefore conceivable that the heated 
legal-policy discussion concerning the right to withdraw from the contract will 
calm down if the consumer is granted a right of cancellation, limited in time, in 
door-to-door sales and sirnilar transactions. 
(c) Corrective advertising 
122 A third proposal in terms of legal policy amounts to the introduction of what 
is known as corrective advertising241 • This was initially developed under US law 
and means that the advertiser has to retract, or possibly correct, his advertising 
clairn at bis own expense in the same rnedia242 • U nder Germ an law corrective 
advertising has so far been a subcategory of the so-called claim for removal 
(Beseitigungsanspruch), which exists in the Iaw of torts irrespective of fault and 
may be invoked against rnisleading advertising. Such a clairn may be either for 
retraction or for correction243 • In addition, Art. 23 para. 2 UWG provides for 
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publication by order of the court of the substance of the judgement. The 
opposing party's right to reply exists only in the law of the press, not in adver-
tising law. 
In court practice the claim for correction and the right to publication have so 
far played a minor role. Therefore their theoretical possibility does not 
invalidate the demand for corrective advertising. The real problem of corrective 
advertising is not one of civil procedure but one of substantive law. For as long 
as the concept of deception is determined by subjective criteria (No. 83), correc-
tive advertising is based on a weak foundation, for there is no requirement by 
law that an advertiser should make objectively correct statements. He has only 
to remove the misleading element, which does not necessarily require correc-
tive advertising; conversely, corrective advertising may give rise to further 
deception. 
The right of action on the part of associations continues to be a problem, 
though, for it is quite controversial whether the claim for removal requires that 
the party be affected personally or, irrespective thereof, belongs to any organi-
sation which may demand that the other party should refrain from doing a par-
ticular thing244 • Lastly, the publication of court rulings should also be extended 
to include prohibitory injunctions (einstweilige Verfügungen). On the other 
hand, legislation should provide not only for the substance, but also for the 
findings of court rulings to be made public245 • 
Corrective advertising so far has been used only by persons conducting a trade 
or business whose 'rights' were 'encroached upon' by competitors, consumer 
organisations or organs of the press. In this context, the claim derives from 
the law of torts and is regarded as a means of restitution within the meaning 
of Art. 249 Civil Code. The Federal High Court permits reimbursement of 
expenses (for instance, advertising in newspapers) for making good a damage. 
The claim for reimbursement, however, is limited to the correction or supple-
mentation of the preceding misrepresentation, i.e. the corrective advertisement 
must bear reference to the violation of the law24sa. 
The Federal High Court's practice gives rise to a considerable additional risk 
of liability for critical press reports on the behaviour of traders. The extent to 
which this court practice will be applicable to consumer organisations has not 
yet been decided. This means that a trader in the case of misrepresentation 
(No. 71) may impose the cost of 'corrective advertising' on press organs or 
consumer organisations. In this context it must be said, though, that the Federal 
High Court is trying to restrict such a 'right of self-help'. 'Corrective adver-
tising', not in favour but at the expenseof consumerorganisations (!), may clash 
with the principle of freedom of speech as defined in Art. 5 Basic Law. If the 
Federal High Court in permitting 'corrective advertising' refers to 'consumer 
expectations', this does not say anything about passing on the cost of adver-
tising campaigns. If an advertiser comes forward with his statement, he must 
also tolerate critical, possibly even wrong reports, provided he has occasioned 
such reports. 
(d) Bill to amend the UWG 
123 The government bill of 26 May 1978 to amend the UWG246 provides in a new 
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wording of Arts. 13 to l 3c UWG for appropriate sanctions under the law of 
torts, but as regards corrective advertising leaves the de lege lata situation 
unchanged. Under a new Art. 13a para. 2, the legislator first of all would 
provide for a claim for damages to the consumer injured by an unlawful trade 
practice if he was induced to enter into the contract as a result of such unlawful 
practice. In the case of (punishable) untrue advertising pursuant to Art. 4 
amended version UW G, the claim for damages is extended in two directions: the 
consumer has a right to claim damages in respect of the differential damage 
(comparison between the actual value of the commodity and the value claimed 
in the advertisement), and he is granted a special right of rescission pursuant to 
Art. 13b. Ifthe advertising claim originates from a third party, thecustomer has 
a right of rescission only if the other party to the contract knew or should have 
known that the claim was untrue or participated through his own measures in 
advertising such a claim. 
A striking feature of the bill as compared with the first draft is the restrictive 
handling of the claim for damages in the case of false advertising: according to 
the first draft, any misleading advertising was sufficient; according to the 
present government bill it must be a case of punishable advertising - which is 
often hard for the consumer to provew. Another prob lern is presented by selling 
on a division-of-labour basis: often the advertiser and the consumer's con-
tracting party are two different persons, especially in the sale of branded 
articles. According to the first draft, any objective participation in advertising 
by the contracting party was sufficient, whereas according to the government 
bill such a party either could culpably have been familiar with the falsehood of 
the advertisement or must have had a share in it through his own measures. So 
the right to damage and the special right of rescission against the seller will play 
only a small role in law enforcement. Of greater importance seems tobe the right 
to claim for damages against the advertiser which, for example, may also take 
the form of a claim tobe released from contractual obligations the consumer has 
entered into with a third party (the seller). 
The legislator grants such an individual claim for compensation less in the 
interest of the individual consumer than as a prerequisite for a 'collective' 
assertion of such a claim. This is effected through the assignment of claims to 
the consumer association. Pursuant to a new Art. 13c, the assignment must be 
in writing and may be withdrawn until filing of the action. The Federal Govern-
ment prefers this type of collective claims to a class action on the US model or a 
collective action in the consumer organisation 's own right, since in the Federal 
Republic of Germany consumer organisations are not run on a membership 
basis 248 • The assignment of claims will, however, present problems in legal prac-
tice, especially if they concern only minor losses, all of which have tobe ascer-
tained individually in court, particularly as regards causation and the amount of 
damage249 • Thus, it is not tobe expected that the combination of claims will have 
a preventive effect and that it will be possible actually to make good the damage 
suffered by the consumer. The bill - unlike the EC draft directive - does not 
in any case provide for the skimming off of excess profits. 
The functioning of the device of the new collective action will also depend on 
the extent to which an association may assert a claim for its own damage, 
particularly for the purpose oflaw enforcement and prosecution. The courts are 
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reluctant to grant to consumer associations the right, for instance, to charge 
extrajudicial lawyer's fees and expert's fees (No. 120). This is altered by the 
draft only in that the association, if the collective action for damages has been 
successful, may deduct costs prior to paying out the amount of compensation 
(Art. l 3c, para. 3 draft UWG). The bill does not provide for corrective adver-
tising beyond the provisions of the existing Iaw. 
3 Administrative and criminal sanctions 
124 (aa) Administrative control of advertising does not play a great role in the 
Federal Republic of Germany for various reasons, although the possibilities of 
such control do exist. 
The broadest powers to take action are included in the AMG, which enables 
the supervisory authority to examine advertisements (Art. 64 para. 3 AMG) in 
the case of drugs subject to sale by pharmacists only, and to object to media 
advertising and marketing pursuant to the HWG2so. 
Art. 23 of the Gesetz über das Kreditwesen (KWG) (Act on Supervision of the 
Banking Business) and Art. 81 of the Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz provide for 
the possibility of supervisory authorities raising objections to advertisements of 
banks and insurance companies. Such a right is exercised occasionally, but more 
in an informal way than through appropriate administrative action. The possi-
bility under Art. 23 KWG of establishing advertising guidelines by statutory 
order has remained unused since l 9672s1. 
Within the framework of the supervision of food advertising, tobacco adver-
tising and cosmetics advertising there also exist powers to take administrative 
action. lnfringements ofthe advertising provisions regulated in the above Acts, 
particularly of the prohibition to mislead, may be fined. The authorities may 
forbid or criticise certain advertising measures also through administrative 
action, which almost never occurs in practice. 
Beyond its power of supervision of the rules on workable competition, the 
Federal Carte/ Office may also take action against advertisements or trade prac-
tices of market-dominating enterprises in the event of abuse. With reference to 
that provision, the Federal Cartel Office forbade an advertising campaign by a 
leading enterprise on the margarine market, but did not succeed with its decision 
before the Kammergericht (Regional Court of Berlin)252 • Government super-
vision of trade practices forbidden under trade law, for instance within the 
framework of direct sales, plays practically no role from the point of view of 
consumer protection253. 
125 (bb) Intentional infringements of certain administrative regulations are 
regarded as criminal offences. However, in practice they will hardly ever be 
prosecuted, since so far there has been no comprehensive criminal law of adver-
tising in the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Grossly misleading or false advertising may be punished pursuant to Art. 4 
UWG. The prerequisites for punishment are described in a very restrictive way, 
however: an advertiser is punishable only if he intends to create the impression 
that something is an exceptionally favourable offer, if he makes his claim to a 
!arge audience and if he knows that these statements are false or apt to mislead. 
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Art. 4 stands out clearly against the civil-law provision of Art. 3 UWG. The 
statutory provisions present the prosecuting authorities with almost insur-
mountable difficulties, so that punishments for punishable advertising hardly 
ever occur254 • 
In the more recent legal-policy discussion it has therefore been demanded that 
Art. 4 UWG be extended. There are two different directions. The Commission 
for Economic and Social Change plans to consider advertising·punishable as 
soon as there is 'conditional intent' and misleading statements have been made, 
irrespective of whether or not they are knowingly false255 • 
The political public has also demanded that a criminal sanction should take 
effect as soon as misleading statements are made negligently256 • However, that 
reform would come close to the civil-law provisions in the law of unfair competi-
tion. Another question tobe asked is whether criminal law is generally a suitable 
means to fight infringements of the law of unfair competition. The present prac-
tice in Germany tends to prove the contrary. 
The government bill to amend the UWG provides for an amendment of Art. 4 
UWG also. The advertiser will be punished in case of conditional intent. Only 
such untrue advertising claims shall be covered as are directed to a major group 
of persons and are essential to the conclusion of a contract; misleading state-
ments are not punishable257• The amendment is of special importance as apre-
requisite for the consumer's claim for damages and his right of rescission of the 
contract (No. 123). 
4 Self-regulation 
126 Of late the demand for self-regulation schemes by trade and industry and the 
advertising business has increasingly been voiced in the Federal Republic to 
replace or supplement state controJ258 • An express statutory basis does not there-
fore exist. lt should be noted, though, that these schemes may become impor-
tant from the point of view of antitrust law if they are apt to influence market 
conditions through restraint of trade; they will then require exemption by the 
Federal Minister of Economics, Art. 8 GWB. On several occasions in recent 
years, the Federal Minister of Economics has permitted such arrangements in 
order to enable self-control of advertising both in terms of quality and quantity, 
e.g. the Orderly Market Arrangements of the tobacco industry in 1973 and the 
agreement of cigarette manufacturers to indicate harmful substances on 
cigarette packages. The Federal Minister of Economics advances consumer 
protection and public health interests as express reasons for his exemption 
decisions. lt is also possible that the Federal Cartel Office will tolerate the agree-
ment for reasons of public policy259 • lt is disquieting, though, that here the 
powers envisaged under food law should remain unused. lt should not be 
forgotten that infringements of such self-regulation arrangements do not entail 
effective sanctions in terms of public or consumer policy. 
Another means of self-regulation are the mies of fair trade practices agreed 
upon by trade and industry. Thus there are, for example, rules concerning the 
insurance business and rules of pharmaceutical advertising 260• In 1975, the 
Markenartikelverband (association for branded goods) reported detailed 
regulations on trade practices under Art. 28 GWB to the Federal Cartel Office. 
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However, these rules do not intend consumer protection, but organise self-help 
against certain types of discrimination and obstruction. Consumer associa-
tions do not take part in the establishment and registration of such rules, so that 
it is a question of whether or not this may be regarded as an effective means 
tobe welcomed in terms of consumer policy261 • An infringement of these rules 
may perhaps constitute a practice against public po/icy within the meaning of 
Art. l UWG; in other respects there are no sanctions, particularly not against 
outsiders262 • 
Lastly, the Deutscher Wer berat (German Advertising Council) should be 
mentioned which comprises representatives of the various branches of trade and 
industry and as a supreme self-regulation organ supervises media advertising. In 
line with its by-laws, there are no sanctions available to the German Advertising 
Council. Rather, it tries to remedy grievances in advertising in an informal way 
through the moral pressure of its authority26J. Consumer associations do not 
take part in the activity of that agency either, but may complain to the Adver-
tising Council. So far, the Council 's activity has not been very successful264 • 
There is no formal legal basis for its activity. Since the Council does not impose 
sanctions, it is assumed according to the dominant view that its activity is not 
hindered by regulations under antitrust law or the law of unfair competition. 
Also, civil-law liability for its activities is generally rejected. 
5 Horizontal interlocking of the systems of sanctions 
127 The different systems of sanctions which so far operate parallel to each other 
in German consumer law urgently require horizontal inter/ocking265 • lt is in the 
interest of the consumer that infringements of, for instance, administrative 
regulations should also have consequences under the law of unfair competition 
and under civil law and vice versa. First steps in that direction have been made 
by the courts. Thus, misleading advertising forbidden under food law and the 
law of drugs not only results in administrative sanctions, but gives rise to an 
injunction under the law of unfair competition pursuant to Art. 3 UWG. In a 
particular case, however, differences may exist. Also, slack-fill packages 
prohibited pursuant to Art. l 7a Eichgesetz constitute misleading advertising, 
possibly even contrary to public policy. Thus consumer organisations may ask 
for an injunction against a prohibited trade practice under Art. 13, para. la 
UWG even if administrative agencies refuse to take action. 
A misleading statement by a supplier about the existence of information 
regulations on advertising may constitute an unfair trade practice. This has been 
recognised in court practice with respect to instalment sales 266• That principle 
may be a generalisation. In addition, it may be assumed that infringements of 
consumer protection regulations contemporaneously constitute infringements 
of public policy under Art. 1 UWG for public policy is put into concrete terms 
through appropriate statutory regulations. Thereby it is possible, for example, 
to have consumer organisations enforce labelling rules directly by means 
provided for under the law of unfair competition 267 • 
Conversely, it is rightly demanded that the prosecution of infringements of 
the law of unfair competition pursuant to the UWG should not only be left to 
private associations entitled to bring an action, but should also be a matter of 
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public concern. Whether to that end a special consumer protection authority or 
the Federal Cartel Office should be invested with appropriate powers requires 
careful consideration26s. 
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CHAPTER5 
Saf ety of Products and Services 
1 INTRODUCTION 
128 Technical progress not only benefits the consumer in a variety of ways: mass 
production also involves a great number of risks to the consumer's health and 
property. The aspect of safety is therefore of prime importance to the consumer 
when he purchases a product or avails himself of a service. Over the last few 
years it has become apparent that manufacturers do not provide adequate pro-
tection to the consumer. Competition, which according to the liberal theory of 
economics is to ensure that only manufacturers of the best products will survive, 
does not fulfil its function in practice either. Therefore it is the task of the state 
to ensure the necessary protection for the public. Even before the adoption by 
the Federal Government of the first consumer protection programme, which 
expressly provides for the protection ofthe public against dangers to their health 
and property, legislation was enacted for two spheres of life which are of vital 
importance to the consumer, namely foodstuffs and drugs. Both Acts have since 
been amended and have strengthened the consumer's position with lasting 
effect. The LMBG of 1 August 1974, which came into force on 1 January 1975, 
extended the government 's powers of control. The AMG of 24 August 1976, 
which came into force on 1 January 1978, introduced the procedure of prior 
approval of drugs which had so long been wished for. The Acts regulate the exis-
tence of powers to take official action. The implementation of the Acts is incum-
bent on the competent authorities, i.e. the food inspection authorities of the 
German Länder and - for drugs - the Federal Health Authority. Also 
subject to a certain degree of state control are 'technical labour materials' 
which, in addition to implements proper, include household appliances and 
toys. The Maschinenschutzgesetz (MSchG) (Technical Labour Materials Act) 
of 24 June 1968 (renamed Gerätesicherheitsgesetz (GSG, Act on Safety of 
Appliances) on 13 August 1979) tries to check the dangers emanating from these 
products by imposing on manufacturers and importers the obligation to 
produce and market only products that according to the established standards 
of technology are not dangerous to the consumer if used as provided. It is the 
task of industrial inspection boards to check whether manufacturers observe the 
established standards of technology. As such standards are established by 
manufacturers practically without any governmental influence, it is for the 
official supervisory authorities to check whether manufacturers observe their 
own guidelines. 
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Apart from special legislation on explosives or poisons, there are no other 
statutory regulations ensuring the protection of the consumer, although many 
products do involve dangers. 
The control of these product areas may be exercised by industry itself. To that 
end self-regulatory institutions are available for a variety of products that do 
not come under the GSG (radio, TV), although in a certain way they are similar 
to the appliances mentioned there. Here control is likewise exercised through the 
estab!ishment of standards which in most cases the manufacturers concerned 
undertake to observe. Here there is also an important field of activity for 
consumer organisations. However, in this connection it may be pointed out that 
consumer organisations currently Jack the necessary personnel and power to 
exercise effective control. 
lf we consider all possibilities for protection that may be employed in the 
course of the production process (i.e. both those available to the government 
and those trade and industry have created for themselves), it must be noted that 
they do not suffice to prevent dangerous products from being manufactured 
and passed on to the consumer. Since dangerous products do come onto the 
market, damage occurs and the question arises of who is liable for such damage. 
Generally, the seller of a product does not come into question as a person 
against whom a claim lies. His primary obligation is to supply the buyer with a 
commodity which is unobjectionable in quality. Depending on the source of 
defect, aspects of safety may come into play in the judgment of quality. 
Basically, though, the quality aspect has priority in the law ofimplied warranty. 
Claims for damages based on Jack of safety of.products may in a particular case 
be justified from the viewpoint of positive breach of contract (positive Forde-
rungsverletzung). The narrow scope of application of contractual liability 
shows that the person actually to be held liable for any claims for damages is the 
manufacturer. Hence, the type and scope of any liability on the part of the 
manufacturer will have to be shown. Since under German law the manufac-
turer's liability is not codified, it was incumbent upon the courts to design it. 
Meanwhile, a court practice has been established whereby the consumer's 
protection may be judged according to the principles laid down. Special impor-
tance will be attached to a comparison between proposals made in Europe for an 
amendment of the manufactu'rer's liability and the existing German law. 
II POSSIBILITIES OF CONTROL 
1 Preliminary remarks 
129 As has been said above, the present industrial mass production of products 
and services may involve considerable risks to safety. To keep the production 
and marketing of dangerous proqucts to a minimum, control measures must be 
taken. The possibilities of control vary widely, though, depending on who is in 
charge: industry, government or consumer organisations. Through legislation 
and its enforcement the government is able to achieve a greater measure of 
binding force than industry within the framework of its self-regulatory agree-
ments. Consumers largely lack statutory powers, so that they depend on actual 
pressure to achieve their objectives. 
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Before we examine the avenues of control open to the three institutions in 
charge, we must find out at what stage of production intervention is possible. 
The earliest possibility of intervention is in the production process itself. Such 
measures are of a preventive nature: they control the products before they leave 
the production line. Preventive control is possible even if the products have 
already reached the sphere of marketing, but have not yet been made accessible 
to the consumer. However, if dangerous products are already on the market, we 
must distinguish between measures which have for their object the avoidance 
of a theoretical <langer to the consumer, which are classed with preventive 
measures. If a theoretical danger has become practical, though, and injury is 
imminent, only retrospective measures can be taken in an attempt to check the 
<langer or to prevent it from spreading. Measures of an exclusively retrospective 
nature can only be taken if damage has already occurred. 
2 Control measures of industry 
130 Representatives of industry, particularly, point out that, because of its selec-
tive mechanisms, the market is the appropriate means of ensuring the greatest 
possible safety 1• Although from that point of view measures of self-control are a 
contradiction in terms, there are self-regulatory institutions in some branches of 
industry2• ln some cases they were established because the branches of industry 
concerned thereby escaped imminent and much stricter state control3. Another 
reason was to let the legitimate interest of entrepreneurs in a branch prevail over 
the short-sighted interests of individuals whiclrwould otherwise have resulted in 
economic and non-material loss to all those in that branch4 • Such reasons have 
been advanced by representatives of the various branches of industry according 
to whom there is a black sheep in every sector that has to be eliminated (cf., for 
instance, the reasons given in support of the terms recommendations by the 
Deutscher Reisebüroverband (German Travel Offices Association)). 
Self-regulatory institutions of industry in the area of safety are designed in 
such a way that industry establishes industrial standards which it undertakes to 
observe (No. 157). 
The Federal Cartel Office considers such agreements to be unobjectionable 
under antitrust law, because they do not aim at restraint of competition, but are 
only meant to ensure technical safety and protect people or products against 
dangers 5• Such exemption applies even to cases where the establishment of a new 
safety standard completely blocks the sale of the obsolete product6• The reasons 
given by the Federal Cartel Office seem tobe quite unrealistic. Safety standards 
do serve competitive purposes. Thus the German export industry is interested in 
German Standards being introduced in developing countries in order to block 
these markets for foreign products. Conversely, German safety standards 
impede the import of foreign products 7• Self-regulatory institutions are of a 
preventive nature, for they aim at influencing the sphere of production: only 
products that comply with the established standard shall be manufactured. In 
this connection it is not the interests of consumers, but primarily those of the 
manufacturing industry that are taken as a criterion. 
Moreover, self-regulatory institutions lack an important prerequisite to their 
effectiveness: they have no retrospective powers. Thus overall, self-regulating 
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measures of industry cannot be said to be of decisive importance in consumer 
protection. This is not surprising, because the prime objective of self-regulation 
is not to see that the manufacture of products conforms to consumer needs but 
to safeguard production interests. The pursuance of that objective implies that 
consumer protection as a mere by-product cannot be pursued as appropriate. 
Precisely because consumer protection is an instrument of protection of the 
weaker party against the stronger, it calls for more exact and purposive 
elaboration. 
3 State control measures 
(a) Preventive control measures 
131 From the consumer's point of view, preventive measures are the most effec-
tive means of affording effective protection. The more the state wants to inter-
fere in the sphere of production, the fiercer the resistance it will rneet from trade 
and industry. All the same, the amendments of the LMBG and AMG show a 
tendency towards increased preventive state control. 
One possibility for the state to exert an influence on the sphere of production 
is measures to promote competition, so activities by the state to promote com-
petition must be mentioned here. When introducing bills which are by their 
nature intended to strengthen the consumer's position unequivocally, the 
Federal Government emphasises that such bills at the same time promote com-
petition8. This goes to show the overall conception both of present and previous 
governments, which is based on the idea that promotion of competition contem-
poraneously improves consumer protection. This explains why the Government 
is reluctant to intervene in the course of economic events through control 
measures that attach greater importance to the consumer's legal position. 
lnstead, measures conforming to market trends play a prominent part in consid-
erations aimed at improving preventive protection9 • 
The lndustrial Code and the respective special legislation include the require-
ments tobe satisfied as to the manufacturer's qualifications andlor the design 
of his enterprise. The lndustrial Code deals, inter alia, with products which 
constitute a <langer to the general public. Of course, these dangers also threaten 
the consumer. Because in this study the consumer is interpreted as the final 
consumer, regulations made for the protection of the general public may be 
ignored. 
The requirements as to manufacturers and enterprises engaged in manufac-
ture for the final consumer flow from the respective special legislation. Thus 
special requirements exist with respect to the manufacturers of drugs, 
Arts. 13-20 AMG. With respect to pharmaceutical undertakings, internal rules 
and regulations may be made prescribing to the manufacturer of drugs how to 
design his enterprise from packaging to control, storage, hygienic standards, 
requirements as to his personnel, Art. 54 AMG. Special regulations govern the 
sale of food and beverages under the Gaststättengesetz (Hotels and Restaurants 
Act) and the production of dairy products. 
The inspection of goods according to criteria of substantive law was intro-
duced by the AMG. The legislator considers the procedure of prior approval to 
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be necessary to guard the consumer against dangers involved in taking potent 
drugsw. 
Since 1 January 1977 correspondence courses have also been subject to prior 
approval, to ensure that the studentis provided with teaching material enabling 
him to reach the goal aimed at. The Government had initialiy tried to get 
organisers to have their courses voluntarily examined by the governmental 
admission agency. However, it was only possible to subject 150 out of 1150 
courses to such examination 11 • 
In some cases the legislator bases his considerations on the assumption that 
preventive protection of the consumer's health may be achieved by the legislator 
imposing certain prohibitions prescribing the use or non-use of certain sub-
stances. In order that the competent authority (as a rule the federal ministry 
involved) may comply with the prohibitions, it is authorised to issue regulations 
for the protection of the consumer's health. The prerequisite for the issuance of 
an order is a suspected danger to health. This principle is tobe found primarily 
in the new food law 12, but the law of drugs also includes the instrument of 
preventive regulations (Arts. 5-7 AMG). 
The production process may be controlled by the Government becoming 
active of its own accord without the manufacturer having occasioned such 
control. Such powers are provided for in the food law and the law of drugs, 
where enterprises must be controlled regularly (every two years); on such occa-
sions samples from a series may be taken. 
Another possibility of preventive intervention is in the control of the 
exchange of goods sphere, which can be exercised in several ways. Thus the 
legislator may lay down mandatory provisions to the effect that certain goods 
must not be marketed at all. Such provisions are included in the LMBG and 
AMG, but the legislator may also issue regulations on the manner of the 
exchange of goods process. This has been done in the law of drugs, where drugs 
may be sold only to particular persons or institutions who/which in turn are 
entitled to seil them to the consumer. 
The AMG and LMBG include another special feature which influences the 
exchange of goods sphere: they provide for the drawing up of the food codex 
and the pharmacopoeia to include binding rules on the quality, testing, storage, 
etc., of foods and drugs. Both books reflect fair trade usage and legitimate 
consumer expectations. In their effects, they are equivalent to prohibitions and 
thus are also of importance to the sphere of production. The central recording 
of drug risks and the official collection of samples and investigation reports on 
foods serve the same purpose. 
(b) Retrospective control measures 
132 Retrospective control measures are measures initiated by competent authori-
ties to control a production process, because they have received information 
about concrete dangers to safety. In most cases, the authorities do not become 
active until after damage has occurred. In both cases, the goods concerned may 
be seized or their further sale prohibited. If the damage is due to a violation of 
the manufacturer's duty, a comprehensive !ist of sanctions is available to the 
authorities, at least under food law and the law of drugs. If products are sold 
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despite a ban placed on their sale by the competent authorities, as a rule 
contracts underlying the purchase should be void because they infringe Art. 134 
of the Civil Code. 
4 Control by consumer protection associations 
133 Consumer associations have no statutory powers to control economic pro-
cesses. Just as Iittle does the legislator permit them to participate on a par in the 
decision-making processes of trade and industry. Consumer protection associa-
tions perform advisory functions, if any. In some cases these are performed 
within the framework of legislation the object of which is the improvement of 
consumer protection. In other cases, the associations are assigned such func-
tions through administrative measures or are involved by industry itself. In the 
law of drugs, consumer representatives participate neither in the procedure of 
prior approvaI nor in the control of the production sphere. Much the same is 
true of the food law. Consumer organisations do participate in the establish-
ment of technical standards. The DIN (German Institute for Standardisation) 
may serve as an example of consumer associations sitting on various commit-
tees. However, their number is always such as not to jeopardise the decision-
making powers of industry 13 • 
While the Government has not issued any regulation on the contents of the 
pharmacopoeia, representatives of industry and science, consumers and the 
Government cooperate side by side on a par basis in drawing up the food codex. 
Resolutions may be taken only by a 75% majority. In addition to ascertaining 
manufacturer habits and consumer expectations, these resolutions shall have a 
creative function. Despite this changed objective, the commission cannot be 
expected to make a significant contribution to consumer protection, because as 
in the past the commission' s underlying idea continues to be that consumer 
interests may be enforced in cooperation with the manufacturer. 
In addition to truly legal participation, only an actual position of power might 
enable consumer associations to exert an influence on the Government's or 
industry 's economic decisions. Apart from a f ew exceptions, the associations do 
not occupy such a position 14• They Jack the organisation that might exercise a 
'countervailing power'. lt is a question anyhow of whether consumer associa-
tions may be organised along the lines of trade unions, which are in a position to 
force industry to take certain decisions 15 • Apart from problems relating to the 
associations' structure 16, to their willingness to face conflicts 17, and to the 
question of who is a consumer 18 , what is of importance here is the fact that the 
associations do not see themselves as representatives of a majority requiring 
protection as the weaker party in terms of economic power, but as partners of 
industry 19 helping to improve and stabilise the market system20 • 
The same partnership considerations characterise their relationship to the 
state. As far as consumer representatives participate in state organisations, they 
act as representatives of the individual consumer whose interests are also deter-
mined by the state, and not as representatives of agroup which has its own will 21 • 
The remodelling of consumer associations into a countervailing power 
against industry and also against the state would therefore require that these 
associations arrive at an entirely new conception of themselves. 
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5 Control by the individual consumer 
134 lt would be conceivable to have the individual consumer participate in the 
preventive control of the safety of products by entitling him as an advocatefor 
the general public to take action against a manufacturer and to see to it that the 
manufacturer is forbidden to continue selling the product which is a <langer to 
safety or to sue the competent adminis{rative authorities for taking the neces-
sary steps. However, under the existing law it is doubtful whether an individual 
consumer has such powers. The courts and legal writers view these remedies 
with some reservations, because the consumer would thus participate in the 
enforcement of legislation: the consumer would control the manufacturer with 
regard to his statutory obligations, and could even have the administrative 
authorities controlled as to whether they duly perform their obligations. 
Remedies against the manufacturer may stem only from civil law, as the 
consumer as a citizen would take action against another citizen. The entire 
.German civil law is based on the idea that an individual citizen may defend 
himself if his statutory rights or spheres of protection are infringed or 
threatened by another citizen (Arts. 823, 1004)22. lt does not provide for any 
right on the part of an individual to bring an action for any damage or threat to 
the general public. The action numerous women have brought recently against 
the publishers of Stern to the effect that repeatedly running photographs of 
nude women in magazines discriminated against them has reconfirmed that 
attitude23 • There must always be a threat to an individual himself or an indi-
vidual must have suffered injury. In the event of injury to a consumer, the 
consumer may claim damages according to the principles of the manufacturer's 
liability (No. 165ff). He may avoid a threat ema·nating from a dangerous 
product by way of a preventive action for injunction24, if his health, property or 
person are threatened. Preventive control ro a limited extent may therefore be 
achieved only if the product which is a threat to the general public at the same 
time constitutes a concrete threat to the rights of a suing consumer. According 
to the courts, such a threat exists if in the circumstances there is an immediate 
danger of successive infringements of the law2s. Applied to the cases to be 
studied here, numerous questions arise: does the consumer have to buy a 
dangerous product in order to be exposed to the .threat himself or does it suffice 
that he intends to buy the product because he needs it, but refrains from doing so 
because of its dangerousness? An additional factor is that to bring a preventive 
action for injunction the <langer of repetition must be shown26 • Many products 
are bought by the consumer only once, so that any repeated threat is excluded. lt 
would no doubt be worth considering whether or not the consumer coul~ be 
helped by an action for removal on account of constant interference. In the fmal 
analysis, recourse to an action for removal cannot obscure the fact that the 
remedies mentioned are tailored to other cases. It is conceivable that the require-
ments mentioned can be satisfied in a particular case, but then anot~er pr?blem 
emerges. The claim for removal pursuant to Art. 1004 Civil Code 1s sub3ec~ t? 
the same restriction as the claim for compensation pursuant to Art. 823 CIVIi 
Code. In the law of torts it is understood as a general principle, however' that 
for Jack of damage to property no compensation may be claimed for damage 
that arises from the defective product itself. The consumer involved has 
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acquired ownership of an unsafe, that is to say defective, product. In its recent 
Schwimmschalter (float switch) decision the Federal High Court27 has extended 
the manufacturer's liability risk, though. According to that decision the person 
concerned, whether consumer or trader, may himself raise claims in tort for a 
defective product within the limits set by the Federal High Court. A consumer 
might be entitled to bring a preventive action for injunction or an action for 
removal against an enterprise which fails to comply with its obligation to recall 
dangerous products pursuant to Art. 823 Civil Code. Any manufacturer is also 
under an obligation to watch his products after having marketed them and to 
take steps in the event of any danger28 • However, if the manufacturer is und er an 
obligation to recall a product, it is only reasonable to give the consumer threat-
ened by a danger emanating from that product, for instance because he drives 
on dangerous tyres, an opportunity to require the manufacturer to recall the 
product. On theoccasion ofthe ADAC-Juristentag (German Lawyers' Assembly 
organised by the ADAC) in 1978, Löwe suggested that consumer associations be 
granted such right of action by virtue of law29 • 
The requirements of an action against the administrative authorities are 
determined by administrative law. Irrespective of the type of action, such action 
is possible only if the suing consumer is able to show that his rights as a person 
are infringed, Art. 42, para. 2 Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (VwGO, Act on 
the Constitution of and Procedure in Administrative Courts). This requirement 
is to prevent citizens from bringing a type of action (Popularklage) which has 
for its object the allegation of infringements of the Iaw which do not affect the 
plaintiffs30• This is to keep querulous actions away from the courts. Attempts at 
inferring such a type of action from the existing law fail as a rule, because of the 
above requirement of admissibility31 • In actual fact, what is behind this negative 
attitude towards that type of action is a certain conception of the state. The 
citizen is not permitted to participate in the administration himself, but is 
excluded therefrom with reference to the fact that administrative authorities 
safeguard the interests of the general public as well as his own interests. On the 
other hand, only the enforcement of a welfare state law by way of that type of 
action would make allowance for the principle of the constitutional state as 
defined in Art. 20, para. 3 Basic Law, which not only protects the citizen 
against encroachments upon his freedom and property, but is also designed to 
ensure that administrative authorities act only if so empowered by law. Above 
all, that would satisfy the requirement under the theory of democracy arising 
from Art. 20, para. 1, 28 Basic Law, according to which any legal provision 
enacted by parliament implies the obligation of implementation32 • Considering 
what has been said above, the introduction of the above type of action would 
seem desirable. lt may not be inferred, though, from the existing provisions on 
administrative procedure. 
An action by an individual consumer is possible - and thus is a possible 
preventive measure - only if the consumer is able to show that his rights are 
infringed. This means that the consumer must plead a right in respect of which 
he is the party entitled. Such a right need not expressly be mentioned in the law, 
but may also follow from the legislator's intent if the latter wants to protect the 
individual in addition to the general public33 • The courts find it hard to come to 
grips with this problem, in most cases they interpret legislation as being aimed 
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merely at the protection of the general public34• 
As far as can be ascertained, in the areas of the LMBG, AMG and GSG, 
which will be discussed here, individual consumers have not yet tried to have the 
respective supervisory authorities forced judicially to act in a certain way. lt 
would be decisive for the issue of any proceedings if the legislation mentioned in 
addition to protecting the general public aims also at protecting individuals. 
Much may be said in favour of the intention to ensure the necessary protection 
of the individual. lf we take a look at the tradition of court practice, the chances 
of actions are quite pessimistic. 
If legislation fails to include the consumer in its protective purpose, and if 
therefore there is no right of action pursuant to Art. 42, para. 2 VwGO, 
theoretically it is still possible to plead an infringement of constitutional rights. 
With respect to environmental protection, the Federal Administrative Court has 
recently sta(ed that even the Basic Law does not grant an individual directly 
enforceable claims for certain measures of environmental protection35 • 
III CONTROL OF SPECIAL GOODS 
1 Control of foodstuffs 
135 The Gesetz zur Neuordnung und Bereinigung des Rechts im Verkehr mit 
Lebensmitteln, Tabakerzeugnissen, kosmetischen Mitteln und Bedarfsgegen-
ständen (LMBG, Act to Reform and Streamline the Law on Trade in Food-
stuffs, Tobacco Products, Cosmetics and Consumer Goods) of 15 August 1974 
has brought to a close for the time being many years of endeavour to achieve a 
sweeping reform of the entire food law. The main reform objective is the exten-
sion and enhancement of protection against the impairment of health. This 
objective will be achieved by an extension of the powers to take preventive 
official action. The intensified control of foodstuffs is another important objec-
tive of the reform endeavours. 
(a) Preventive control measures 
136 Foodstuffs are not subject to prior approval (which would present great diffi-
culties in view of the !arge number of products). They are controlled in such a way 
that the legislator or authority issuing orders prescribes to manufacturers the 
use of certain substances or restricts their use. In some cases the law mentions 
the prohibition directly, in other cases the legislator is authorised to issue new 
prohibitions or to put general prohibitions into more concrete terms. Orders 
issued under the old LMG are not superseded by the new Act. The official 
reasons given for the respective provisions show that the legislator considers the 
principle of prohibition suitable to enforce the consumer's protection. Refer-
ence is made to international legislation which employs .the same means 36 • 
Para. 2 of the LMBG 'Verkehr mit Lebensmitteln' (trade in foodstuffs) regu-
lates the scope and terms of the prohibitions. 
137 (aa) The central standard of prohibitory food legislation is the general clause 
of Art. 8 LMBG. Pursuant thereto it is forbidden to produce or market food-
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stuffs that are apt to harm the consumer's health. The term 'harm' includes the 
meanings of damage and destroy. The impairment of health includes not only 
disease in the medical sense, but any temporary, more than slight disturbance of 
health. Mere aversion or disgust are not sufficient37. 
Specifications of this prohibitory standard related to certain production 
methods, marketing methods and the like supplement the general provision of 
Art. 8 (Arts. 9-15 LMBG). They are always linked with the power granted to 
the competent minister to issue regulations that develop the standard. The pro-
tective provisions are initially directed against dangers that may emanate from 
any foodstuff (Art. 9 LMBG), but eventually also regulate special matters and 
dangers (Arts. 12-15 LMBG). 
Generally speaking, the authority issuing orders has regulatory powers as 
soon as any impairment of health is imminent (Art. 9 LMBG). This is to enable 
timely preventive action in favour of the consumer38 • Merely theoretical 
dangers which according to the normal experience oflife may result from food-
stuffs, can constitute a case of impairment39 • While a concrete <langer may be 
assumed in many cases with the aid of current scientific research and investiga-
tion methods, it cannot be proved. Effective protection of health against 
dangers requires, however, that foodstuffs be forbidden if there is even a remote 
suspicion that their consumption may be harmful40 • The regulatory powers are 
defined more closely in items 1-6 of Art. 9: accordingly, what is required and 
what is forbidden may be laid down only for certain foodstuffs (para. l, items 3 
and 4) or certain substances (items la, 5 and 6) or certain methods (item lb). 
Pollution through contaminants arising from the environment is regulated in 
detail in Art. 9, para. 1, item 2 LMBG; even the restriction fol!ows from the 
tenor. On the basis of the regulatory power defined in Art. 9, para. 1, though, a 
number of regulations have been issued which do not exhaust the scope 
provided41 • 
The special requirements of food hygiene are not covered by Art. 9, which is 
exclusively to prevent any impairment of health, but are expressly regulated in 
Art. 1042• lt is quite possible that Art. 9 and Art. 10 LMBG overlap. The 
hygienic requirements are deemed tobe infringed if there is a <langer that food-
stuffs are affected in a nauseating or otherwise detrimental way by microorgan-
isms, impurities, odours, temperatures, atmospheric effects or treatment and 
preparation. 
In this area the German Länder may issue appropriate orders (Art. 10 
LMBG) if the federal minister does not exercise his right. Although it is 
generally accepted that a uniform hygiene order for the entire Federal Republic 
is necessary43 , so far there exist only Landorders which in most cases are limited 
to meat and meat products44 • 
In addition to these general protective provisions, the LMBG also includes 
special prohibitions and special regulatory powers (Arts. 11-15). The provi-
sions are systemised in such a way that to begin with a prohibition is imposed. 
Such a prohibition is not absolute, though, which means that the use of certain 
substances or certain processes is not generally forbidden, but only the use of 
substances or processes not officially approved. Following the prohibition, the 
federal minister concerned is authorised to permit exceptions to the relative 
prohibition if this is compatible with consumer protection, or to restrict the use 
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of certain substances or processes if so required by consumer protection. The 
following details may be noted: it is forbidden to use non-approved additives, to 
employ ion exchangers as far as they allow non-approved additives to get into 
foodstuffs and to use processes for the purpose of producing non-approved 
additives in foodstuffs (Art. 11 LMBG). Which substances are approved for use 
in the production of foodstuffs follows from Art. 2 LMBG. Pursuant thereto, 
additives are substances designed to be added to foodstuffs to influence their 
condition and to produce certain effects. As distinguished from the food law in 
force until 1974, the new food law not only takes qualities and characteristics as 
criteria, but primarily goes by the purpose for which substances are intended45 • 
Thus, what an additive is is determined irrespective of its value in terms of phys-
iology of nutrition. As a result, an essentially greater number of substances are 
included than came under the former term 'foreign substances ', so that above 
all the majority of agents, such as colorants, preservatives, emulsifiers, stabi-
lisers, antifoams, humectants, bleaching agents and swelling auxiliaries fall with-
in the Act 46• However, the intended purpose should not be the only criterion of 
a definition, for otherwise flour, yolk and spices would also be additives. To 
avoid such exceptions, which are not justified for practical reasons, Art. 2 
LMBG includes a restrictive provision. Substances are not classed with additives 
if they are of natural origin or if their chemical composition is equivalent to that 
of a natural substance and if according to generally accepted standards they are 
used primarily because of their nutritional value, their value in terms of smell or 
flavour or if they are used as semi-luxuries. 
The consumer's rights have not only been extended through the changed 
definition of what an additive is. In a departure from the old LMG, the produc-
tion of non-approved additives in foodstuffs by means of ion exchangers and 
certain methods of treatment is forbidden47. For some time, ion exchangers have 
been used primarily to soften water, where they exchange calcium and magne-
sium ions, which cause hardness, for sodium ions. lt is the legislator's intention 
to preclude undesirable and uncontrolled additives from getting into foodstuffs 
through an ion exchange4B. 
However, there are exceptions to the prohibition mentioned (Art. 11, para. 2 
LMBG): 
Agents employed only in the technological process may be used if the final 
product includes only technically unavoidable and technologically ineffective 
residues in proportions that are unobjectionable in terms of health, smell and 
flavour. Technically unavoidable means that according to the current standards 
of technology such amounts cannot be eliminated49• Furthermore, certain 
additives are excluded which are commonly unobjectionable in terms of health 
or otherwise, such as distilled and demineralised water, air, nitrogen and carbon 
dioxide unless they are used as propellant gases (e.g. in sprayers with whipped 
cream). 
Lastly, the competent minister is authorised to permit exceptions to the pro-
hibition oj Art. 11 LMBG, Art. 12, para. l LMBG. However, additives may be 
approved only if this is compatible with consumer protection considering 
requirements in terms of technology, physiology of nutrition and diet50• Among 
these would be substances which according to the current supply situation and 
to the current standards of technology cannot be completely done without and, 
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on the other hand, seem defensible in case of strict pharmacologiCal testing 51 • In 
the first place, consumer protection relates to objections from the health point 
of view, but the consumer also has a legitimate interest in not being deceived as 
to the use of chemical substances to which he frequently objects 52 • In this 
connection; labelling as required under Art. 16, para. 1, sentence 1 LMBG does 
not suffice. The authority issuing orders must weigh the interests of industry 
against those of consumers. If there are any objections to the approval of sub-
stances from the point of view of consumer protection, the entrepreneur 
concerned is not entitled to claim approvaJl3• 
The exceptional regulations issued under the old LMG may be subdivided 
into three groups according to their subject matter54 : (1) General Order con-
cerning foreign substances, (2) Orders concerning preservation, antioxidants 
and colorants, (3) Orders relating to individual foodstuffs or groups of food-
stuffs. Furthermore, the competent minister is authorised to issue regulations 
on maximum quantities and purity as regards ion exchangers and additives 
(Art. 12, para. 2 LMBG). The objective ofthis regulation is thus opposite to the 
one of Art. 12, para. 1 LMBG as it confers the power to impose restrictions. 
However, the measures as defined in Art. 12, para. 2 LMBG must be required 
for the protection of the consumer. Objections in terms of health and hygiene 
must be considered as much as protection against financial loss 55 • 
lt is alsoforbidden to subjectfoodstuffs to any non-approved treatment with 
ultraviolet or ionising rays or to market f oodstuffs that have been subjected to 
such treatment (Art. 13, para. l LMBG). This prohibition is based on possible 
impairment of health. Thus the treatment of milk with ultraviolet rays to 
increase its vitamin B content, which has been approved for a number of years, 
has not yet received final approval, because according to the Federal Health 
Authority the photochemical behaviour of milk components is no exact proof 
of the harmlessness of irradiation from a health point of view56• On account of 
their energy, ionising rays may produce ions in the substances they irradiate. 
Such rays are intended primarily to delay microbiological spoilage, fight sal-
monella, kill parasites and hinder the sprouting of potatoes 57 • 
With respect to this prohibition the competent federal minister is also 
authorised to permit exceptions by way of statutory order if this is compatible 
with consumer protection. To judge the harmlessness of irradiated foodstuffs, 
the Fremdstoffkommission der Deutschen Forschungsgemeinschaft (Commis-
sion for Foreign Substances attached to the German Society for Promotion of 
Research) in its bulletin of 21 November 1968 compiled criteria to be taken 
into account in considerations as to whether approval of such foodstuffs is 
compatible with the consumer's interests58 • The Commission requires that the 
application for approval should include data on the type, purpose and effect of 
irradiation. In the approval procedure it must be considered that approval does 
not come into question if according to present scientific findings a risk cannot be 
excluded. Moreover, if approval is given, any notice to that effect must include a 
detailed description ofthe process, and must lay down minimum and maximum 
irradiation as weil as storage time. 
The authority issuing orders has exercised its regulatory powers in the Lebens-
mittelbestrahlungs-Verordnung (Food Irradiation Order) of 19 December 1959 
(BGB! l, page 761) especially regarding particular purposes. The Order 
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continues in force. Pursuant to Art. 2 of the Order, treatment with direct ultra-
violet rays is permitted in the case of sterilisation of drinking water, regarding 
the surface of fruit and vegetables andin the case of hard cheese for storage pur-
poses; also permitted is the indirect irradiation of foodstuffs which occurs in the 
disinfection of air through ultraviolet rays. Tentatively it was also permitted to 
irradiate potatoes by means of electrcin rays and to seil them to a limited group 
of personss9• 
The authority issuing orders may prescribe certain technological processes for 
use in irradiation approved under Art. 12, para. 2, item 1, Art. 13, para. 2, 
item 2 LMBG. lf it turns out that the process prescribed does not eliminate the 
danger, the authority issuing orders must cancel the approval given 60• Further-
more, it isforbidden under food law to market foodstuffs by way of business if 
in or on them there are plant protectives, fertilisers and pesticides exceeding the 
fixed maximum amounts (Art. 14, para. 1, item 1 LMBG). Furthermore, such 
plant protectives as within the meaning of the Pflanzenschutzgesetz (Plant 
Protection Act) are not approved or may not be used must be absent in or on 
foodstuffs or present only in approved maximum quantities (Art. 14, para. 1, 
item 2 LMBG). This prohibition is of special importance to imported foodstuffs 
which at the place of their cultivation or production are treated with agents that 
in some cases are unknown or cannot be controlled61 • The maximum quantities 
of the above plant protectives and preserving agents (including pesticides) 
allowed to be used must be established by the authority issuing orders (Art. 14, 
para. 2, item Ja LMBG). Scientists expressed the desire that maximum quanti-
ties be envisaged only for certain plant protectives 62 • The approved maximum 
quantities are laid down in the Höchstmengenverordnung Pflanzenschutz, 
pflanzliche Lebensmittel (Order concerning Maximum Quantities in Plant 
Protection, Vegetable Foodstuffs) as amended on 13 June 1978 and Vegetable 
Foodstuffs as amended on 29 August 197863 • We regret to say that the legislator 
failed to authorise the Federal Health Authority to establish tolerable maximum 
quantities in a legally binding way. The Federal Health Authority may provide 
in the approval of new agents for lower quantities than those provided for in the 
Höchstmengenverordnung (Order on Maximum Quantities), but a requirement 
to that effect does not directly cause an amendment of the Höchstmengen-
verordnung to be made, so that food inspection authorities which go by the 
order may disregard such a Federal Health Authority requirement 64 • 
Pursuant to Art. 14, para. 2, item 2b, the authority issuing orders in addition 
may forbid the use of certain pesticides. Lastly, para. 2, item 2 authorises the 
authority issuing orders to permit exceptions to be made to the prohibition of 
para. 1, item 1. The interplay between rule and exception is shown by the 
Höchstmengenverordnung of 13 June 197865. 
lt is f orbidden to market animalfeedstuffs by way of business if in or on them 
are substances having pharmacological effects or products of transformation 
thereof which exceed the established maximum quantities (Art. 15, para. 1 
LMBG). Among the substances having pharmacological effects are in partic-
ular drugs and such additives to feedstuffs as may exert a special influence on 
the texture, condition and function of the body, or above all increase useful 
performance or serve preventive health protection66. Any effective protection of 
the consumer of foodstuffs must be based on the concept that the fields of law 
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touched on here - food law, drugs law and feedstuff law - complement each 
other in a sensible way. 
Furthermore, waiting periodsmust be observed; that is to say, periods during 
which residues of substances that are not harmless from a health point of view 
must be expected tobe present in the meat of animals having been treated with 
drugs according to their designated purposes (Art. 15, para. 2 LMBG). The 
provision proceeds from the assumption that, in future, substances having 
pharmacological effects must either be registered or be approved as feedstuff 
additives pursuant to the regulations under feedstuff law and will have tobe 
controlled from the point of view of food hygiene. Pursuant to Art. 15, para. 2, 
sentence 1 LMBG, foodstuffs with respect to which the waiting periods are not 
provided for in the drugs and feedstuff laws must not be produced or marketed. 
As waiting periods in respect of all substances coming into question here cannot 
be fixed at too short notice, Art. 15, para. 2, sentence 2 LMBG provides for a 
safety period of five days. If an animal is treated with drugs, the producer has to 
specify the waiting period (Art. 23, para. 1 AMG), which is determined by addi-
tional analyses by residue. As Art. 23 came into force only on 1 January 1978, it 
will take some time before drugs intended for use in animals will carry pertinent 
data. 
Also, the competent minister may lay down maximum quantities by way of 
statutory order, exclude the use of certain substances having pharmacological 
effects and equate certain substances with substances having pharmacological 
effects (Art. 15, para. 3, item 1 LMBG). This regulatory power ensures the 
complete concurrence of food, animal drugs and feedstuff laws and enables 
better supervision of what is known as the grey drug market, where pharma-
cologically effective substances are used illegally67 • 
On the basis of Art. 15, para. 3, item lb and c LMBG, the Verordnung über 
Stoffe mit pharmakologischer Wirkung (Order concerning Substances having 
Pharmacological Effects) of 3 August 1977 was issued, pursuant to which a 
number of substances having antimicrobic, estrogenic, androgenic or gesta-
genic effects must not be administered to certain animals68• Pursuant to Art. 15, 
para. 3, item 2 the Order concerning Exceptions to the Waiting Period pursuant 
to Art. 15, para. 2, sentence 2 was issued as early as 2 January 197569 • The 
Annex to Art. 1 of the Order lists the substances that may be administered to 
animals also within a period of less than five days. Among these are proteins, 
carbohydrates, fats, vitamins, provitamins, vitamin B (up to 500 000 IU), 
sodium, potassium, calcium and magnesium compounds of organic or inorganic 
acids as weil as trace elements of iron, iodine, cobalt, copper, manganese, 
selenium and zinc. 
138 (bb) The German Food Codex is a compilation of guiding principles describ-
ing the production and condition of foodstuffs or other features important to 
their marketability. lt does not include legally binding regulations, but only lays 
down in an objective way how foodstuffs are constituted according to general 
trade practice and legitimate buyer expectations. The Food Codex was intro-
duced by Art. 7 of the Amending Law of 1958. lt was designed to satisfy the 
need on the part of industry, food inspection authorities and the courts for 
certainty as to what the law is 70 • The legislator considered the Food Codex a 
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suitable means to make allowance by rapid adjustment for the progressive 
development in food chemistry. In practice the concept did not prove a 
success 71 • lt turned out tobe easier to amend a statutory order than a guiding 
principle. The commission 's activity was exhausted mainly in the laying down of 
rules that were already accepted. This is explained by the make-up of the 
commission in which representatives of industry, government, science and 
consumers were represented on a par basis and had to decide unanimously72 • 
The new food law wants to remedy that grievance, for one thing by providing 
that resolutions may now be adopted by a three-fourths majority, and for 
another thing by extending the powers conferred under it, Art. 34, para. 3, 
sentence 2 LMBG. In future all features important to marketability shall be 
described. In this way the guiding principles beyond establishing manufacturer 
habits and consumer expectations shall have a creative function although 
basically without binding force 73 • Doubts about the realisation of this concept 
continue to be appropriate 74 • The make-up of the commission on a par basis 
moreover precludes assigning the commission further tasks as, for instance, the 
definition of general legal terms under food law. As the German Food Codex 
does not include legally binding regulations, it is as important as an objectified 
opinion. As the guiding principles are laid down by all interested groups 
involved, it may be assumed that they are observed by .all those engaged in food 
trade as a manifestation of honest trade usage and legitimate consumer expecta-
tions. Such is the control function of the Food Codex which is also of a preven-
tive nature. Proposals aiming at granting the commission the power to issue 
regulations itself are therefore open to constitutional doubts. 
The LMBG also includes a provision regulating the procedure tobe followed 
in taking control measures. The Federal Health Authority is obliged to make 
public an official compilation of methods for drawing samples and examining 
f oodstuffs, Art. 35, para. l LMBG. The purpose o f that regulation is to achieve 
standardisation through a compilation of the various methods of examination. 
Standardisation is necessary, since in most cases foodstuffs are judged by an 
examination and the method of examination selected is often of prime impor-
tance to the result of such judgment75 • The methods are laid down in coopera-
tion with experts from the fields of food inspection, science and industry, 
Art. 35, sentence 2 LMBG. 
(b) Retrospective control measures 
139 (aa) The success of food law control is entirely dependent on an efficient 
control system. This requirement has been lacking during the past few years 76 • 
The Food Act of 15 August 1974 aims at an increase in the efficiency of control 
primarily by the estabiishment of efficient inspection institutions in addition to 
the assignment of a greater number of qualified persons on all levels. These are 
not only important to control within the country, but also to efficient import 
control77• 
· The German Länder are in charge of implementing the food Iaw, Art. 40, 
para. 1, sentence 1 LMBG. This involves certain problems regarding a uniform 
standard of control. On the other hand, Art. 45 LMBG enables uniform imple-
menting regulations to be made. The involvement of the German Länder is 
145 
ensured by the fact that the administrative rule requires the approval of the 
Länder. From the official reasons 78 given for Art. 45 LMBG follow the scope 
and objective of the administrative rules, which the legislator expects to be 
established in a uniform way for the entire Federal Republic. Accordingly, 
detailed regulations on increased control in manufacturing and importing enter-
prises, on regular controls over restaurants and canteens, on the establishment 
of central institutions and rules on standardised reporting by inspection institu-
tions will prove to·be necessary. The Federal Government and the Federal 
Council (Bundesrat) have not so far acted on this legislative mandate. 
Control comprises first of all the inspection of objects coming into question 
(Art. 41) as weil as the drawing (Art. 42) and examination of samples. 
The competent authorities have to satisfy themselves by regular controls and 
the drawing of samples as to whether regulations are complied with, Art. 41, 
para. l, sentence 2 LMBG. The competent Land authorities are authorised at 
any time within the framework of their constitutional mandate to implement 
federal law in accordance with Arts. 44, 45 LMBG and, if need be, to issue 
general regulations on the frequency of inspections, the method of drawing 
samples and the instructions tobe given to the personnel in charge of inspection. 
The circular of the RMdI of 21 June 1934 (uniform implementing orders)79 
includes uniform regulations on how trade in foodstuffs shall be controlled 
pursuant to the provisions of Arts. 41, 42 LMBG. They were put into force by 
the German Länder governments, in some cases amended by further regula-
tions. The enforcement of the control measures provided for in Art. 41 are the 
task of police or administrative authorities replacing the former in the field of 
public health for whose guidance pursuant to Art. 1, para. 1 of the uniform 
implementing orders chemical, veterinary and medical experts (scientific 
experts as weil as chemical, veterinary and medical inspection boards) shall be 
appointed80 • 
As a control organ, Art. 41, para. 2 LMBG names vocationally trained 
persons. Among these rank persons whose official duty it is to control food-
stuffs. In the case of imminent danger, any police enforcement officer may take 
the necessary measures. Art. 41, para. 2, sentence 2 authorises the federal 
minister subject to the Federal Council 's consent to issue regulations by way of 
statutory order regarding professional requirements as to the persons involved. 
Here, also, the authorities issuing orders have not yet become active, so the 
respective Land law continues to apply, which in some cases provides for special 
food inspectors or other control personnel - just as in the case of trade inspec-
tion boards 81 • Control persons are those appointed as experts (food chemists, 
veterinarians) by the competent authority. In addition to giving assistance to the 
competent administrative personnel, they may also be charged with making 
inspections and drawing samples. The tasks of medical inspection institutions 
are summarised in Art. 4, para. 2 of the uniform implementing regulations. 
Several German Länder have already consolidated their investigation institu-
tions as aimed at under Art. 44, para. l, item la LMBG 82 • Further powers of 
control which exist besides Art. 41 LMBG follow from legislation which links 
the commencement and conduct of trades dealing with the production of food-
stuffs to certain business-related and/or personal requirements. The running of 
a restaurant or licensed house, the retail trade in spirits and enterprises selling 
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milk83 are subject to approval or Iicence. To a certain extent the powers of 
control overlap, because the duties of health officers differ from the measures 
taken by food inspectors84 • 
The powers the above-mentioned persons have are as follows: (Arts. 41, 42 
LMBG): (1) entry to properties, offices and business premises; (2) inspection 
inside and to some extent also outside these premises; (3) further rights of entry 
also to flats to avoid imminent <langer; (4) inspection of business records, draw-
ing of samples; (5) access to all necessary information. 
Art. 7 of the uniform implementing order gives some instructions as to how 
the powers of control shall be exercised within the framework of what is admis-
sible. Recommendations exist as to the reasons for inspection (strikingly Iow-
price offers), the manner of inspection (inconspicuously and in plain clothes), 
etc. The control organs enjoy a right .of entry only during normal working and 
business hours, unless there is imminent <langer, Art. 41, para. 3, item 1. We 
are fully aware of the fact that through this time schedule the legislator restricts 
the increased control he is demanding. 
As the law grants the persons involved a right of entry, the official may 
employ force to gain entry, without this being considered forcible entry. If the 
persons involved offer resistance to such officers, the police may be called in for 
assistance. The expert who is not a member of but only commissioned by the 
authority enjoys the same right. 
To inspect means more than just to look at. The official may look for hidden 
objects and push aside shelves as weil as feel and taste goods. Any different 
interpretation of the word would drastically reduce the powers of control and 
would practically make them valueless 85 • Which rooms are subject to the right of 
inspection is regulated in Art. 41, para. 3, item 1 LMBG. Accordingly, the law 
makes a distinction depending on the purpose they serve. The inclusion of 
properties shows that it does not matter whether the enterprise operates indoors. 
Living accommodation may be entered only if it is used also for business 
purposes. In the interest of the consumer, producing, treating and marketing 
activities on a commercial basis mean that any person who pursues a gainful 
activity within the scope of the law is subject to controJs6• 
The right to inspect business records is designed primarily to facilitate tracing 
the source of a rejected commodity and where it went to. In addition to the 
making of notes the right of inspection includes the power to make photostats. 
We fail to see why the legislator excepted production specifications from the 
right of inspection, since such a right exists under Art. 58 Weingesetz. For 
production specifications, which include formulae of all types, manufacturing 
regulations, special production processes and even the composition of food-
stuffs, are important data for drawing conclusionss7• Their exclusion from the 
general right of inspection considerably limits the possibilities of the competent 
authorities to gain knowledge. 
The right to demand information was newly introduced under Art. 41, 
para. 3, item 4 LMBG. Information may be demanded both upon inspection 
of the premises, directly in connection with control, andin writing. The right 
to demand information also extends to include production specifications as 
expressly stated in Art. 41, para. 3, item 3 LMBG. 
Police law continues tobe the responsibility of the German Länder. There are 
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differences mainly concerning the regulation of responsibility. The practical 
functions of the police or the competent administrative authorities have not 
changed as far as food law is concerned; they continue to include preventive 
measures by police officers to avoid dangers. That presupposes a concrete 
danger to the general public or to an individual. Police powers with respect to 
foodstuffs range from warnings, requirements and prohibitions to seizure. 
Warnings by authorities that have no police powers also come into question. 
Such warnings are pronounced by the Federal Health Authority or by the 
competent departmental minister. Against such warnings the manufacturers 
concerned cannot take legal action, as they are not verifiable in the course of 
law 88 • 
The drawing of samples likewise serves to control foodstufjs. This is regu-
lated in Art. 42 LMBG. In addition to the persons in charge of control, police 
officers are also entitled to draw samples, but basically only those officers who 
under Land law are in charge of drawing samples. However, in case ofimminent 
danger any police officer may take action. 
Again the competent minister is authorised (Art. 44, para. 2 LMBG) to issue 
regulations on the method of drawing samples. Until the issuance of such regu-
lation the respective Land law applies. 
Criteria to go by are currently still to be found in the uniform implementing 
order (Art. 10). Samples may be drawn not only from finished products but also 
from semi-finished products (Art. 7). This does not include advertising matter, 
although in most cases it is made available voluntarilys9. A contrasting sample 
must be left behind, Art. 42, para. 1, item 2. That is, a second amount of the 
sample drawn which is ofthe same type and comes from the same manufacturer. 
Two circumstances interfere with this principle: manufacturers and importers, 
unlike wholesalers, middlemen or retailers, may do without the contrasting 
sample; and it must be left behind only if the sample can be divided without the 
purpose of examination being impaired thereby. Moreover, it is not necessary to 
leave a sample behind where officials of the competent authorities buy samples 
without disclosing their identity. Since in this case the possibility of drawing a 
contrasting sample does not exist from the start, a result of examination arrived 
at in such a way may be less conclusive. The contrasting sample may be exam-
ined only by approved experts (Art. 9 VII). The contrasting sample is not at the 
owner's disposal, rather it forms part of the seized sample. This regulation is 
necessary to guard againsrabuse, for instance through exchange or alterations90 • 
Official seizure is performed by official locking or sealing, which is sanctioned 
by Arts. 137, 136 Penal Code. The contrasting sample must be provided with a 
date after the expiry of which the seizure ends automatically (Art. 42, para. 2, 
sentence 2 LMBG). 
140 (bb) The LMBG contains a detailed !ist of acts that are forbidden onpenalty, 
Arts. 51 et seq. Basica!Iy, it may be assumed that any obligation irrespective of 
its legal form which the LMBG imposes on the group of persons coming within 
its scope is backed by a system of appropriate sanctions. Generally speaking, the 
law distinguishes between administrative offences and punishable acts. Art. 51 
which provides for imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years (in the 
event of negligence not exceeding one year) or a fine - in very grave cases a 
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sentence of imprisonment for a term of six months to five years may be 
passed - punishes above all infringements of the general clauses under food 
law. Pursuant to Art. 52, a sentence of imprisonment of up to one year or a fine 
may be imposed on any person who infringes the principles laid down in 
Arts. 11-19 LMBG. If the acts defined in Art. 52 are committed negligently, 
they are regarded as administrative offences and are punishable by a fine of up 
to DM 50 000. Art. 54 enumerates a number of less serious administrative 
offences which are punishable by fines ranging from DM 1000 to DM 25 000, 
depending on the type of violation. 
2 Control of cosmetics 
141 The control of cosmetics is Iikewise regulated in the LMBG. In contrast with 
the former law, the control of cosmetics is now set forth separately. The con-
tents and structure of the control system is modelled on the system for food-
stuffs. 
(a) Definition 
The LMBG defines cosmetics as substances or preparations from substances 
which are intended for external use by man or for use in his mouth cavity to 
clean, care for or influence his appearance or body odour, or to convey frag-
rances, Art. 4, para. 1 LMBG. The express regulation of the field of cosmetics 
(Arts. 4 and 24-29 LMBG) is the principal item of the extended protection of 
the public in the area of consumer goods. Moreover, the number of cosmetics 
coming within the scope of that Act has been enlarged. Now means of influ-
encing body odour, i.e. deodorants or external spray-deodorants for feminine 
hygiene, and means of conveying fragrances, i.e. perfumes proper, belong here 
as well 91 • By contrast, the implements used in cleaning and caring do not come 
within the scope of the Act92• Likewise, substances designed primarily to alle-
viate or cur<: diseases, ailments, or bodily defects are not classed with cosmetics. 
Cosmetics are distinguished from drugs, for one thing, by the fact that they are 
not intended for external use by man or use in his mouth cavity. For another, the 
inclusion of the intended purpose serves to except only such cosmetics as are 
designed primarily to fight disease. A striking feature is that it was the 
legislator's intention not to exclude from the definition of cosmetics means for 
the prevention of diseases, so-called preventives 93 • lt should be noted that sub-
stances designed to influence bodily shapes are also considered drugs, Art. 4, 
para. 3 LMBG. This clarification of terms redresses many grievances caused 
through the uncontrolled marketing - specifically in the mailorder trade in 
response to press advertisements - of bust beauty creams and weight reducing 
creams. Their classification with drugs is justified on account of the fact that 
such creams usually contain major portions of female sex hormones. 
142 (b) Preventive measures: Prohibitions and regu/atory powers to issue 
preventive regu/ations 
The legislator uses the same means here as in the case of foodstuffs to protect 
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the consumer against dangers to his health. 
The regulations on cosmetics also include a general clause standardising 
general health protection (Art. 24 LMBG, which is modelled on Art. 8). lt is 
forbidden to manufacture, process dnd market harmful cosmetics. The term 
harmful is the same as that used in Art. 8 LMBG. The prohibition of harmful 
drugs extends beyond that of harmful foodstuffs, though, because it includes 
not only means which may impair health when used as provided for, but also 
when used as foreseeable. This is to compel the manufacturer in his instructions 
for use to make allowance for the inadvertent consumer. 
Basically, it is forbidden in the manufacture or processing of cosmetics on 
a commercial basis - even for private use - to emp/oy without permission 
substances requiring a doctor's prescription, Art. 25, para. 1, item 1 LMBG in 
combination with Arts. 48, 49 AMG. Likewise, it is forbidden to market 
cosmetics on a commercial basis if they contain non-approved substances 
requiring a doctor's prescription. The prohibition to use substances requiring a 
doctor's prescription is one of the e.ssential improvements of prophylactic 
health protection which reform legislation on food law had aimed at94 • The 
underlying reason of the prohibition is that nowadays, in the manufacture of 
certain cosmetics, substances are used which, if sold to the consumer as drugs, 
require a doctor's prescription, i.e. are taken only under medical supervision. 
The <langer to be avoided lies in the fact that such cosmetics are often used for 
many years without any control95 • At the same time it is made clear that sub-
stances that do not require a doctor's prescription may also be used in cosmetics, 
Art. 25, para. 2, item 1 LMBG. 
However, here too, the authority issuing orders (Art. 25, para. 2, item 2 
LMBG) may approve certain forbidden substances (as defined in Art. 25, 
para. 2, item 1) if this is compatible with consumer protection. In such a case, 
strict pharmacological examination is required. 
Lastly, the authority issuing orders may also establish maximum quantities as 
to the contents of approved substances. In this connection the measures taken 
by the Cosmetics Commission attached to the Federal Health Authority must be 
taken into account. 
l f certain preconditions exist, the authority issuing orders may become active 
in a preventive way to avoid any impairment of human health, Art. 26 LMBG 
(cf. the parallel to Art. 9 LMBG). 
The manufacture or marketing of certain cosmetics may be made contingent 
upon a licence or notice, Art. 26, para. l. This is to facilitate the control of 
enterprises processing organ preparations, hormones, and the like. The 
authority issuing orders may also set Standards as to the microbiological nature 
of certain cosmetics, Art. 26, para. 2. lt has turned out to be necessary toset 
such standards, because the shelf life of cosmetics preparations depends on their 
initial germ content following manufacture. Above all, bacteria contained in 
cosmetics may cause grave injuries to health. Furthermore, positive or negative 
lists concerning purity regulations on cosmetics may be issued, Art. 26, para. 3. 
In particular, warnings or instructions as to how to behave in the case of 
accidents may be prescribed and the intended purpose restricted. 
However, regulations under Art. 26 may be issued only for certain cosmetics; 
that is to say, not for all of them. 
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Generally speaking, Art. 26 LMBG Ieaves a wide scope for enhancing the 
protection of the consumer's health. 
The authority issuing orders has made a first step with the Verordnung über 
kosmetische Mittel of 16 December 1977 (Federal Law Gazette 1, page 2589)96• 
This Order is based on the regulatory powers provided for under Art. 25, 
para. 2, item 1 and Art. 26, para. 1, item 3 of the LMBG. The Order forbids the 
use of certain substances listed in Annex 1 in the manufacture or processing of 
cosmetics on a commercial basis (Art. 1 ofthe Order). This principle, which is 
tobe welcomed, is restricted immediately afterwards in manufacturers' favour, 
for the substances concerned may be contained in cosmetics if their presence is 
technically unavoidable and harmless from a health point of view (Art. 1, 
sentence 2 of the Order). This is a dangerously flexible provision which is not apt 
to make things clear. The Order, moreover, includes the !ist of substances which 
are approved to a limited extent, Art. 2. Lastly, the extent to which colorants 
may be used is laid down, Art. 3. 
(c) Retrospective control measures 
143 As regards control by inspection, what has been said concerning foodstuffs 
also applies to cosmetics, for the increase in control envisaged by law to be 
achieved by an extension of the powers under Arts. 40-46 LMBG applies to the 
same extent to cosmetics. 
As in the case of foodstuffs, the LMBG contains detailed penal regulations 
concerning cosmetics. Penal acts are infringements of the general clause of 
Art. 24 and of the principles laid down in Arts. 25 and 26. Administrative 
offences relate either to negligent breach of duty in respect of the principles laid 
down in Arts. 25 and 26 or less important infringements which do not constitute 
such a grave <langer to the consumer. 
3 Control of consumer goods (Bedarfsgegenstände) 
This body of subjects is likewise regulated by the LMBG. The amendment to 
the Act has extended the scope of the Act quite considerably. The control system 
is Iargely in line with that for foodstuffs and cosmetics. 
(a) Definition 
144 Art. 5, para. 1, items 1-9 of the LMBG contains a comprehensive !ist of 
what are known as consumer goods, but does not give a general definition. We 
could say that these are goods for use and consumption which in the event of 
imperfect condition and wrong treatment may involve dangers to human health. 
The former LMG included cosmetics in the same term, but these are now regu-
lated separately. In addition to this merely technical classification, the new act 
also incorporates several improvements in substance. lt not only enumerates 
goods, but in a number of cases goes by their intended purpose and conse-
quently by the effects they may have on the human body. Moreover, the !ist of 
objects has been extended considerably. Whereas the LMG listed only table-
ware, drinking vessels and kitchen utensils as examples of objects which upon 
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extraction, production, preparation, measurement, weighing, packing, storage 
or consumption are designed to come into direct contact with foodstuffs and 
may thereby exert a strong effect on them, Art. 5, para. 1 LMBG also subjects, 
interalia, objects which come into contact with the mucous membranes (Art. 5, 
para. l, item 3), cleaning and preservative agents for household use (item 7), 
cleaning and preservative agents for consumer goods within the meaning of item 
1 (item 8), and means and objects for deodorisation or insect control indoors to 
the regulations of the LMBG (item 9)97 • For reasons of size, the objects specified 
will not be enumerated and discussed here. lt should be pointed out, though, 
that Art. 52, para. 2 LMBG distinguishes consumer goods from drugs. 
A power enabling statutory regulations to be made equating further objects 
and means for domestic requirements with consumer goods within the meaning 
of Art. 52, para. 1 LMBG is to be found in Art. 52, para. 3. The provision 
makes aliowance for unforeseeable technical development. 
(b) Preventive control measures: Prohibitions and regulatory powers to 
issue preventive regulations 
145 The legislator employs the same means of control as in the case of foodstuffs 
and drugs. Thus prohibitions designed to serve health protection have been 
imposed (Art. 30, items 1-4 LMBG). lt is forbidden to manufacture or process 
consumer goods of the type specified in such a way that, upon use as provided 
for or upon foreseeable use, they are apt to impair health (Art. 30, item 1). The 
terms 'use as provided or foreseeable use' must be interpreted in a broad sense, 
since the protective intent of the law, which includes children, must be taken 
into account98 • At the same time it is forbidden to market consumer goods which 
were manufactured in violation of the prohibitions previously imposed 
(Art. 30, item 2 LMBG which is modelled on Art. 8, item 2 and Art. 24, item 2). 
The prohibition also includes consumer goods that were not manufactured as 
such if they are marketed as 'consumer goods' and are dangerous to health 
within the meaning of Art. 30, item 199• Lastly, the prohibition is also extended 
considerably: even the use of consumer goods in the production or processing of 
foodstuffs is forbidden if thereby foodstuffs are influenced so as tobe likely to 
impair the consumer's health, Art. 30, item 3. lt is also forbidden to use objects 
as consumer goods on a commercial basis in such a way or to market them for 
such intended purposes that they give off substances that pass into foodstuffs or 
onto the surface thereof, unless these are portions that are unobjectionable in 
terms of health, odour and flavour and are technically unavoidable, Art. 31, 
para. l. This relates to all objects irrespective of the purposes for which they 
were manufactured if they are used as consumer goods within the meaning of 
their definition. As regards the harmfulness of substances being given off, the 
possi bility of impairment is sufficient. Wording in such broad terms is explained 
by the fact that according to the current level of scientific knowledge it is 
impossible to prove that something is actually apt to impair health 101 • Art. 31, 
para. 2 LMBG enables legally binding regulations to be made laying down for 
certain substances those quantities which are to be considered legally unobjec-
tionable when passing from consumer goods into foodstuffs. Lastly, it is for-
bidden to market objects that may be mistaken for foodstuffs, Art. 30, item 4. 
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This regulation was occasioned by a number of accidents: children had drunk 
dishwashing detergents, because they had mistaken them for a juice because of 
the lemons illustrated thereon. 
The federal minister is authorised to take measures by way of statutory order 
to avoid dangers to health emanating from consumer goods (Art. 32 LMBG). 
This regulation largely corresponds to the regulation of Art. 9 LMBG. So far 
the authority issuing orders has not used this power. 
(c) Retrospective measures 
146 The possibilities of control of consumer goods by inspection correspond to 
those described with respect to food law. 
lnfringements of the general clause of Art. 30 LMBG or of the duties laid 
down in the principles of Arts.31, 32 LMBG are punishedin the same way and to 
the same extent as infringements of the regulations on foodstuffs or drugs. 
4 Control of drugs 
147 The control of drugs is regulated in the Gesetz zur Neuordnung des Arznei-
mittelrechts (Act to Reform the Law of Drugs) of 24 August 1976. lt is the 
declared objective of that Act to afford the consumer better protection against 
harmful drugs in future, cf. Art. 1 AMG. Not least the Thalidomide catas-
trophe has shown that the registration procedure provided for in the AMG 61 
did not suffice to ensure effective protection of the consumer. Despite these 
experiences it took almost 20 years before the new legislation came into force. 
The Federal Republic is thus one of the last countries to transform into national 
law international agreements and regulations on the approximation of German 
law to a certain established standard 102• 
The core of the Act is the revised procedure of prior approval of drugs and the 
provision on strict liability. In addition the Act includes several other instru-
ments for improving preventive health protection. 
(a) Definition 
148 The terms 'drugs' and 'substances' as well as other terms used in the AMG are 
defined in Arts. 2-4 AMG. Drugs are substances and preparations from 
substances which by internal or external application to the human or animal 
body are designed to eure diseases, reveal mental conditions, and kill agents of 
diseases, Art. 2, para. I AMG. Art. 2, para. 2 contains further basic rules 
about objects regarded as drugs. These rules essentially retain the former 
concept of drugs. At the same time they objectify matters; thus for the sake of 
certainty in law the scope of the law of drugs is more clearly distinguished from 
that of food and feed law. Substances are chemical elements, plants, parts of 
plants, animal carcases and live animals, as well as body components and micro-
organisms inclusive of viruses and components of viruses, Art. 3 AMG. This 
definition is in line with the present law. A number of definitions important to 
the understanding of the terminology of the AMG are to be found in Art. 4 
AMG: not only definitions of individual chemical terms, but also of terms 
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relating to the production method (waiting time, manufacture, quality, batch, 
and marketing). 
(b) Preventive control measures 
149 (aa) Like the food law, the law of drugs imposes prohibitions in connection 
with powers to interpret the prohibitions and to grant exceptions. 
As the procedure of prior approval was retained, the legislator puts the prin-
ciple of prohibition as a means of preventive health protection besides regula-
tions on the procedure of prior approval. Harmful drugs may be forbidden, 
Art. 5 AMG. Harmful according to the definition of the law (Art. 5 AMG) are 
drugs where there is strong suspicion on the basis of scientific knowledge at any 
time that, if used as provided, they will have harmful effects exceeding the 
measure defensible according to the findings of medical science. The suspicion 
must be substantiated in line with the level of scientific knowledge at any time 
and must exist when the drug is being marketed 103 • The provision shows at the 
same time that harmful effects in drugs must be accepted if they are outweighed 
by their therapeutical value. Since the prohibition exists side by side with the 
procedure of prior approval, it may only be interpreted as an expression of the 
responsibility of the manufacturers of drugs. Public discussion about the drug 
Duogynon shows the problems involved in the constituent facts of 'harmful' 
and 'sufficient suspicion' very clearly 104. 
The use of certain substances or objects in the manufacture of drugs may also 
be forbidden or restricted by the authority issuing orders, and marketing may be 
prohibited if the drugs were not manufactured pursuant to these regulations, 
Art. 6 AMG. This provision serves the consumer's interest in preventive protec-
tion against harmful substances endangering his health. In addition to the 
prohibition pursuant to Art. 5 AMG and the decision on prior approval 
pursuant to Art. 25 AMG, Art. 6 AMG is important per se, because according 
to the former provisions the dangerousness of individual drugs has to bejudged, 
while under Art. 6 AMG the general dang er situation is taken as a criterion w5• 
Furthermore, it is forbidden to use and market radioactive substances and 
drugs treated with ionising rays, Art. 7, para. 1 AM G. Exceptions to this pro-
hibition may be made in the case of radioactive drugs if these are tobe used in 
animals, Art. 7, para. 2. If ionising rays are used in the manufacture of such 
drugs, exceptions may be approved provided that their use is not harmful to 
man or animal by the level of medical science. 
As far as exceptions are made for radioactive drugs, the authority issuing 
orders may prescribe channels of trade and packing. Any use of radioactive rays 
requires that the principles laid down in the Strahlenschutzverordnung (Radia-
tion Protection Order) of 13 October 1976106 be complied with. 
150 (bb) Further control is ensured by the fact that the manujacture of drugs is 
subject to the requirement of licencing, Arts. 13-20 AMG. Basically, any 
person who intends to manufacture drugs on a commercial basis for sale to 
others requires a licence. Who is a manufacturer follows from Art. 4, item 14 
AMG. Excepted are: pharmacists, hospital institutions, the veterinarian as 
regards the manufacture of drugs he sells for use in animals treated by him, the 
wholesaler for the decanting/bottling, packing or labelling of drugs, unless 
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packages designed for sale to the consumer are concerned, the retailer who has 
the expert knowledge (Art. 50 AMG) for decanting/bottling, packing or 
labelling drugs for direct sale in unchanged form to the consumer. Reasons for 
denial of a licence to manufacture from which simultaneously follow the perti-
nent requirements of licensing are set forth under Art. 14 AMG. In accordance 
with the World Health Organization, a control manager who is independent 
regarding his responsibility is assigned to the production manager, who used to 
be solely responsible under public law for compliance with the statutory provi-
sions on manufacture. Both have to have the expert knowledge defined in 
Art. 15, paras. 1-3 AMG. Proof to that effect is deemed to have been fur-
nished if the person concerned is a registered pharmacist or has a diploma 
evidencing completed university studies in pharmacology, chemistry, biology 
and human or veterinary medicine. The latter must in addition command suffi-
cient basic knowledge of a number of specifically listed basic subjects (Art. 18, 
item 3 AMG). Furthermore, both persons must have done practical work for no 
less than two years in the area of manufacture or testing of drugs. Owing to the 
complexity of the testing and manufacture of drugs, it is open to doubt whether 
practical work as an examiner actually proves the qualification required for the 
manufacture of drugs. These objections, which were raised by the Bundesrat, 
were not taken into account in the final wording of the law 107• The production 
manager is responsible for compliance with the regulations on trade in drugs, 
Art. 19, para. 1 AMG. The control manager has to test drugs for the necessary 
quality, Art. 19, para. 2 AMG. A further requirement for licensing is that the 
person planning to start operations appoints a sales manager who need not 
command expert knowledge. He is solely responsible for the marketing of drugs 
in accordance with legislation and for compliance with the regulations on adver-
tising in the field of medical and therapeutic services, Art. 18, para. 3 AMG. 
The sales manager may also hold the position of production·manager, Art. 15, 
para. 2, sentence 1 AMG. In enterprises that apply exclusively for a Iicence to 
decant/bottle, pack or labe! drugs or to prepare prepacked drugs from drug pre-
mixes, the production manager may perform all three functions. 
Further requirements for the grant of a licence are appropriate premises and 
facilities for the planned manufacture, testing and storage of drugs. The law 
does not specify what is meant by appropriate premises and facilities. However, 
the competent authority issuing orders may use its power pursuant to Art. 54, 
para. 2, item 5 AMG to put the law into more concrete terms. 
The licence to manufacture may be limited in time (Art. 16 AMG) and may be 
withdrawn if afterwards it turns out that a reason for denial existed or came into 
existence after the licence had been granted, Art. 18 AMG. 
The regulations on a licence to manufacture do not apply without restriction 
to enterprises that had been in existence at the time the AMG came into force. 
Under Sect. 3 of the transitional regulations under the law of drugs, Arts. 1 -4 
contain provisions concerning enterprises that have been engaged for some time 
in the manufacture of drugs. The position of established pharmaceutisal enter-
prises is protected by the licence required under the AMG being simulated as 
appropriate, Art. l. However, a simulated licence covers only the scope granted 
under the former law. Manufacturers of drugs are allowed a period of three 
years starting from the date the Act enters into force to engage a competent 
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control manager, Art. 2, para. 1. Moreover, the latter may also hold the posi-
tion of production manager for another five years, Art. 2, para. 3. Overall, a 
term of eight years from the entry into force of the Act is planned to be grä.nted 
for full adjustment to the World Health Organization's directive on the basic 
rules of manufacture and quality protection of drugs. The sales manager must 
be appointed within six months. Also the position of those production managers 
who upon entry into force of the Act had performed that function pursuant to 
the regulations of the former law of drugs remains unaffected, Art. 4 of the 
transitional regulations under the AM G. 
151 (cc) Contra/ by the estab/ishment of operating regu/ations (Art. 54 AMG). 
This regulation is closely connected with the provisions on granting licenses, for 
it enables the factual and personal requirements (listed in Arts. 13-20 AMG) as 
to enterprises manufacturing drugs to be extended to the entire field of business 
organisation. What is initially required is that these be measures that are neces-
sary to ensure regular operations and required quality. The authority issuing 
orders has broad powers of intervention in the organisation of an enterprise. In 
addition to regulations on manufacture, testing, storage, packing, maintenance 
and filing of documents evidencing such business operations, requirements as to 
personnel, quality of premises and containers, and requirements as to hygienic 
standards may be made. As regards its substance, the regulatory power under 
Art. 54 AMG extends far beyond the former Art. 39. Any improvement of 
health protection through mandatory provisions on business organisation 
remains an illusion as long as the authority issuing orders fails to exercise its 
powers. Under Art. 39 only a regulation of relatively minor importance was 
issued 108• Regulations under the law of the German Länder exist only in Berlin 
and Schleswig-Holstein 109. 
152 (dd) The principal items of the new law of drugs are the provisions on the 
procedure of prior approval, Arts. 21-37 AMG. There are numerous reasons 
for the introduction of this procedure. The increased incidence of side effects in 
new drugs, the Thalidomide catastrophe 1io, the increase in the consumption of 
drugs by 400% since 1961 and the setting of standards by the EC have forced the 
legislator to brush aside his initial objections to state control. 
Prepacked drugs are subject to prior approval, and so to a limited extent are 
veterinary preparations. Prepacked drugs are drugs manufactured in advance 
and marketed in packages intended for sale to the consumer, Art. 4, para. 1 
AMG. The procedure of prior approval is designed in such a way that basically 
the manufacturer himself has to test the quality, effectiveness and harmlessness 
of his drug, approval of which he seeks from the Federal Health Authority. To 
that end he has to enclose with the application, inter alia, the following data 
(Art. 22, para. 1, items 1-15 AMG): the description of the drug, its compo-
nents, effects, range of application, side effects, reciprocity in regard to other 
drugs, dosage, limits of non-perishability, and methods of controlling quality 
as weil as the results of analytical, pharmacological/toxicological and clinical 
examinations, Art. 22, para. 2 AMG. In certain cases the manufacturer may 
replace the pharmacological/toxicological and analytical ·examinations by other 
scientific findings, Art. 22, para. 3 AMG. 
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Regarding drugs intended for use in animals, the waiting time, established by 
special residue examinations, must also be specified, Art. 23 AMG. To a certain 
extent other scientific findings may also be submitted, Art. 23, para. 1, sentence 
4AMG. 
Expert opinions summarising and evaluating control methods and test results 
shall be enclosed with the documents on the results of the various examinations 
required under Art. 22, paras. 1-3 and Art. 23 AMG. Criteria on which the 
respective opinions must comment are defined in Art. 24, paras. 1-3 of the 
Act. Details follow from the notification by the Federal Health Authority 
concerning the prior approval and registration of drugs of 10 September 1977 
and the explanations published thereunder 111 • 
An application for approval may be refused only if the documents submitted 
are incomplete, if the drug has not been tested on the basis of the current 
standards of technology and science or Jacks the quality appropriate according 
to accepted pharmaceutical rules, if the drug Jacks the therapeutic effectiveness 
claimed by the manufacturer or if such effectiveness has not been sufficiently 
proved by the applicant according to the accepted standards of technology and 
science, if there is suspicion that the drug upon use as provided produces 
harmful and not defensible effects, if the waiting time indicated is not sufficient, 
or if the marketing of the drug would infringe the statutory regulations (Art. 25 
AMG). In this context the AMG uses many terms which are not defined 
precisely (accepted pharmaceutical rules, harmlessness, proof of effectiveness, 
and standards of science). 
The proof of therapeutic effectiveness of a drug tobe furnished by the manu-
facturer was and continues tobe a controversial issue under discussion 112• The 
opponents of the proof of effectiveness object primarily to the issue of the 
burden of proof113 • Since the manufacturer is required to furnish proof, the 
Federal Health Authority is entitled to decide points of scientific controversy. 
That amounts to an encroachment upon the freedom of science, which in the 
final analysis results in a curtailment of the rights of the consumer involved 114• 
This view presupposes that the consumer's well-being is better taken care of by 
the manufacturer of drugs. In actual fact, the procedure of prior approval was 
introduced because manufacturers of drugs did not always make due allowance 
for the consumer's health. Criticism is justified inasmuch as the extent to which 
proofs are accepted or rejected depends on the interests in terms of science or 
social policy prevailing in the Federal Health Authority. Furthermore, we may 
assent to the criticism in that shifting of the power to take a decision from the 
manufacturer to an authority does not in itself ensure improved protection of 
the consumer's health. All the same, consumers' interests should be better taken 
care of by the Federal Health Authority. Lastly, and this should not be over-
looked, the administrative courts are the last instance to decide about approval. 
This fact does not alter the problem of the burden of proof, but shifts respon-
sibility from the authority to the judiciary. 
Much more serious is another criticism of the proof of effectiveness: it is quite 
sure that clinical tests as the essential means of furnishing proof are meaningful 
to a limited extent only 115 , but legislation forces manufacturers to furnish proof 
in that manner. For this reason, strongly objecting legal writers have even been 
led to argue that a controlled test is punishable 116• Even if the example given in 
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support of this thesis is fictitious 117 , it must not be overlooked that Jegislation 
favours red tape concerning facts and statistics and in the past has left out of 
account any effects of drugs that were impossible to explain or to examine. 
Problems concerning proof of effectiveness result also from the plurality of 
therapeutic methods. Classical medicine and homeopathy, anthroposophical 
medicine and phytotherapy are in some cases incompatible. If the same require-
ments of proof of effectiveness were to be made of these types of therapy, a 
measure of uniformity that would fail to do justice to the different modes of 
action would be achieved. While drugs contain chemical substances which may 
produce provable effects, homeopathic remedies are always diluted to such an 
extent that even trace elements are no longer present in them. The AMG tries 
to solve that problem by involving a commission of experts whose make-up 
depends on whether or not a drug requiring a doctor's prescription is concerned 
(Art. 25, paras. 6 and 7 AMG). While the members of both commissions are 
appointed by the federal minister at the recommendation of the chambers of 
therapeutic professions, doctors, dentists, veterinarians, non-medical practi-
tioners and manufacturers of drugs, commissions for specific therapeutic 
methods may be formed in respect of drugs not requiring a doctor's prescrip-
tion. Even if the law does not specify the number of members, we are hopeful 
that in the therapy commissions representatives of a different method will not be 
outvoted right away. The last instance to take a decision in any case is the 
Federal Health Authority. lt is not bound by the examination results arrived at 
by the commission, Art. 25, para. 6, sentence 3 and Art. 25, para. 7, sentence 3 
AMG. The commissions have not only to deliberate on the requirements as to 
proof of effectiveness, but also to decide on what is to be understood by 
standards of medical science, Art. 25, para. 2, items 2, 4 and 5 AMG. 
The problems encountered regarding proof of effectiveness resemble those 
regarding 'standards of medical science'. Standards of medical science are 
controversial. The authors of the Bill did hold, though, that the authorities shall 
take account thereof and shall confine themselves to what is uncontested. 
Rath er, the authorities side with one of the parties in a scientific controversy and 
take decisions which are binding also upon those scientists who take a different 
point of view. What are the criteria for the authority to go by in assessing 
standards of science? If different experts express contradictory opinions, the 
competence and experience ofthe experts involved might be taken as a criterion. 
That would be a decision not for reasons of fact, but for reasons of authority. 
Moreover, guidance by what renowned scientists have tried for years might 
preclude new drugs from prevailing on the market. Despite these dangers, the 
Higher Regional Court of Hamm in a decision of 1964 took as a criterion the 
number and notability of university teachers in a methodological controversy 118• 
This is to illustrate the dynamite of the criterion 'standards of science' 119• 
Art. 27 AMG dispels doubts about undue delays in the possible use of new 
drugs by obligating the Federal Health Authority to take a decision on an appli-
cation for approval within four andin exceptional cases within seven months. In 
complicated cases that term could be too short and in turn might lead to the rash 
approval of drugs for fear of claims for damages. 
The Federal Health Authority may link approval with present and subsequent 
requirements, Art. 28 AMG. lt is obliged to revoke approval on certain condi-
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tions, particularly if it turns out that the drug lacks therapeutical effectiveness. 
Without prejudice to approval under Art. 32 AMG, sera, vaccines and test 
allergens may be marketed only if the batch concerned has officially been tested 
and released. 
The federal minister's power to exempt certain drugs or groups of drugs from 
the procedure of prior approval, Art. 36 AMG, may be of considerable prac-
tical importance. For the issuance of such a regulation, guiding principles have 
already been worked out 120• lt will be the objective of that regulation to establish 
standards for certain prepacked drugs in respect of which effectiveness, harm-
lessness and quality have been proved; to relieve the competent federal authority 
of the burden of having to process many individual cases of approval of the 
same kind; to relieve the entrepreneur of the trouble of having each drug 
approved individually and of preparing and submitting the documents for 
approval connected therewith and to contribute to clarity as to the supply of 
drugs on the market. In the preparation of the regulation, a number of insti-
tutions are to participate, inter a/ia, institutions not safeguarding particular 
interests, such as university institutes and the Arzneimittelprüfdienst München 
(Munich drug testing service). Consumer representatives are not mentioned. 
With a regulation worded in such broad terms, the <langer of abuse is quite 
obvious. 
Homeopathic drugs which do not require a doctor's prescription have been 
regulated in a special way (Arts. 38, 39 AMG). They are not subject to the 
requirement of prior approval, but merely to that of registration. The procedure 
followed here is largely modelled on the procedure of prior approval; how-
ever, here statements regarding effects and fields of application as weil as docu-
ments and opinions on pharmacological, toxicologicaJ.and clinical tests are not 
required. 
The changeover from the registration procedure to that of prior approval of 
1 January 1978 requires a transitional regulation which is provided for in 
Arts. 5-10 of Sect. 3 AMG. 
Special approval in the area of sera and vaccines is simulated if under the 
present provisions of the law of drugs these drugs were subject to approval, 
Art. 5. Those cases where upon entry of the Act into force registration in the 
special register under the AMG 61 had been required are now subject to the 
procedure of prior approval under the new Act, Art. 6. This applies to all 
special drugs within the meaning of Art. 4 AMG 61, viz. all drugs whose 
composition is always the same and which are marketed with special descrip-
tions in packages ready for sale. That in itselfvery strict and far-reaching regula-
tion is ignored in some cases (Arts. 7-10). Special regulations apply primarily 
to prepacked drugs which at the same time are drugs within the meaning of 
Art. 2, para. l or para. 2, item 1 AMG, Art. 4, para. l. The extent to which 
such drugs are exempted from the regulations on prior approval under the AMG 
is contingent upon the time of marketing. If the drug is on the market on the day 
of promulgation of the new Act or if an application for registration in the 
speciality register has then been filed, the drug is considered to have been 
appro:ved (Art. 7, para. 1), however, within six months of the coming into force 
of the new Act a description of effective components and fields of application 
must be reported to the Federal Health Authority. The approval of a drug 
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reported within the period prescribed expires only 12 years after the coming into 
force of the Act. If, however, an application for registration of a drug in the 
speciality register was filed only after promulgation of the Act and if the 
application is granted prior to the Act coming into force, the drug is considered 
to have been approved if it is on the market when the Act comes into force, 
Art. 8. Approval is limited to a period of six months; thereafter the manufac-
turer has to file an application for approval pursuant to Arts. 20 et seq., AMG. 
Where drugs are prepared in a pharmacy and dispensed by it to the consumer, 
such drugs may be marketed without approval for another five years after the 
coming into force of the Act, Art. 10. 
153 (ee) As the clinical test was made a prerequisite for approval, it is also neces-
sary to regulate the conduct of clinical tests in order adequately to protect the 
group of test persons (Arts. 40-42 AMG). The necessary protection of test 
persons must be weighed against the interest in developing new drugs. Basically, 
the Act distinguishes between test persons who are healthy, that is do not suffer 
from any disease thedrug is meant to fight, and persons suffering from a disease 
which the drug in question is meant to eure. A special regulation exists for 
minors, Art. 40, para. 4 AMG. The first requirement for a clinical test in 
persons belonging to the first group is that the test be defensible from a medical 
point of view. The test person must be informed about the nature, importance 
and implications of the clinical test and must be able to judge the matter. 
Consent may only be given personally and in writing. Further requirements 
relate to the physician conducting the test. Drugs may be tested in minors only if 
it is necessary to diagnose or prevent (not fight) diseases occurring only in 
minors. The necessary consent is given by the legal representative or guardian 
and if the minor is capable of judgment, he must give his consent in writing. lf a 
drug is tested in a patient whose disease is tobe cured by the drug, there must in 
addition be an indication for use of the drug to be tested. A test may also be 
conducted in patients incapable to contract if the legal representative has given 
his consent. Consent may be dispensed with if the test serves to save the patient's 
life or to restore his health and the patient does not seem to object, Art. 41, item 
7 AMG. This exception is worded in too broad a manner and should be 
restricted to cases where there is actual danger to life. 
The regulations do not apply where a drug is being tested which has already 
been approved or which does not require approval, Art. 42 AMG. 
154 (ff) There are also regulations on who may act as drug sa!esman (Arts. 43-54 
AMG). Drugs within the meaning of Art. 2, para. l or para. 2, item 1 AMG 
may be sold only by retail in pharmacies. Drugs intended exclusively for 
purposes other than the eure or alleviation of diseases, Art. 44, are not subject 
to sale by pharmacists only. Among these range artificial and natural mineral, 
medicinal and sea waters, healing earth, mud baths, plants and parts of plants, 
plaster and dressings for burns. Pursuant to Art. 45 AMG, the authority issuing 
orders may exempt other drugs from the requirement of sale by pharmacists 
only. 
The channel of distribution for drugs subject to sale by pharmacists only is 
regulated as follows (Art. 47 AMG): manufacturers and wholesalers may 
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dispense them, in addition to pharmacies, for instance, only to other manufac-
turers and wholesalers, to a limited extent to hospitals and doctors, and to veter-
inary authorities and veterinarians. 
The requirement of prescription of drugs is embodied in Arts. 48 and 49 
AMG. Special regulations on retail trade, sale through peddling, prohibition of 
self-service and hearing of experts are to be found in the provisions of 
Arts. 50-53 AMG. We shall not go into details of the channels of distribution, 
but will point out the following: by far the majority of drugs is bought in 
pharmacies. The involvement of pharmacies as an intermediate agency between 
patient and doctor originally served the purpose of protecting the consumer 
against questionable decisions by doctors. Such control was ensured as long as 
the pharmacist prepared drugs himself and therefore knew their composition 
and was able roughly to judge their effects. Nowadays, the pharmacy is increas-
ingly developing into a mere retail outlet of large-scale industry, so the appro-
priate regulations safeguard primarily the pharmacists' position, i.e. serve their 
professional interests, while additional protection of the consumer against 
dangerous drugs is more and more on the wane 121 • 
155 (gg) The Pharmacopoeia is a compilation of accepted rules on the quality, 
testing, storage, sale and description of drugs (Art. 55 AMG), and also contains 
requirements as to the nature of containers and wrappings. The rules laid down 
in the Pharmacopoeia are legally binding upon manufacturers of drugs. This is 
an important feature distinguishing the Pharmacopoeia from the Food Codex. 
The effect of the Pharmacopoeia must therefore be rated much higher, for in the 
event of infringements manufacturers are liable to punishment, Art. 97, item 16 
AMG. Consequently, it may be assumed that manufacturers comply with the 
German Pharmacopoeia, which thus serves to avoid dangers to health. 
The competent authority issuing orders may amend or supplement the 
Pharmacopoeia according to the standards of science and technology at any 
time. As far as this goes, the former regulation is retained as provided for in 
Art. 5 AMG 61 which the Government bad intended to abolish in favour of a 
more practicable solution 122. 
156 (hh) To avoid direct or indirect risks to human or animal health the competent 
federal superior authority has to record and evaluate centra!ly the risks that may 
occur in the use of drugs, particularly side effects and reciprocity in regard to 
other drugs, and has to coordinate measures to be taken; this is laid down in 
Art· 62 AMG. The central recording of such matters may be regarded as a direct 
outgrowth of the Thalidomide catastrophe, for in that case failure to pass on 
suspicious facts about side effects resulted in consumers and doctors not having 
been informed appropriately andin timel23. The passing-on of information pre-
supposes, though, that the Federal Health Authority obtains such information 
in the first place. That is the decisive prob lern encountered in the establishment 
of a recording agency. The Act does not say anything about how it intends to 
make manufacturers, doctors and consumers report risks that occur. As regards 
doctors, the legislator is hopeful that their professional organisations will take 
action by establishing a drug commission 124. True, the authority issuing orders 
may issue a phased plan for the performance of functions incumbent upon the 
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recording agency (Art. 63 AMG), but regulations on a duty to notify are not 
envisaged here, either. For the issuance of a general administrative regulation, 
the competent federal ministry has meanwhile submitted guiding principles 
entitled 'System to Record Drug Risks' 125 • 
(c) Retrospective control measures 
157 (aa) The control of tegulations under the law of drugs is of great importance 
to the consumer, for the best prohibitory legislation or procedures of prior 
approval offer optimum safety only if compliance with them is controlled. lt 
was here that in the past the system showed great deficiencies 126• The new Drugs 
Act is designed to improve the control of trade in drugs. The uniform control of 
pharmacies by the competent control authorities serves that purpose. The 
respective provisions of the Gesetz über das Apothekerwesen (Act on Pharma-
ceutical Service), Arts. 18, 19,25,para. l,item3aresupersededbyArt. 9,item 
6 AMG. Furthermore, the control organs' powers were extended and conse-
quently an extension of the control authorities became necessary. The control 
regulations conform to the respective regulations under food law and anticipate 
the transformation of Arts. 16 and 17 of the 2. Pharmazeutische EG-Richtlinie 
(Second Pharmaceuticals EC Directive)l 27 • 
The German Länderare in charge of implementing the law of drugs. They do 
not have a uniform authority 128 • Unlike the LMG, the AMG does not give the 
authority issuing orders powers enabling implementing regulations tobe made. 
Only Art. 68 AMG imposes on the respective Land and federal authorities the 
obligation to render reciprocal administrative assistance. 
Every two years the competent authorities have to perform inspections and 
have drug samples officially examined, Art. 64, para. 3 AMG. Within the scope 
of their constitutional competence to implement the law, the Land authorities 
may at any time make general regulations on the method of sampling and give 
instructions to the persons charged with inspection. The persons entrusted with 
control must perform these functions in a professional capacity. Unlike the 
food law (cf. Art. 61, para. 2 LMG), special training is not required. Therefore 
it is the task of the authorities to determine the necessary expert knowledge. In 
case of imminent danger any police enforcement officer may take the necessary 
measures to avoid dangers to the general public or to an individual 129• 
The powers of the competent Land officials are enumerated in Art. 64, 
para. 4: (l) entry to properties, offices and business premises during normal 
business hours; (2) inspection inside and usually to some extent also outside 
these premises; (3) further rights of entry to living accommodation to avoid 
imminent danger; (4) inspection of business records and drawing of samples; (5) 
access to all necessary information. The respective rights are similar to those 
granted under food law. For that reason, reference may be made to them. 
As regards details, there are some peculiarities. The AMG permits entry even 
in case of imminent <langer only during normal business hours, an absurd 
regulation: the legislator acts as if dangers occur only during business hours. 
Like the LMBG, the AMG exempts manufacturing specifications from the right 
of inspection. In this context an interpretation doing justice to all interests 
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requires that at least the right to information be extended to include manufac-
turing specifications. 
The powers to draw samples, Art. 65 AMG, correspond to the regulation 
under Art. 42 LMBG. 
The competent Land authorities must give necessary orders to inspect viola-
tionsthat have been ascertained and avoid future violations, Art. 69 AMG. The 
measures referring to a violation of the law are of preventive importance for the 
future only. For that reason they are preventive •ontrol measures to a limited 
extent only. However, as compared with the former regulation, the scope has 
been extended in that now marketing may already be forbidden in the case of 
danger to an individual and not as in the past to the general public. The authori-
ties may put drugs in safekeeping, forbid their marketing or order their recall if 
they have not been approved as required, if the drug is not of the appropriate 
quality, if it Jacks therapeutical effectiveness, if harmful side effects are 
suspected, if the prescribed quality controls have not been performed or if the 
required licence to manufacture drugs has not been obtained. 
158 (bb) Like the LMBG, the AMG sanctions a great number of breaches of duty 
by imprisonment or fines. The distinction made between punishable acts and 
administrative offences and the degree of punishment is identical in both Acts. 
The AMG is stricter in two ways, because imprisonment for a term between one 
and ten years may be imposed on particularly severely punishable acts and all 
administrative offences may be punished by a fine of up to DM 50 000. The 
provision that violations of the general clause of Art. 5 as weil as of the prin-
ciples laid down in Arts. 6 and 7 are punished the most severely is identical 
under the LMBG and AMG. lt is astonishing that infringements of the duties to 
be fulfilled in the procedure ofprior approval do not belang here. Such breaches 
of duty may .even constitute a mere administrative offence if they were com-
mitted negligently. We shall not go into the details ofthe regulations, since the 
provisions under Arts. 95-97 AMG are very involved. 
5 Control of technical labour materials 
159 The intention of the GSG is to increase the prevention of industrial accidents 
and to fight accident hazards in the household. 
(a) Definition 
160 Technical labour materials are ready-for-use working equipment, above all 
tools, implements, processing machines and engines, lifting apparatus and 
conveyors as weil as means oftransportation, cf. Art. 2, para. l GSG. Accord-
ing to the legal definition, ready-for-use working equipment is equipment that 
may be used for its intended purpose without the addition of further parts. In 
this respect the bill by the Bundestag (Federal Diet) of 29 August 1977 also 
provided for an extension of the scope of the Act to include parts of working 
equipment which usually have to be procured separately and when used as 
provided have to be fitted in 130, such as machine tools, drills, grinding disks 
and spare parts. In the Act Amending the Gesetz über technische Arbeitsmittel 
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of 13 August 1979131 (henceforth called Gerätesicherheitsgesetz, GSG) that 
extension has been omitted. Therefore Art. 2, para. 1 GSG is retained in its old 
version. The GSG also applies to household appliances, athletic implements and 
amateur handicraft equipment and to toys (Art. 2, para. 2, item 3 and 4 GSG). 
Beyond the reach of the Act are household appliances coming under entertain-
ment electronics (stereo sets and the like). 
(b) Preventive control by selj-regulatory measures of industry 
161 The manufacturer or importer of technical labour materials may market such 
materials only if according to the generally accepted standards of technology 
they are so constituted that users or third parties are protected against dangers to 
their life and limb as far as that is possible in the intended use, Art. 3, para. 1 
GSG. The bill of 29 August 1977 provided for an extension of that duty to 
suppliers. The reasons given for the proposal for amendment were the interest in 
increased control of the enforcement of the law and improved protection of the 
consumer 132• The bill that eventually became law did not consider that reform 
proposal. The above-mentioned duty incumbent on the groups of persons 
concerned includes a restriction of importance to the consumer. He is protected 
only as far as is permitted by the type of intended use. Intended use is use for 
which the working equipment is suitable according to the manufacturer's or 
importer's specifications or, particularly, advertising, and customary use is use 
following from the construction and design oftechnical labour materials (Art. 2 
GSG). For that reason, foreseeable misuse by the consumer comes within the 
scope of intended use. The Act does not regulate 'generally accepted standards 
of technology'. From the administrative regulation issued under Art. 11 133 it 
follows that the legislator equates technical standards established by industry 
with the generally accepted standards of technology. This amounts to statutory 
recognition that trade associations determine the safety of technical labour 
materials themselves. 
(aa) Technical standards are technical specifications or regulations governing 
the manufacture or installation, nature or description, and application or use of 
objects. Objects may be corporeal things as weil as processes or reactions 134• 
They serve rationalisation and the safeguarding of safety and quality in all 
spheres of life. They include technical, economic, scientific, social and regula-
tory characteristics. We speak of standardisation above single-enterprise level if 
standards are established by associations for a great number of enterprises. 
lmportant standardisation organisations in the Federal Republic today are the 
Deutsche Institut für Normung e. V „ the Verein Deutscher Ingenieure, the 
Verband Deutscher Elektrotechniker and the Deutsche Verein von Gas- und 
Wasserfachmännern. In addition to these, there are a number of other associa-
tions. A general survey of all organisations does not exist. 
As technical standards are established merely by private associations they are 
not original legal rules; all the same, they are of great practical importance 135 • 
While manufacturers are not bound to comply with these standards, they often 
make the mistake of believing that technical standards are binding. Pressure is 
also exerted by the state, which often makes the awarding of contracts contin-
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gent upon compliance with existing technical standards. The importance of 
standardisation to the consumer lies in the fact that there is a growing trend 
towards standardisation of consumer goods. This is again and again pointed out 
to the consumer by governmental agencies. And for that reason the state is deci-
sively instrumental in the consumer equating the label of technical standardisa-
tion with satisfactory quality and safety. 
(bb) How a technica/ standard is established will be briefly described on the 
basis of the activity pursued by the Deutsche Institut zur Normgebung e. V. 
(DIN) (German Institute for Standardisation). The DIN is the most important 
Organisation for standardisation. With effect from 1 September 1975, the DIN 
received its present name. That same year, i.e. 6 May 1975, the Federal Govern-
ment made a contract with the DIN regulating their relationship to each other. 
Under that contract the Federal Government recognised the DIN as the national 
Organisation for standardisation. The contract at the same time includes skeleton 
terms governing the rights and duties of the contracting parties. Pursuant 
thereto, the Government is granted seats in the managing body, without the 
majority ratio being impaired thereby. Practically speaking, the contract 
amounts to governmental recognition of the self-regulation of industry 137 • 
Under Art. l of the effective by-laws of 20 April 1975, the DIN in a cooperative 
effort with interested groups establishes standards for the benefit of the general 
public (that is, its conception of itself). A distinction must be made between the 
general DIN labe! and the DIN tested labe!. The former only indicates whether 
according to the manufacturer the product complies with existing DIN 
standards. The 'DIN tested' labe!, which was introduced in 1972, means that the 
product has· been tested by a testing agency (Standards Testing Agency) and is 
subject to regular control1 38 • Enterprises and legal persons may be members of 
the DIN, but neither governmental institutions nor consumer organisations. As 
regards its organisational structure, the DIN comprises the members' meeting, a 
president, a director and standardisation committees. On 1 January 1975 the 
presiding board included 37 members, 22 thereof coming from industry. The 
specialised committees (Fachausschüsse) which make up the standardisation 
committees (Normungsausschüsse) are in charge of standardisation proper 139• 
The honorary members of the committees are experts from the groups of those 
interested (user, authority, trade cooperative association, university, handi-
craft, manufacturer, testing industry, property insurance company, and 
consumer) who shall be represented in the committees in an appropriate ratio to 
one another. In actual fact, manufacturers are usually decisively predomi-
nant 140• In the case of disputes concerning committee make-up, the managing 
body will decide. 
According to the by-laws, any person may apply for initiation of the stan-
dardisation procedure, but in practice this is usually done by industry. The 
proposal drafted by the relevant specialised committee is submitted for review 
to the Standards Testing Agency, which then releases the respective standards 
for publication. 
The Standards Testing Agency comprises 20 honorary members, 13 thereof 
belonging to large-scale industry. This predominance makes it possible for 
enterprises to fix the contents of DIN standards by agreement among themselves 
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prior to the specialised committees taking up their activities at all. Technical 
standardisation proper then takes place in the conference rooms of large-scale 
industry 141 • 
The entire procedure is open to serious doubt as to whether the established 
standards actually serve the general public. Since the interested industry prac-
tically binds itself without any control, it is suspected that often economic 
interests play a more prominent part than safety, which the DIN labe! is said to 
ensure. Moreover, a great number of standards are obsolete, so it cannot be 
assumed that D 1 N standards always reflect the latest level of technology. 
Consumer associations are represented in the respective standardisation com-
mittees 142. Because of the committees' make-up their proposals do not carry 
weight. In the mid-sixties, consumer under-representation resulted in the estab-
lishment of the Committee for Fitness for Use attached to the DIN which was to 
incorporate consumer interests in the standardisation activity. lt was the task 
of that Committee to work increasingly towards requirements relevant to · 
consumers being established by way of standards, and to organise consumer 
representation in the various specialised committees. The Committee comprised 
representatives of industry, the state and consumers on a par basis. Because of 
its make-up the Committee was unable to fulfil its coordination function. In 
1974, the Consumer Advisory Council 143 , attached directly to the DIN 
managing body, took over that function. The advisory board comprises five 
members, one representative each of the AGV (Association of Consumers), 
Stiftung Warentest, Bundesanstalt für Materialprüfung (Federal Institution for 
Materials Testing) and the Ministry ofEconomics, and one independent person. 
The advisory board does not establish standards, nor does it represent an 
interested group in specialised committees. lt performs exclusively functions of 
coordination. lt has to render relevant assistance to the representatives of final 
consumers by counseling and giving advice. 
The situation described in the case of the DIN may serve as an example of all 
the other standardisation organisations. The entire field of technical standards 
is controlled by industry. As far as consumer organisations participate, they do 
not jeopardise powers of decision. Therefore the consumers' interests are prac-
tically ignored in standardisation. There are no efforts to change this state of 
affairs through legislation. 
(cc) lt should be pointed out that supplier interests also influence the imple-
mentation of the GSG, as the Committee for Technical Labour Materials 
attached to the Federal Minister of Labour under Art. 8 GSG shall advise the 
Minister concerning the implementation of the law and make recommenda-
tions. The Committee is firmly controlled by manufacturers: they have more 
seats than employees and consumers jointly 144• Even if the Committee has only 
an advisory function, its make-up shows how insignificant the state's and the 
consumer's influence are in the field of technical standardisation. 
(c) Areas of state control 
162 (aa) Basically, there is no state control in the preventive area of standardisa-
tion. Only by way of exception may the state intervene in a regulatory way if 
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there are no technical standards; it is authorised to that effect under Art. 4, 
para. 2 GSG. The competent agency has not so far made use of its regulatory 
power. As far as the respective requirements (also defined in Art. 4, para. 2) 
actually exist in a particular case, a different method is used: the competent 
German Land government officials prepare safety directives, which serve as a 
basis for orders of prohibition and are later adopted by standardisation institu-
tions 145 • Under Art. Sa, which was inserted by legislation of 13 August 1979, the 
Federal Minister of Labour may direct, following a complicated procedure 
governing the issmrnce of statutory orders, that medical apparatus may be 
marketed or exhibited only if so required for the purpose of protection against 
danger under Art. 3 GSG. In seven items, Art. Sa regulates the factors to be 
considered in a statutory order. So far the powers have not been used. 
The state's main function under the GSG is to check whether manufacturers 
comply with the established standards of techno/ogy. That function is exercised 
by the industrial inspection boards of the Länder governments. The authorities' 
powers are contained in Arts. 5 and 7 GSG and in the Administrative Regula-
tion of 27 October I 970 issued under Art. II GSG 146• The authorities have 
powers to take official action to a limited extent only. Thus it is not the task of 
inspection boards to test the approximately I 80 000 apparatuses appearing on 
the market every year for their compliance with the generally accepted standards 
of technology. Industrial inspection boards may only control products endan-
gering safety on a prevenüve basis, Art. 5, para. 1 GSG. These are measures 
taken by the authorities before an injury or danger has become known. A 
striking feature is that the Act and the Administrative Regulation do not go into 
further details regarding such general power of control. In actual fact, the 
authorities can fulfil their obligations in a very inadequate way only because 
they Jack the necessary funds 147. 
(bb) In the area of retrospective control, the legislator concerned himself 
where the need was greatest with regulating the powers of industrial inspection 
boards in cases where damage has occurred or where there is a threat of damage. 
Therefore it is obvious that the GSG does not aim at comprehensive control but 
takes effect only at certain points where there is a <langer to health. Thus the 
competent industrial inspection board may take action under Art. 1 of the 
Administrative Regulation either if an accident connected with the condition of 
a technical labour material has occurred or if the board is informed about the 
insufficient safety of a product by, for instance, the Stiftung Warentest. Some 
of the German Länder governments even provide for the possibility of taking 
action only in case of an accident 148• In this manner the consumer's protection 
is considerably limited 149-. In practice, measures are often taken only after 
accidents have occurred 150• lf an industrial inspection board becomes active, it 
must ascertain whether the product complies with the established standards of 
technology (Art. 2, para. I, item 1 of the Implementing Order). In the case of 
DIN and VDE standards, the authority must base its considerations thereon 
(Art. 3, para. I of the Order). The authority may do without an examination 
under Art. 2 GSG if a test certificate by an accepted testing agency is available 
for the product. In addition to the official organisations, such testing agencies 
are above all the DIN and the institutions of the VDE and DVGWV. The 
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authority's powers are considerably limited by the fact that it equates the 
accepted standards oftechnology with the DIN standards. Apart therefrom, the 
industrial inspection board must check whether the manufacturer complied 
with the effective industrial safety regulations and accident prevention regula-
tions, Art. 8, para. 1, items 2-4 of the Order. lf the competent authority is not 
in a position to judge whether the technical labour material complies with the 
requirements mentioned in Art. 2, it may ask for information and other assis-
tance necessary in the performance of its functions, Art. 7, para. l GSG. As far 
as is necessary, the authority may demand that the manufacturer or importer 
should have the technical labour material tested, Art. 7, para. l, sentence 3. 
The expert shall be appointed by mutual consent, Art. 5, sentence 2 of the 
Administrative Regulation. Moreover, the competent officials (pursuant to 
Art. 7, para. 2 GSG) may enter premises or properties in or on which technical 
labour materials are manufactured, inspect and test such materials, and in 
particular conduct tests in the manufacturing plant. If, considering these prin-
ciples, the competent authority comes to the conclusion that the material fails to 
comply with the respective requirements, it may take the necessary measures to 
prevent marketing or exhibition of the product tested. The most drastic means is 
the order of prohibition (Untersagungsverfügung) pursuant to Art. 5, para. 1, 
sentences 2 and 3 GSG. Since the Act came into force, about 400 orders of 
prohibition have been issued, which is little indication of the effectiveness of the 
industrial inspection boards' activity 151 • The Act of 13 August 1979 considerably 
extended the group of those to whom an order of prohibition may be issued. 
Industrial inspection boards may now also take action against organisers of 
fairs (Art. 5, para. l, sentence 2) and against suppliers (Art. 5, para. 3); 
however, this is only a subsidiary possibility - organisers of fairs may be for-
bidden to market or exhibit dangerous products only if the manufacturer or 
importer concerned cannot be identified. As regards suppliers, the requirements 
are even stricter: an order of prohibition is admissible only if the manufacturer 
or importer had previously been forbidden to market the product concerned and 
the supplier, despite his knowledge of the order of prohibition, does not make 
use of his right to return the defective product. The bill of 29 August 1977 did 
not provide for such a graded responsibility. lt stands to reason that the merely 
subsidiary responsibility, particularly on the part of the supplier, cannot be in 
the interest of effective consurner protection. 
The authorities do not have further powers to take official action, for 
instance to recall dangerous products. Products are recalled by manufacturers, 
if at all. Apart from industrial inspection boards, the Stiftung Warentest and the 
ADAC may exert indirect pressure. The latter in some cases enters into direct 
negotiations with the manufacturer concerned to bring about a recall. In the 
final analysis threatening claims for damages by injured consumers should be 
crucial for the recall of a product. 
(cc) As far as the manufacturer or importer wilfully or by gross negligence 
contravenes an order ofprohibition or any other measure within the meaning of 
Art. 5, para. l GSG or infringes his obligations under Art. 7 GSG, he may be 
fined up to DM 50 000 in the case of Art. 5 GSG and up to DM l 000 in the case 
of Arts. 7, 9 and 10 GSG. However, punishment is also incurred by the compe-
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tent officials of industrial inspection boards who disclose a trade or business 
secret entrusted to them in their capacity as official persons. The punishment is 
up to one year imprisonment, in grave cases up to two years imprisonment 
and/or a fine. 
6 Control of imported goods 
163 All imported goods are subject to German law if they are marketed in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Import control serves the purpose of additional 
examination, which may be exercised in such a way that certain goods must not 
be imported in the first place. lt can also be imagined that the import of goods is 
made contingent on the fulfilment of certain requirements. 
The Außenwirtschaftsgesetz (A WG) (Foreign Trade and Payments Act) is 
concerned wi th the import of goods. Basically, this Act regulates trade relations 
between the Federal Republic and countries outside Germany. As far as the 
import of goods is concerned, the subject matter of the Act coincides with inter-
national regulations under the Allgemeines Zoll- und Handelsabkommen 
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GA TT) 152. Accordingly, the A WG 
(Art. 10) lays down the principle of free import of goods by residents, as far as 
this follows from the import list which is announced in the FederaJ Journal as an 
Annex to Art. 10 AWG as amended 153 • Limitations on free import are possible 
only to protect the German economy or superior security interests. Consumer 
expectations do not play apart here. The import list specifies the requirements 
residents have to meet for the import of goods and names the governmental 
agencies responsible for examination, licences, etc. The !ist is subdivided in such 
a way that it follows from the respective columns: 
- within whose scope of responsibility the commodity comes: Federal 
Minister of Food, Agriculture and Forestry and Foreign Trade Agency for 
Food and Agricultural Commodities, or Federal Minister for Economic 
Affairs and Federal Office for Trade and Industry: 
- whether import is exempted from licensing or subject to licensing, with 
exemption from licensing applying in case the country of purchase and the 
country of origin are specified in country lists A, Bor C; 
- whether further regulations must be observed upon import, particularly 
whether the commodity involved is subject to market regulating laws or 
whether upon import a certificate of origin has to be produced. 
Certificates of origin are documents identifying a commodity by type, 
quantity, and the like and certifying its origin by an authorised agency 155 • Such 
certificates need not necessarily include qualitative statements. 
The situation is different as regards market regulating laws and other regula-
tions imposing requirements on the importer. These statutory regulations go 
beyond the general control of goods import ensured by the A WG which protects 
indirectly also the consumer's need for safety. Some of them regulate limita-
tions on trade in goods, so-called market regulating acts 156: 
- Gesetz über den Verkehr mit Zucker (Act on Trade in Sugar) 
- Gesetz über den Verkehr mit Getreide und Futtermitteln (Act on Trade in 
Grain and Feedstuff) 
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- Gesetz über den Verkehr mit Vieh und Fleisch (Act on Trade in Cattle and 
Meat) 
- Gesetz über den Verkehr mit Milch, Milcherzeugnissen und Fleisch (Act 
on Trade in Milk, Milk Products and Meat). 
- Gesetz über den Verkehr mit Hähnchenfleisch (Act on Trade in Chicken 
Meat) 
Some of these actswere enacted for the protection of human health and there-
fore limit the import of goods 157 : 
- Viehseuchengesetz (Act concerning Epizootie Diseases) 
- Arzneimittelgesetz (Drugs Act) 
- Lebensmittelgesetz (Food Act) 
- Gerätesicherheitsgesetz (Act on Safety of Appliances) 
Art. 147 LMG, just as Art. 73 AMG, include bans on imports of foodstuffs 
and drugs not complying with the substantive German law in force. That is to 
ensure preventive protection of the German consumer. 
The ban as such does not, of course, ensure that importers comply with the 
German regulations in force. That is why the control of bans on imports of 
goods is of decisive importance. The legislator has realised this weak point. 
Control will now be improved by a greater involvement of customs offices in the 
control activity 158 • Arts. 48, 49 LMBG and Art. 74 AMG include enabling 
provisions permitting statutory orders to be issued which regulate cooperation 
between the control authorities of the German Länder and customs offices and 
the customs offices' powers to take action 159• In addition, a regulatory power 
with respect to certain foodstuffs has also been included, Art. 49 LMBG. 
Pursuant thereto, import may be made contingent upon recognition of the 
manufacturing enterprise, notification to or production before the competent 
food inspection authority, and examination or production of an official test 
certificate. At the same time it may be ordered that these foodstuffs be imported 
only via certain customs offices. The powers to take action provided under the 
respective articles, which are applicable irrespective of the statutory regulations, 
do not suffice to afford effective protection. The statutory orders described 
above are therefore urgently needed to put into practice the desired improve-
ment of import controJl60 • 
The GSG equates importers with manufacturers of technical labour materials 
(Art. 3, para. 1 GSG). Like the manufacturer, he must obey the rules of tech-
nology accepted in the Federal Republic of Germany (No. 179). 
If importers of foodstuffs or drugs violate their duties, they incur a penalty as 
weil. Those concerned must expect to be fined up to the amount of DM 25 000 
under the LMBG and imprisoned up to one year under the AMG. 
In addition to national legislation, interstate agreements regulating the 
import of goods must be obeyed 161 • Upon import, importers must obey such 
agreements if the legislative bodies have agreed to them in the form of a federal 
act, Art. 59, para. 2, sentence 1 EC Treaty. Among these range the treaties on 
the Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG, European Economic 
Community, now EC), on the Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl 
(Montanunion, European Coal and Steel Community) and on the Europäische 
Atomgemeinschaft (Euratom, European Atomic Energy Community). Such 
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agreements are made essentially for economic purposes. Consumer protection is 
more and more emphasised as is shown by the first EC Programme on a Po1icy 
of Consumer Protection and Information, of 14 April 1975. The protection of 
the consumer's health and safety is a special item of the Programme to be 
achieved by increased administrative measures of a preventive nature162 • 
The significance of the EC Treaty has recent1y been under1ined by a decision 
passed by the European Court of Justice163 • The Court had to interpret the 
subject matter and scope of Art. 30 under which quantitative limitations on 
imports or measures having equivalent effect are forbidden. In the initial 
proceedings a Durch trader had been charged with having infringed Dutch 
health regulations when importing drugs from Great Britain because he had 
Jacked the accompanying documents necessary for import. The Court found an 
infringement of Art. 30 EC Treaty, because the Jicensing procedure meant an 
insurmountable obstacle to importers for their Jack of power of disposition of 
the necessary documents. This does not forbid all Jicensing procedures in 
general. Rather, the requirements must be such that importers - even if they 
have to incur additional expenditure - can meet them. Current practice of the 
Federal Health Authority definitely does not infringe Art. 30 EC Treaty. From 
the point of view of consumer policy it must rather be criticised for not ensuring 
sufficient examination 164 • 
7 Summary 
164 The above study focused on a presentation of the various wordings of the law 
and powers to take official action granted to the authorities. To sum up, we may 
say that the AMd, LMBG and GSG, at least as regards their wording, have 
considerably improved the consumer's protection against unsafe technical 
labour materials and against drugs and foodstuffs dangerous to health. 
Whether .the great legislative objectives have been realised will be proved only by 
effective implementation of the Acts. Suchimplementation is not ensured by 
any of the said Acts. As far as the Acts include regulatory powers for the issue 
of preventive orders, we may note throughout that these powers are not being 
exercised. Without orders putting the Acts into concrete terms - here we are 
thinking primarily of the AMG and LMBG - such Acts are devoid of mean-
ing. While the general clauses thereunder do contain pleasing declarations of 
intention by the legislator, they are of no benefit to the consumer. There are 
many reasons why the Federal Government or the competent federal ministers 
do not exhaust their regulatory powers. Firstly, it must be taken into account 
that before individual orders are issued comprehensive scientific examinations 
must be made in the specialised field involved. Of still greater importance 
should be the aspect that any issuance of an order is preceded by a general 
weighing of interests. Since in the final analysis any order entails costs - either 
in the form of an increase in budgetary expenditure owing to increased require-
ments of administrative personnel, or in the form of a rise in product prices 
owing to an increase in the prime cost - its issuance is hard to justify in the 
present economic and political climate. 
Implementation of the said legislation is characterised by yet another defi-
ciency: it is not suffi~iently ensured that the competent supervisory authorities 
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control compliance with the laws and orders issued thereunder. The food 
inspection authorities of the German Länder, the industrial inspection boards 
and the Federal Health Authority are not in a position to exercise the many 
functions assigned to them. The authorities lack both the personnel and the 
technical equipment to control and enforce the laws. Overall, the consumer's 
preventive protection has been neglected - true, this type of protection 
requires the greatest expenditure, e.g. regular controls of enterprises. The 
authorities intervene mostly in a retrospective way, that is only after damage has 
already occurred. For this reason the consumer may expect at best to be 
protected in future. As long as the authorities, for fear of possible claims for 
damages by trade and industry for conduct detrimental to their business, fail to 
bring before the public, with a view to warning it, measures they have taken or 
results they have achieved by way of negotiation 165, the consumer's protection 
against dangers already known will never get past the rudiments. 
lt is not the task of this study to explain why the effective enforcement of 
control measures laid down by legislation is so deficient. We should note that in 
other areas of consumer legislation the poor powers invested in the executive are 
a bar to radical changes. As long as this state of affairs remains unchanged, 
consumer protection legislation has only an alibi function. The government is 
able to say that it stands up for the consumer's interests. The lack of enforce-
ment then precludes an offence of trade and industry by the government. 
Consumer organisations must intensify their efforts at achieving the enforce-
ment of legislation. As long as this problem has not been solved in favour of the 
consumer, it is not very sensible to keep calling for new legislation. This applies, 
of course, only to legislation which to become effective requires state control. 
On the background of these problems we shall give abrief survey of the existing 
loopholes in legislation. 
In the food law these loopholes consist mainly in the Jack of appropriate 
regulations. As long as the law has not been supplemented by regulations, 
detailed comments are impossible. The same applies to the law oj drugs. We 
regret to say that in amending the law of drugs the legislator did not take 
occasion to fight the flow of drugs more vigorously. Control that obliges the 
manufacturer to prove the harmlessness of a product may serve to check that 
flow somewhat, but it will not make the state of the drug market easier for the 
consumer to grasp. The GSG continues in force in its old version. Industrial 
inspection boards are, however, overtaxed by the functions assigned to them 
under that Act. All the same the powers granted are insufficient. Beyond the 
order of prohibition concerning continued marketing which has been imposed 
on manufacturers, the GSG does not enable the authorities involved to take 
action directly against suppliers. This merely secondary possibility of taking 
action implies the <langer that in the Federal Republic of Germany there remain 
a thousand and one dangerous products on sale 166 • Furthermore, the Act must 
be criticised in that it does not include the area of entertainment electronics, 
although also these products involve dangers (household fires and electric 
shocks). Parts of working equipment are also excluded. Industry even fails to 
exercise due self-regulation as provided by law. For many devices there are no 
standards (e.g. skate boards) 167, DIN standards are unsatisfactory 168 , or 
standardisation begins too late (for skis and skiing accessories only in 1972, for 
172 
skin diving equipment only in 1973). There is great uncertainty for the consumer 
as to which label means what. A first step towards standardisation to combat the 
confusion of labels has been made by the introduction of the new GS 
- geprüfte Sicherheit (tested safety) label; all testing agencies, including since 
1 January 1978 the VDE testing agency, have declared their willingness to the 
Federal Ministry of Labour to adopt the new GS safety label, so that the intro-
duction of a uniform safety label in the Federal Republic may be considered 
successfull69• On the mediation committee's (Vermittlungsausschuß) initiative, 
this regulation was included in the Act of 13 August 1979170. Even if industry 
were to remedy all the deficiencies enumerated, two basic deficiencies would 
continue to exist: government and consumers do not adequately participate in 
standardisation, and - which may perhaps be more serious - even if partici-
pation were envisaged, the fact remains that manufacturers, importers and soon 
possibly also traders need not comply with the standards they established in a 
joint effort, since under Art. 3, para. 1 GSG they may prove safety also in a 
different manner. In this context the question is bound to arise of whether or not 
technical labour materials should be subject to state control as regards 
standardisation. However, that question will be put in theory only, since in the 
Federal Republic no efforts to change the present state of affairs are identifiable 
as yet. In the light of the difficulties of state control described above, caution is 
in any case advisable as regards the demand for more state control. 
IV CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SAFETY OF PRODUCTS 
1 The manufacturer's liability under German law 
165 The manufacturer is responsible for the safety of products. He controls the 
production process and by using appropriate technical means may influence the 
safety of the product to be manufactured. By comparison, the seller of the 
product is responsible to the consumer primarily for fitness for use (No. 128). 
166 (aa) There are no general regulations under German law on the manufacturer's 
liability. In addition to the system of the Civil Code, there exists in some cases 
special legislation which gives rise to strict liability on the part of the manu-
facturer171. If these exceptions are left out of account, either Art. 823 Civil 
Code - that is, liability for fault - or provisions under special legislation are 
applicable. However, as early as 1908 172 the Reich Supreme Court rejected the 
analogous application of regulations on strict liability arguing that such liability 
was an exception to the general principle of liability for fault which did not 
admit of analogy. The Federal High Court has continued that practice 173. Thus 
the manufacturer's liability has been shifted to the scope of liability for fault 
under Art. 823 Civil Code. Yet the result of the increasing mechanisation of 
industrial production was that the injured party who had to prove all require-
ments of Art. 823 Civil Code encountered more and more difficulties in proving 
the manufacturer's fault in the making of a product that caused damage. 
Moreover, the entrepreneur had the possibility of furnishing exculpatory 
evidence pursuant to Art. 831 Civil Code and could thus pass liability on to the 
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individual worker. The result of that situation was that since the beginning of 
the sixties legal writers have criticised liability for fault on the part of the manu-
facturer under Art. 823 Civil Code as being unreasonable and unjust. The dis-
cussion reached its climax on the occasion of the 47th Deutscher Juristentag 
(German Lawyers' Assembly) (1968) 174. To solve the problem it was suggested 
that because of the special legal relationship between manufacturer and injured 
party the manufacturer should be liable irrespective of fault 175 . Other authors 
tried to justify the analogous application of regulations under the law of 
contract 176. In its chicken-pest decision 177 the Federal Court has definitely 
rejected all attempts at making the manufacturer liable irrespective of fault 
through contractual or quasi-contractual devices. In that same decision the 
Federal High Court hasset forth that the manufacturer's liability is conceivable 
only within the scope of Art. 823 Civil Code. However, the Federal High Court 
has taken into account technical development in that now it does not require the 
injured party to prove fault on the part of the manufacturer, but requires the 
manufacturer to prove that he is not at fault. The presumption of the entre-
preneur 's fault holds until proofto the contrary is furnished. It is presumed that 
the defect occurred merely because the manufacturer failed to organise his plant 
adequately. The presumption of what is known as organisational fault holds 
true only if the injured party proves that the damage was caused within the 
manufacturer's scope of organisation and risk, namely by an objective defect or 
a condition of non-compliance with the requirements as to technical design of 
the products 178. lt is not necessary to prove how the defect was caused in the 
. tort-feasor's plant; that is, through defective design, defective production or 
defective instruction (No. 162). As long as only the objective defect is certain, a 
presumption is raised. According to a more recent Federal High Court deci-
sion179, the principles of presumed organisational fault relate also to persons 
who are liable in addition to the manufacturer and who hold a prominent and 
responsible position in the manufacturer's production department, i.e. execu-
tive employees. In support of its decision, the Federal High Court pleads that 
executive employees hold a position similar to that of the manufacturer 180. Such 
extension of the manufacturer's liability should be rejected 181 . For one thing, the 
executive employee's liability is relevant from an economic point of view only if 
the manufacturer himself is unable to pay and, for another, such a shifting of 
damage is in contrast to the generally accepted fact that basically the manufac-
turer shall be liable for damage arising from the sphere of production. Lastly, 
the executive employee cannot offset his liability against profits, so that an 
essential basic idea of the manufacturer's liability does not apply to him. 
In its chicken-pest decision, the Federal High Court made it clear that the 
manufacturer's liability is a case of liability in tort, particularly of what is 
known as breach ofthe duty of care, since the manufacturer's liability is created 
mainly as a result of tortious misconduct by the manufacturer. That is why it 
was and is necessary to determine the contents and scope of duties of care in the 
production process. To that end, legal writers have taken pains to classify the 
manufacturer's liability by type of defect 182 . Something of a classical categorisa-
tion is division into defective design, defective production, defective instruction 
and development defect. 
A defective design is attributable to the design of a product and is therefore 
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inherent in the entire series of production. The Federal High Court has accepted 
this category in the so-called brake decision 183 and has confirmed it in a number 
of others 184. 
Defective manufacture occurs in the production process itself and is thus 
found only in some products. The causes are as numerous as the processes. The 
chicken-pest decision is classed in this category. 
Defective instruction is insufficient and incomplete instruction for use, which 
does not adequately warn of dangerous product cha.racteristics. Instructions 
and warnings must be sufficiently obvious; that is, they must clearly point out 
possible dangers to the person concerned. For that purpose the manufactu.rer 
must bear in mind the danger of obvious misuse (No. 164). In the Estil case, the 
Federal High Court has also accepted this category 185. 
Development defects are defects that were not foreseeable by the standards of 
technology current at the time the product was under development. 
In addition to these four categories the manufacturer incurs liability in the 
event of breach of his duty to watch a product or violation of his recall obliga-
tion 186. For, after having placed his products in the stream of commerce, the 
manufacturer must watch the market in order to ascertain whether the products 
manufactured by him cause unexpected dangers 187. 
Dogmatically, the duty to watch a product is a subcategory of the duty of 
care. Thus nothing stands in the way of its acceptance in principle. However, 
only recently have the courts and legal writers attempted to put the duty to watch 
a product into concrete terms 188. The duty to watch a product lies with the manu-
facturer in respect of all his products, irrespective of whether they are new 
designs or products that have been mass-produced for years without any risk 189. 
There is agreement that the manufacturer must not wait for the first case of 
damage. Rath er, he has to trace any informatiori indicating that the product 
manufactured by him might involve dangers. In this context technical publica-
tions and trade conferences play a special part. If the manufacturer knows 
about a danger, the decisive question is as from what time of realisation of this 
the manufacturer must warn his buyers, dealers or consumers or recall the 
product from the market in order to fulfil his duty of care. The Higher Regional 
Court of Celle commented on this problem for the first time from the point of 
view of court practice. As a prerequisite for the obligation to warn, it demands 
that there be a concretely foreseeable product-related danger and a reliable 
factual basis 190. Rumours are not sufficient, any more than are regional data. 
Moreover, the Higher Regional Court of Celle says that the manufacturer must 
be allowed a reasonable time for checking the data. The definition is still very 
vague and Ieaves him adequate scope for manoeuvre. lt is completely obscure 
which requirements must exist for the obligation to warn to become a recall 
obligation. The only thing identifiable at present is that the requirements tobe 
met according to the courts are stricter in the case of drugs191. If the manufac-
turer fails to fulfil his obligation to watch his products, he is liable to make good 
the damage resulting from breach of duty. 
With respect to all sources of defect, the Federal High Court has extended the 
manufacturer's liability decisively in the so-called float switch decision 192. 
Accordingly, the fact that there exist or existed direct claims under a contract of 
sale between damaging manufacturer and injured party does not preclude laying 
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a claim to the manufacturer under the manufacturer's liability. Hence there is a 
conflict of laws between contractual claims and claims in tort. That is also why, 
after the short period of contractual limitation has elapsed, the injured party 
may hold the tortfeasor liable in tort. In addition, the Federal High Court has 
redefined the relationship between claims in tort and contractual claims. So 
far it had been understood as a principle that the manufacture of a new, but 
defective product did not constitute a case of damage to property. Hence the 
conclusion was drawn that the seller was liable under a warranty for things 
supplied by him, but liability in tort did not come into question. Now liability in 
tort may be incurred if it is a matter of a functionally limited deficiency/defect 
in the object purchased which in relation to the whole thing is of minor impor-
tance and only later, i.e. after passing of the risk, causes additional, more far-
reaching damage in the initially flawless thing 193 • The Fedetal High Court has 
thus given up the traditional distinction between tort and contract. No doubt 
a decisive factor for the extension was the short limitation under the law of 
contract in respect of claims of a tortious nature. The decision has given rise to 
animated discussion among legal writers 194 • Shortly afterwards the same 
division of the Federal High Court confirmed its practice in the so-called 
Hinterrad decision 195. Any change in that court practice could be brought about 
only by a decision of the Große Senat (Union of the various divisions of the 
Federal High Court). From a <;logmatic point of view a number of doubts remain 
unresolved. Thus the functional concept of property will give rise to many 
problems of delimitation 196• In the final analysis the question will arise whether 
or not the method chosen by the Federal High Court will result in the law of torts 
and the law of contract existing side by side, since a differentiation within the 
concept of property is somewhat artificial1 97 • The conflict of laws gives rise to 
the question to what extent daims in tort may be excluded through contractual 
exemption clauses (No. 210). The Federal High Court's float switch decision 
has considerably strengthened the consumer's legal position. As via the la.w of 
torts, he is now in a position to receive compensation for a setback suffered in 
cases where his legal position under a contract used to be weak. 
167 (bb) Since the chicken-pest decision, a number of further Federal High Court 
decisions have been handed down relating to goods of every description. The 
manufacturer's liability has practically been completely generalised; tkere are 
no fields of production that are privileged under the law of torts 198 • With respect 
to the four accepted case categories the following picture emerges: for defective 
designs 199 and defective instructions200 the manufacturer is liable without any 
possibility of exculpation. Any person who markets products that according to 
the state of the art at the time of manufacture constitute a faulty design infringes 
his general duty of care. The same applies to any person who markets products 
without appropriately pointing out to the consumer dangers possibly arising 
from such products, knowledge of which he cannot reasonably expect of the 
buyers involved. With respect to defective production we must differentiate: the 
manufacturer is liable for defective production only if he may also be blamed 
for violation of his duty. In the case of what are known as 'escapers' (Ausreißer), 
which may occur in any industrial production method even if all safety measures 
were taken with due care, the manufacturer cannot be blamed 201 • Therefore the 
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manufacturer may escape liability for defective production if he can prove that 
the injured party was injured by an escaper. While it should be quite difficult to 
furnish such proof202 , two cases that have recently been decided show that 
exculpatory proof may be successfuJ2°3• With respect to development defects, 
the manufacturer is not liable in principle. If a development defect occurs, the 
manufacturer cannot be blamed because at the time the product was designed 
and manufactured its dangerous characteristics were not objectively percep-
tible204. Although consequently it is impossible by definition to include develop-
ment dangers in the concept of Iiability for fault, Iiability can be imagined on 
account ofthe fact that duties to watch products have been recognised. The duty 
to watch forces the manufacturer also to recall products that, according to the 
then state of the art, were flawless at the time they were under development. As 
regards development defects, if any, the manufacturer is liable only for defects 
that occur after the time a duty to take action had existed under the duty to 
watch. Theoretically it could be imagined that the manufacturer himself should 
be liable for the first series of damages if before damage occurred dangers had 
already been pointed out in scientific publications. In its decision the Higher 
Regional Court of Celle had t0 examine for the first time whether liability on 
account of the duty to watch a product existed in the case of a development 
defect205 • The problems involved in protection against development defects 
afforded by the duty to watch a product can be illustrated nicely in the light of 
that decision. For one thing, it is obvious that the main point at issue in Iawsuits 
is when a scientific publication gives rise to a duty to take action. Thus the 
dispute is argued out at a scientific level and results in a grading from important 
examinations, that is to say those tobe pursued, to unimportant ones, i.e. those 
tobe neglected. Another point is that the burden of proof that the manufacturer 
infringed his duty to watch the product is on the plaintiff206 • If the manufacturer 
has proved that the damage is due to a development defect he may take his time 
waiting for the injured party's reasoning. lt would be completely wrong to say 
that the problem of developrnent losses has been eliminated with the aid of 
liability on account of the duty to watch a product 207 • The consumer continues to 
bear the risk of development defects. The same is true of escapers. An examina-
tion of the cases decided shows that that risk occurs only very rarely. With 
respect to all the other groups of defects the courts have arrived at quite reason-
able results. The consequence is that the number of those who want to accept 
interpretation of the manufacturer's liability by the courts as a permanent 
solution is becoming !arger and larger. 
168 (cc) Such approaches do not take into account that court practice shows 
essential deficiencies in addition to the gaps in protection indicated. Certainly 
there is not much sense in attacking the dogmatic reasons given by the Federal 
High Court for a reversal of the burden of proof, for in that respect the Federal 
High Court's practice is of a common law nature208 • What carries much more 
weight is that the distinct casuistry cannot obscure the fact that a successful 
definition of the manufacturer's duties as to his conduct has not been achieved. 
For development, design, manufacture and sale are so closely connected that for 
legal purposes only an integral view of product damage proves adequate and 
practicable209• Lastly, the courts also use general standards of judgment, which 
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involves the danger that the concrete contents of duties as to conduct incumbent 
on the manufacturer are accurately defined practically only after damage has 
occurred and not at the time of possible acts or omissions as required in the case 
of Iiability for certain conduct 210• Such court practice is hard to calculate in 
advance both for the tortfeasor and the injured party. The dilemma cannot be 
solved as long as the type and scope of the duty of care inferred from Art. 823 
Civil Code is decisive for the creation of Iiability. 
As a permanent solution, such court practice must also be rejected because 
the manufacturer's liability is not a prob lern of the burden of proof as the courts 
wish us to believe. Possibly the Federal High Court had to choose this method 
because according to the traditional understanding of the law it is not author-
ised to introduce liability regardless of fault by way of court judgment. lt is, 
however, of far greater importance that the Federal High Court need not 
comment on how the problems of the manufacturer's Iiability were caused, but 
may withdraw to the seemingly neutral ground of procedural regulations 211 • 
Because ofthis loophole, there is no discussion in principle about the level ofthe 
manufacturer's liability in relation to the function and importance ofthe law of 
torts in an industrial society. Thus, discussions about the problem on whom the 
burden of proof should be placed push into the background considerations 
about the demand for new rules of substantive law. The apparently neutral 
solution offered by the Federal High Court cannot prevent any shift in the 
burden of proof entailing a change in the requirements as to the manufacturer's 
liability proper. This does not apply only to the reversal of proof in the area of 
fault, even if here the change is most obvious. Strictly speaking, the Federal 
High Court has introduced quasi-strict liability under the cloak of procedural 
law at least in those cases where there is no possibility of exculpation 212 • 
Moreover, the Federal High Court has made allowance for the injured party's 
difficulty in proving the causal link between defect and damage by appro-
priately facilitating the burden of proof. The Federal High Court has given the 
injured party an opportunity of producing primafacie evidence and at the same 
time has taken care that objections by the manufacturer which might ruin such 
evidence may often be dismissed as mere protective claims 213 • The decisive point 
about such court practice is not the facilitation of the burden of proof in favour 
of the injured party; but the increasing impossibility for the manufacturer to 
exculpate himself, which is another factor changing the requirements of 
liability. 
Disguised under the cloak of procedural law there are indications of some-
thing many people would not admit. The problems of the manufacturer's 
liability cannot be solved by means of liability for fault without liability for fault 
cancelling itself, so a permanent solution to the problems of the manufacturer's 
liability can be found neither by procedural methods nor by liability linked to 
the manufacturer's fault as an individual. Sooner or later this last bulwark of 
traditional reasoning is also bound to fall and clear the way for regulatory 
devices tuned to the peculiarities of industrial series production214• 
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2 Comparison between the convention by the Council of Europe (CE), the 
draft by the European Community (EC) and German court practice on 
the manufacturer's liability 
169 Signs of a further development of the law of torts are not tobe expected in the 
area of national legislation. Meanwhile it has become a generally accepted fact 
that German law in force does not make sufficient allowance for the consumer's 
need for protection215 • The Federal Government has also emphasised the need 
for reform in its Second Report on Consumer Policy of 12 October 1975216 , but 
has postponed the solution of problerns at a national level in favour of a new 
arrangement at a European level. At present there exists the convention by the 
Council of Europe of 27 January 1977217 and the draft by the EC Commission of 
1 October 1979218 • The Convention has already been signed by the competent 
Belgian, French, Luxemburg and Austrian ministers. The EC draft of 1 October 
1979 is the result of many years of deliberation219 • Since the pre-draft had been a 
point of discussion in the European Parliament as early as 26 April 1979220, the 
present draft has now been submitted to the Council of Ministers for decision. lt 
cannot be predicted yet whether the desired regulation will materialise. 
(a) Comparison between the basic features of the conventionldraft and of 
German court practice 
170 Both propositions provide that the manufacturer of a moveable article shall 
be liable regardless oj fault for damage caused by a defective product (Art. 3, 
para. 1 CE, Art. 1 EC). In the Commission's opinion, only strict liability is 
suited to make allowance for the injured party's difficulty in furnishing proof 
and to include the essential causes of damage221 • The inclusion of developrnent 
dangers was a highly controversial issue, but the majority of people feit that the 
consumer should not bear the risk of new technologies (cf. expressly Art. I, 
para. 2 EC)222 • Since escapers also come within the scope of protection 
of the propositions, the gaps in protection resulting from liability for fault 
would be filled and the consumer's legal position considerably strengthened. 
However, the two Commissions were unable to settle on absolute liability 
(Kausalhaftung)223 • To give rise to the manufacturer's liability, the injured party 
must prove not only the defect and damage, but also causation 224 • As far as that 
goes, the propositions do not differ from moderate liability for fault under 
German law. 
171 (aa) To those involved in the present discussion it was almost a matter of 
course to regard the defective product as the essential item of consideration 
regarding the manufacturer's responsibility. Also, the Commissions went to 
great trouble to arrive at a definition of defect. Resort to the concept of defect 
shows that the justification of the manufacturer's liability for damages 
continues to be attributed to no matter what kind of blameworthy conduct. lt 
may be said in justification of the Commissions, though, that they were aware 
of the danger. ln order not to leave a loophole for the principle of fault via the 
concept of defect, both proposition& are based on an objective concept of 
defect 225 • They take as a criterion the safety the consumer may reasonably expect 
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considering all circumstances (Art. 2c CE and 4 EC). The manufacturer has to 
take all precautions that 'people' may reasonably expect, which means nothing 
else but that in the manufacturing process he has to comply with the standards 
of science and technology. 'People' signals the basic condition of liability. 
Although it is possible so to objectify the concept of defect, doubts are appro-
priate as to whether or not the principle of fault will take effect again as a result 
of wordings such as 'people' and 'defect'. We can think of situations where a 
product causes damage, but where 'people' cannot blame the manufacturer for 
a 'defect'. Depending on how the user's horizon of knowledge and experience is 
defined, 'people' may variously define what is expected of the manufacturer 
and may thus save him from liability for damages. Art. 1, para. l ofthe draft of 
the EC Commission merely indicates that a stop shall be put to attempts at such 
interpretation. The passage says that the manufacturer has to make good the 
damage caused by a defective product no matter whether he knew or should 
have known of the defect. If it does not matter in how far the manufacturer 
should have known of a certain defect, it should hardly be possible to find cases 
where he is not liable to make good the damage226 • Disregarding the mention of 
development dangers in Art. 1, para. 1 of the EC draft, neither proposition 
goes by case categories 227 , as the German courts and legal writers have done to 
define liability. By defining the concept of defect, the European propositions 
enhance legal protection. Moreover, this regulation permits inclusion in the 
scope of liability of defects that cannot be imagined at present or have not yet 
occurred, without the need for assigning them to the established case categories. 
For some time, German jurisprudence has tried to define what is meant by a 
defective product. Accordingly, a product is considered defective if by the 
accepted standards it Jacks the necessary quality228 • Such a definition of defect 
was dismissed, since it was impossible in the law of torts to base considerations 
on a concept of defect yet to be defined 229 • Criteria had to be taken from the 
duties to avoid <langer, which are characterised by great diversity. The use of a 
concept of defect and the establishment of case categories meant, it was said, a 
restriction. The decisive question could only be whether through his products 
the manufacturer had occasioned in a foreseeable way any violation of rights 
protected under the law of torts 230• Hence the limits of liability would be there 
where the manufacturer could still be blamed for fault. 
The courts have not so far tried to give a general definition of defective 
product. They have merely recognised the case categories of defective design 
and defective construction and laid down for those two groups different rules on 
the burden of proof as to fault 231 • Therefore, from the point of view of court 
practice, the propositions include something really new, although the courts had 
already taken into account the safety of a product under Art. 823, para. 2 in 
connection with Art. 3 GSG 232 • Here the Standards of safety are technical 
standards (DIN, VDE). To determine the safety of goods within the meaning of 
the European propositions, these standards must now be applied. There are 
objections to the unlimited use of such technical standards in that they are estab-
lished by industry itself without public contro\233 • 
The definition of the concept of defect chosen by the Commissions also 
includes cases where the consumer did not use the article for its intended 
purpose234 • For the consumer's legitimate expectation includes at least misuses 
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the manufacturer has to expect23 5. This is not changed by the amended version of 
Art. 4 EC in which use for the intended purpose as a requirement of Iiability has 
expressly been set forth 2l 6. 
As regards German court practice237, it initially looked as if the Federal High 
Court wanted to grant compensation only in the case of use for the intended 
purpose. However, in the Estil decision238 the Federal High Court recognised 
that in the case of obvious misuse the obligation to warn the consumer is placed 
upon the manufacturer. The Federal High Court has apparently restricted such 
practice in the Spannkupplung decision239, since now the user must take care 
how to use the product he bought. The decision mentioned relates to industrial 
consumers and not to final consumers, so that with respect to the latter the 
restriction need not necessarily apply. Like the Federal High Court in its Estil 
decision, some jurists240 advocate compensation of the consumer if the type 
of use which resulted in damage was within the scope foreseeable for legal 
purposes. Court practice and legal literature correspond to the regulation in 
Art. 84 AMG241 . 
172 (bb) A limitation of liability is tobe found in Art. 5 of the propositions. Hence 
the manufacturer is not Iiable ifhe can prove that he did not market the defective 
article or that it was not defective at the time of marketing. The first of the two 
hypotheses takes up an undisputed principle: the manufacturer's liability pre-
supposes the release of the product for use by third parties242. The intention of 
the second hypothesis is not clear for the very reason that it applies to all defects 
in products. Products characterised by a development defect are defective as 
early as at the time of marketing. These might be cases where the user himself is 
responsible for the damage. The manufacturer would be released from liability 
if he could prove that the damage occurred as a result of improper use243 . As long 
as the manufacturer is unable to exculpate himself, both facts are presumed in 
favour of the consumer. As a prerequisite of Iiability the requirement is thus 
irrelevant. 
This does not apply to German law. Here both facts are prerequisites of 
liability in terms of constituent facts. This is true at least if the manufacturer's 
liability is regarded as a subcategory ofthe duty of care244• The manufacturer is 
the person who creates the source of <langer. He does so by marketing the defec-
tive commodity - thus liability is incurred only as from the time of market-
ing245 and exists only if the article was defective at that time246. Neither fact has 
so far played an important role in German court practice. Tobe distinguished 
from the requirements mentioned is the question of whether the manufacturer 
must know about the defectiveness of the thing. Art. 1, para. 2 of the EC draft 
expressly states that to create liability knowledge is not decisive. The European 
Council's convention does not include such a provision. In German court 
practice it is recognised that the manufacturer is liable to pay damages even if he 
learns of the defect only later247 . 
The manufacturer's liability may also be limited or excluded on account of 
contributory negligence on the part of the injured party. While this principle is 
mentioned separately in the CE convention (Art. 4), the EC Commission has 
not included such a provision in its draft, since the limitation of liability through 
contributory negligence is accepted in all member countries of the EC248 • 
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173 (cc) The type and extent of damage tobe made good varies considerably in the 
two propositions. While according to the CE convention only damage to 
persons is tobe made good (Art. 3, para. 1), the EC draft also includes damage 
to property (Art. 6) suffered by a private final consumer. The EC draft 
expressly provides (Art. 6b) that only those things not acquired for industrial 
use and which the consumer at the time of use intended to employ for private 
purposes (Art. 6b ii) will be replaced249 • Private commodities are replaced only 
if they are damaged in consequence of a defective article. No compensation is 
paid for the damaged or destroyed article itself250 • In this respect the national 
rules governing contracts of sale apply and should not be interfered with 251 • 
Since the draft also includes consequential damage resulting from defects, 
which may be provided for under Arts. 480 and 463 Civil Code, and positive 
breach of contract 252, overlap is possible contrary to that objective. 
In German law such limitations do not exist: under Art. 823 1, II Civil Code, 
damage to persons and property inclusive of the damaged thing itself are com-
pensated for. The scope of Art. 823, paras. land 2 Civil Code is likewise not 
limited to consumers. Decisions handed down by the courts in the past related 
predominantly to disputes between manufacturers and industrial consumers253 • 
No more is required than the damage caused by a defective product. The CE 
convention allows the member countries to limit the amount of liability (Annex 
2). Simultaneously the convention fixes a minimum amount payable in any case 
(in the event of injury to or killing of a person DM 200 000). lf similar products 
characterised by the same defect kill or injure several persons, the maximum 
amount of damages payable under the convention must be not less than DM 
30 million. The EC draft also contains a limitation of liability (Art. 7). In the 
case of series accidents, liability is limited to 25 million units of account. In the 
most frequent case, i.e. damage to an individual, the manufacturer's liability is 
unlimited. lt is exactly the other way round in the case of limitation of liability 
for damage to property. Here liability is limited in a particular case, graded 
depending on whether movable or immovable property is concerned. The 
proposals of the CE and the EC consider limitation necessary because only thus 
are manufacturers able to calculate the risk of strict liability, specifically regard-
ing damage resulting from development defects254 • From Switzerland and the 
USA, where there is no limitation of liability255 , no data are available to the 
effect that the willingness of manufacturers to take risks in developing new tech-
nologies has noticeably been affected256• More recently it has been claimed on an 
increasing scale that in the USA 'strict liability' has resulted in intolerable 
burdens 257 • The starting point for the discussions were two research projects 
undertaken in the USA, both of which came to the conclusion that unlimited 
liability puts persons liable to pay damages into a problematic situation258 • Even 
if that judgment is true, the results obtained may be applied to conditions 
prevailing in Europe with great caution only259 • The reasoning that liability must 
be limited because it exists regardless of fault is similarly unconvincing 260• In the 
case of strict liability the attribution of damage is also based on conduct attrib-
utable to the manufacturer261 , so that it is not intelligible why, unlike liability for 
fault, in the area of strict liability, the possibility of calculating the risk is said to 
be of special importance. The Commissions did not enter into discussion. From 
their points of view it was positive that a departure from fault meant a limitation 
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of liability. They did not therefore get down to the problem that the risk of 
having to make good part of the damage oneself varies greatly, depending on the 
type of product causing damage. lt is true that the dimensions of defective 
production in individual household appliances are different from those of 
development defects in drugs. Within the framework of limitation of liability 
the Commissions should therefore also have taken measures tuned to the type of 
damage. The method of differentiation chosen by the EC is not convincing, 
because the various causes of damage in series accidents have not been taken 
into account. The EC's prime concern was to establish acceptable average 
values. From that point of view the Commissions' decision is a compromise in 
favour of manufacturers 26Z. If the present maximum amount which is not 
contingent upon the product concerned is left unchanged, the injured party's 
attention will soon focus on strategies of circumvention. Indications are 
included in the directives themselves: although the propositions aim at an 
approximation of laws, in the final analysis they supplement national law only 
by another basis of claim. The European Council and the EC Commission 
expressly state that claims for 'another legal cause' shall remain unaffected 
(Art. 11 of the convention/draft). Another legal cause above all means bases of 
claims linked to fault. Art. 823 Civil Code therefore has an important function 
in claims for damages going beyond the limitation of liability. The same is true 
of damages for pain and suffering, for a limitation of liability also includes 
claims for damages for pain and suffering granted under Art. 6c of the EC draft 
of 1 October 1979263 • On the other hand, liability under the law of torts may also 
be limited under German law if an exclusion of liability has been provided for 
under the contract 264 • The limits of exclusion of liability are determined by 
Art. 11, item 7 AGBG (No. 210). 
174 (dd) According to the propositions, the injured party must prove the causa/ 
link between defect and damage. When a defect is deemed to be the cause of 
damage is determined by the respective national legislation. Neither proposition 
deals with the difficulties encountered by the injured party in proving causation. 
Art. 5, para. 2 of the CE convention shows a certain peculiarity. Pursuant 
thereto the manufacturer is liable for damage caused both by the product and by 
third party influence. The EC draft does not contain such a provision. Also 
under German law a tortfeasor is liable if a third party intervenes in the process 
of causation, the requirement being that there was an adequate causal link 
between intervention and daipage and the third party was challenged to 
intervene265. 
175 (ee) Limitation is designed identically in the two propositions. The injured 
party's claim becomes statute barred within three years of the time the damage, 
defect and identity of the manufacturer is or ought to have been known (Art. 6 
CE, Art. 8 EC). The respective national legislation then determines when the 
period of limitation is interrupted or suspended. The manufacturer's interest in 
not being liable for an indefinite period of time is made allowance for by a ten-
year time limit which begins to run upon marketing of a product (Art. 7 CE, 
Art. 9 EC). If the propositions are interpreted literally, in the final analysis the 
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manufacturer does not have to care for his products once the time limit has 
expired: the duty to watch a product ceases upon the expiry of the time limit. lf a 
product which was on sale without causing damage for many years causes 
damage after the expiry of the time limit, such damage is not made good. Such a 
solution is hardly compatible with the experience regarding product damage 
gained in the past. In the case of drugs and cosmetics it has often turned out that 
seemingly harmless products may develop into serious sources of danger266 • The 
great superficiality of the regulation under the propositions may be offset only if 
the duty to watch a product resulting from Art. 823 Civil Code continues to 
apply and consequently the manufacturer is liable at least under the law of torts. 
The German law of torts provides for a three-year period of limitation from the 
date on which damage occurred (Art. 852 Civil Code), so that this would afford 
protection to the injured party. It should also be noted that strict liability of the 
manufacturer of drugs is provided for under Art. 90, para. 1 AMG for a period 
of 30 years. 
176 (ff) The liability created under the propositions may not be excluded or 
limited by contract (Art. 8 CE, Art. 10 EC); a common regulation of liability is 
to serve the purpose of equal opportunity regarding competition267 • This goal 
would be missed, though, if the respective manufacturers could set aside strict 
liability at their discretion. Pursuant to the CE convention, provisions in favour 
of the consumer deviating from the convention may not be included in national 
legislation (Art. 10 CE). Pursuant to the EC draft it is allowed. 
(b) Persons entitled to claim in the draft!convention andin German /aw 
177 From the beginning, one of the questions discussed most was who was meant 
by the 'manufacturer'. There was much less discussion about the group of 
persons entitled to claim, although the manufacturer's liability does suggest 
such a question, for if the changed production process is the reason for the 
manufacturer's liability, then those must be protected who owing to the pecu-
liarities of the production process are not in a position to protect themselves: 
these are primarily·the consumers. 
The European Council and the EC Commission speak in favour of limiting 
those entitled to claim, yet they avoid calling those entitled to claim consumers. 
Those entitled are defined in ·various ways. Pursuant to the CE convention only 
damage to persons is to be made good, Art. 3, para. l CE. Anyone who 
obviously refuses to make good damage to property gives to understand that he 
does not count manufacturers among those entitled (No. 172). Otherwise 
damage to property would have been an essential aspect of the duty to make 
compensation268 • A limitation of the groups entitled is further emphasised by 
Art. 9 CE, under which claims by manufacturers against each other are not 
subject to the convention. Certainly there are a great number of cases where the 
person affected by a product damage is not a manufacturer. All the same, such a 
person cannot claim damage to property. The actual limitation is provided for 
under Art. 3, para. l. In addition to damage to persons, the EC draft includes 
damage to property suffered by persons not conducting a trade or business, but 
only private final consumers shall benefit from the pro·posed regulation, not just 
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any person having suffered damage to his property. In support of its view, the 
Commission refers to its programme for the protection of the consumer269. 
Both propositions say that the private final consumer shall receive compensa-
tion regardless of whether he is the injured purchaser or a third party and 
regardless of whether he has used the product or was injured only acciden-
tally270. Much as the iimitation to consumers of those entitled to claim is to be 
welcomed, it cannot be concealed that cases of doubt may occur. The extent to 
which minor traders, craftsmen and industrialists are tobe equated with manu-
facturers or may be treated as private final consumers should only be resolvable 
by way of interpretation in a concrete case. The group of persons protected 
under German law results from the basis of claim under Art. 823 Civil Code. 
The law of torts protects anyone whose rights are jeopardised by any conduct 
relevant to the law of torts. Consequently, any injured party is entitled to claim 
regardless of whether he is the buyer of the product, a user or an uninvolved 
third party271 • Injury by a defective product must only relate to rights (Rechts-
güter) protected under the law of torts272. Liability is merely contingent upon 
damage and not upon any specific quality of the injured party. Compared with 
the present German law, the propositions include decisive restrictions, e.g. the 
owner of the farm in the chicken-pest decision repeatedly mentioned above 
would not receive compensation under them. 
(c} Persons opposing a claim in the draft!convention andin German law 
178 (aa) Both propositions deal at some length with the group of persons liable. 
The manufacturer of finished products and components is regarded as the 
responsible manufacturer (Art. 2b CE, Art. 2, para. 1 EC). The CE convention 
equates producers of agricultural products with manufacturers. The first draft 
by the EC Commission included a regulation similar thereto. However, at the 
European Parliament's suggestion the Commission in its draft of 1 October 
1979 limited the liability of producers of agricultural, craft and art products 273 . 
Now the producer of such products shall not be liable if it is obvious that his 
product was not industrially produced. lt should be almost impossible to tell 
'obviously' that a product was industrially produced. A great many agricultural 
products are produced by industrial methods; the same applies to art and craft 
products. If this is so, the producers of such products should also be liable 
without restriction274 . In the wording of the draft directive the courts are 
charged with putting this provision into concrete terms. 
In respect of damage caused by a defect in a product incorporated into 
another product, the producer of the incorporated product is liable and so is the 
person having caused the incorporation (Art. 3, para. 4 CE, Art. 2, para. 1 
EC). The Commission of the Council of Europe does not give any reasons for 
the regulation of double liability275 • Pursuant to the convention, the producer of 
the incorporated product shall not be liable if he proves that the defect is attrib-
utable to the planning or instructions of the person who caused such incor-
poration276. This does not apply if the producer of the incorporated product 
knew or should have known of the defect277. The EC draft does not provide for 
such proof of exculpation. This solution leads to unreasonable results if the 
producer of the incorporated product does not even know to what subsequent 
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trea:tment his goods will be subjected27s. Basically, the inclusion of the producer 
of the incorporated product is tobe welcomed. For one thing, he should often 
have greater financial resources than the producer incorporating the product 
and, for another thing, the consumer may select from two manufacturers liable 
the one who is in a position to make good the damage. 
According to both propositions, suppliers are not liable. In support of that 
decision it is argued that the supplier plays only a secondary role in the produc-
tion process279• Certainly he cannot be included in the group of persons liable for 
the same reason as the manufacturer, and yet it seems too simple to reject 
liability on the part of the supplier just because he is not a manufacturer. This 
decision by the Commissions is explained by their intention, also as regards the 
above problem, not to interfere with the provisions under national laws of 
sales280 • Pursuant to Art. 3, para. 2 CE, Art. 2, para. 1 EC, the manufacturer's 
liability is incurred by any person who affixes his name, trademark or other 
distinctive mark to a product. The CE convention requires in addition that the 
supplier should offer the product as his own281 • Fears that the EC draft will also 
apply to persons who merely affix to a product a price tag bearing their name are 
unfounded282 : the provisions of the propositions aim at holding liable powerful 
sales organisations that have their goods manufactured abroad and thereafter 
seil them as their own283 • The supplier's liability may furthermore result from 
the provision of Art. 3, para. 3 CE, Art. 2, para. 2 EC, pursuant to which the 
injured party may take legal action against the supplier only if the manufacturer 
cannot be identified through the product and the supplier fails to disclose the 
manufacturer's identity within a reasonable period of time (the EC draft speaks 
of 'forthwith '). The injured party cannot be expected to identify the manufac-
turer himself284 • 
Of special importance is the fact that the importer is equated with the manu-
facturer (Art. 3, para. 2 CE, Art. 2, para. 3 EC)285. The EC draft regards as an 
importer only the person who imports goods into the member countries. From 
the CE convention it is not clear whether imports are meant here to be imports 
from non-EC countries or also from one member country into another. More-
over, the respective explanations do not give any clues why importers were 
included in the liability regulation. Inclusion in the liability regulation is war-
ranted by the fact that only by transporting goods across the border does the 
importer create dangers to the consumer. The importer may gather information 
about the safety of goods from the foreign manufacturer and may exempt 
himself from liability. Even if it is assumed, also according to the CE conven-
tion, that importers are only those persons who import goods from non-EC 
countries into the member countries, it remains doubtful whether such an 
inclusion serves the consumer's interests. At least this permits to keep away 
from the domestic market foreign competitors offering prices that are attractive 
to consumers286 • 
179 (bb) When comparing those liable, a simple comparison of the requirements 
of liability is not possible, since the starting situations of the two European 
propositions and of German law are completely different. The European 
propositions try to regulate the requirements of strict liability by way of defini-
tion, while in German law the group of persons is determined by the starting 
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point of dogmatic considerations which led to the creation of the manufacturer's 
liability under Art. 823 Civil Code. That starting point existed in the judicature 
that developed on duties of care. Accordingly, the decisive question the courts 
had to examine in all proceedings was whether an obligation to watch goods in 
the area of design, manufacture or instruction was placed on the person 
opposing a claim - no matter whether producer of an incorporated product, 
producer incorporating a product, distributor, etc. 287 • This problem is also the 
basis of considerations of legal writers288 who do not want to fit the manufac-
turer's liability into the area of the duty of care. Accordingly, the courts and 
legal writers have considered the person opposing a claim to be liable for 
damages only if such a duty to avoid <langer was placed on him. The scope of 
duties incumbent upon the party opposing a claim was determined depending on 
whether he was a manufacturer or a producer of an incorporated product. In 
this connection duties to watch were placed on the final manufacturer who 
assembled the parts supplied to him289 , i.e. duties which are known to be 
presumed by the courts in those cases where the party originally subject to a duty 
of care assigned his duty to a third party. In its waste disposal decision, the 
Federal High Court applied these principles to the relationship between a large-
scale enterprise and an enterprise charged with waste disposal290 • lt is accepted 
that the producer of an incorporated product is a manufacturer regarding the 
products manufactured by him291 • However, basically his liability is limited to 
the individual part supplied, unless he is involved in the design of the final 
product292 • Pursuant to the EC draft the producer of an incorporated product is 
always liable. Amending the draft the convention has adopted this regulation. 
The German courts also regard as a manufacturer any person who assembles 
a finished product from parts supplied by third parties293 • He must satisfy 
himself as to the flawlessness of the parts supplied294 and must employ pertinent 
techniques in assembling them295 • As he is not the manufacturer of parts made 
by third parties, duties of a manufacturer cannot be placed on him. He has to 
examine the parts supplied to him as to their flawlessness, but not in the same 
way as his supplier has to do so296 • He must satisfy himself as to whether in the 
supplier's plant the necessary controls have been organised297 and are carried 
out. 
If a manufacturer who assembles the finished product from parts supplied to 
him not only assembles these parts but subjects them to further treatment, more 
far-reaching obligations are placed on him298 • He now takes an active part in 
planning, design and instruction. Neither proposition defines the term 'pro-
ducer incorporating a product'. In the final analysis it may be assumed that 
regardless of the manner of participation in the production process, the 
producer incorporating a product is liable for damage. 
lt is not clear whether sales organisations not participating in the production 
process as manufacturers are liable. lf the production and sale of a defective 
product are handled separately for organisational, company or tax reasons, the 
sales Organisation is liable provided it is that organisation's task to market 
the products made by the manufacturing enterprise299 • Whether or not the 
marketing company sells the products under its own name does not matter. 
Hence, companies that have their products manufactured abroad and seil them 
in the Federal Republic of Germany und er their trade names m ust be regarded as 
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manufacturers3°0. This does not apply to cases where within the framework of a 
multistage trading chain a trading company which had neither manufactured 
nor marketed the product as a legally independent company sells products under 
its own name or trademark. The courts refuse to include such trading enterprises 
in the manufacturer's liability, because duties to avoid danger within the 
meaning of Art. 823 Civil Codeare not created by the mere fact that an enter-
prise affixes a trade name to an industrial product produced by somebody 
else301 . This clearly goes to show that a trademark alone cannot create quasi-
manufacturer's liability. For all that, in its Trevira decision the Federal High 
Court created liability within the meaning of Art. 463 Civil Code on the basis of 
the trademark. A different judgment may follow only if the user in view of his 
confidence in the tradename omits to take precautions he would otherwise have 
taken 302. With this qualification, the Federal High Court has at least held out 
hope to the consumer in those cases where a trademark is associated with certain 
expectations. The propositions are largely identical with German court practice. 
While superficially the impression is given that the manufacturer's liability may 
be created merely on the strength of a trademark, in actual fact liability arises 
only if there is a close economic link between the actual producer and the bulk 
buyer who to the public appears as the producer303. 
The importer's liability as quasi-producer is not recognised to that extent 
under German law. While legal writers have taken up the issue of whether or not 
for reasons of domestic consumer protection the importer should be equated 
with the manufacturer304, the discussions so far have not got to the heart of the 
problem. Once more the dogmatic starting point for the manufacturer's liability 
was emphasised according to which the duties are to be determined depending 
on the sphere of responsibility305 . In a decision (bicycle decision) recently 
handed down, the Federal High Court 306 has flatly rejected demands for liability 
of the importer on grounds of desirable consumer protection. lmporters into the 
Federal Republic oftechnical appliances made in one ofthe original six member 
countries of the European Economic Community are not obliged in principle to 
check such goods for defective design. Dogmatically, the Federal High Court 
equates importers with distributors. The reasons given are scarcely convincing. 
Without going into details the Federal High Court proceeds from the assump-
tion that the level of technology is roughly identical in the six founder members 
of the EC. This idea at least is questionable; for the procedure of industrial 
standardisation in the EC countries varies widely306a, Furthermore, the Federal 
High Court rejects liability of the importer pursuant to Art. 823, para. 2 Civil 
Code, Art. 3 GSG. In the Federal High Court's opinion Art. 3 GSG does not 
impose any duties of a manufacturer on the importer. In the final analysis, the 
Federal High Court infers an importer's concrete duties from the duties to avoid 
dang er laid down under Art. 823, para. 1. By the circuitous way of equating the 
duties of an importer pursuant to Art. 823, paras. 1and2 Civil Code with those 
pursuant to Art. 3 GSG, the Federal High Court deprives Art. 3 GSG of its 
independent substance. In these circumstances the introduction of the manufac-
turer's liability at a European level within the meaning of the convention or 
draft seems even more urgent. 
The German courts have so far rejected liability on the part of the producer of 
primary agricultural products 307. The mere production of natural products 308 , 
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they claim, is not an activity performed by a manufacturer. In derogation of 
that practice a producer of agricultural products is liable in principle pursuant to 
the convention of the Council of Europe (Art. 2b CE) as well as to a limited 
extent according to the proposition of the EC309• Liability on the part of execu-
tive employees in line with the principles of the manufacturer's liability, which 
the Federal High Court is known to have recognised recently310, is not provided 
for in the propositions. 
3 Liability of the manufacturer of drugs 
The AMG, which came into force on 1 January 1978, introduces strict 
liability with respect to manufacturers of drugs. lt is not true absolute liability 
(Verursacherhaftung), since liability for compensation is linked to the proof of 
a defect, of causation and damage 311 • Also, the introduction of strict liability 
was possible only after the insurance industry had promised to assume the risk 
of damage. 
(a) History of the Act 
180 The history of the Act reveals that the solution in terms of insurance law 
which became law falls decisively short of the original goals to prevent cases 
similar to that of Thalidomide. 
The second pre-draft by the Federal Health Ministry dating from 1974 pro 
vided for a three-stage regulation of liability: individual liability of the entre-
preneur on the basis of liability for fault and strict liability, with the establish-
ment of a compensation fund being secondarily liable. The fund was to be 
financed by pharmaceutical enterprises. Strict liability covered the generally 
accepted case categories - development defect, defective production and 
defective instruction. For the first time, the much-discussed manufacturer's 
liability for development damage was to be clarified through legislation. The 
establishment of a fund was meant to avoid social hardship. A claim was to 
accrue to the injured party if he was able satisfactorily to show that he could 
claim damages neither from a person liable to make good the damage nor from 
an insurance company. According to the official reasons given, this provision 
was meant to apply to those cases in which the injured party is unable to enforce 
his claim legally or cannot realise his claim for damages 11 2. Manufacturer's 
insolvency and deficiencies in caut>ation also count among such cases. 
The cabinet bill by the coalition of Social Democrats and Free Democrats 
regulated the pharmaceutical entrepreneur's liability in two stages - liability 
for fault on the part of the manufacturer under Art. 823 Civil Code313 , and 
secondary liability of the fund financed by pharmaceutical enterprises. In 
contrast to the Federal Health Ministry's proposal, the bill does not include the 
entrepreneur's strict liability. As in the past the manufacturer's liability was to 
be determined by Art. 823 Civil Code, a provision considered almost unani-
mously to be unsuited to the adequate regulation of the dangers involved in 
industrial production. Liability on the part of a fund was to come into question 
only if no other person accepted liability for the damage or the claim could not 
be settled otherwise (in which case the burden of proof was on the fund). Hence 
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liability arises if the claim is unenforceable and the tortfeasor cannot be 
identified. Unlike the provision in the official's draft, the injured party must not 
only satisfactorily show but prove that he cannot claim damages from the tort-
feasor. The fund was to cover damage resulting from all categories of defect, 
that is to say including development defects. Both the Government 's bill and the 
Ministry's draft were based on the concept that the fund should answer for a loss 
if the injured party was unable to enforce his claim against the damaging manu-
facturer although certain minimum requirements had been satisfied. What the 
authors had in mind here was particularly the responsible manufacturer's 
insolvency. Similarly, difficulties in providing the causal link between defect 
and damage were not necessarily to result in the injured party not receiving com-
pensation314. The implications of insolvency may be judged if one imagines 
Chemie Grünthal not having been in a position to make at least DM 100 million 
available to the Thalidomide children. The dangers that may flow from the 
difficulty of proving the causal connection between defect and damage were 
demonstrated by Wolter315 on the basis of the Smon disease common in 
Japan316 • 
The statutory strict liability of the pharmaceutical undertaking laid down in 
the new AMG does not provide for Iiability in the cases described above. The 
consequence is that the injured party has to cover his damage himself. Here he 
benefits from statutory health insurance if he is an employee and from statutory 
pension insurance. While the injured party has been helped if the insurance 
institutions mentioned answer for the loss, economically this means that the cost 
is passed on to the general public. If for some reason the insurance companies 
fail to answer for the Ioss, the injured party has to make good the damage out of 
his own pocket. In the case of severe injuries to health what is left in the final 
analysis is national assistance which may guarantee the injured party a subsis-
tence leveP 17 • 
(b) Bases of liability 
181 The decisive legislative provision is Art. 84 AMG: 
If as a result of the application of a drug intended for use in human beings, 
which in the area of application of this Act was sold to consumers and is 
subject to prior approval or has been exempted from the procedure of prior 
approval by statutory order, a human being is killed or his body or health are 
injured quite severely, the pharmaceutical entrepreneur who marketed the 
drug within the area of application of this Act is liable to make good to the 
injured party the damage resulting therefrom. 
Liability for compensation is incurred only if 
- the drug upon use as provided has harmful effects which go beyond a 
measure defensible according to the findings of medical science and the 
cause of which is in the area of development or production or 
- damage has occurred in consequence of the Iabelling or the instructions 
for use not corresponding to the findings of medical science (sentence 2). 
182 (aa) Art. 84 AMG lays down statutory strict liabi!ity for the generally 
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accepted categories of defect. Art. 84, sentence 1 AMG deals with development 
defects, defective design and defective production. For damage attributable in 
that area, the manufacturer is liable only in respect of those defects that exceed a 
scientifically defensible measure. The consumer has to accept without compen-
sation injury to his body and health which occurs within defensible limits. lt 
goes without saying that such a limitation is contrary to the consumer's 
interests 318 • In practice the term 'scientifically defensible measure' is sure to 
result in battles between experts. In view of the complicated composition of 
drugs, the courts should find it difficult to draw clear lines. lt must be criticised 
that in a particular case the manufacturer's liability is exclusively contingent 
upon expert opinions. Art. 84 AMG does not say which time is decisive as 
regards the scientifically defensible measure, the time of marketing or the time 
of damage. In the consumer's legitimate interest it is necessary to start out from 
the time of damage in order tobe able to evaluate fully experiences with the drug 
causing the damage319 • A further Iimitation of consumer protection in the cases 
provided under Art. 84, sentence 1 AMG follows from the fact that the manu-
facturer has to answer for a defect only in the event of use for the intended 
purpose. Use for the intended purpose is always determined by the manufac-
turer. If a consumer does not get a prescription for a drug by his doctor but may 
buy it in a pharmacy without a prescription, he is compelled to follow the 
instructions in any case. Basically, it is certainly correct that such a consumer 
does not arbitrarily change dosages or makes other mistakes in taking the drug. 
However, it is also presumed that the patient is in a position to realise the correct 
application. Those cases where a doctor prescribes the use of a drug and makes a 
mistake in administering it must be treated in the same way. Art. 84, sentence 1 
AMG does not make any difference whether use contrary to the intended 
purpose is made by the patient himself or is prescribed by a doctor. However, if 
a doctor has prescribed a drug in contrast to its intended purpose, the patient 
may hold the doctor liable. In such cases it is not always justified to have the 
manufacturer assume Iiability through the intervention of a third party. Any 
other rules may apply only if the manufacturer caused use in contrast to the 
intended purpose by having failed to warn ofmisuse. That case is not included in 
Art. 84, sentence 1 AMG. What comes into question is the manufacturer's 
Iiability under Art. 84, sentence 2 AMG, which regulates liability for defective 
instruction. The information to be furnished by the manufacturer includes not 
only correct instructions for use, but also a warning of dangers that may result 
from misuse. If the manufacturer has not fulfilled his obligation in that respect, 
he must answer for the damage caused by insufficient information 320• If the 
attending doctor has caused misuse, because he has not realised the dangers for 
Jack of information, the manufacturer is bound to make compensation all the 
same. Art. 84, sentence 2 AMG contains the duty to answer for a loss if the 
cause of faulty conduct is within the producer's scopei21, yet Art. 84, sentence 2 
AMG contains a limitation of consumer protection if it takes as a criterion for 
the necessary information merely the findings of medical science. The consumer 
would enjoy comprehensive protection only if intelligible consumer informa-
tion appropriate to the case, in line with the level of scientific research regarding 
the preparation, were taken as a criterion. 
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183 (bb) The scope of the duty to make compensation in the event of killing 
(Art. 86 AMG) and bodily harm (Art. 87 AMG) corresponds to that under the 
law of torts, Arts. 844 Civil Code and 823, para. 1, 249 Civil Code. The amend-
ments contained in the AMG are of a clarifying nature only; they do not extend 
the scope of damages. To the legislator, the introduction of strict liability was 
necessarily linked with limitation of liability. In the event of one person being 
killed or injured, the party to pay damages is liable up to an amount of DM 
500 000 only or a pension of DM 30 000 per annum; in the event of several 
persons being killed or injured by the same drug, up to an amount of DM 200 
million or a pension of DM 12 million per annum. lt is not clear how the legis-
lator arrived at a maximum of DM 200 million. lt may be that the compensation 
amount in the Thalidomide litigation has served as a standard, without that 
having been expressly stated. In view of the limitation to DM 200million and the 
fact that compensation for pain and suffering is not granted, claims in tort 
continue to have an important function. In this respect Art. 5 AMG may gain 
importance which constitutes a protective provision within the meaning of 
Art. 823, para. 2 Civil Code322 • The claim under Art. 84 AMG becomes statute-
barred within three years of the date the causes of damage are known (Art. 90 
AMG). Unlike the propositions to reform the manufacturer's liability in 
Europe, the AMG lays down a time limit of 30 years - i.e. 30 years after the 
serious event has happened all claims are statute-barred regardless of knowledge 
- which is an improvement compared with the propositions but excludes 
possible late damage from liability. 
184 (cc) The authors have not given any thought to the group of persons entitled to 
claim. What is necessary is that the injured party was injured in consequence oj 
the app/ication of a drug. lt is doubtful whether persons infected by the person 
who took the drug may also claim damages - the Act does not give any clues. 
In the consumer's interest it is necessary to include those persons in the scope of 
liability 323 • 
185 (dd) At all events only the manufacturer marketing the drug (Art. 84, para. 1 
AMG) is liable tosatisfy a claim. This wording is apparently unequivocal. After 
all, one could imagine that drugs manufactured by third parties are marketed 
through a special sales organisation. Here reference should be made to the con-
siderations about the concept of the manufacturer made in connection with 
Art. 823, para.l Civil Code. By contrast, the producer of an incorporated 
product does not come into question as a person liable for compensation, since 
he does not usually market the finished product. Several persons liable for 
compensation are liable as joint debtors, Art. 93 AMG. 
186 (ee) Pursuant to Art. 94 AMG, the entrepreneur must provide cover by taking 
out a liability insurance or by means of an indemnity obligation by a domestic 
credit institution. We regret to say that the injured party was not granted a direct 
claim against the insurance company. Such a regulation would provide greater 
security to the consumer than the obligation under Art. 94 AMG, the fulfilment 
of which the consumer must rely on. 
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4 The contractor's liability 
187 The contractor is liable primarily for the fitness for use of the product to be 
manufactured by him. lt may happen though that the consumer / orderer suffers 
damage to his person or property because a product manufactured by the 
contractor was unsafe. Here the courts do not refer to the principles developed 
with respect to the manufacturer's liability. They have the contractor incur 
Iiability either under Art. 635 Civil Code if Jack of safety must be regarded as a 
defect in the work or for positive breach of contract if the manufacturer 
culpably infringed his obligation to protect the orderer against damage. Also, 
claims under Art. 823, para. 1 Civil Code were examined in some cases 324. In 
connection with the float switch decision a new development is beginning to 
appear in outline. The courts are inclined to admit claims under Art. 823 Civil 
Code in addition to contractual claims for damages if the orderer makes 
available to the contractor his own material for subsequent treatment325 • In the 
case of repairs there is also a conflict of laws. The situation with respect to case 
categories in which a defect in the work exists right from the start is unclear as 
yet. So far, there is no court practice regarding the law of contracts to manufac-
ture that is similar to the float switch decision. In its decision of 24 March 1977, 
the Federal High Court at least suggests that the principles of functional owner-
ship (funktionales Eigentum) developed in the float switch decision may also be 
applied to the law of contracts to manufacture326• That is perhaps why things are 
developing along the same lines as in the case of conflicting claims under a 
contract of sale327 • In the case of a conflict of Iaws the question remains open 
whether the same duties to answer for a loss are placed on the contractor as are 
derived from the duty of care with respect to the manufacturer of goods. So far 
this question has been answered in the negative328 • The negative attitude is 
explained by the completely different basis of Iiability. The contractor is liable 
to the orderer under contractual duties to answer for a loss; he has to duly manu-
facture the goods ordered and in so doing to take all precautions to avoid later 
damage to health or other property. By comparison, the manufacturer of goods 
is liable because he who creates a source of <langer also has to answer for the 
resultant damage, if any. The basis from the point of view of the law of torts is 
much wider. But here also a change begins to appear in outline. In its decision of 
14 June 1977, the Federal High Court recognised that duties under the law of 
torts may also be placed on the contractor329• To what extent the Federal High 
Court considers the application of principles under the Iaw of torts admissible 
cannot yet be predicted. 
Application of the rules of manufacturer's liability would, no doubt, result in 
a considerable extension of liability. Whether such an extension of liability 
would be justified must be judged by the degree to which the contractor occupies 
a position similar to that of the manufacturer of goods. The cause of the manu-
facturer's liability is the changed production process on which a comparison 
must therefore focus. lf a work is produced by way not of single piece produc-
tion, but of industrial mass production, precisely the situation warranting 
increased liability exists. Mass production brings in its wake that the consumer is 
no langer able to see through the production process, which prevents effective 
protection of his rights. As far as in a concrete case the contractor produces 
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work by way of industrial production, one might think of treating him as a 
manufacturer as regards questions of the law of torts330 • Should court practice 
actually develop in the way described above, the scope of application of the 
manufacturer's liability would be even wider, since the courts do not so strictly 
link liability to an industrial production process. 
5 Government liability 
188 The question of government liability arises where the government exercises 
control functions in the production area, that is to say in the area of food law 
and the law of drugs and in the area of technical labour materials. For if 
consumers suffer damage through drugs, foodstuffs or technical labour mate-
rials, it is natural to examine whether or not through early intervention of the 
supervisory authority the damage could have been avoided. The basis of govern-
ment liability is Art. 839 Civil Code in connection with Art. 34 Basic Law. Here 
a factor is whether the authorities fulfil the duties placed on them by the legis-
lator exclusively in the interest of the general pu blic; if so, a breach of their 
duties does not give rise to liability in relation to third parties even if the latter 
are injured in consequence of official action. However, if the official duty in 
addition to protecting the intere~ts ofthe general public serves predominantly to 
protect an individual, a claim for damages accrues to the latter331 • Accordingly, 
the objective and scope of protection of the violated official duty has always to 
be clarified332 • Injured consumers would be included in the scope of protection 
of the Acts mentioned above if they could resort to a legal remedy or enjoyed a 
right under public law (subjektives öffentliches Recht) to take action333 • As was 
explained above, such claims for performance do not exist; this does not mean, 
though, that those concerned automatically lack the protection afforded by 
state liability: to create a claim for performance a much stronger legal position is 
required than to give rise to a duty to protect the consumer334 • As far as could be 
ascertained, the courts have not so far taken any decisiori as to whether those 
cornpetent by law, i.e. food inspection authorities, the Federal Health 
Authority and industrial inspection boards, also fulfil their duties in the interest 
of the individual consumer. Judgments relate only to individual cases, which do 
not allow a final judgment of what decision might be reached335 • Clues as to the 
attitude expected to be taken by the courts follow frorn the position of the 
Federal Banking Supervisory Office and the Federal Supervisory Office for 
Insurance Companies, which is of a similar nature. However, in the banking 
system a noteworthy development is beginning to appear in outline which will 
no doubt exert an influence on the entire law of state liability in the area of 
supervision of the economy. Until 1978 the courts had rejected state liability in 
insurance and banking law arguing that the respective legislation did not aim at 
protecting individuals336 • In 1979, the Federal High Court had to decide whether 
the Federal Banking Supervisory Office had infringed its obligations in connec-
tion with the bankruptcy of the Herstatt and Hubmann banks in a way that 
entitled the savers concerned to claim damages from the governmentm. In the 
decisions handed down shortly one after the other, the Federal High Court com-
pletely broke with its practice in the past. What is decisive is no longer the matter 
of official duties in principle affecting third parties, but the respective legislative 
194 
provision in a particular case. Referring to the history, the official reasons and 
the trade inspection nature of the Kreditwesengesetz (KWG, Banking Act), the 
Federal High Court came to the conclusion regarding some facts of the KWG 
that the injured individuals shall be protected by law. To assert a claim for 
damages it is no longer required that there be abuse of office or evidence of 
incorrect official action. An incorrect discretionary decision alone may give rise 
to a duty to make compensation. 
Even assuming that there is basically a claim for government liability, a claim 
for damages may nevertheless fail on account of the provision of secondary 
liability (Art. 839 I, sentence 2 Civil Code). According to which, the govern-
ment is not liable if its officials only may be blamed for negligence and the 
injured party is able to obtain compensation elsewhere. For this reason govern-
ment liability could be important in itsetf only if it were possible to establish that 
only the officials of an authority have acted culpably while the entrepreneur 
cannot be blamed for fault. As a rule this will not be the case, so that possible 
government liability fails because of the anachronism of the provision of 
secondary liability339• By contrast, the government is always liable if the official 
has made himself guilty of an abuse of office. For the presumption of abuse of 
office not any culpable breach of duty will suffice. Any wilful damage contrary 
to public policy (Art. 826 Civil Code) is always an abuse of office; in addition an 
abuse of office may exist also in the case of certain types of negligent conduct, 
which, however, depend on the peculiarities of a particular case. Not all negli-
gent breaches of duty are abuses of office contrary to public policy merely 
because the official could have recognised his duty and told himself that a third 
party might suffer damagei4o. Whether the clause of secondary liability may be 
applied in the case of negligent abuse of office has so far been left undecided341 • 
For the consumer it is in any case hard to prove abuse of office. 
6 Claims settlement through insurance, collective funds and social security 
189 A manufacturer of drugs or other products is bound to compensate the con-
sumer for damage to his person and/or property arising from a defective pro-
duct. The manufacturer is liable to the injured consumer in the first instance to 
the extent of his property or the respective corporate/partnership assets. In 
most cases claims are settled under a product liability insurance taken out by the 
manufacturer. However, it is also possible for manufacturers in a certain 
industry or trade to join and pay premiums into a fund which in the event of 
damage will answer for the loss. 
The injured party does not necessarily have to hold the tortfeasor or his 
insurance company liable. Often he himself has insurance cover as a party to the 
contract. Insurance cover of the injured party is regulated under statutory 
health, accident or pension insurance. The extent of insurance benefits follows 
from legislation if the injured party belongs to the group of persi:ms covered by 
the three insurances mentioned. These statutory institutions form the network 
of social security in the Federal Republic of Germany. The professional classes, 
self-employed persons, etc., do not belong to this group: they must provide for 
their social security themselves by taking out appropriate private health, 
accident or life insurance. If such persons have failed to provide for a case of 
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damage, the Bundessozialhilfegesetz (Federal Act on National Assistance) 
affords a certain minimum protection. Statutory or private insurance cover is 
important, because the tortfeasor's duty to make compensation is often estab-
lished only after lengthy disputes, which means that initially the injured party 
will not receive money even from the tortfeasor's insurance company. However, 
the injured party depends on the assistance he is granted forthwith, irrespective 
of responsibility for the damage. Thus the respective institutions are bound to 
defray for the time being hospital charges, doctor's fees and the cost of drugs. In 
return, the injured party's claims devolve upon the insurance institutions which 
then have recourse to the tortfeasor's insurance company or possibly to the tort-
feasor himself. 
190 (aa) The traditional employer's /iability insurance (Betriebshaftpflichtversi-
cherung) taken out by the manufacturer of goods (with the exception of drugs) 
covers those cases of damage for which the manufacturer is liable under the 
applicable German law of manufacturer's liability. This follows from Art. 1, 
No. 1 Allgemeine Haftpflichtversichetungsbedingungen (AHB, Standard Con-
ditions of Third Party Liability Insurance). Liability includes damage to 
persons and to property342 • The traditional employer's liability insurance was 
extended in 1974 to include the special terms of the Produkthaftpflichtversi-
cherung (PHB, product liability insurance)343. This insurance aims at covering 
Iiability for consequential damage resulting from Jack of warranted qualities 
(zugesicherte Eigenschaften)344 • The change in insurance practice is important 
because here a parallel is established to the insurability of a manufacturer's 
strict liability inclusive of development dangers. In the past an extension of 
insurance cover to consequential damage resulting from defects was rejected on 
the grounds that the risks were difficult to calculate and therefore not insm:able. 
The insurability of a product risk has for some time been a central item in the 
discussion of whether or not strict liability of the manufacturer of goods should 
be introduced 345• The whole discussion has become superfluous because the 
Iegislator introduced strict liability under Arts. 84 et seq. AMG. This solution 
became possible only after the insurance business had declared its willingness to 
assume the liability risk up to an amount of DM 200 millionJ46. Under Art. 94 
AMG, manufacturers of drugs are bound to take out a liability insurance or to 
secure an indemnity obligation or a warranty of a domestic credit institution for 
the amount of DM 200 million. Precise regulations on the design of the 
insurance contract between manufacturers of drugs and insurance companies 
have not so far been published. 
191 (bb) The estab/ishment of a compensation fund for product damage was 
under discussion for some time during the legislative process regarding the 
AMG. Both the officials' draft and the cabinet bill were in favour of liability on 
the part of a fund. Moreover 1 there had been agreement to the effect that the 
fund was to accept liability for a loss only secondarily if the injured party was 
unable to enforce his claims against the manufacturer. Since the manufacturer's 
primary obligation continued to exist, he would have had to take out an 
employer's liability insurance. The financing of the fund was a debatable 
question. Basically, all the manufacturers of drugs were to pay the necessary 
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contributions into the fund. Opinions were not unanimous as to whether the 
government should share in the costs 347 • 
192 (cc) As far as the injured party has suffered damage to his person through 
defects in a product, the statutory hea/th, accident andpension insurancefunds 
assume liability in his favour. They cover the consequences resulting from 
injury to health. These include curative treatment as such, continued wage 
payments and compensation for the reduction of income. The claims against a 
possible tortfeasor pass to the insurance institution which may, if need be, have 
recourse348 • 
Statutory health insurance exists for all workers, employees up to a certain 
income, unemployed, pensioners, students, and certain groups of self-employed 
persons. A claim is due to the insured who in consequence of a disease, inclusive 
of an accident, requires medical treatment. The duty to continue wage payments 
with respect to civil servants follows from the respective special legislation 
concerning workers and employees from the Lohnfortzahlungsgesetz (Contin-
ued Wage Payment Act). The duty to continue wage payments exists for a 
period of six weeks only; thereafter income from employment is replaced by 
sickness benefit payable by a health insurance fund at the rate of 85% of the 
income. Within a period of three years, sickness benefit for one and the same 
disease is granted for a maximum of 78 weeks. The statutory accident insurance 
fund assumes liability if after the completion of curative treatment conse-
quences of an accident remain which impair the injured party's earning capa-
city. The group of insured comprises all persons employed und er an employment, 
service or apprenticeship agreement. A claim arises if the insured suffered 
damage in an industrial accident, an accident while on the way to or from work 
or in consequence of an occupational disease. lf the earning capacity is reduced 
permanently by 20%, a claim for a pension is due to the insured. These provi-
sions may overlap with those under statutory pension insurance, since the latter 
also has for its purpose protection against the consequences of premature dis-
ablement. However, in that case the victim of an accident must be subject to 
statutory pension insurance. 
All persons who do not belong to the group of those insured under statutory 
pension, accident and health insurance must make provision themselves for the 
consequences of injuries to their health. In most cases those affected are self-
employed persons who to cover the respective risks take out a health insurance 
combined with accident and Iife insurance. The amount of benefits paid by 
private insurance institutions is determined by the type of contract in each case. 
lt should be noted that statutory and private insurance companies assume 
liability only for the consequences of injuries to health: damage to property is 
not covered. In that respect the injured party must take action against the tort-
feasor or his insurance company. 
7 Critical evaluation 
193 Manufacturer's liability is undergoing a change. The traditional instruments 
of control do not suffice to ensure consumer protection which is appropriate to 
the changed conditions of production. A factor giving rise to all reform consid-
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erations regarding manufacturer's liability is the impact of changed production 
processes on consumers. Consumers are no langer able to see through the pro-
duction process and are therefore bound to fail on account of a law of torts 
which presupposes transparency of the process. The adoption of new industrial 
production methods therefore entails changes to the system of liability. The 
AMG and the propositions to amend rnanufacturer's liability intend to solve the 
problem through liability regardless of fault. Yet adherence to the concept of 
defect shows that people continue to believe that liability presupposes the manu-
facturer's individual resporisibility. The reason for the rnanufacturer's liability 
is not his increased responsibility but production processes causing dangers. lt 
would therefore be better to disregard the product and to focus solely on the 
production process. If industrial production methods are concerned, the manu-
facturer should be liable for any damage caused by his products, provided they 
are used for their intended purposel49 • Only true absolute liability for damage 
caused could solve the problems linked with industrial production. Therefore 
the next step should be made, i.e. a complete break with a law of torts based on 
blameworthy conduct. There is no doubt that the two European propositions 
and the AMG constitute a considerable improvement in legal production, 
because the gaps in protection under liability in tort are filled. Above all, the 
inclusion of development dangers points the way for further reform move-
ments. We regret to say that apparently maxirnum amounts of liability are 
considered an unavoidable accompaniment of the tightening of liability. Of the 
two propositions, the EC draft seems to have two decisive advantages: it 
includes damage to property and expressly ensures liability for development 
defects. Even if the Federal Government has not so far commented on the 
propositions350, the AMG which has just been enacted contains clues as to the 
attitude tobe expected. For example, it is safe to say that unlimited liability and 
the award of damages for pain and suffering will not be introduced. Whether 
the Government will curtail the draft in any other way cannot be predicted. lt 
would mean a welcome step towards increased consumer protection if the EC 
directive (which goes further than the CE convention not only in regard to its 
subject matter but also in being structured more clearly, and being less involved 
is to be preferred to the CE convention) were to become applicable law in the 
Federal Republic of Gerrnany. 
Lastly, a seasonable harmonisation of the laws of torts also requires that the 
law of government liability be reformed. The government cannot, on the one 
hand, increasingly intervene in a regulatory way in the production process for 
the consumer's sake and, on the other, fail to fulfil its legislative obligations in 
the event of damage. At this point consumer associations should start their 
public relations activity and initiate a process of reorientation aiming at partici-
pation of the consumer in the form of control of the administrative authorities. 
The manufacturer and the government should always be liable to the con-
sumer as joint debtors if they have apart in the cause of damage. The necessary 
reform of the law of government liability has already been tackled. Accord-
ingly, future government liability will be in respect of wrong done (not liability 
for fault) and the public authority will incur primary and not secondary liabil-
ity351. Whether, and if so when, those plans will become law is, however, still 
questionable. 
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But the best of liability regulations cannot obscure the fact that they may 
merely concern the spreading of risks and compensation for damage. The most 
effective protection against dangerous products would be the prevention of 
damage through comprehensive safety precautions laying down the production 
process in a mandatory way, compliance with which would have tobe controlled 
by·the government. 
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to § 15. 
70. Amtliche Begründung zu Art. 7, BT-Drucks. 3/316, printed in Holthöfer / 
Nüse/Franck, §33, ref. no. 2. 
71. Amtliche Begründung zu §33 LMG, printed in Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, 
§33, ref. no. 3. 
72. Cf. Simitis, op. cit. (note 4), p. 177. 
73. Amtliche Begründung printed in Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §33, ref. 
no. 3. 
74. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §33, ref. nos. 10, 14, 16. 
75. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §35, ref. no. 4. 
76. Cf. v.Hippel, op. cit. (note 1), p. 43; this is al~o admitted by the Federal 
Government, cf. 2. Bericht zur Verbraucherpolitik, p. 29. . 
77. Amtliche Begründung zum 7. u. 8. Abschnitt, printed before the prelimi-
nary remark to §§40-46 in Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck. 
78. Printed in Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §45. 
79. Reichsgesundheitsblatt [1934], p. 590, printed in Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck 
as appendix A No. 1. 
80. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §41, ref. no. 8. 
81. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §41, ref. no. 11. 
82. Examples in Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §41, ref. no. 14. 
83. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §41, ref. no. 20. 
84. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §41, ref. no. 22, with further comments on the 
areas of authority. 
85. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §41, ref. no. 44. 
86. References from court practice in Holthöfer /Nüse/Franck, §41, ref. 
no. 50. 
87. Holthöfer /Nüse/Franck, §41, ref. no. 55 at the end. 
88. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §41, ref. nos. 72ff. 
89. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §42, ref. nos. 9-1 l. 
90. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §42, ref. nos. 26, 27. 
91. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §4, ref. no. 8. 
92. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §4, ref. no. 6. 
93. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §4, ref. no. 15; also Zipfel, D 501, §1 AMG, 
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note 51 (AMG 61). 
94. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §25, ref. no. 3. 
95. Amtliche Begründung zu §25, printed in Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §25, 
ref. no. 1. 
96. BGB! [1977], II, p. 2589ff. 
97. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §5, ref. no. 8. 
98. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §30, ref. no. 9; and Chapter 5, item 182. 
99. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §30, ref. no. 15. 
100. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §31, ref. no. 9. 
101. Holthöfer/Nüse/Franck, §30, ref. no. 17. 
102. v.Hippel, op. cit. (note 1), p. 61. 
103. Etmer/Bolck, vol. IV, Materialien zum Arzneimittelgesetz, B §52, 
Begründung des Regierungsentwurfs, p. 24. 
104. Plagemann, WRP (1978), p. 779ff (781- 784). 
105. Etmer /Bolck, op. cit. (note 103), §6; 2; Begründung des Regierungsent-
wurfs, p. 25. 
106. BGB! [1976], l, p. 2905; amended on 21January1977 - BGB!, l, p. 184. 
107. Etmer/Bolck, op. cit. (note 103), §15, 3; Stellungnahme des Bundesrates. 
108. Verordnung über Erwerb. Herstellung, Aufbewahrung und Abgabe von 
Arzneimitteln in Ausübung des tierärztlichen Dispensierrechts of 31 July 
1975, BGB!, 1, p. 2115. 
109. Berlin: VO betreffend Regelung und Beaufsichtigung des Verkehrs mit 
Arzneimitteln, Giften und giftigen Pflanzenschutzmitteln außerhalb der 
Apotheken of 22 May 1962, GVBI p. 483; Schleswig-Holstein: VO über 
die Regelung und Beaufsichtigung des Verkehrs mit Arzneimitteln 
außerhalb der Apotheken of 23 July 1952, GVBI p. l 124as amended on 23 
March 1962, GVBI p. 130. 
110. Cf. on this the essay worth reading by Winter /Der Jeder, Demokratie und 
Recht [1976], p. 260ff. 
111. BAnz No. 185 of 1 October 1977, printed in Sander/Scholl, Kommentar 
zum AMG, 2. instalment as of November [ 1977) in appendix 1/5 and 1/8, 
respectively. 
112. Basically on the problems of proof of effectiveness Plagemann, Der 
Wirksamkeitsnachweis nach dem Arzneimittelgesetz v. 1976; an introduc-
tory survey of the legislative regulation and the state of the discussion may 
be found in Henning NJ.W [1978], p. 1671ff. 
113. In detail on the problems of the onus of proof Plagemann, p. 73ff and p. 
167ff (176-178). 
114. Kriele, ZRP [1975], p. 260ff; cf. on this also Sander/Scholl, Erl. §25 C 
7.8. 
115. Kienle, ZRP [1976], p. 66ff; for a critical view, see also Plagemann, op. 
cit. (note 112), p. 44/45. 
116. Fincke, NJW [1977), p. 1094ff. 
1,17. Liedtke, NJW [1977), p. 2113ff; for a negative view, see also Henning, op. 
cit. (note 112), p. 1673174. 
118. OLG Hamm, Max-Planck, Selbstbiographie, ed. 4 [1967], p. 22. 
119. Kriele, NJW [1976], p. 355ff (p. 358), as weil as esp. the decision of the VG 
Minden cited on p. 356. Unclear Henning, op. cit. (note 112), p. 1675; 
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Plagemann, op. cit. (note 112), pp. 112-121 and 168/169; cf. the Kalkar 
decision of the BVerfG NJW [1979] p. 359ff (362). 
120. Etmer /Bolck, Materialien zur Reform des Lebensmitte/rechts F, Leitsätze 
zum Erlaß der Rechtsverordnung nach §34 Abs. 1 Nr. 4 des Regierung-
sentwurfs zur Neuordnung des Arzneimittelrechts (Arbeitstitel: Verord-
nung über Standardzulassungen) - as of 12 February 1975. 
121. This is clearly stated in the reasons given for the respective regulations. 
Etmer /Bolck, op. cit. (note 120), B §40. 2. Begründung des Regierungs-
entwurfs. 
122. Etmer /Bolck, op. cit. (note 120), B §52. 2. Begründung des Regierungs-
entwurfs, p. 104. 
123. Einstellungsbeschluß des LG Aachen, JZ [1971], p. 507ff (517). 
124. Etmer/Bolck, op. cit. (note 120), §57. 2. Begründung des Regierungs-
entwurfs, p. 112. 
125. Printed in Sander /Scholl, Arzneimitte/recht Erl. §63 C 2-12. 
126. v.Hippel, op. cit. (note 1), p. 47. 
127. Etmer/Bolck, op. cit. (note 120), §59. 2. Begründung des Regierungs-
entwurfs, p. 114. 
128. Zipfel, op. cit. (note 39), D 501 §15, ref. no. 8 (AMG 61) 
129. Zipfel, op. cit. (note 39); §40, ref. no. 8. 
130. BT-Drucks. 81856 p. 4. 
131. Bundesgesetzblatt [1979], part I, p. 1432ff. 
132. BT-Drucks. 8/856, p. 5. 
133. Published in Bundesanzeiger of 3 November 1970. 
134. Brinkmann, op. cit. (note 7), p. 57. 
135. Brinkmann, op. eil. (note 7), p. 64ff. 
136. Brinkmann, op. eil. (note 7), p. 83ff. 
137. Brinkmann, op. cit. (note 7), p. 75. 
138. Brinkmann, op. eil. (note 7), p. 91. 
139. The procedure of DIN standardisation is essentially regulated in DIN 820 
BI. 1. 
140. Brinkmann, op. cit. (note 7), p. 94. 
141. Brinkmann, op. eit. ~note 7), pp. 94/95. 
142. Brinkmann, op. cit. (note 7), pp. 97-102; Höhfeld, HdVR, group 240, 
ref. nos. 85-89. 
143. Höhfeld, HdVR, group 240, ref. nos. 88, 89. 
144. Brinkmann, op. cit. (note 7), p. 76ff; Hummel/Liljegren, HdVR, group 
60a, ref. no. 8. 
145. Hummel/Liljegren, op. cit. (note 144), ref. no. 9. 
146. Bundesanzeiger of 3 November 1970. 
147. Hummel/Liljegren, op. cit. (note 144), ref. no. 13. 
148. Abschnitt 1 Nr. 2b und 3.2 Runderlaß des Arbeits- und Sozialministers -
Durchführung des Gesetzes über technische Arbeitsmittel - III A 3-8100 
B (MB! NW of 19 December 1968, p. 1957). The regulations in other 
German Länder are similar, cf. Schmatz/Nöthlichs, nos. 2205, 2305, 
2405. 
149. Brinkmann, op. eil. (note 7), p. 77. 
150. Hummel/Liljegren, op. cit. (note 144), ref. no. 13. 
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151. Hummel/Liljegren, op. cit. (note 144), ref. no. 13. 
152. Schulz, Außenwirtschaftsrecht, §10, ref. no. 3. 
153. Schulz, op. cit. (note 152), §10, ref. no. 6. Einfuhrliste - Anlage zum 
Außenwirtschaftsgesetz - Teil 1 u. II der Einfuhrliste in der Fassung der 
57. Verordnung zur Änderung der Einfuhrliste vom 29.12.1976 (Supple-
ment to Bundesanzeiger No. 247 of 31December1976), last amended by 
the 60. Verordnung zur Änderung der Einfuhrliste vom 27 June 1977 
(Bundesanzeiger No. 116 of 28 June 1977). 
154. Schulz, op. cit. (note 152), §10, ref. nos. 10-15. 
155. Schulz, op. cit: (note 152), §10, ref. no. 18. 
156. Schulz, op. cit. (note 152), §1, ref. no. 24. 
157. Schulz, op. eit. (note 152), §1, ref. no. 25. 
158. Cf. Zipfel, op. cit. (note 39), Lebensmitte/recht, §47, ref. no. 2; Etmer/ 
Bolck, Arzneimitte/recht, Part B, Materialien zur Reform des Arzneimit-
telrechts, Begründung des Regierungsentwurfs zu Art. 1 §§67 und 68 (later 
73, 74), p. 124. 
159. Zipfel, op. eil. (note 39), §48, ref. nos. 13, 11. 
160. Zipfel, op. cit. (note 39), §1, ref. no. 2. 
161. Schulz, op. eit. (note 152), §1, ref. no. 27. 
162. Cf. A 15a (iv) of the programme. 
163. EuGH NJW [1976], p. 1575ff. 
164. Reference in Sander/Scholl, op. cit. (note 125), Erl, §21 AMG C 5. 
165. Cf. on this related to industrial inspection boards Hummel/Liljegren, ref. 
nos. 18, 19. , 
166. The original bill was more favourable to the consumer, cf. BT-Drucks. 
8/856, p. 7. 
167. Test 7 [1977], p. 13. 
168. Cutters without carriage and remnant catching device are not in accor-
dance with the state of the art, but with DIN 1558. 
169. Klare, in: Die Berufsgenossenschaft [1977], p. 497ff; [1978], p. 15ff. 
170. Bundestags-Drucksache 8/3029 of 28 June 1979. 
171. §25 AtomG, §84 AMG; on this in Chapter 5, items 180ff. 
172. Cited in Kötz, Deliktsrecht [1977], p. 164. 
173. BGHZ 55, p. 229ff. (234). 
174. Fora very good survey see BGHZ 51, p. 9lff (93ff). 
175. Verhandlungen des DIT [1968], vol. l part C, paper by Simon ibid., vol. 
II, part M. 
176. BGHZ, op. eit. (note 173). 
177. BGHZ 51, 9lff„ last BGH NJW (1974], p. 1503. 
178. BGHZ 51, 9lff (105). 
179. BGH BB [1975], p. 103lff (Spannkupplungsurteil) = NJW [1975], p. 
1827ff with note by Schmidt-Salzer, BGH BB [1975], p. 1033ff; West-
phalen BGB BB [1975], p. 1034ff; Bieberstein Vers.R. [1976], p. 41 lff. 
180. BGH NJW [1975], p. 1827ff (1828). 
181. Bieberstein, op. cit. (note 179), p. 141; Diederichsen, NJW [1978], p. 
1283ff (1287). 
182. Cf. Palandt/Thomas, §823 note 16 De; last impressively Leßmann, JuS 
[1978], p. 433ff (434/436). 
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183. BGH JZ [1971], p. 29 = BB [1970), p. 1414. 
184. Cf. the most recent compilation in Diederichsen, op. cit. (note 181}, 
p. 1284. 
185. BGH NJW [1972], p. 2217ff. 
186. Diederichsen, op. eil. (note 181), p. 1284. 
187. Cf. Schmidt-Salzer, Produkthaftung, ref. nos. 98ff; Diederichsen, op. cit. 
(note 181), p. 1283; Leßmann, op. eit. (note 182), p. 436. 
188. Löwe, in DAR [1978], p. 128ff; OLG Celle BB [1979], p. 392 with note by 
Schmidt-Salzer (note 187), p. 394. 
189. Differently Schmidt-Salzer, Produkthaftung, ref. no. 86; as here Löwe, 
op. eil. (note 188), p. 290. 
190. OLG Celle, op. cit. (note 188), p. 393. 
191. BGH NJW [1972], p. 2217ff (2220). 
192. BGH NJW [1977], p. 379ff = BGHZ 67, 359ff. 
193. BGH NJW [1977], p. 380. 
194. Fora confirming view, see Engels, DB [1977], p. 617; Emmerich, JuS 
[1977], 472; v.Westphalen, BB [1977], p. 314; Löwe, BB [1978], 1495; 
for a negative view, see Lieb, JZ [1977], 345; Rengier, JZ [1977), 347; 
Schubert, JR [1977), 459; Weitnauer, Arztrecht [1978), p. 38; Schmidt-
Salzer, BB [1979], p. lff; Ebel, NJW [1978], p. 2494ff. 
195. BGH BB [1978], 1491 = NJW [1978], p. 224lff. 
196. See OLG Braunschweig, NJW [1979], p. 1552ff. 
197. Schmidt-Salzer, BB [1979], p. lff (p. 10). 
198. Diederichsen, op. cit. (note 181), p. 1284. 
199. BGH VersR [1956], 625; [1959], 523; [1960], 855 and Staudinger/Schäfer, 
§831, ref. nos. 195, 197. 
200. BGH BB [1975], 1031 (1032) if the requirements as to the duty to instruct 
are satisfied; also Staudinger /Schäfer, §831, ref. no. 198. 
201. BGH VersR [1966], p. 410; BGH 51, p. 9lff (105) and BGH BB [1975), p. 
1031 ff. 
202. Diederichsen, op. cit. (note 181), p. 1288. 
203. LG Frankfurt NJW [1977), p. 1108ff; AG Frankfurt VersR (1977), p. 
ll37ff. 
204. Contergan Fall LG Aachen JZ [1971], p. 507ff. 
205. OLG Celle BB [1979], p. 392ff. 
206. OLG Celle, op. cit. (note 205), p. 393/394; Schmidt-Salzer, op. cit. (note 
194), p. 395. 
207. But so Schmidt-Salzer, op. cit. (note 194), p. 396. 
208. Leßmann, op. cit. (note 182), p. 439. 
209. Leßmann, op. cit. (note 182), p. 436 and the Estil decision as an example 
of many other cases; cf. Diederichsen, op. cit. (note 181), p. 1284. 
210. Leßmann, op. cit. (note 182), p. 435, 437 with reference to BGH NJW 
[1963], p. 484. 
211. Simitis, in Festschrift für Konrad Duden (1977], p. 605ff (607). 
212. Simitis, Festschrift, p. 608; cf. Nüßgens, in 25 Jahre BGH [1973], p. 96. 
213. Diederichsen, op. cit. (note 181), p. 1288 with reference to OLG München 
VersR [1975], p. 606ffand BGH NJW [1972], p. 2217ff(2220). 
214. Simitis, Festschrift, p. 611. 
205 
215. Cf. esp. the discussions on the occasion of the 47. DJT [1968], (Report in 
NJW [1968], p. 2047; JZ (1968), p. 715). Here belong those writers who 
already under the existing law support liability regardless of fault, cf. the 
treatment in BGHZ 51, p. 9lff (p. 95ff); Staudinger/Schäfer, ref. no. 208 
on §831; Simitis - Verbraucherschutz [1975], p. 50ff; v.Hippel - Ver-
braucherschutz [1974], p. 28ff. 
216. op. cit. in III 1.4 p. 27. 
217. Text printed in: European Series No. 91 and International Legal Materials 
(1977], 16:7; the proposition of 20 March 1975 is reproduced in DIR/JUR 
75 printed with reasons, German text also in Lindemeyer WRP (1975], 
p. 426ff; Lindemeyer WRP [1975], p. 420ff, and 712ff; Micklitz, ZRP 
[1978], p. 37ff; Dahl, ZVP (1978], p. 343ff; Ficker in Festschrift für 
v.Caemmerer [1978], p. 343ff. 
218. Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaft of 26 October 1979, No. 
C271/3. 
219. See the pre-draft in BT-Drucksache 7/5812. 
220. However, the European Parliament wanted to exempt development 
defects from absolute Jiability, see FAZ of 3 May 1979. 
221. Einleitung zum Entwurf der EG, BT-Drucks. 7/5812, p. l; similarly the 
Begründung des ER Nos. 10-13, pp. 12/13. 
222. On ER-Entwurf No. 36, p. 19 of the Begründung, on EG-Entwurf Art. 
la, p. 6 of the ET-Drucksache. 
223. So the Atomgesetz §25; cf. Lorenz, op. cit. (note 217), p. 250. 
224. Cf. Begründung No. 43, p. 21 of the ER-Entwurf and Lorenz, RIW 75, 
p. 250; it remains unclear whether Lorenz, p. 251, considers the burden of 
proof of the defectiveness or flawlessness of a product in general tobe on 
the producer; as Lorenz, Lindemeyer, op. cit. (note 217), p. 422; on the 
EC-Entwurf Begründung Art. ld, p. 6 of the Dr-ucksache. 
225. No. 34, p. 18 of the Begründung des ER-Entwurfes; Begründung Art. 4, 
p. 8 of ST-Drucksache. For a critical view of the concept of defect see 
Blenk, BB [1978], p. 1725ff. 
226. Simitis, op. cit. (note 4), p. 625. 
227. Cf. in lieu of all Palandt/Thomas, §823 note 16 D c bb. 
228. Weitnauer, NJW [1968], p. 1593 (94); based on Weitnauer also Palandt/ 
Thomas, §823 note 16 D c bb. 
229. Schmidt-Salzer, Produkthaftung [1972], ref. no. 184. 
230. Schmidt-Salzer, op. cit. (note 229), ref. no. 185. 
231. In the case of defective production the producer may furnish the decen-
tralised proof of exculpation under §831 BGB; cf. Reich/Tonner I 
Wegener, op. cit. (note 2), p. 162; Palandt/Thomas, §823 note 16 D cff. 
232. Palandt/Thomas, §823 D b; Lukes, JuS [1968], 351. 
233. Cf. Brinkmann, op. cit. (note 7), p. 97ff; Chapter 5, item 161. 
234. Differently the I. Vorentwurf der EG-Kommission, Dokument XI/ 
334174 - D of August [1974]. There the concept of defect enabled the 
producer to furnish proof of exculpation if he was able to show that the 
article was used for its intended purpose; on this see Lindemeyer, op. cit. 
(note 217), p. 425 (V 1). 
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235. Differently Lindemeyer, op. cit. (note 217), p. 712, who in the case ofuse 
contrary to the intended purpose precludes legitimate expectations as to 
safety. 
236. That passage was incorporated on the initiative of the European Parlia-
ment; cf. on this v.Hülsen, RIW [1979], p. 365ff (375); on this also 
Chapter 5, item 182. 
237. BGHZ 51, 91 (102); on this Schmidt-Salzer, Produkthaftung, ref. no. 240. 
238. BGH NJW [1972], p. 2217ff. 
239. BGH BB [1975], p. 103lff, with note by Hasskarl, BB [1976], p. 165ff. 
240. Schmidt-Salzer, Produkthaftung, ref. no. 24, p. 182; differently Simitis, 
Gutachten zum 47. DJT, p. 66. 
241. On this Wolter, ZRP (1974), p. 260ff (p. 262); Chapter 5, item 174. 
242. Simitis, Grundfragen, p. 70ff in: Verhandlungen des 47. DJZ I C 49. 
243. Simitis, Festschrift, p. 626. 
244. Cf. the references from literature and court practice in Diederichsen, Die 
Haftung des Warenherstellers, p. 58ff with criticism p. 75. 
245. Cf. the references in Schmidt-Salzer, Produkthaftung, p. 83 footnote la; 
Schmidt-Salzer, op. eil., ref. no. 98, assumes that a duty to avert <langer is 
on the producer even before his products are put on the market. 
246. So Weitnauer, NJW [1968], p. 1593 {1594); Simitis, Gutachten, p. 46; 
differently the BGH in BGHZ 48, 310 (312) in the case of the contractor's 
liability. 
247. Cf. on this the references in Diederichsen, Haftung des Warenherstellers, 
p. 72. 
248. Originally the Commission had done without such a provision, on this see 
Begründung Art. 5c p. 8 of BT-Drucksache. 
249. Begründung zu Art. 6c, p. 9 of ET-Drucksache. 
250. Begründung zu Art. 6d, p. 9 of ET-Drucksache. 
251. Begründung zu Art. 6d, p. 9 of ET-Drucksache. 
252. BGH NJW [1968], p. 1622ff - Kontact-Kleber-Fall. 
253. Cf. on this Micklitz, ZVP [1979], p. 329ff. 
254. Einleitung zum Vorschlag des EG-Entwurfs, p. 2 of ET-Drucksache and 
Erläuterung Nr. 50, p. 23 des ER-Entwurfs. 
255. Cf. Kötz, AcP [1970], p. lff(37); Kötz, Deliktsrecht, p. 163; Lorenz, op. 
cit. (note 217), p. 253. 
256. Cf. Kötz, AcP [1970)\. p. !ff (p. 37); Lorenz, op. cit. (note 217), p. 253. 
257. v.Hülsen, RIW [1977], p. 349ff; v.Hülsen, RIW [1979], p. 365ff. 
258. v.Hülsen, RIW [1979], p. 369. 
259. Cf. Dahl, ZVP [1979], pp. 19/20; differently v.Hülsen, RIW [1979], p. 
373ff. 
260. Cf. p. 2 der Einleitung zum EG-Entwurf in ET-Drucksache. 
261. On this Kötz, AcP [1970], p. lff (p. 39). 
262. Simitis, Festschrift, p. 633. 
263. Cf. on the question of pain and suffering also in the case of absolute Iia-
bility Kötz, in: Festschrift v. Caemmerer [1978], p. 389ff. 
264. Cf. BGH NJW [1977], p. 379 (381) where the BGH makes the admissi-
bility of such clauses contingent upon a particular case; on the relationship 
between §823 BGB and contractual claims for damages, BGH op. cit. with 
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notes by Lieb and Rengier, in JZ [1977], p. 344ff. 
265. Cf. Palandt/Heinrichs, preliminary remark preceding §249. 
266. Thorotrast/Fall, KG VersR [1975], p. 247. 
267. Begründung Art. 10, p. 6 des EG-Entwurfes in BT-Drucksache. 
268. Simitis, Festschrift, pp. 615, 616. 
269. Begründung Art. 6, p. 9 of BT-Drucksache. 
270. Begründung No. 45, p. 21 des ER-Entwurfs; Begründung Art. lc, p. 6 of 
BT-Drucksache. 
271. Palandt/Thomas, §823 note 16 D c; Staudinger/Schäfer, §831, ref. no. 
215; Schmidt-Salzer, Produkthaftung, ref. no. 191, p. 140. 
272. Schmidt-Salzer, Produkthaftung, ref. no. 191, p. 140. 
273. FAZ of 3 May 1979. 
274. Cf. Consumers Consultative Committee Opinion on the amended 
proposal of 21 February 1980, p. 3ff and Simitis, Festschrift, p. 621. 
275. Cf. the Erläuterungen, p. 22, No. 47 where joint and several liability is 
merely noted. 
276. Whether the supplier has been charged exclusively with technical respon-
sibility, because he alone conducted the necessary materials tests, is not 
taken into account; cf. BGH NJW [1968], 247 and Lindemeyer, op. eil. 
(note 217), p. 423. 
277. Cf. Erläuterungen No. 47, p. 22 zum Entwurf des Europarates. 
278. Cf. Lindemeyer, op. cit. (note 217), p. 713. 
279. Erläuterung No. 28, p. 17 zum Entwurf des ER; Begründung Art. le, p. 6 
zum Entwurf der EG in BT-Drucksache; cf. also Lorenz, op. cit. (note 
217), p. 248 who comments on the legal position in the USA, where the 
wholesaler and the retailer are included in the Iiability. 
280. Erläuterung No. 28, p. 17 zum Entwurf des ER, Begründung Art. le, p. 6 
zum Entwurf der EG in BT-Drucksache. 
281. According to Erläuterungen No. 46, pp. 21122 this does not apply to a 
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CHAPTER 6 
Quality of Goods and Services 
1 PRELIMINARY REMARKS 
194 Apart from the safety of products, what matters most to the consumer when 
purchasing a product or availing himself of a service is quality. The sources of 
information about quality available to a consumer when purchasing an article 
are primarily descriptions by the seller /supplier and appropriate hints by the 
manufacturer. In the case of services the consumer's expectations focus on 
comprehensive counselling by the supplier of services. There are no quality 
controls by the state. Only the Fernunterrichtsschutzgesetz (FernUSG, 
Correspondence Course Protection Act) provides for the examination of corre-
spondence courses to check their suitability for the consumer (No. 197). So the 
manufacturer or supplier of services is solely responsible for the measure of 
quality. Trade and industry control themselves through quality standards estab-
lished by them which lay down the requirements as to quality for a wide scope of 
technical production. A certain measure of quality control of goods and increas-
ingly also of services by independent third parties is achieved through the 
publication of test results by the Stiftung Warentest (No. 6). If a product - or 
a service - comes off badly in the test, the manufacturer/supplier of services 
may be forced to remedy the quality defects noted. At the same time, test results 
published in daily papers also provide the consumer with quite comprehensive 
information. 
Since statutory quality control exists to a very limited extent only, liability on 
the part of the person who sold and delivered the product or rendered the service 
to the ultimate consumer becomes a central issue tobe dealt with. Liability for 
the quality of products and services is subject to the law of contracts. That is 
why in the case of complaints and litigation the party to be held liable is the 
contracting party and not the manufacturer as in the case of inadequate safety. 
The fact that in contracts of sale concerning technical appliances the seller tries 
to replace his warranty by the manufacturer's guarantee is indicative of liability 
being somewhat shifted to the manufacturer (No. 237). However, as a rule the 
contracting party's liability is not determined by the statutory regulations on 
warranty. The contractual liability provided for in the Civil Code includes non-
cogent provisions from which sellers deviated in their Allgemeine Geschäfts-
bedingungen (AGB, standard form contracts) to the detriment of the consumer. 
Liability for quality of goods or services is therefore determined by exemption 
clauses in standard form contracts. lt is not a question of what statutory rights 
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the consumer has, but rather of what rights he has left due to the unilateral 
enforcement of contractual exemptions by sellers whose economic position is 
stronger. The legislator tri es to master the development through measures 
having very different objectives. The new AGBG will protect the consumer in 
the area of non-cogent contractual law, regardless of the design of the contract 
in each case. At the same time the legislator tri es to regulate in a mandatory way 
through special legislation types of contract which have developed (FernUSG, 
Reisevertragsgesetz, Travel Contracts Act). 
II CONTROL OF GOODS AND SERVICES 
1 Control of goods 
195 There is no state control of the quality of goods. There is neither general nor 
specific legislation having for its purpose the control of quality. There is control 
on a modest scale inasmuch as products subject to safety control are simulta-
neously tested for their quality if safety and quality are linked inseparably. 
Quality control is a mere by-product, an unavoidable corollary which the legis-
lator accepted in order to pursue his prime objective, namely an increase in 
safety and health protection. The newly introduced procedure ofprior approval 
of drugs may serve as an example of the connection between safety and quality 
(No. 152). The proof of effectiveness required for approval not only causes 
dangerous drugs to be withdrawn from the market, but ensures that the 
consumer will get only effective drugs. lt is not tobe expected in the near future 
that the legislator will intervene in the production process in a regulatory way 
beyond the uriintended side effects of the aforementioned legislation to ensure a 
minimum quality standard in favour of the consumer. The reasons for this 
attitude lie in our economic system in which the manufacturer himself is respon-
sible for the quality of a product. lf the view held by advocates of the liberal 
economic theory is followed, intervention beyond that is unnecessary, because 
control is exercised by themarket in which the consumer will not buy the inferior 
product and will thus force the manufacturer concerned to manufacture 
products of better quality. Competition takes care of the necessary process of 
selection. Actually, there is workable competition in the Federal Republic of 
Germany in some sectors only: the report on mergers in 1977 which was recently 
publi.shed by the German Cartel Office shows an increasing trend towards 
monopolisation 1• Assumin.g there were workable competition which could 
cause quality control, any reduction of competition should lead to a deteriora-
tion of quality control and consequently also to a Ioss of quality. The fact is that 
topical scientific and political discussion is concerned with the question of 
whether products keep deteriorating. The starting point for the discussion is 
deterioration in quality not as a result of the concentration of enterprises, but as 
a result of what is known as 'planned obsolescence'2. The question is whether 
advanced industrial societies pursue a special product and marketing strategy 
the object of which is to manufacture goods lacking the optimum useful life and 
thereby to prompt early substitute purchases 3• The theory of planned obsoles-
cence has been under discussion in the Federal Republic since 1971. The 
continued economic crisis has fueled the discussion. The reason for such 
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continuation may be the fact that planned obsolescence is typical of stagnant or 
shrinking markets in which the actual or threatening saturation of the market is 
obviated by a policy of artificial obsolescence which aims at removing already 
existing goods as an obstacle to sales4 • 
During the fifties and sixties, at a time when the economy experienced a 
steady upswing and there was apparently no Iimit to its expansion, the question 
of planned obsolescence did not play any role. Today it is not merely a question 
of boosting the economy by support from the state. Another item under 
discussion is that the sources of energy are not inexhaustible and that through 
the excessive load on the environment over the past 25 years they have been 
impaired to a degree constituting a threat to the population. The question as to 
the alternatives of coping with the crucial growth and environmental crisis 
implies the question of canalisation and as far-reaching as possible a limitation 
of resource-consuming goods production. The abolition of planned obsoles-
cence would be implied in such considerations. We cannot discuss the matter 
any further here, since there are no indications of control as yet. lt is still a point 
at issue whether there is planned obsolescence in the first place, not how it can be 
controlled. 
2 Control of services 
(a) General possibilities of control 
196 A control system of services must make allowance for the fact that the subject 
matter of control is not an industrial product, but a human activity. Not only the 
result of work done will be subject to quality control, but work done itself. The 
quality of a commodity may at least in theory be controlled before the com-
modity is cleared for sale. The quality of a human activity does not admit of 
control in a similar way. To control services, only a system that takes into 
account the peculiarities of the service concerned can be eligible. As far as a 
service or contract work is concerned, control may begin with the training of 
those concerned or with the Jicence to operate. The Industrial Code and the 
respective special legislation lay down the preconditions for setting up a trading 
firm. Thus it is ensured that the contract work will be performed by skilled 
entrepreneurs. The disadvantage to the consumer is that such a control system 
checks vocational qualifications in a very general way only, but does not ensure 
that a specific service is rendered in an optimum way. That would necessitate the 
existence of pertinent regulations laying down precisely how a service has 
to be rendered. Where services are no longer rendered by individuals but are 
rendered within the framework of !arge firms, job descriptions already exist. 
For example, car repairs: here manufacturers make available instructions for 
repairs. Repairs are performed increasingly by !arge firms where the service is 
rendered on the assembly line (shoe repairs, television and radio repairs). The 
industrialisation of the services sector makes it unavoidable to standardise 
working processes. Already technical standards contain specifications of work-
ing processes5• Standardisation at the same time allows for control. Yet such 
standards do not come within the scope of the GSG, so there is no statutory 
control of standardised services. 
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(b) Special control of correspondence courses 
197 Since 1 January· 1977, correspondence courses have been subject to state 
control6• The introduction of the requirement of licensing was necessary for 
participants to be provided with suitable learning material preparing them for 
realistic learning objectives. Complaints by participants focused primarily on 
the fact that time and again offers of little methodical and expert quality had 
been made. This grieyance could not be solved in past years, since it was left to 
the organiser's discretion whether or not to have his courses examined by a state 
agency. 150 correspondence courses had received the quality labe! compared 
with 1150 courses that had not been tested. Those concerned, mostly people 
from classes who had hoped for an opportunity for advancement through a 
correspondence course, thus suffered not only direct loss of property as a result 
of fees spent in vain on unqualified courses, but feit swindled out of opportuni-
ties that a professionally and pedagogically unobjectionable correspondence 
course would have offered them 7• 
Pursuant to the FernUSG, all correspondence courses for a consideration 
which have for their purpose the imparting of knowledge and skills and in which 
the instructör and student must at leastfor the most part be at separate Iocations 
and the instructor or his agent controls progress are subject to the requirement 
of licensing (Art. l FernUSG). The portion of correspondence tuition must at 
least be 51 % . The formalistic regulation of the Act almost invites circumven-
tion. For example, 'programmed instruction', in which the participant controls 
himself with the aid of appropriate questionnaires, is not regarded as correspon-
dence tuition. As it turned out, even during the process of legislation, organisers 
of correspondence courses increasingly switched over to programmed learning 
to evade the law8• Correspondence courses which in their subject matter and 
objective serve exclusively recreational activities or entertainment are not 
subject to the licensing requirement. Though such courses must be reported to 
the competent Land authority (Art. 12, para. l, sentence 3 FernUSG), this 
obligation does not replace the urgently required quality control. After all, it is 
precisely these courses that involve the danger that the consumer is offered com-
pletely useless units of instruction. 
Also not subject to the requirement of licensing are supplemental courses, 
the objective of which is to steadily supplement other self-contained courses 
offered and which can be used only in connection with the latter. Lastly, special 
requirements apply to the Iicensing of vocational correspondence courses for a 
consideration (Art. 14) and without a consideration (Art. 15 FernUSG). We 
regret to say that the scope of application of the Act is very limited and offers 
simple possibilities of circumvention even where there should be control 
according to the intention of the legislator. 
198 (aa) An organiser planning to offer a correspondence course must apply for a 
licence to the Zentralstelle für Fernunterricht (ZFU, Central Agency for Corre-
spondence Courses). He must prove that the objective stated and aimed at by a 
participant can actually be achieved through the correspondence course in a 
justifiable way (Art. 12, para. 2, item l FernUSG). The authority examines 
in particular the participant's pedagogic and technical guidance9• Also, the 
215 
correspondence course must not as regards its subject matter and objective 
disturb public order (item 2). This provision is to ensure that the participant in a 
correspondence course is neither endangered nor endangers others through 
improper direction, for instance in technical experiments, nor is caused to act in 
violation of the laww. Furthermore, the organiser must prove that the partici-
pant will be given complete and appropriate instruction in line with the statutory 
regulations in time before a contract offer is made (Nos. 61, 260). ltem 3 refers 
to a grievance often encountered in the past, namely that unsuitable or mislead-
ing information material was distributed, inducing the participant to take a 
wrong decision before the contract was made. That provision forces the 
organiser to submit information material and to disclose his intended adver-
tising policy 11 • 
A licence must not be granted if the organiser's intended design of the 
contract terms does not meet the statutory requirements (No. 260). The 
organiser must not deliberately accept contractual deficiencies, trusting that the 
participant will not assert his claims for damages under civil law or exercise his 
other rights 12 • Through legislation by the German Länder further requirements 
may be Jaid down (Art. 12, para. 2 FernUSG). lf an organiser does not succeed 
immediately in meeting the requirements of licensing, a preliminary licence 
subject to certain minimum requirements may be granted (Art. 12, para. 3, 
items 1-3 FernUSG). A preliminary licence is granted provided that the study 
material is submitted for review within a period tobe fixed in a particular case. 
The purpose of preliminary control is that in the case of comprehensive 
correspondence courses investments may be so high that the organiser cannot 
reasonably be expected to invest the full amount before the commencement of 
the course, being uncertain whether it will be licensed in the first place 13 • 
Depending on their objective, vocational correspondence courses for a 
consideration require proof to the effect that their objective and the details of 
their implementation are in harmony with the Berufsbildungsgesetz (Act on 
Vocational Training) (Art. 13 FernUSG). The contents and scope of reasons for 
denial, which follow from the nature of the vocational correspondence course, 
may be specified by statutory order. 
Vocational correspondence courses that are free, Art. 15 FernUSG, are not 
subject to the requirement of licensing. However, upon application they may be 
recognised by the Bundesinstitut zur Berufsbildung (BIBB). Quality certifica-
tion by the state is important for correspondence courses offered free of charge 
by non-profit associations or enterprises. This method is of special importance 
to correspondence courses used under an apprenticeship pursuant to the Berufs-
bildungsgesetz, since such correspondence tuition may be performed free of 
charge under Art. 5, para. l, item l of the Berufsbildungsgesetz and the 
licensing procedure under Art. 12 FernUSG does not come into question. A 
licence may be withdrawn if one of the reasons for denial existed when it was 
granted or the requirements of preliminary licensing had not been satisfied. If 
one of the reasons for denial arises later, the licence must be revoked, Art. 14 
FernUSG. 
Basically, the requirement of licensing has been in existence since 1 January 
1977; however, all sections of the Act came into force only on 1 January 1981 
(Art. 22 FernUSG). Correspondence courses otherwise requiring a licence 
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were exempted from the requirement of licensing up to 1 January 1980 if the 
organiser filed an application for licensing not later than 1January1978. Voca-
tional courses if considered suitable prior to the coming into force of the Act 
(pursuant to Art. 60, para. 4, sentence 3 Berufsbildungsgesetz or pursuant to 
Art. 5, para. 1 ofthe contract between the German Länder on the establishment 
and financing of the central state agency for correspondence courses of 20 
December 1973 14) were exempted until 1January1981. 
199 (bb) The implementation of the Act is incumbent upon the German Länder. 
Prior to the Act coming into force, quality control of correspondence courses 
coming within the authority of the Minister of Education of the German Land 
concerned was exercised by the central state agency for correspondence courses 
under the contract between the German Länder of 20 December 1973. The 
German Länder will expand the functions of their present central agency 
competent merely for school correspondence courses (ZFU) and will establish a 
new central state agency for correspondence courses under a new contract 
between the German Länder. A contract to that effect was adopted in February 
1978 and is presently under discussion in the Länder parliaments 15 • The ZFU is 
the state licensing agency competent for all courses offered under the FernUSG 
in the area of the Federal Republic. In those cases where a license for a voca-
tional correspondence course is applied for, the ZFU and BIBB are obliged to 
obtain an expert opinion. Under the heading 'information ', which is inaccurate, 
the legislator in Art. 20 FernUSG regulates certain powers of control held by the 
competent Land authorities and the Bundesinstitut für Berufsbildung. An 
organiser is obliged to furnish on demand the information these authorities 
require in performing their duties, to produce the necessary documents com-
pletely and within the period prescribed and, for the purpose of examination, 
even if the organiser's obligations under Art. 2, para. 1 FernUSG have been 
complied with, to tolerate during business hours the inspection of business 
premises where correspondence courses inclusive of accompanying instruction 
are held. 
200 (cc) The fact that the legislator introduced the requirement of licensing with 
respect to correspondence courses is no doubt to be welcomed. The narrow 
scope of the Act casts doubt, though, upon whether participants can actually be 
protected effectively against unsuitable instruction material. lt is a pity that the 
legislator failed to pay more attention to the questions of scope. Since no 
amendment is currently under consideration, it remains to be seen whether the 
Act is a suitable means to fight untrustworthy organisers of correspondence 
courses. A comprehensive judgment seems impossible one and a half years after 
the coming into force of the Act. lt should be noted, however, that in the imple-
mentation of the Act difficulties will be encountered similar to those described 
in detail with respect to the law of drugs and foodstuffs as weil as technical 
labour materials (No. 164). 
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III CIVIL LIABILITY FOR THE QUALITY OF GOODS 
1 Statutory regulations on warranty and their realisation in practice 
201 (aa) The consumer as a buyer of goods is interested in the goods being opera-
tive, flawless and of high quality. His rights are regulated in Arts. 459 et seq. 
Civil Code. If the thing bought has a defect that destroys or reduces its value or 
suitability for its ordinary or stipulated use, the buyer may withdraw from the 
contract, demand abatement of the purchase price or subsequent delivery if it is 
a purchase of unascertained goods. As far as the seller has promised the buyer 
certain qualities, the buyer may in addition claim damages for non-per-
formance. All claims exist irrespective of the seller's fault. The system of 
Arts. 459 et seq. Civil Code aims at smooth handling of the contract of sale. In 
the case of movable things, the buyer is allowed a period of only six months to 
enforce any deficiency claims. 
From a superficial glance at the statutory regulations one might have the 
impression that the buyer /consumer enjoys a favourable legal position as 
compared with the seller. Appearances are deceptive. The entire law ofwarranty 
is non-cogent law; that is, it may be contracted out. The Civil Code does not 
regulate the consumer's interests with priority, rather it claims to lay down the 
legal relationship between manufacturer, supplier and consumer in the event of 
a defect in the object of purchase. Specific interests und er the law of sales, that is 
those of the various links in the chain of supply, are taken into account only in 
the Code of Commercial Law, where under Arts. 373 et seq. there are special 
provisions on trade purchases between enterprises. The consumer has no such 
right; he has to rely on the Civil Code which is not tailored to his requirements 
since it constitutes, so to speak, the general part of the law of sales affecting all 
links in the chain of supply 16. 
The civil law assumes that a seller advises the customer carefully, makes 
promises on account of his expert knowledge and shall be liable therefor. lt may 
be that this model reflected real conditions at the time legislative work on the 
Civil Code was under way. As regards legal reality in the industrial age, that 
model proves to be a fiction. The function of the supplier, who is the link 
between the manufacturer and the consumer, has undergone fundamental 
changes. Distribution is essentially his function. Personal advice has been 
replaced by the manufacturer's advertising promise 17 • Economic structures 
today present to us a seller who is often on a par with the manufacturer in terms 
of economic power. Seilers use their economic power to dictate contractual 
conditions to the buyer 1 availing themselves of the principle of private 
autonomy underlying the Civil Code. The buyer's freedom is restricted to 
freedom of contract: he has no influence on the design of the contractual 
relation. Contracts are shaped in line with standard form contracts which aim at 
saddling the buyer as far as possible with the risk of liability for inferior quality. 
The question of the seller' s liability is therefore a question of the applicability or 
effectiveness of standard form contracts. Exemption clauses by the seller in 
standard form contracts 18 determine legal reality, not problems of the law of 
warranty in the Civil Code. In view of changes in the economic structures, the 
scope of application of the law of the Civil Code is very small. Only in day-to-
day cash transactions, in the purchase of food, cosmetics, textiles, books and 
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magazines, does the law of warranty continue to play a part. However, this 
advantage is destroyed again by the fact that the customer often has difficulty in 
furnishing proof, since as a rule verbal contracts are concerned 19• This does not 
apply to the purchase of valuable consumer durables, such as new or second-
hand cars, furniture, washing machines, dishwashers and sewing machines, 
electric stoves, radio sets and TV sets. Here the scope of the consumer's legal 
protection is determined by the degree of admissibility of exemption clauses. 
202 (bb) The purchase of services by a consumer involves a great variety of 
transactions. As regards their legal nature, some of them are contracts of 
service, contracts to manufacture or agency contracts, while others are mixed 
types also including elements of the law of sales, landlord and tenant law or 
company law. The legislator regulated merely the contract to manufacture in 
such a way as to permit adjudication on the law of warranty. The statutory 
rights of redhibition or abatement enjoyed by the consumer /orderer are largely 
in line with the regulations under the law of sales. There are essential differences 
only in that the consumer has a statutory right to demand repair of defects and 
any claim for damages presupposes fault on the part of the manufacturer. As 
the entire law of warranty is of a non-cogent nature (apart from Art. 637 Civil 
Code, which prohibits exclusion of Iiability in the event of malice) it was 
possible that in the area of services and contract work matters developed along 
similar lines as in the law of sales: the law of standard form contracts has super-
seded the statutory law of warranty. The consumer's deprivation of his rights is 
attributable to the disequilibrium in power between the consumer and the 
supplier of services. The latter today is no langer the minor craftsman, trader 
and industrialist living and working in the same area, but increasingly a highly 
industrialised enterprise. The scope of liability is determined by the limits of 
effectiveness of non-warranties in standard form contracts. Only in contracts 
for the repair of commodities, such as shoes, clothing, minor electric or 
plumbing work and painting jobs, does the law of warranty of the Civil Code 
continue to apply, because those contracts for repairs are often made without 
standard form contracts andin many cases not even in writing. 
2 Limits of exemption in the Civil Code and under the AGBG 
203 Since the Civil Code fixed hardly any limits in its provisions on warranty, it 
was for the courts to correct the warst abuses of economic power20• Over the 
years, the courts developed a closely knit system of decisions fixing the limits of 
exemption. Accordingly, the progressive development of court practice could 
not obscure the fact that the legal means available to the courts were unfit to 
master exemption clauses in the lang run. Also, people increasingly became 
aware of the fact that the Civil Code and its interpretation by the courts did not 
offer the consumer adequate protection. Therefore the AGBG has as its stated 
aim the fight against abusive exemption clauses in standard form contracts21 • 
(a) Limits of exemption in the Civil Code 
204 (aa) The regulations on warranty under the /aw of sales do not contain any 
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special provisions on exemption clauses. The entire law of warranty may be 
contracted out with the exception of Art. 476 Civil Code (malice). The case 
provided for in Art. 476 Civil Code is of limited importance to the consumer 
anyway, as he should succeed in proving fraudulent concealment on the part of 
the seller only very rarely. All the same, it may be noted that the courts tend to 
reduce the buyer's burden of proof (No. 217). Likewise, it is impossible to 
exclude warranted qualities (zugesicherte Eigenschaften) because this would 
devoid the warranty of its meaning22 • The seller must not bring to nothing what 
he has promised in his offer of a contract by inserting an exemption clause in his 
standard form contract. However, this applies only if by the warranty of certain 
qualities (zugesicherte Eigenschaften) the buyer was meant to be protected 
against consequential damage resulting from defects 23 • 
The courts determine the scope of the seil er' s liability. In its decision of 195624 
the Federal High Court fixed the limits of exclusion of liability. At the consumer 
Jevel the judgment concerns primarily the purchase of new durable consumer 
goods; in that particular case it concerned a purchase of furniture. The sum and 
substance of the decision is: 
In summary it follows that in the purchase of brand new furniture the 
exclusion of claims under contractual liability may be provided for in the 
seller's standard form contract if the buyer is granted a right to demand 
repair of defects, but that such claims under contractual liability are revived 
if repair of the defects is impossible for some reason or other. 
In support ofits view, the Federal High Court advances the buyer's interest in 
purchasing a commodity free from defects which warrants protection. Such an 
interest can be safeguarded only if the buyer may at least demand repair of the 
defects in the article bought. Until today, the Federal High Court has adhered to 
that court practice. Accordingly, many standard form contracts were changed 
to conform to the decision. All the same, the courts have not succeeded in 
solving the problems in principle25 • lf repair of defects is impossible, claims 
under warranty law are revived. lt is a controversial issue26 whether the buyer 
then enjoys the full range of rights provided for in Arts. 459 et seq. Civil 
Code - that is, redhibition, abatement of purchase money, and damages - or 
whether the seller.in his standard form contract may restrict the buyer's option 
in the eveht of revival of statutory claims. Some people hold27 that a limitation 
of the right of option such as standard form contracts are known to bring 
about28 is inadmissible. 
Court practice relates but to contracts of sale concerning new goods; in the 
case of used goods, a complete exclusion of the right of redhibition or abate-
ment is admissible (No. 216). 
In addition to exclusions of the right of redhibition or abatement, exemption 
clauses play a great part in practice, under which the buyer's rights in the event 
of delayed delivery or impossibility of delivery are restricted. As here the buyer's 
rights are not affected as regards quality of goods, such clauses may be left out 
of account in the present study. lt should be pointed out, though, that the courts 
have not taken any definite view regarding these questions, so draftsmen of 
standard form contracts were able without hindrance to contract out the Civil 
Code in this area29. 
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205 (bb) In the law governing contracts to manufacture it was also the task of the 
courts to oppose the contractors' request to exclude warranty completely. As in 
the law of sales, complete exclusion of warranty is inadmissible. The customer 
must at least be granted a right to demand repair of defects30. That right cannot 
be restricted by the fact that the manufacturer is liable only for defects for which 
the fault lies with him3 1• If repair of defects is impossible, claims under warranty 
law, that is redhibition, abatement of purchase money, and damages, are not 
revived contrary to the contract of sale. For in the law governing contracts to 
manufacture the customer may by act of law demand merely repair of defects, 
Art. 633, para. 2, sentence l Civil Code, while the rights listed in Arts. 634-635 
Civil Code come into question only if the contractor failed to repair the 
defects32. That does not mean that the customer has no rights if repair of defects 
fails: it is inadmissible for the contractor to exclude in his standard form 
contract both the right to demand damages and the right of rescission if repair of 
defects fails 33 . However, the contractor may limit the buyer's right of option to a 
right of rescission if repair of defects fails 34 . Just as in the law of sales, an 
exclusion of liability is inadmissible if the contractor promised the customer 
certain qualities (zugesicherte Eigenschaften) of the goods in order to protect 
him against consequential damage resulting from defects35 . 
lt is a striking feature that court practice regarding exemption clauses always 
concerns cases where two companies take action against each other36. In most 
cases, machinery was concerned which was tobe delivered as a whole or in parts. 
(b) Limits oj exemption clauses in the AGBG37 
206 As regards its legal nature, the AGBG is a prohibitory law. Arts. 10 and 11 
AGBG prohibit the use of certain clauses which are inadmissible as to sub-
stance. Art. 10 AGBG includes prohibitions providing for a scope of judgment. 
The court must establish whether the clause is reasonable on the basis of still 
further circumstances. By contrast, in the cases covered by Art. 11 AGBG the 
legislator made such j udgment. Basically, the clauses listed there are void i f their 
factual requirements are satisfied. The general clause makes it possible also to 
declare void clauses other than those listed. Thus the admissibility of exemption 
clauses in standard form contracts may be checked in two stages. Basically, it 
does not matter who - trader or consumer - is a party to the contract, since 
the scope of the Act is not limited to consumers. This is why the AGBG is not a 
distinct consumer protection act. The lists of prohibitions contained in Arts. 10 
and 11 AGBG, which we shall study in the following sections, apply only to 
contracts where at least one party is a consumer, Art. 24 AGBG. Contracts 
between traders cannot be checked for compliance with the lists of prohibitions 
(No. 237). 
3 Typical exemption clauses in standard form contracts for acquisition 
207 Exemption clauses in standard form contracts are tailored to the type of 
purchase transaction involved. The legal classification of a purchase transaction 
as a contract of sale - irrespective of whether it is a true contract of sale, 
a leasing or a hire-purchasing transaction - is characteristic at best of the 
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common trend towards a shift of liability to the detriment of the consumer. 
However, exemption clauses also bear a relation to the type of object of 
purchase. Often the two are linked with each other if, for instance, certain 
products may be sold only in a certain legal form. The following notes try to take 
up these differences. To that end typical exemption clauses in standard form 
contracts regarding typical purchase transactions will be described. 
(a) Contracts of sale concerning new goods 
208 Standard form contracts are to be found only in contracts of sale concerning 
durable consumer goods: cars, furniture and electric appliances. Exemption 
clauses aim primarily at saddling the buyer with the risk of inferior quality. 
Art. 11, item 10 AGBG regulates in detail the consumer's rights under a 
warranty concerning new goods that cannot be contracted out. Art. 11, item 10 
AGBG does not apply to used articles. As regards the latter, the exclusion of any 
liability declared admissible by the courts continues to apply 38 • An examination 
of the case is possible under Art. .9 AGBG, though. The Act gives no definition 
of the new article. What matters is not whether the thing was defective within the 
meaning of Art. 459 Civil Code owing to a Jack of novelty, but how the 
customer was allowed to interpret the essence of the contract. Therefore, for 
example, a demonstration car which has been standing in a sales room for a year 
is a new car 39 • Quite a different question is whether the age of a car entitles the 
buyer to demand redhibition or abatement of the purchase price. 
209 (aa) Art. 11, item 10 AGBG essentially constitutes a codification of court 
practice, without decisive progress having been made in favour ofthe consumer. 
Just as court practice, it forbids the seller completely to exclude warranty 
regarding the product mentioned or any parts thereof. Whether it is a matter of 
complete exclusion of warranty must be judged by whether a settlement may 
actuaUy be effected on the basis of the rights left to the customer or whether in 
reality the customer is deprived of bis rights4o. Therefore the standard form 
contract provision in question need not expressly include a complete exclusion 
of liability. A clarification to the effect that the seller is not allowed to exclude 
liability for those parts that are susceptible to trouble is tobe welcomed41 • Such 
clauses are particularly frequent in contracts of sale concerning cars. Actu~lly, 
since the Federal High Court' s leading decision dating from 1956, some sellers 
have refrained from completely contracting out liability for quality. Their 
standard form contracts include the right of abatement or redhibition in one 
way or another; the most common practice is to grant the buyer a right to 
demand repair of defects instead of a right of redhibition or abatement. The 
seller thus secures himself the possibility of subsequently making up for lack of 
quality, without having to reckon with the loss of or reduction in the purchase 
price. From the seller's point of view the right to demand repair of defects is the 
lesser evil. The buyer is not released from the contract, he has to see to it that the 
defects are repaired and despite all the annoyance is obliged to pay the purchase 
price. The AGBG does not counteract that development; rather, it takes it up as 
a fact that cannot be changed. This alone is surprising, because the Civil Code 
does not provide for a right to demand repair of defects in c,ontracts of sale. In 
222 
the case ofinferior quality, the buyer should have the possibility ofreturning the 
product bought withqut further ado and without lengthy negotiations. Any 
Iimitation to a right to demand repair of defects is effective only if the buyer 
contemporaneously has the right to demand that the consideration be reduced 
or, at bis option, the contract be rescinded should repairs fail or subsequent 
delivery be effected. According to present court practice, the buyer also has to 
be granted at least a right to demand repair of defects. A change in the legal 
position results from the fact that it is now certain that if repair of defects fails 
the consumer has a right of option to the effect that he may choose whether to 
rescind the contract of sale or abate the purchase price. This provision includes 
uncertainties inasmuch as no definition is given as to when any repair of defects 
must be considered to have failed. The Act does not regulate how many attempts 
at repair the buyer must accept, whether the buyer may fix a time limit within 
which the seller must repair the defects or whether the seller in his standard form 
contract may fix such a time limit to the detriment of the buyer. The number of 
attempts at repair of defects is determined in a particular case, so that even two 
attempts may be unreasonable. Generally the subject matter of performance 
should be decisive. In the case of durable consumer goods, three attempts 
should be reasonable; in the case of minor household appliances, coffee-
grinders or the like, repair of the defects must be considered to have failed after 
two unsuccessful attempts42, because repeated inferiority suggests further 
defects. lt is a controversial issue in legal literature whether present court 
practice according to which the buyer is obliged to allow the seller a certain 
period for repair of defects continues to apply after the coming into force of the 
AGBG. As the Act does not require the fixing of a time limit, previous court 
practice is obsolete. The buyer merely has to prove that repair of the defects 
failed, but not that a time limit was fixed 43 • Furthermore, the Act does not 
regulate whether the buyer loses his statutory rights of redhibition or abate-
ment, which are revived should repair of the defects fail, if he continues to use 
the commodity purchased pending the numerous attempts at repair of defects. 
The question gains importance in the case of cars, whose value steadily 
decreases especially in the first year of continued use. If a buyer were tobe 
denied the continued use of a car pending repair of its defects, the car would be 
useless to him during that period. This is why he cannot lose his statutory rights 
of redhibition or abatement44• 
210 (bb) Subsequent to the regulation on the right to demand repair of defects, 
standard form contracts usually contain a provision in which their users exclude 
any claims f or damages. Depending on the causes of damage, two types of cases 
that may cause injury to the consumer 's health or property can be distinguished. 
lt can be imagined that the seller might fulfil his duty to repair the defects not in 
due order, too late or not at all. Damage may also occur because the seller prior 
to the conclusion of the contract fails to take seriously the obligations incum-
bent on him, or after the conclusion of the contract makes mistakes - not 
connected with the duty to repair the defects - in performing it, or on the 
occasion of the contract even commits an act that satisfies the factual require-
ments of Art. 823 Civil Code. Since the AGBG in Art. 11, item IOb affords the 
consumer only minimum protection in the form of a right to demand repair of 
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defects, it seems to be obvious that such an exclusion of Iiability should be 
considered admissible. Nevertheless, exclusions of liability for rights to claim 
damages are admissible only if the damage is attributable to a slightly negligent 
act in violation ofthelaw on the part ofthe seller or any person employed by him 
in performing his obligations. The seller cannot exempt himself in the case of 
gross negligence or intent, Art. 11, item 7 AGBG. The limitation of exemption 
is designed to safeguard the customer's rights in the event of non-performance 
and defective performance45 • lt is open to doubt, though, whether that aim has 
been achieved. lt is safe to say that the consumer's rights have been strengthened 
considerably compared with previous court practice, for in court practice no 
uniform attitude towards exemption with respect to one's own or a third party's 
fault had prevailed46 • The courts were particularly vague regarding the admissi-
bility of exemption clauses in the case of gross fault on the part of persons 
employed to perform a principal's obligation47 • The Act has put an end to the 
uncertainty. The possibilities of excluding liability under Arts. 276, 278 Civil 
Code have been reduced considerably. On the other hand, the consumer's 
protection has been limited to especially drastic cases; the majority of injuries 
should be attributable to slight negligence. 
The legislator's basic decision cannot be applied to the cases mentioned 
without differentiation. According to the dominant view, basically the seller is 
liable for culpa in contrahendo48 and positive breach of contract49 only in the 
event of intent and gross negligence. Here it is overlooked that precisely these 
legal remedies, at least as far as they relate to the defectiveness of a thing, 
amount to an extension of statutory claims under a warranty whose exclusion is 
forbidden under Art. 11, item lOa. For all that, the courts also treat positive 
breach of contract as an element of the law of warranty by making it subject to 
the short period of limitation under Art. 477 Civil Codes0 • Accordingly, the 
seller cannot effectively exempt himself in his standard form contract from 
Iiability for slight negligence. If the damage is the result of a tort, the first thing 
to be clarified is whether liability in tort may be contracted out from the start in 
standard form contracts. This question has gained great .importance in connec-
tion with the extension of manufacturer's liability through the Federal High 
Court's float switch decision 51 • In legal literature an exclusion of liability within 
the limits of Art. 11, item 7 AGBG is considered admissible for legal relation-
ships involving consumers and traders52 • The courts have joined that judgment 
in principle 53 • In its decision of 7 February 197954 , the Federal High Court hasset 
forth the requirements that standard form contracts have to satisfy in order not 
to be void for uncertainty. lt is of decisive importance whether a trader may 
infer from the standard form contract the legal consequence in each case with 
sufficient certainty and clarity. The Federal High Court's decision, as expressly 
emphasised by the Federal High Court, merely relates to the legal relationship 
between businessmen. Therefore it seems premature to assume that the same 
principles apply to legal relationships involving consumers. A striking thing is 
that the courts and legal writers do not deal with the difference in principle 
between the reasons for liability - the law of contract and the law of torts. lt is 
precisely that difference that forbids equal treatment. Even if Art. 11, item 7 
AGBG is intended to be applied, it would have to be examined under Art. 9 
AGBG whether or not the seller-producer might also be Iiable for a tortious act 
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committed by slight negligence55 • lt is inadmissible to exclude Iiability for slight 
negligence at least in the second type of case, if the damage is attributable to 
culpable violation of the duty to repair the defects 56• Due completion of repairs 
is apart of the statutory right under a warranty that cannot be contracted out. 
211 (cc) In some cases, in the motorcar trade clauses may be found in standard 
form contracts which Iimit the consumer's statutory rights under a warranty to a 
right of abatement of purchase money. The AGBG does not include any direct 
statements on the admissi bility of such provisions. lt would be possible to judge 
admissibility by the general clause and to decide depending on whether the 
right of abatement takes sufficient account of the consumer's interest 57 • Yet 
inadmissibility in principle follows from the legislator's judgment in Art. 11, 
item lüb AGBG. The right to demand repair of defects may be only Iimited, 
because if those repairs fail the statutory rights of redhibition or abatement are 
revived. A right of abatement cannot fail - at best it can be imagined that the 
consumer is unable to enforce it. As far as could be ascertained, sellers rarely try 
to enforce any limitation of statutory rights under a warranty to a right of 
abatement. 
212 (dd) Attempts rather concentrate on Iimiting the consumer's unavoidable 
right to demand repair of defects. One possibility is to make the elimination of a 
defect or substitute delivery contingent upon prior payment in full or, 
depending on the circumstances, on excessive payment 58 • Such clauses are now 
inadmissible, Art. 11, item IOdAGBG. Theprohibitionoftheconsumer'sduty 
to effect prepayment contained in that provision is of minor importance, 
because according to its tenor the provision takes effect only if a consumer does 
not put up with the defectiveness of the commodity and takes action against the 
seller himself. If the con·sumer raises in defence the article's defectiveness in a 
Iawsuit brought against him, he is protected under Art. 11, item 2 AGBG which 
provides that the consumer must not be deprived of the right to refuse perfor-
mance under Art. 320 Civil Code or Art. 273 Civil Code. 
213 (ee) Similar purposes are served by clauses which aim at imposing on the buyer 
an obligation to give notice of defect (Rügepflicht) in the event of apparent 
defects. After the expiry of the time Iimit for claims, the rights of redhibition or 
abatement are forfeited. The AGBG does not forbid time Iimits for claims in 
general, but only in the event of apparent defects. Neither the Civil Code nor the 
AGBG defines when a defect is considered apparent and when hidden. The 
question must be decided on Jhe basis of the fact that outside trade purchases a 
buyer is under no obligation of inspection and of making a claim59• Only in an 
exceptional case may a defect thus be apparent. The burden of proof that the 
defect was apparent is on the seller. In any case, the time Iimit for claims must be 
more than a week and no less than two weeks for the consumer not familiar with 
written matters. 
214 (ff) The last possibility of the seller to escape his warranty is to shorten the 
periods of warranty. Such attempts are now forbidden: the minimum period is 
six months. According to its tenor, Art. 11, item IOf AGBG comprises only 
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claims under a warranty. lt also applies to claims arising out of culpa in contra-
hendo and positive breach of contract. lt follows from the view presented here 
that these legal remedies are equal by virtue of their legal nature, i.e. by being 
rights of redhibition and abatement. But also, according to the dominant view, 
the same result is bound to be arrived at, since the remedies available at least 
under the law of sales are subject to the statutory period of limitation60• As 
regards its meaning, the provision should also be applicable to other provisions 
on extension and interruption of the limitation period which are prejudicial to 
the buyer61 • 
For the scope of legal protection, when the period of limitation begins to run 
is decisive. For some time it had been agreed that the period began to run upon 
delivery of the object of purchase. Of Iate, an jncreasing mimber of writers have 
raised the question whether or not, to avoid iniquitous hardship and curtailment 
of the buyer's rights, the period of limitation should begin to run as from the 
time damage occurs or becomes obvious62 • As regards periods of guaranty 
exceeding the statutory minimum period, the Federal High Court has recently 
decided that the period of Iimitation starts to run only after the defect has 
become known (No. 237). 
215 (gg) Exemption clauses limiting the seller's liability for quality are not only 
found in the form of exclusions of warranty. In their standard form contracts 
some sellers reserve the right to alter or deviate from thepromised performance. 
Such change in performance may affect the quality of a thing. For the most part 
the reservation of alterations hides the seller's right to deliver goods of a quality 
that is inferior to that stipulated. Reservations of alterations are found 
primarily in the furniture trade, since there production has not yet reached as 
advanced a stage as to ensure that products are always identical. Often the buyer 
wants to obtain furniture of the same shade he saw in the sale-room andin view 
of which he signed the contract of sale. The AGBG now forbids the seller to 
include in his standard form contract such reservations of alterations. The 
prohibition is not absolute, though; the buyer must accept the alteration if the 
seller proves that the buyer can reasonably be expected to accept the deviation 
from the promised performance. The question on whom rests the burden of 
proof may gain importance if the parties argue about whether a technical alter-
ation constitutes an improvement 64 • 
(b) Contracts of sale concerning used goods 
216 The purchase of used goods plays a great role with respect to durable 
consumer goods. For second-hand motor cars, a market of their own has 
developed. Contracts concerning used cars are made on the basis of standard 
form contracts if the consumer's contracting party is a dealer. In the case of 
contracts of sale between consumers, Standard form contractS are tobe found 
less often. The two types of contract have in common that the seller usually 
excludes any liability for possible defects. The courts declared at an early stage 
the exclusion of any warranty tobe lawful in the case of used cars 65 • In that 
respect the AGBG does not improve the consumer's protection, for the prohibi-
tion to exclude the warranty applies only to new goods. The Regional Court of 
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Munich and the Regional Court of Augsburg made a new start towards 
restricting the exclusion of any warranty66 • The Regional Court of Munich 
motivates its decision by referring to the uncertainty of the clause 'bought as 
inspected and to the exclusion of any warranty'. The clause, it claims, includes 
only apparent, but not hidden defects. The Regional Court's reasoning is not 
convincing, because the exemption clause in question is unequivocal. Of greater 
importance should be the grounds stated by the Regional Court -of Augsburg 
according to which the court imposes on the seller a quasi-guarantee obligation 
at least regarding freedom from defects affecting the roadworthiness and road 
safety of the used car. 
The court differentiates between typical defects inherertt in the purchase of a 
used car and defects that are so serious as to be contrary to the meaning of the 
type of contract defined as 'purchase of a used car'. More far-reaching still than 
the Regional Courts' practice is a proposal made in legal literature67 according to 
which the seller of a used car is to be Iiable under Art. 459, para. 1 Civil Code 
regardless of any exemption and writing clause in his standard form contract if a 
defect usually present in a car of the type sold and of the age in question and 
detectable in a routine but expert examination is concerned. This view is essen-
tially substantiated by considerations of equity68 • lt is argued that the seller may 
exempt himself from liaoility only if he refers to the fact that he neither 
examined nor overhauled the car. The proposal may be adopted by the courts to 
solve the problem of delimitation between Art. 459, para. l and Art. 459, 
para. 2 Civil Code69 • The consumer's interest would be served if he had a right 
of redhibition or abatement in the event of extraordinary signs of wear and 
substantial damage7o. 
In response to the action brought by the Consumer Protection Association 
(Verbraucherschutzverein), the Federal High Court has now decided that the 
clause 'used, as inspected and to the exclusion of any warranty' does not 
infringe Art. 9 AGBG 71 • In its decision the Federal High Court merely sum-
marises arguments that have been known for some time. lt takes for granted 
that the buyer has to assume the risk when buying a defective car. However, 
even dealers in used cars remain in doubt about such a unilateral distribution of 
burden, for the terms recommendations drafted by the Zentralverband des Kfz-
Gewerbes (ZdF, Central Association of the Automobile Trade) in cooperation 
with the ADAC (General German Automobile Club) oblige the dealer to test the 
used car and to make a report on the condition ofits most important parts. lfthe 
statements are incorrect, the buyer may demand repair of the defects for a 
period of three months, i.e. that the condition mentioned in the report be 
restored72 • The terms recommendation has been reported to the Federal Cartel 
Office for registration. 
Despite the fact that according to the dominant view the exclusion of any 
warranty is admissible in principle, the buyer is not deprived of all his rights. 
217 (aa) lf the seller of a used car fraudulently conceals a def ect, he is Iiable despite 
an exclusion ofwarranty, Art. 476 Civil Code. However, the buyer must prove 
the seller's fraud. If the buyer blames the seller for fraud, the seller is not 
exempted from liability merely on account of the fact that he sold the car 'as 
inspected and seen'. If the seller knows about defects or believes that there may 
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be defects he must point out these imperfections74• Thus it is accepted that the 
seller must indicate in any event repairs that were necessitated by an accident75 • 
Any doubts as to the existence or possibility of existence of defects may give rise 
to a duty of examination. The scope of such a duty of examination and thus of 
the duty of disclosure is determined by the seller's possibilities of gaining 
knowledge. Thus the requirements will be higher in the case of a dealer in used 
cars having a workshop than in the case of a private party. In the case of 
commercial sellers, fraud is generally assumed if a defect that was bound to be 
detected in a proper examination is concealed76 • In any case, there must have 
been a reason for examination. No general duty of examination is placed on the 
dealer in used cars 77 • By extending the term of fraud, the courts succeeded in 
mitigating the buyer's difficulty of furnishing proof. That becomes especially 
clear in the decision handed down by the Regional Court of Nürnberg78 • In the 
court 's view, the seller must not give any indications as to the mileage reading if 
he does not know anything about it. If he does so all the same, he deliberately 
accepts a misrepresentation. Here the courts assume conditional intent on the 
part of the seller, which suffices to assume fraud. With the reasoning men-
tioned, the court at the same time relieved the buyer ofthe need to prove that the 
seller knew the actual mileage reading 79• Nevertheless, in many cases the buyer 
should not be able to succeed in proving fraud. Therefore, the legal remedy 
under Art. 476 Civil Code is a suitable means to a Iimited extent only. The same 
difficulties are encountered with respect to Art. 123 Civil Code, which allows 
the buyer to rescind the contract for fraud. The difficulties encountered in 
furnishing proof have resulted in buyers attempting to hold the seller liable for 
negligent misrepresentation of the condition of a car on grounds of cu/pa in 
contrahendo. However, the Federal High Court has rejected liability attaching 
to cu/pa in contrahendo as far as the condition of the car was in question80• 
Although there are compelling arguments against the Federal High Court81 , a 
change in court practice is not to be expected in the near future. 
218 (bb) The courts have also stopped the seller's attempts at exempting himself 
from any liability by holding him liable for warranted qualities (zugesicherte 
Eigenschaften) under Art. 459, para. 2 Civil Code even if he excluded Iiability 
(No. 204). lt is decisive that according to the courts a promise may also be made 
tacitly. More recently the following matters were regarded as warranted quali-
ties: kilometres travelled by the engine82 , the question whether a replacement 
engine has been installed or whether it is the original engine83 , and the statement 
included in the advertising message 'overhauled by a master-hand and inspected 
by theTechnical Inspection Authority' 84 • Of special importance to the trade in 
cars is the Federal High Court's decision of 25 June 197585, where the mileage 
stated on the sales ticket gave rise to the seller's liability under Art. 459, para. 2 
Civil Code. As far as exemption clauses are included in standard form contracts, 
Art. 11, item 11 AGBG applies, and also covers used cars 86• There it is expressly 
stated that a user of standard form contracts is liable for warranted qualities 
(zugesicherte Eigenschaften) even if he has excluded liability in such standard 
form contracts. 
There is a significant change over previous court practice. The Federal High 
Court has declared an exclusion of liability to be inadmissible only if by the 
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warranty of certain qualities the consumer was meant to be protected against 
consequential damage resulting from defects87 • Liability for damage resulting 
directly from the Jack of a certain quality was excluded. Pursuant to the new 
statutory regulation the exclusion of any liability is forbidden 88• Likewise the 
user is forbidden to limit his liability to direct damage89 • From this it is not tobe 
gathered, however, that the user must make good consequential damage 
resulting from defects in addition to damage directly attributable to the Jack of a 
warranted quality. The Act merely makes clear that the user is liable at any rate 
for the interest in the performance of the contract (Erfüllungsinteresse). (By 
way of damages the buyer must be placed in the same position as if the seller had 
effected due performance.) Consequential damage resulting from defects is 
included only if the seller's warranty has for its very object the customer's 
protection against such damage. The legislator wanted expressly to retain the 
definition adopted by the courts 90 • Cases so far decided by the courts relate 
throughout to circumstances where liability was excluded in a standard form 
contract, so that in future Art. 11, item 11 AGBG should be decisive. 
219 (cc) The applicability of Art. 459, para. 2 Civil Code/ Art. 11, item 1 I AGBG 
does not automatically give rise to the seller's liability; all standard form 
contracts include what is known as a writing clause9' pursuant to which amend-
ments including warranted qualities must be in writing. Court practice 
regarding writing clauses lacked uniformity prior to the entry into force of the 
AGBG. The Federal High Court had declared that clause tobe admissible in 
principle92, and in some cases did not object to its validity93• At the same tiine, 
though, it had assumed in the cases it had to decide94 that the parties had set aside 
the obligation to comply with the required form by way of informal agreement. 
Here no express agreement is required. lt is sufficient if the parties according to 
the objective meaning of their statements had intended the authoritative quality 
of the additional verbal agreement; they need not have had in mind the writing 
clause95 • In this case a notional construction to the effect that the parties had 
cancelled the requirement of writing becomes a mere fiction. Of late, the Federal 
High Court has even denied the effectiveness of a writing clause if the seller by 
invoking that clause contradicts his previous conduct96 • From that decision the 
conclusion may be drawn that the Federal High Court considers writing clauses 
possible only within certain limits, because it reviews such clauses by way of 
checking the subject matter of standard form contracts97 • The enactment of the 
AGBG brought about a new situation and legal writers are not agreed on how to 
handle it: some of them want the individual agreement pursuant to Art. 4 
AGBG to have priority 98, while others take as a criterion whether a principal or 
collateral obligation is the subject matter of the writing clause99• lt should be 
correct to apply the prohibition of circumvention under Art. 7 AGBG. Through 
the writing clause, the seller wants to establish that his Iiability, which is regu-
lated in a mandatory way under the AGBG, follows a pattern other than the 
statutory one. This is a typical constituent fact of circumvention. For this reason 
it is not admissible to undermine the unlimited liability for warranted qualities 
(zugesicherte Eigenschaften) in standard form contracts by requiring writing for 
such a warranty. 
It remains to be seen whether the Federal High Court will take up the 
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discussion in legal literature. In its latest decision made public on this body of 
subjects, the Federal High Court has substantiated the Jawfulness of a writing 
clause without discussing the problems any further by simply making reference 
to the fact that the clause makes allowance for the interests of the seller and that 
the buyer should urge that verbal agreements be incorporated into the con-
tract97". Even if the decision reviewed the lawfulness of a writing clause rather in 
passing, doubts are appropriate whether in future the Federal High Court will 
take a decision in favour of consumers. 
220 (dd) 'Intermediary clauses' constitute a new attempt at exempting oneself 
from liability existing despite the admissibility in principle of an exclusion of 
liability. Standard form contracts in the second-hand car trade usually provide 
for a dealer acting merely as the seller's agent empowered to contract. The 
arrangement is made palatable to the seller by the fact that in a sale between 
private consumers he will save value added tax and therefore may obtain a 
higher price. In actual fact it is a matter of shifting the risk of liability to the 
private seller. The dealer may then pocket the commission without having to 
struggle with problems of warranty. The buyer must pay the higher price 
without getting in return a car tested by an expert. Previous court practice 
regarding intermediary clauses lacked uniformity. In travel contracts, the 
Federal High Court has cancelled the intermediary clause as an inadmissible 
clause excluding liability 100, and has held liable for culpa in contrahendo the 
dealer in second-hand cars who under his standard form contract acted merely 
as agent empowered to contract; provided he held the unqualified position of an 
agent 101 • The AGBG requires that the legal position be reconsidered. In some 
cases the inadmissibility of intermediary clauses is justified by the priority rule 
of Art. 4 AGBG. lf a user, it is argued, presents himself to the contracting party 
as principal, he cannot escape direct contractual consequences by terming 
himself intermediary in the standard form contract. The very impression 
created by bis conduct in relation to third parties gives rise to an individual 
agreement which has priority over the agreement contained in the intermediary 
clause102• Here also, it seems correct to judge the legal position by Art. 7 AGBG. 
The dealer wants to evade liability for warranted qualities (zugesicherte Eigen-
schaften) which is important in practice, Art. 11, item 11 AGBG. Liability for 
warranted qualities cannot be limited, though, so intermediary clauses consti-
tute attempts at circumvention. The courts have not so far followed that 
reasoning. Without the AGBG being taken into consideration, intermediary 
clauses are considered effective 103 • 
221 (ee) Contracts of sale concerning used goods do not only relate to cars, 
although the purchase of used cars is a main subject in court practice and juris-
prudence. Antiques, art objects, coins and stamps are also used goods. But these 
are hardly consumer goods, rather luxuries which only certain groups of 
customers can afford. All the same reference is made to an important decision in 
which the Federal High Court 104 has extended the principles established in the 
second-hand car trade to include private auctions of art objects. The judgment 
is of paramount importance to all auctions, particularly those concerning 
antiques, art objects, coins and stamps. Although the Federal High Court has 
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made it clear that the decision does not comment in principle on the question of 
exclusion of warranty by the art auctioneer, auctioneers should extend their 
exclusions of liability in consequence of that decision. So much the more signi-
ficant therefore are reasons speaking against that decision. Apart from doubts 
as to the suitability of equating used goods with old objects, etc., it should be 
noted above all that the Federal High Court grants the auctioneer a claim for the 
purchase price obtained even if there is manifest disproportion between the 
object bought by auction and its actual value. As the party interested has only 
Iimited possibilities of checking catalogue statements 105 , in the final analysis 
such court practice results in the highest bidder being deprived of all his rights. 
Therefore that decision cannot be followed. 
(c) Leasing contracts (No. 334) 
222 Related to contracts of sale are leasing contracts and hire-purchase agree-
ments, respectively. In a leasing contract the person known as lessor lets to the 
person known as lessee for valuable consideration a thing or several things, with 
the Iessor being exempted from the risk of and liability for destruction, damage 
and maintenance of the things. On the other hand, the lessee has the advantage 
of being allowed to return an obsolete product to the lessor. The distribution 
of risk is thus similar to that in the law of sales. As a rule, a Ieasing contract 
includes an option of purchase. The Iessor may be a manufacturer, his subsi-
diary (in 'producer leasing') or a person independent of the producer, particu-
larly a finance leasing enterprise 106• Normally, leasing contracts are made on the 
basis of standard form contracts 107• However, the contracts underlying leasing 
transactions are mostly contracts concluded between two companies, so·that the 
consumer is less often exposed to that legal form, as leasing involves predomi-
nantly the letting or renting of movable industrial capital goods 108, among which 
the renting of commercial vehicles occupies a prominent position 109• 
By comparison, hire-purchase110 is a lease in which the lessor grants the lessee 
the right to purchase an object at a certain price within a specified period, with 
the rent paid until such time being applied against the purchase price. Hire-
purchase is a lease including an option of purchase. The decisive difference 
compared with a leasing contract is that in a hire-purchase transaction the lessor 
must bear the cost of maintenance and assume the risk of accidental 
destruction 111 • Unlike a leasing transaction, a hire-purchase transaction affects 
the final consumer, for example' the purchase of colour television sets where 
agreements are made increasingly on that basis. 
223 (aa) The subject matter of the contract is always laid down in standard form 
contracts. Exemption clauses have for their object the exclusion of statutory 
rights of redhibitlon or abatement under the lease. The question arises whether 
the prohibition of exclusion of any warranty included in Art. 11, item 10 is 
applicable to hire-purchase transactions. The views taken by legal writers differ 
and the courts have not so far taken any decisioris 112 • According to its tenor, 
Art. 11, item 10 in addition to contracts of sale relates also to contracts for 
delivery. The result of the broad wording of the introductory sentence is that 
loan for use contracts, such as leasing contracts and hire-purchase agreements, 
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must also admit of being gauged by the provision of the AGBG. However, the 
peculiarities of the contract type in question must be taken into account. 
Applied to hire-purchase agreements, the AGBG says that it is inadmissible to 
exclude any warranty. The lessee must have the right to demand of the lessor 
that he shoi.Ild maintain the subject matter of the contract in a condition fit for 
use. By contrast, what can be imagined is an exclusion of the right of cancella-
tion. However, that right is revived if the lessor fails to comply with one of his 
principal obligations. Since the duty to maintain the subject matter of the 
contract continues to exist, the lessor cannot exempt himself from the conse-
quences of violation of that principal obligation 113 . 
224 (bb) A regulation of warranty typical of hire-purchase transactions is that the 
lessor excludes his warranty under landlord and tenant law and instead assigns 
to the customer the claims he has against )1is seller under a warranty pursuant to 
the law of sales 114. The admissibility of that clause is determined by Art. 11, item 
lOa AGBG. Accordingly, so-called vicarious liability clauses, which limit the 
buyer's claims under a warranty to the granting of claims against third parties or 
make them contingent upon the prior suing of third parties, are forbidden. 
Contrary to their misleading tenor, vicarious liability clauses are not inad-
missible in general, but only if they definitely limit liability by reference to third 
parties or require the consumer to institute proceedings against a third party. 
Under an appropriate clause the consumer may therefore be forced to seek 
performance of the warranty from a third party prior to having recourse to the 
lessor 115 . Therefore vicarious liability clauses in lease contracts are admissible. 
However, this applies on the understanding that the requirements of prior 
recourse to a third party must be kept as low as possible 116. Thus recourse to a 
third party is considered to have failed if the third party cannot per form or does 
not succeed in performing the warranty 117• The consequence of failed recourse 
to a third party is that the user of standard form contracts will be liable himself. 
(d) Energy contracts 
225 Contracts for the supply of gas, water and electricity involve a special type of 
purchase transaction 118. The legal relationship between consumers and public 
utilities is currently still regulated by the General Supply Conditions of Elec-
tricity 119 and the General Slipply Conditions of Gas120, which form part of the 
contracts 121 . The supply of the population with water is handled by local 
authorities 122. As far as that goes, there is no regulation comparable to the 
General Supply Conditions applicable to all waterworks. However, local 
authorities have drafted model by-laws 123 which are always adopted. The perti-
nent standard form contracts constitute a far-reaching deprivation of the 
consui;ner's rights. In the General Supply Conditions of Gas and Electricity 
respectively, any liability is excluded (II 5). A different legal position applies to 
special customers, i.e. industry. Here individual contracts are negotiated in the 
case of which the General Supply Conditions do not apply or apply to a limited 
extent only 124. Compared therewith, waterworks assume a somewhat friendlier 
attitude towards the consumer. Liability is excluded merely for inevitable 
events, while otherwise in the case of a breakdown, as far as it is attributable to 
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fault, liability is assumed, Art. 40, sentences land 2 of the model by-laws. 
The courts have fixed the limits of exemption of liability. They have recog-
nised throughout the exclusion of any liability. In support thereof the weil 
known reasoning is given that the tight price calculation justifies an exclusion of 
liability. The AGBG does not improve legal protection because it does not apply 
to standard form coutracts under public law: standard form contracts must be 
incorporated in the contract by an agreement to that effect, Art. 2 AGBG. This 
requirement does not exist in the case of legal rules which determine the subject 
matter ofthe contract in advance without any agreement 125. The General Supply 
Conditions of Electricity and Gas count among these legal rules. By compari-
son, contracts between public utilities and special customers, i.e. industry, are 
subject to the AGBG, since in that case contracts are not concluded on the basis 
of the General Supply Conditions. Art. 10 and II AGBG are not applicable 
either, Art. 23, para. 2, item 2 AGBG. The purpose ofthat regulation is that in 
contracts of a private-law nature bulk consumers are treated in essentially the 
same way as normal-rate consumers 126. So in theory public utilities may also 
enforce the exclusion of any liability in relation to bulk consumers. 
The legislator himself has recognised that the standard form contracts of 
public utilities call for a review. He has therefore supplemented the enabling 
section provided for in the Energiewirtschaftsgesetz which authorises the 
issuance of standard form contracts of public utilities (electricity and gas) to the 
effect that the authority issuing orders must in future design such standard form 
contracts in a weil balanced way, taking into account mutual interests, Art. 26 
AGBG. The same principles apply now to the Allgemeine Versorgungs-
bedingungen Wasser und Fernwärme (AVB Wasser und Fernwärme, General 
Conditions of Supply with Water and Long-Distance Heat), Art. 27 AGBG. A 
review of the present regulation seems appropriate at any rate in view of the fact 
that on account of the AGBG private enterprises are subject to much stricter 
liability. Such a different treatment ofthe state and of enterprises has frequently 
been criticised by the press and has been described as unjust. The pressure 
exercised by the media should at least have been instrumental in the fact that the 
Federal Economics Ministry with the consent of the Bundesrat has issued a 
Verordnung über Allgemeine Bedingungen für die Elektrizitätsversorgung von 
Tarifkunden (A VB Elt, General Conditions for the Supply of Electricity to 
Normal-Rate Consumers) and a Verordnung über allgemeine Bedingungen für 
die Gasversorgung von Tarifkunden (A VB Gas, Order Concerning General 
Conditions for the Supply of Gas to Normal-Rate Consumers) 127. Both orders 
came into force on 1 April 1980 and at that time superseded the General Supply 
Conditions of Electricity and Gas. The most important changes lie in the fact 
that a duty to give notice of interruptions of supply was incorporated and that 
Jiability was extended. According to the future legal position, the public utility 
will be fully Jiable for damage caused to a customer through interruptions of or 
irregularities in supply if such damage results in killing, bodily harm or injury to 
health; in the case of damage to property and pecuniary damage it will be liable 
only in the event of intent and gross negligence limited to a maximum amount 
for the total damage caused to all consumers andin the amount of DM 5000 in 
each case of lass to an individual consumer. The design of liability will certainly 
have an influence on the drafting of the AVB Wasser und Fernwärme12s. 
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4 Typical exemption clauses in contracts for the supply of services 
(a) Contracts for the production of new goods 
226 Contracts that relate exclusively to the production of new goods are of no 
great importance in practice, because the majority of articles required by private 
consumers are bought in prefabricated condition. Consumers (except those 
earning high incomes) only very rarely have something specially made to meet 
their requirements. But it is precisely consumers earning low incomes that are 
especially prone to have products that have yet to be adjusted to fit their homes 
sold to them on the doorstep, for example roller blinds, outer door linings and 
radiators. As regards their legal nature, these are contracts for work and 
materials (i.e. nonfungible things) which in some cases are governed by regula-
tions under the law of sales and in other cases by regulations under the law of 
contracts to manufacture. The problems encountered in door-to-door sales 
(No. 324) with reference to the AbzG and attempts on the part ofmanufacturers 
to circumvent the AbzG through cash transactions will not be discussed in detail 
here. Usually the legal position is such that the consumer cannot get rid of the 
contract, because the AbzG is not applicable and he is unable to prove fraud or 
the like. Therefore he is compelled to cancel the contract. The firms concerned 
speculate precisely on that attitude and therefore in their standard form 
contracts stipulate that the consumer has to pay lump-sum damages at the rate 
of about 40%. 
Prior to the coming into force of the AGBG, the courts in contrast to some 
legal writers 129 had already recognised the settlement of claims in a lump sum 130 
and with reference to the statutory regulation to be expected had developed 
principles similar to those that later became law. The extent to which the settle-
ment of claims in a lump sum is admissible follows from Art. 11, item 5 AGBG 
or from Art. 11, item 6 AGBG if damages in a lump sum must be interpreted as 
a disguised conventional penalty. While conventional penalties are ineffective 
ipso jure in the cases provided for in Art. 11, item 6, Art. 11, item 5 permits 
settlement of claims in a lump sum if the damage to be expected in the normal 
course of events is not thereby exceeded and if it is not made impossible for the 
consumer to prove that the damage is smaller than the lump sum. In the case of 
each settlement agreement it is therefore a question of whether or not in actual 
fact it· is a disguised conventional penalty. According to the Federal High 
Court's practice 131 it is a matter of a conventional penalty if the performance of 
the main contract is to be secured thereby and thus pressure is exerted on the 
customer, while lump-sum damages merely serve to facilitate the enforcement 
of a contractual claim that is presumed to exist. That such court practice gives 
rise to considerable difficulties in practice is obvious, since lump-sum damages, 
too, are of a penal nature. The simplified assessment of damages in a lump sum 
serves to perform the contract, so 'lump sums' must be controlled regardless of 
their legal qualification 132• lt is necessary to determine the limits of a defensible 
measure within the meaning of Art. 11, item 5 AGBG. Only thus can effective 
protection of the consumer against lump sums be achieved. The AGBG does not 
give any clues as to what is still defensible. To begin with it is necessary that 
liability for damages should exist on merit 13 3. Therefore, in contracts to manu-
facture of the type in question, only such items asrelate to a damage computed 
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in the abstract may be included in lump-sum damages. The lump sum consists 
mostly of a profit share and the agent's commission. The assessment must be 
based on the standards applicable to a reasonable man. The Federal High 
Court's practice concerning the law of sales shows that a lump sum of 40% 
exceeds the defensible measure. Thus the Federal High Court has recognised a 
lump sum of 20% in the trade in second-hand cars and 25% in the purchase of 
furniture 134• Lump-sum damages at the rate of 40% are therefore ineffective 
under Art. 6, para. 2 AGBG 135 • Any reduction of the lump sum to a defensible 
measure is impossible. As regards the burden of proof, it is ensured both by the 
wording of Art. 11, item 5a AGBG 136 and by more recent Federal High Court 
practice 137 that not the customer, but the user of standard form contracts has to 
prove defensibility. However, the burden of proof that the damage was much 
less is on the consumer 1Js. 
(b) Contracts for repairs 
227 Contracts for repairs are separate contracts for the repair of durable 
consumer goods. These are not repairs to the object of purchase or work 
performed under a warranty. As regards their legal nature, contracts for repairs 
are contracts to manufacture. The subject matter of contracts for repairs is 
determined by the standard form contracts of the contractors involved as far as 
repairs to durable consumer goods are concerned. In this connection four 
sectors are of importance: contracts to repair motor cars and radio or television 
sets, contracts to clean textiles and maintenance contracts for durable consumer 
goods. If we disregard maintenance contracts, which are often known to be 
concluded in connection with the sale of complicated technical appliances -
they are concluded on the basis of standard form contracts which are not, 
however, as uniform - a notable development may be observed in the sectors 
mentioned. The basis of contracts for repairs are mostly terms recommenda-
tions suggested by the umbrella organisation concerned and reported to the 
Federal Cartel Office under Art. 38, para. 2, item 3 GWB 139• The drawback of 
these terms, though, is that they are not binding on all repair shops or tradesmen 
in the trade or industry involved. 
228 (aa) Exemption clauses in contracts for repairs serve above all the purpose of 
exempting the contractor from any contractual liability. Such clauses are now 
checked by the AGBG, Art. 11, item 10 AGBG. That provision covers not only 
contracts for the supply of new goods, but also contracts for services 140• 
According to the legislator's intent repairs shall be subject to the AGBG. The 
contractor may therefore restrict his standard form contract within the limits set 
by Art. 11, item 10 AGBG (No. 209). 
The business conditions negotiated between the motor-car trade and the 
ADAC were adjusted to the requirements of the AGBG in 1977. The duty to 
repair defects, the revival of the statutory right of redhibition or abatement and 
the period of limitation conform to the AGBG. The principal's liability is 
restricted to intent and gross negligence. The exclusion of liability for slight 
negligence is not in line with the legislator's judgment (No. 210). 
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229 (bb) A Jimitation of liability to 15 times the wage in standard form contracts of 
dry cleaners has resulted in a number of controversial court decisions in recent 
years 141 • The AGBG provides for improved legal protection of the consumer in 
future, because limitation of Iiability is ineffective at any rate as far as the 
damage is attributable to intent or gross negligence, Art. 11, item 7 AGBG. 
According to the view taken here, an exclusion of liability is inadmissible also in 
the event of merely slight negligence. Even if that view is not followed, the 
ineffectiveness of a limitation of liability irrespective of the degree of fault 
follows from the fact that the linking of a limitation of liability to the price of 
cleaning is not justified and therefore infringes good faith, as the price of 
cleaning bears no relation whatsoever to the value of the thing. If there is a 
limitation of liability, it must be geared to the value of the thing tobe cleaned 142• 
The legal position will be clarified by the action the Consumer Protection 
Association has brought in the Regional Court of Cologne. 
230 (cc) Exemption clauses in maintenance contracts have not so far made them-
selves feit in a particular way. This may be attributable above all to the fact that 
the specific problems involved in maintenance contracts have not so far been 
studied 143 • Problems may arise, though, if the conclusion of a maintenance 
contract coincides with the conclusion of a contract of sale. As a rule, the buyer 
is then obliged to effect monthly payments to the seller under a warranty 
connected with the contract of sale. lt is possible that under the maintenance 
contract the customer pays for a service which pursuant to the provisions of the 
Civil Code and the AGBG the seller has to render free of charge. The problems 
may be solved with the aid of Art. 7 AGBG which forbids circumvention of 
Art. 11, item 10AGBG144 • 
Maintenance contracts often include clauses aiming at inducing the consumer 
to conclude long-term contracts which cannot be judged in terms of money. The 
AGBG, Art. 11, item 12, now puts an end to such attempts (No. 268). 
(c) Contractsfor bank services (No. 321) 
231 The services provided by credit institutions are regulated without exception 
by standard form contracts 145 • Whether transfer, bill or cheque transactions or 
investments are concerned, the detailed provisions of the standard form 
contracts of banks, savings banks, etc., which hardly differ from each other, 
always take effect. The AGBG fully applies to the standard form contracts of 
banks. While in anticipation ofthe forthcoming AGBG banks, savings banks as 
weil as people's banks and agricultural credit cooperatives had changed a great 
number of individual provisions in their standard form contracts in consulta-
tion with the Federal Banking Supervisory Office (Nos. 282-289) and the 
Federal Cartel Office effective l January 1976146, the many changes to the Act 
which at that time was still a bill once again required thorough revision 147 • In 
credit contracts questions of warranty law do not, of the nature of things, play 
an important part. So much the more important to the consumer are exemption 
clauses limiting liability. In the event of delays or faulty performance in the 
handling of orders banks, also after the revision, had been liable basically only 
for loss of interest, unless the customer had especially pointed out to the bank 
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the occurrence of a Ioss (item 7 AGB). Such a limitation of liability infringes 
Art. 11, item 7 AGBG in so far as the damage is attributable to intent or gross 
negligence. In the past, clauses through which banks limited their liability for 
persons employed in performing their duties to fault in the selection of such 
persons have been a subject of argument. lt is a fact that banks have to rely on 
third parties in performing the functions entrusted to them. Such endeavours of 
exemption have now been stopped, since banks are liable for intent and gross 
negligence on the part of persons employed in performing their obligations. 
Banks have started an attempt to circumvent statutory liability by the regulation 
provided for in item 9 of their standard form contracts according to which upon 
involvement of a third party the customer's order is deemed to have been dele-
gated pursuant to Art. 664, para. 1, sentence 2 Civil Code and consequently 
their liability is Iimited to the careful selection and instruction of the third party 
they commissioned. Worded in such broad terms, that clause should infringe 
the prohibition of circumvention, Art. 7 AGBG. The last body of subjects tobe 
dealt with in connection with exemption clauses relates to liability for the giving 
of information, item 10 standard form contracts of banks. In this respect, too, 
Art. 11, item 7 AGBG makes it clear that a bank is liable at any rate for intent or 
gross negligence. Even if the AGBG extended protection, especially in relation 
to banks, the problems involved in the admissibility of non-liability for slight 
negligence become clear once more. All business transactions are handled by 
banks and their institutions. They are not obvious to the consumer and cannot 
be controlled by him. Mistakes are made only in the bank's sphere ofrisk. From 
that point of view it should be considered whether or not a correction via the 
general clause is advisable148. 
(d) Contracts of insurance 
232 Contracts providing for insurance coverage are concluded on the basis of 
general conditions of insurance149 • The subject matter is determined by the type 
of insurance involved - i.e. Iife, accident, health, motor car, liability, legal 
expenses or household insurance. General conditions of insurance come within 
the scope of the AGBG irrespective of whether or not they have been approved 
by the supervisory authority or have even been recommended150 • Only two 
provisions of the Act are expressly declared to be inapplicable to general 
conditions of insurance: Art. 23, para. 2, item 6 AGBG declares Art. 11, item 
12 AGBG (term of long-term contracts) to be inapplicable, under Art. 23, 
para. 3 AGBG, Art. 2 AGBG (incorporation in the contract; No. 268) does not 
apply to general conditions of insurance which were approved by the super-
visory authority. For reasons of size it is impossible within the framework of this 
study to deal with the problems of exemption clauses in the insurance business. 
Depending on their subject matter, insurance contracts differ widely, so that in 
any event either statements in a wider context or very detailed statements would 
come into question. All the same, it should be noted that authors close to the 
insurance industry try to declare the AGBG tobe applicable to a limited extent 
only. In justification of their view these authors usually advance that the Iists of 
prohibitions as thecentral element ofthe AGBG do not really 'fit' the insurance 
business151 • 
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lt is also a matter of argument whether descriptions of insurance benefits in 
contracts of insurance are subject to control of content under Ar't. 9 AGBG. lt 
could be imagined that exclusions of benefits are treated as an unreasonable dis-
crimination contrary to good faith which would result in their being ineffective. 
If the legislative purpose, namely to protect the consumer against being walked 
all over by the involved wording of standard form contracts, is taken as a basis, 
that basis exists also in the case of descriptions of insurance benefits in contracts 
of insurance 152. 
(e) Marriage brokerage contracts 
233 Many problems are presented by contracts under which the consumer avails 
himself of the services of an intermediary, particularly of a marriage broker. 
Since there are only very few statutory regulations (Arts. 652 et seq. Civil Code), 
there are a great many standard form contracts in this field. Marriage brokerage 
contracts are also subject to the AGBG. However, the specific problems do not 
relate to cases of non-liabilityl53. 
(/) Contracts of carriage 
234 The subject matter of contracts of carriage of passengers or goods is 
determined almost exclusively by standard form contracts or similar 
regulations 154. In the field of transport and communications, the Federal 
Minister is authorised to issue statutory orders by which he may lay down the 
subject matter of standard conditions of carriage in commercial passenger 
service, Arts. 51, 58, para. 1, item 3 Personenbeförderungsgesetz (Carriage of 
Passengers Act). As regards commercial passenger service, the Federal Minister 
of Transport has acted upon his power by issuing1ss the Verordnung über die 
Allgemeinen Beförderungsbedingungen für den Straßenbahn- und 0-Busver-
kehr sowie den Linienverkehr mit Kraftfahrzeugen (Order concerning general 
conditions of carriage by tramway and trolley bus and motor cars running 
regular services) of 27 February 1970. The same applies to goods traffic, 
Arts. 20a, para. 5, 84f, para. 4 GüKG (Güterkraftverkehrsgesetz, Road 
Haulage Act). Here the Kraftverkehrsordnung (KVO) für den Güterverkehr mit 
Kraftfahrzeugen (Beförderungsbedingungen) Reichskraftwagentarif (RKT) 
Part 1of30 May 1936 is applicable 1s6. 
The Eisenbahnverkehrsordnung (Railway Traffic Regulation) of 8 
September 1938157 , applying to the carriage of goods and passengers by rail, was 
issued by the Reich Minister of Transport on the basis of the authority given 
under Arts. 458, 460 HGB. 
As regards air traffic, the authority of the Federal Minister of Transportation 
to lay down the conditions of carriage by regular service follow from Art. 21, 
para. 2 Luftverkehrsgesetz (Aviation Act)iss. 
The carriage of mail and parcels by the post office is regulated in Art. 7 Post-
gesetz (Postal Services Act). Accordingly, the relationship between the 
consumer and the Federal Postal Administration is determined by the 
provisions of the Postgesetz and by the Postordnungen (Postal Regulations) of 
16 May 1963 159 , issued by the Federal Minister of Post and Telecommunications 
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under Art. 14 Postverwaltungsgesetz (Postal Administration Act). 
The AGBG does not apply to public-law standard form contracts, since they 
constitute legal rules 160• The relationship between consumer and Postal 
Administration concerning the use of postal services is designed exclusively 
according to public-law principles. Standard form contracts that differ from the 
KVO of 27 February 1960 are excepted: these are subject to the AGBG. 
However, to such standard form contracts the prohibition of exclusion of 
liability under Art. 11, item 7 AGBG, Art. 23, para. 1, item 3 AGBG does not 
apply. The reasons why the legislator made such a regulation resemble those 
that caused the legislator to exclude special customers from the scope of applica-
tion of Arts. 10 and 11 AGBG 161 • To the consumer the exclusion of contracts of 
carriage from the scope of application of the AGBG means that legal protection 
in relation to public authorities is much smaller than in relation to private enter-
prises, because the provisions involved provide for non-liability within broad 
limits. 
Likewise of importance to the carriage of goods are the Allgemeinen 
Deutschen Spediteurbedingungen (ADSp, General German Forwarding 
Agents' Conditions) 162• These are standard form contracts which apply only 
subject to an agreement.to that effect between the parties. Under Art. 2 they 
also apply in the case of forwarding transactions involving non-traders, i.e. 
consumers. But the ADSp are applied mostly in contracts between forwarding 
agents and the shipping industry. 
5 Duty to perform additional services under contracts of sale and contracts 
for the supply of services 
235 The subject of this part of the study is all obligations of the consumer's 
contracting party exceeding the mere repair of defects. 
(a) lncidental expenses of repair of defects 
236 Art. 476a Civil Code, which was inserted in the Civil Code under Art. 25 
AGBG, provides in sentence 1 that the buyer, if his rights of redhibition or 
abatement are limited to a claim for repair of defects, may demand of the seller 
that he should defray the expenses incidental to such a repair of defects, particu-
larly costs of transportation, travelling expenses, labour and material costs. 
Art. 476a Civil Code applies irrespective of whether the statutory rights of 
redhibition or abatement are superseded by standard form contracts or by indi-
vidual agreements. Art. 476a Civil Code was inserted by the legislator because 
under the buyer's claims for repair of defects the question of who, the buyer or 
seller, has to bear the expenses incidental thereto was not regulated 163 • The 
provision now lays down that basically the seller has to bear the expenses. As 
regards its nature, it is a statutory standard admitting of deviating agreements. 
Only deviations in standard form, i.e. through standard form contracts, were 
prohibited by law under Art. 11, item !Oe AGBG. In the process of legislation 
the proposal was made to design Art. 476a Civil Code as a standard of prohibi-
tion from which only traders were to be exempted 164• That would also have 
ensured comprehensive protection of the consumer in the case of individual 
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agreements. However, that view did not gain ground. The provision should not 
therefore be of great importance in practice 165• In the final analysis, Art. 476a 
Civil Code is a provision which was inserted for the sake of preserving the 
systematic pattern of legislation 166• Art. 476a, sentence 2 Civil Code exempts the 
seller from such expenses incidental to repair of defects as he cannot reasonably 
be expected to defray. This applies if expenses increase, because the thing 
bought was carried following delivery to a place other than the consignee's 
domicile or place of business, unless such carriage is in keeping with the use of 
the thing for its designated purpose. The last part of the sentence presents diffi-
culties in that it may often be a matter of argument when carriage is in keeping 
with the designated use. The latter shall be determined by way of interpretation, 
with that being decisive which ihe parties recognisably agreed upon to be the 
subject matter ofthe contract 167 • 
Pursuant to Art. 25, para. 2 AGBG the provision of Art. 476a Civil Code also 
applies to the law of contracts to manufacture. 
In contrast to Art. 476a Civil Code which, although tobe welcomed regarding 
its tendency, in the final analysis affords the consumer only inadequate protec-
tion, Art. 11, item lOc provides for a genuine extension of consumer protection 
as compared with previous practice. In contracts of sale 168 concerning electrical 
appliances 169, standard form contracts very often saddled the buyer with 
expenses incidental to repair of defects without the courts having taken 
exception to that situation. In the law of contracts to manufacture the courts 110 
settled the question of law in favour of the orderer 171 • Art. 11, item lüc AGBG 
binds the seller, in connection with Art. 476a Civil Code, or the manufacturer of 
a work under Arts. 633, para. 2, sentence 2 Civil Code to bear all expenses 
necessary to repair defects. The Act itself mentions only the costs of carriage, 
labour and material. The wording 'in particular' makes it clear that other costs 
will also be for the seller's account if such costs accrue, because the claim for 
repair of defects is satisfied 172• If the seller contests the defectiveness of a thing, 
but the buyer succeeds in proving it with the aid of an expert opinion, the buyer 
will have to bear the costs himself at least by the judgment of the AGBG. The 
absorption of costs presupposes the existence of a claim for repair of defects 173 • 
For the same reason the buyer should be bound to bear the expenses incurred as 
a result of his asserting his claim for substitute delivery under Art. 480, para. 1, 
sentence 1 Civil Code. For as regards its legal nature, the claim under Art. 480, 
para. 1, sentence 1 Civil Code is a claim for performance and not a claim und er 
a warranty 174, as is the right to demand repair of defects. But the buyer is not 
deprived of all his rights. lt would be worth considering whether or not on the 
principles of agency law (§683) he could be granted a refund claim in respect of 
those expenses. As Art. 11, item lüc was newly inserted it remains to be seen 
what steps users of standard form contracts will take in order to keep the costs 
imposed on them to a minimum. No doubt, in future the user will dictate the 
mode of dispatch to the buyer. lf a standard form contract does not provide for 
the mode of dispatch, the buyer must choose the least expensive one. If a 
standard form contract provides that repair of defects shall be carried out by a 
third party, such a contract must at the same time stiptrlate in which way the 
buyer is exempted from incidental transport charges 175 • If there is no such 
regulation, the seller must repair the defects himself. The seller must bear the 
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expenses incidental to repair of defects even if they are extremely high in relation 
to the type of defect. This does not apply to the law of contracts to manufacture, 
Art. 633, para. 2, sentence 3 Civil Code. Here the contractor may refuse to 
repair the defects if the expenses are disproportionately high 176• 
(b) Guarantee 
237 Provisions in standard form contracts often tnclude under the heading 
'guarantee' the consumer's rights in the event of a defect in the thing bought or 
the work produced. What precisely is meant by 'guarantee' differs widely. The 
terminology in both commercial and legal areas varies widely and there is no 
established court practice. The greatest protection to the consumer is afforded 
by the independent guarantee contract (selbständiger Garantievertrag). Under 
such a contract the seller warrants to answer for a certain result or purpose 
irrespective of impossibility and fault 177 • However, the result or purpose must 
differ from the mere contractual performance 178 • Tobe discriminated therefrom 
is the dependent guarantee contract (unselbständiger Garantievertrag). These 
are guarantees within the meaning of warranty of qualities under Arts. 459, 
para. 2, 633, para. 2 Civil Code 179• In the majority of cases such a guarantee 
restricts implied warranty. Here we speak of a guarantee of durabi/ily 180• lf from 
the wording of the contract it cannot be gathered beyond doubt what is contem-
plated by the parties, the aim and purpose must be established through 
interpretation. 
Independent contracts of guarantee are very rare in practice. The problems 
involved in dependent guarantee contracts within the meaning of Art. 459, para. 
2 Civil Code have already been discussed (No. 237). We shall therefore focus on 
what are known as guarantees of durability. Of practical importance are 
guarantees in the case of technical articles in which defects are to be expected 
after short periods of time, for instance electrical appliances 181 and cars 182 • 
Guarantees of durability for work produced have not so far gained such 
importance. They may occur in two different types of case. 
lt is a matter of a seller's guarantee of durability if the seller warrants freedom 
from defects or the existence of warranted qualities (zugesicherte Eigen-
schaften) not only for the time when the risk passes, but also for a limited period 
thereafter. In this case the seller undertakes to effect performance in excess of 
his obligations in that he promises to answer for freedom from defects in the 
thing sold also while the buyer is using it 183• Often such liability has not expressly 
been stipulated; however, the seller's guarantee of durability, which he gives for 
a certain period, will have to be interpreted to the effect that he will assume 
liability for all defects occurring within the period of guarantee which are not 
attributable to the buyer's fault 184• The subject matter and scope of guarantee 
are thus regulated differently from what is provided by law. If the guarantee is 
given under a standard form contract, the mandatory provisions of the AGBG 
must be observed. In particular an overall evaluation of the guarantee must not 
show that the seller's performance falls short of the minimum requirements 
und er Art. 11, item l 0 AGBG. More common than the seller's guarantee of 
durability is the producer's guarantee of durability or, simply speaking, the 
producer's guarantee. Such a guarantee exists if the manufacturer of a product 
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warrants to perform certain services and repair jobs which are handied not by 
the seller but by the producer's service department. In that way the consumer is 
tied down to the producer as regards his rights of redhibition or abatement. In 
practice the producer's guarantee is given in such a way that upon conclusion of 
the contract the seller fills in and stamps the producer's guarantee certificates. 
For legal purposes these are two independent contracts: a guarantee contract 
between producer and customer and a contract of sale between seller and 
buyer 185 • From the independence of the contracts it follows that the rights of 
redhibition or abatement under the two contracts cumulate 186• Producers and 
sellers try to evade this situation, which is favourable to the buyer, by the seller 
excluding warranty in his standard form contract and thus referring the buyer to 
the producer. Basically, such splitting of the contractual liability fails on 
account of the independence of the two contracts 187 • If non-guarantee is 
achieved, though, by the provisions ofthe guarantee contract being linked with 
those of the contract of sale, the effectiveness of an exemption clause is 
determined by Art. 11, item 10 AGBG. The arrangement made is then tobe 
judged by the prohibition of the vicarious liability clause. Accordingly, the 
buyer may be bound to seek enforcement of his claims from the producer before 
advancing claims against the seller (No. 224). 
Special problems emerge both regarding guarantees of durability and 
producer's guarantees if the guarantee period provided for in the standard form 
contract exceeds the statutory minimum period of limitation with respect to 
claims under a warranty (six months), for example the guarantee period for 
brand-new cars which has just been extended to one year. If the contents of the 
guarantee period has not been specified in the standard form contract, which is 
often the case, an extension may be of importance from three points of view 188 : 
- the period of Iimitation under Art. 477, para. 1 Civil Code shall be 
extended by contract; 
- the statutory period of limitation shall begin to run only after the expiry of 
the guarantee period; . 
- the statutory period of limitation shall begin to run only after the buyer 
has discovered the defect. 
In a decision dating from 1979, the Federal High Court followed the view 
taken by the majority of legal writers, who basically hold that a guarantee 
extending the statutory period of Iimitation means that that period begins to run 
at the time the buyer discovers the defect 189. 
The giving of a guarantee of durability which puts the buyer in a position 
more favourable than that provided by law does not permit the seller to deviate 
from the !ist of prohibitions under Art. 11, item 10 AGBG 190, for that is the 
typical incidence of circumvention under Art. 7 AGBG. By contrast, if the seller 
has planned the guarantee of durability to cover a period longer than that 
provided for in Art. 11, item lüf AGBG, he must not infringe the !ist of prohibi-
tions under Art. 11, item 10 AGBG within such a period. After the expiry of 
that period he may restrict his performance further than would be admissible 
under Art. 11, item 10 AGBG. 
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(c) Right to exchange 
238 This is the consumer's right to exchange defective goods for goods free from 
defects. lnherently the right to exchange is a right that applies only to contracts 
of sale. In the case of contracts to manufacture, the consumer has a right to 
performance of a work free from defects until acceptance of the work. He may 
therefore refuse to accept the defective work and may demand that it be 
produced again. From that point of view one cannot speak of exchange in 
contracts to manufacture. Tobe distinguished from the right to exchange is the 
right of redhibition. That right provides for the possibility of returning the 
defective commodity and of getting the money refunded. Standard form 
contracts usually exclude the buyer's right of redhibition. The buyer merely has 
a claim for repair of defects. Standard form contracts that are still more favour-
able to the consumer provide for a right of redhibition or abatement only if the 
seller is unable to remedy the defects. Since the coming into force ofthe AGBG 
users of standard form contracts are, however, obliged to adjust their contracts 
to the minimum requirements under Art. 11, item 10 AGBG. 
The buyer has a right to exchange in the case of everyday cash purchases made 
without standard form contracts if the subject matter of the contract is a mass-
produced, but defective - unascertained - product. lf the buyer is on his 
guard and returns the product in flawless condition, an exchange will be made. 
Usually sellers exclude the right to exchange in the case of seasonal sales, special 
offers, clearance and jubilee sales. 
In standard form contracts the buyer as a final consumer is not basically 
granted a right to exchange. However, there are indications that there will be a 
change as developments emerge. The terms recommendations (Kondition-
enempfehlung) negotiated between the ADAC and the trade associations of the 
motor-car industry grant the consumer a 'right to exchange', if serious defects 
cannot be remedied within a week 191 . 
The reverse is the case in contracts of sale between businessmen. Here 
standard form contracts usually provide for a right to exchangeI92; in some 
trades this is even the ruJeI93. 
6 Liability for advertising promises 
239 The consumer's expectations as regards the quality of the goods purchased is 
essentially determined by the seller's and producer's advertising statements. The 
same is true of the services sector, the sole difference being that here advertising 
statements concern not the quality of goods but the performance of services. 
The aim and purpose of advertising is to create in the consumer the desire and 
idea that the advertised commodity/service has the qualities described. 1f quite 
contrary thereto the Federal High Court takes the view 194 that the consumer does 
not link an advertising statement with the qualities actually existing, it fails to 
see the economic objective and function of advertising19s. Advertising not only 
serves to publicise and describe goods, but in many cases also takes the place of 
the seller's advice. 
The question of Iiability raises a great num ber of problems. Advertising state-
ments relate to the quality of a product or the performance of a service. 
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Therefore Iiability may arise only under the law of contract, so under contracts 
of sale the seller may even have to accept liability for advertising statements 
made by the manufacturer on which he has no influence whatsoever, but on 
which he often has to rely for lack of expert knowledge. Apart from some 
exceptions, the producer is not liable to the consumer under the law of contract. 
The principles developed by the courts regarding the manufacturer's Iiability 
concern only safety aspects. As a rule, liability for advertising promises 
concerns only the seller who under the provisions of the Civil Code and under 
the AGBG has to answer for advertising statements. 
The consumer's position is planned tobe somewhat improved by the reform 
of the UWG (No. 188). 
(a) Liability in the /aw of sales 
240 Art. 459 Civil Code, which is of importance solely in the law of sales, lays 
down in para. 1 the seller's liability for defects in the thing bought. Apart from 
the fact that not every incorrect advertising statement constitutes a defect, 
claims against the seller under Art. 459, para. 1 as a rule fail, because the seller 
may exclude his liability. This does not apply to Art. 459, para. 2 Civil Code, 
which provides for the seller's liability in the absence of a warranted quality 
(zugesicherte Eigenschaft). As here non-warranty on the part of the seller is 
impossible under Art. 11, item 11 AGBG, consumer claims may arise under 
Art. 459, para. 2 Civil Code. This presupposes that the seller warranted the 
buyer /consumer the existence of certain qualities. Deviations from advertising 
statements entitle the buyer to advance claims against the seil er only, if the 
advertising measure had been agreed by contract. If an express agreement or 
even an agreement in writing were required, a buyer would hardly ever raise any 
claims. As there may also be an implied warranty many problems of definition 
arise as to when (and, if so, whether) a statement has actually been warranted 196. 
According to court practice, statements made merely for the sake of publicity 
are not to give rise to legal liability 197. The courts extended the exclusion of such 
a type of legal Iiability to include quality standards which find expression in 
trademarks, test and quality labels and particularly in provisions under German 
Industrial Standards 198 . By way of exception, an accompanying trademark gives 
rise to liability from the point of view of a warranted quality (zugesicherte 
Eigenschaft). In the Trevira decision, the Federal High Court ruled that the 
processor of a Trevira product is Iiable to his customers under Art. 459, para. 2 
Civil Code to the effect that if Trevira is processed according to his directions 
the finished product will have certain qualities (for instance, crease-
resistance)199. The basically negative attitude of the courts towards the treatment 
of quality standards as warranted qualities in many cases has met with opposi-
tion from legal writers 200• The Federal High Court fails to see that the use of 
quality standards indicates the seller's willingness to answer for deviations from 
such standards. This does not conflict with the fact that standards such as 
German Industrial Standards merely constitute recommendations made by 
certain associations, i.e. are not presumptions of law201 . For at least concerning 
legal reality, German Industrial Standardsare so important that, as regards 
Iiability, it is justified to equate them with statutory provisions202 • Since, 
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basically, the courts do not treat advertising statements as warranted qualities 
(zugesicherte Eigenschaften), it has to be decided in a particular case whether, 
by way of exception, an advertising statement gives rise to liability all the same. 
The courts have developed certain criteria of definition which makes it possible 
to group the various types of cases203 • 
241 (aa) Thus a certain Irade usage permits the drawing of conclusions as to the 
seller's contractual declarations 204• These facts relate predominantly to disputes 
between businessmen, which is why the problems will not be dealt with here. 
242 (bb) Of importance to the consumer are those cases where a buyer relies on the 
seller's projiciency and expert knowledge and believes his statements as to 
quality. The typical situation here is that the experienced, skilful seller and the 
inexperienced consumer who is unsure of himself as regards business matters 
confront each other 20s. The Federal High Court206 emphasised this point of view 
in a recent decision by concluding an implied warranty from the display of a 
sales ticket showing miles travelled. The Federal High Court emphasised the 
same point of view in a case which concerned the relationship between a 
manufacturer of window frames and a producer of Iacquer207 • Here belong also 
various decisions from the area of trade in second-hand and new cars 208 • lt is 
interesting to note the reasons given by the Higher Regional Court of Cologne209 
for the step from advertisement to contractual warranty. There it says: 
'Advertising by a warranty ofthe qualities of a thing inducing a purchase, nego-
tiations with an interested party attracted by such advertising and the conclusion 
of a contract of sale must form an integrated whole'. 
243 (cc) The third group of cases are those where the buyer attaches special impor-
tance to certain advertised qualities of a thing. Two decisions by Higher 
Regional Courts should be mentioned here. In the first case210 , it was the 
question of whether the seil er 's statement that 'the wine was estate-bottled' 
amounted to a warranty; in the second case, it had tobe decided 211 whether the 
seller's statement regarding petrol consumption of the car bought was signi-
ficant within the meaning of Art. 459, para. 2 Civil Code. The courts decided 
both cases in favour of the consumer, because the qualities in question were of 
decisive importance in the purchase decision. 
244 (dd) Closely related to the aforementioned group of cases are those where a 
certain quality of the object of purchase is the prerequisite for the buyer to use it 
for his purposes. Accordingly, the Federal High Court set forth that the fact 
that the intended use known to both parties was incorporated in the contract 
might be interpreted as an implied warranty of quality (stillschweigend zuge-
sicherte Eigenschaft)212• However, it does not suffice that the buyer only knew 
of the intended use. Another factor must be appropriate statements by the seller 
indicating warranty of fitness for a particular purpose21J. 
(b) Liability in the /aw oj contracts to manujacture 
245 Basically, the principles established on the basis of the Iaw of sales also apply 
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to the law of contracts for work 214• However, it should be noted that the 
consumer has a claim for damages under Art. 635 Civil Code for a warranted 
quality (zugesicherte Eigenschaft) only if the contractor is at fault. Actually the 
cases decided by the courts concerned primarily contracts of sale. The reason 
why there is a disequilibrium is the different measure of industrialisation in the 
field of goods production and the services sector. Advertising and marketing 
developed only in the course of the industrialisation of goods production. ln the 
services sector the consumer's contracting party is often the minor trader or 
industrialist who has not yet mechanised his firm in a way similar to the produc-
tion of goods. Personal talks and advice given by the proprietor play a greater 
part here than in the case of contracts of sale. 
(c) Evaluation 
246 From the grouping of cases decided by the courts it might be gathered that the 
courts decide in a more or less standard manner. Quite the reverse should be the 
case. For either contracting party it is difficult to predict how the matter will be 
decided. The dilemma is not least attributable to the fact that the courts decide 
conflicts of interests between buyer and seller without taking into account at 
which stage of the chain of supply the contracts are made. To the Federal High 
Court it does not make any difference whether the buyer is a dealer or a 
consumer. The interest of the consumer as a buyer in purchasing a commodity 
that is free from defects differs widely from the interest of a dealer. The latter is 
interested in freedom from defects only in so far as his interest in selling the 
goods is concerned, while to the consumer freedom from defects is what 
matters215 . The uncertainty is even increased by the fact that from the parties' 
statements the courts often draw conclusions of which the parties could have 
had no idea at the time the contract was made. Thus the courts break away from 
implied warranty, which presupposes declarations of intent by either party, in 
favour of a sort of liability based on the consumer's confidence (Vertrauens-
haftung)216. 
The cause of that development should be that the courts often decide on the 
basis of equity aspects. On the other hand, they also show how inadequate the 
statutory instruments are. 
That is why legal writers come out increasingly in favour of the advertiser's 
liability for expectations he created in the consumerm. I f such a type of liability 
of the seller could be achieved de lege lata, the liability of the manufacturer who 
shares in advertising to a much greater extent would require an amendment of 
the law. Logically one author suggests that seller and manufacturer should be 
jointly and severally liable, which ought tobe achieved by an amendment to Art. 
463 Civil Code. Simultaneously, Art. 459, para. 2 Civil Codeshall be supple-
mented by a sentence running as follows: 'Advertising statements about the 
condition of a thing also qualify as warranties'. So far, the legislator has not 
taken up such proposals to amend the Civil Code. An enhancement of consumer 
protection to the effect that the seller has to answer for qualities described in the 
advertisement is still very remote. 
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7 Special rules concerning certain services 
(a) Travel contracts218 
247 To an ever-increasing part of the population, travelling has become a natural 
thing of our world of consumption. In 1978, 56.8% of the population above the 
age of 14 made one or several holiday trips219 • In addition to the travel agency, 
the travel boom has given rise to a further activity: that of the travel organiser. 
The organiser relieves the individual traveller of all the arrangements of his trip 
and offers the tourist transportation, board and lodging for a lump sum. The 
law followed that development in actual fact by creating Arts. 651 a-k Civil 
Code. Since 1October1979, the Civil Code has provided for a type of contract 
regulating the legal relationship between travel organiser and consumer. lt is the 
stated aim of this new legislation to protect the consumer against overcharging 
by a travel organiser. As a means of enforcement, the legislator created 
mandatory statutory provisions from which the travel organiser may not deviate 
to the detriment of the consumer. 
The new law of the travel contract has gone through a most varied history220 • 
As early as 1973 the Federal Ministry of Justice submitted an officials' draft 
concerning the travel contract to counteract abuses by travel organisers221 • The 
proposal was then introduced into parliament in the seventh legislative period, 
but was not debated222 • Only during the eighth legislative period did parliament 
deal with the law of travel contracts223 • From the start the regulation designed as 
a special act met with opposition from the Reisebüroverband (Association of 
Travel Agencies), which wanted to stop statutory regulation at any cost. To that 
end it reported to the Federal Cartel Office on 27 October 1976 a recommenda-
tion of general travel conditions for all-inclusive tours224 which in some respects 
improved the customer's position compared with previous practice. However, it 
was only possible to recommend the new general travel conditions to the 
members of the DRY - not to mention non-members. Travel brochures for the 
1978 summer season confirmed the view taken by the Federal Ministry of Justice 
that contractual relations regarding all-inclusive tours required statutory 
regulation225 . When looking through 28 brochures of major and minor travel 
organisers, the Ministry established that only one organiser observed the model 
conditions correctly. In all the other cases the standard form contracts used 
more or less deviated from the recommended model conditions to the detriment 
of the consumer. The aim of improving the consumer' s legal position in relation 
to travel organisers was now tobe achieved through other legislative measures. 
In derogation of the first bill of 6 May 1976, the second bill of 4 December 
1978226 provided for the incorporation of special protective provisions in the law 
of contracts to manufacture included in the Civil Code. The second bill passed 
the legislative organs in its present version227. 
The Act has solved a great many problems, but at the same time has raised a 
number of new questions. In the following not only the Act will be discussed: 
rather, the solutions offered by the law of travel contracts, the AGBG and the 
General Travel Conditions will be shown on the basis of the questions most 
important to the consumer. 
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248 (aa) In Art. 65 la, para. 1, the Act regulates only travel contracts consisting of 
'an aggregate of services'. lt is thus limited to all-inclusive tours, in the case of 
which the travel organiser in addition to transportation to the holiday place 
offers accommodation for a lump sum. A single travel service, for instance the 
booking of a charter flight or reservation of a holiday apartment, does not come 
within the scope of the new law of travel contracts 228 . The law of travel contracts 
therefore applies only to a minority of travellers; of the 26.1 million citizens of 
the Federal Republic who in 1978 made a holiday trip, only 24.1 OJo booked an 
all-inclusive tour229. 
Art. 65 la, para. 2 makes it clear that a travel organiser cannot escape the 
application of the Reisevertragsgesetz by declaring that he merely arranges 
contracts with individual hotels and carriers. If 'according to the other circum-
stances' he gave the impression that he intends to effect performance on his own 
responsibility, any statement to the contrary in his standard form contract is 
irrelevant. Here the law takes up the Federal High Court's practice concerning 
intermediary clauses 230. As early as 1973, in a decision ofwhich great notice was 
taken, the Federal High Court had declared the intermediary clause to be 
ineffective. In that judgment the Federal High Court took as a criterion an 
evaluation from the point of view of the traveller; that is, how the latter could 
and should interpret the travel organiser's statement, taking into account the 
latter's conduct on the whole and the accompanying circumstances. That sum 
and substance continues to be decisive for a close definition of 'other circum-
stances' as mentioned in the Act23t. Intermediary clauses may also be admissible 
under the travel contract if despite the fact that there are several travel services 
there is no link as to substance between them joining them together in an all-
inclusive tour. 
lt is open to question how the legal admissibility of intermediary clauses is to 
be judged if the subject matter of the contract is only one travel service. The 
statutory regulation is apparently unequivocal: it is a matter of a travel contract 
which basically forbids intermediary clauses if no less than two travel services 
were promised. All the same, the question is whether or not by way of exception 
a travel contract - consequently the exclusion in principle of an intermediary 
clause - may be presumed. This question is of great importance in practice, 
since in 1978 of the 6.4 million all-inclusive tours, 1.7 million concerned a 
holiday apartment or a charter flight232. In the judgment mentioned above, the 
Federal High Court has declared the intermediary clause to be inadmissible 
precisely in respect of a contract for the renting of a holiday house. Conse-
quently, the courts interpreted the tra vel contract in a broader sense than the 
legislator233 . Art. l, para. 3 of the government bill declared intermediary 
clauses in the performance of a single travel service to be void if the travel 
organiser renders the travel service on his own responsibility. The Legal 
Committee of the Bundestag deleted that paragraph without giving any reasons 
therefor. The only passage that may be considered for the purpose of interpreta-
tion is not clear234. lt does not therefore conflict with the statutory regulation to 
declare an intermediary clause to be inadmissible also in the case of a single 
travel service if the travel organiser to all appearances offers such a single travel 
service on his own responsibilitym. 
The Allgemeine Reisebedingungen (ARB, travel organisers' standard form 
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contracts) include only travel contracts under which an aggregate of travel 
services is rendered. This follows from the preamble. As to substance, the travel 
organisers' standard form contracts therefore coincide with Art. 65la, para. 1 
Civil Code. The intermediary clause declared tobe inadmissible by the courts 
was replaced by the provision in No. 9, item 1 and No. 9, item 5 of the recom-
mendation. Under No. 9, item 1 the organiser is liable under the duty to take 
businesslike care for reliable preparation of the trip, careful selection and 
supervision of hotels and carriers, correct description of services and due 
performance of the travel services agreed by contract in accordance with the 
local customs of the country or place of destination. Und er the heading liability, 
the travel organiser's duty is put into concrete terms. The purpose is to limit 
one's own obligations and to pass responsibility for defects on to hotels and 
carriers. In that form the clause meets with a great many objections 236. 
No. 9, item 5 lays down that the organiser is not liable for services rendered by 
third parties. Two types of case are mentioned: third-party services expressly 
termed as such (e .g. sporting events) and transportation by regular service. Even 
more definitely than under No. 9, item 1, the old objective of the intermediary 
clause is pursued und er the heading third-party services. The admissi bility of the 
third-party services clause must be judged on the basis of Art. 65 la, paras. 1 and 
2 Civil Code. If from the circumstances it follows that the travel organiser 
arranges the whole trip on his own responsibility, he cannot exempt himself 
from liability for 'third-party services'm. 
249 (bb) The consumer is under an obligation to effect prepayment. In derogation 
of the other provisions of the law of contracts to manufacture, he pays in 
advance. That derogation from the Iaw in force is not taken exception to by the 
courts, nor does the new Act alter the practice238. Some legal writers object to 
the traveller's obligation to effect prepayment239. They argue that such an 
obligation should be forbidden de lege f erenda to protect the socially weak 
customer. 
lt is precisely in the law of travel contracts that it would have suggested itself 
to make allowance for the fact that the travel organiser is able to enforce the 
obligation to effect prepayment only on account of his economic position, 
which is superior in relation to the consumer. In the case of individual trips the 
consumer effects a down payment only. lf the consumer is not then satisfied 
with the performance effected, his starting position is much more favourable, 
since he may withhold part of the price. 
250 (cc) Travel conditions are as a rule subject to certain reservations regarding 
individual travel services (terms, dates, etc.). In contrast to the first bill240, the 
Reisevertragsgesetz includes no provision relating to reservations. The admissi-
bility of reservation clauses regarding trips must therefore be judged on the basis 
of the AGBG. Under Art. 10, item 4 AGBG there are no objections to such 
clauses if the performance offered and performance effected do not differ 
unreasonably241 . Admissible changes must be distinguished from organisational 
defects which render the organiser concerned Iiable for damages242. 
In the event of changes in performance, No. 4 of the terms recommendation 
249 
takes as a criterion whether the customer can reasonably be expected to accept 
them. In the event of unreasonable changes, the consumer is granted a right of 
cancellation. 
251 (dd) Reservations as to price and alterations are to be found in almost all 
travel conditions. Unlike the officials' draft, the Act does not include any 
regulation. In that respect Art. 11, item l AGBG takes effect, under which the 
consideration cannot be changed if the trip commences within four months, 
unless an increase in price within the meaning of Art. 99, para. 2, item 1 GWB is 
concerned243 • No. 4, para. 4 of the recommendation includes a disguised price 
index clause, under which the consumer is granted a right of cancellation if the 
change in price exceeds a percentage rate that the customer may reasonably be 
expected to accept. The clause infringes Art. 11, item l AGBG, because the 
travel organiser is not bound by the price ofthe trip244 • Extra charges for oil price 
increases are therefore admissible only after the expiry of the four-month 
period. However, even then a possibility of control is left on the basis of Art. 9 
AGBG245 • Inadmissibility is not remedied by the granting of a right of cancella-
tion. All the same it is tobe welcomed that in the 1978 summer brochures travel 
organisers observed the absolute limit of 10% provided for in the first bill246 • 
252 (ee) Travel organisers' standard form contracts oblige the consumer to notify 
without delay defects discovered at the destination. The law of travel contracts 
remains silent about such duties to notify. All the same, there is no reason why 
there should not besuch a duty to cooperate. Under Art. 254 Civil Code the 
consumer is obliged to do all in his power to keep the damage as small as 
possible. 
The legal position becomes involved, though, where No. 13 of the terms 
recommendation greatly formalises that duty. Thus the consumer shall inform 
the travel organiser or the hotel or carrier provided that the local tour manager is 
not available or cannot remedy the irregularity in performance. First of all, the 
traveller is under an obligation to notify only as far as he can reasonably be 
expected to do so without any personal difficulties. In addition, the consumer is 
not obliged to notify the defect to the travel organiser if the local travel manager 
is unable to remedy the defect. Such sources of defect come exclusively within 
the travel organiser's responsibility. 
Lastly, the clause under which the consumer is denied claims if he fails to 
comply with those obligations infringes Art. 65ld, para. 2; an exclusion of 
abatement is admissible only if the traveller has culpably failed to comply with 
his duty to notify defects247 • 
Some travel organisers in their standard form contracts require that a record 
be drawn up with the travel manager involved, the existence of which is then 
prerequisite to the assertion of a claim for damages. The law of travel contracts 
includes no direct provision on that circumstance. However, from the provi-
sions on the request for remedial measures it follows that writing is not required, 
Art. 651c, para. 2 Civil Code. As far as that goes, previous court practice is 
confirmed248 • All the same, a record may be useful to the consumer in terms of 
evidence in litigation. The terms recommendation does not provide for such a 
formalised duty to cooperate. 
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While the law of travel contracts does not regulate the consumer's duty to 
cooperate, it does regulate the rights he may derive from the defect once it has 
been discovered, Art. 65 lc, paras. 2 and 3 Civil Code. The consumer may claim 
remedial measures if they do not involve a disproportionately high expenditure. 
Of importance is that under para. 3 the consumer is granted a right of self-help 
in the event of the organiser's failure to take remedial measures within a reason-
able period. In some exceptional cases even the requirement of appointment of a 
time limit is not applicable. 
The recommendation fails to meet the requirements of the Act. There is no 
reference to the customer's right of self-help. The present travel organisers' 
standard form contracts give the impression that the customer is meant to be 
misled as to the scope of his rights249 • 
253 (ff) As a rule, standard form travel contract conditions oblige the consumer 
to make a complaint within a certain period after the end oj the trip, although 
the period within which the consumer is required to report differs (between 3 
and 4 weeks). The argument about admissibility or scope of admissibility has 
now been settled by the unequivocal statutory regulation 250. Art. 65lg, para. l 
Civil Code, just as No. 14 of the recommendation, provides for a four-week 
time limit. Accordingly, the traveller may assert claims after the expiry of the 
time limit only if he was prevented from observing that limit through no fault of 
his own. Here the Act uses a legal conception which comes within the purview of 
procedural Iaw (cf., for instance, Arts. 230 et seq. Code of Civil Procedure). 
Characteristically enough as regards the questions of law in Arts. 230 et seq. 
(restoration to the original position) it is always a matter of whether or not a loss 
of rights occurs. In actual fact the four-week period results in a curtailment of 
the consumer's rights. 
Of great importance therefore are types of cases where the travel organiser 
must be denied pleading of the four-week time limit from the point of view of 
the inadmissible exercise of a right. Such facts exist if upon commencement of 
the trip the travel organiser knew about the defects through reports by the local 
tour manager2s1. 
254 (gg) Travel organisers have at all times had it in view to limit their liability as 
far as possible through exemption clauses. 
(1) As far as statutory rights under a warranty - redhibition, repair of 
defects, and abatement - are concerned, the AGBG had greatly improved the 
consumer's legal position. Now the rights under a warranty of the consumer 
who has concluded a travel contract follow from Art. 651 Civil Code. Para. l 
adopts unchanged the concept of defect under the law of contracts to manufac-
ture. lt merely differs linguistically in that the term 'use' was replaced by the 
term 'benefit'. In the government bill the legal remedies were tobe made contin-
gent upon whether performance 'was not effected or not effected as provided by 
contract'. That was a purposeful break with the system of impediments to 
performance provided for in the Civil Code and an attempt to continue the 
system of a uniform law on international purchases of movable things 252 . The 
regulation, which has since become law, gives rise to the most intricate problems 
of differentiation between the legal remedies for delay or impossibility under the 
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law of travel contracts and under the general part of the law of contract253 . 
In the event of a defect or the absence of a promised quality, the traveller may 
claim remedial action in principle under Art. 65lc, para. 2. Tothe consumer it is 
of importance that statements in a brochure may become a warranted quality 
(zugesicherte Eigenschaft)254. 
Lastly, Art. 651 d provides for a reduction in the price of a trip during the 
period when there is a defect. In addition, under Art. 65le the traveller has a 
right of cancellation if the defect results - by objective standards - in a 
considerable impairment of the trip or the traveller concerned cannot reason-
ably be expected to make the trip for any sound reason recognisable by the travel 
organiser. Usually an unsuccessful request for remedial action limited in time 
(Art. 65 le, para. 2) must precede cancellation. The legal consequences of 
cancellation are regulated in para. 3. lt should be of importance that even after 
cancellation of the contract legal obligations are placed upon the travel 
organiser, particularly obligations to transport the traveller back honie. 
Additional costs incurred are for the account of the travel organiser, para. 4. 
There is no deviating from the rights mentioned to the detriment of the 
consumer, Art. 651 k. The provisions mentioned reflect a design of rights und er 
a warranty tailored to the travel contract which improves the consumer's legal 
position. 
(2) Travel organisers have tried persistently to exclude and limit claims for 
damages. The sedes materiae is now Art. 65lf and Art. 65lh Civil Code. Art. 
651f, para. 1 lays down the travel organiser's obligation which cannot be 
contracted out to pay damages if the loss-entailing events are within his sphere 
of responsibility. 
Art. 651 f, para. 2 puts the provision of para. 1 on damages into more concrete 
terms to the effect that damages will be awarded also for holiday time spent to 
no avail. The legislator let himself be guided by the Federal High Court's 
judgment of 10 October 1974 in which such damage was acknowledged to have 
occurred 255 . The controversial question as to whether holiday time spent to no 
avail constitutes a non-material loss and thus a loss tobe made good only within 
the limits of Art. 253 Civil Code has thus been settled256 . 
Of the utmost importance to the consumer is Art. 651 h Civil Code, which 
allows the organiser by way of contractual agreement to limit in terms of 
amount the claim for damages provided for in Art. 651 f to three tim es the price 
of the trip. Art. 651h, para. 1 distinguishes between two cases: according to item 
1, exclusion of liability is possible only if the damage suffered by the traveller 
was caused neither wilfully nor by gross negligence, i.e. in the event of ordinary 
negligence. Item 1 adopts the regulation of Art. 11, item 7 AGBG. However, 
Art. 65 lh, para. 1, item 1 extends the ineffectiveness of exemptions in travel 
contracts to include also exemptions under individual contracts257 . 
lf the damaging circumstances at the same time constitute a tort, Art. 65lh, 
para. 1, item 1 does not apply. Liability for a tort committed even by slight negli-
gence cannot be contracted out in standard form contracts 258 • 
Pursuant to item 2, a limitation of liability is admissible if the travel organiser 
is responsible for the damage suffered by a traveller only owing to fault on the 
part of a hotel or carrier. In contrast to Art. 11, item 7 AGBG, a limitation 
of liability is possible even in the event of intent and gross negligence. That 
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regulation is of great importance in practice, since in the final analysis often the 
hotel or carrier is the one who is responsible. However, it must be examined 
whether the travel organjser actually fulfilled his organisational obligations. 
The question remains how the different regulations in the AGBG andin the 
law of travel contracts is tobe judged. lt would be defensible only as far as the 
AGBG does not take effect, that is in individual agreements259 . 
Art. 651h, para. 2 provides for a further limitation of liability which applies 
by operation of law: The travel organiser may plead statutory Iimitations of 
Iiability in relation to the traveller, applicable to an individual hotel or canier. 
Consequently, the organiser cannot plead limitations of liability by contract. 
Statutory provisions are tobe found partly under national law, but often also 
under international agreements (Warsaw Convention; Additional Agreement 
of Guadalajara; Athenian Convention of 1974)260 . 
The limitation applies only to a travel service to be rendered by a hotel or 
carrier. If the source of error is within the organiser's scope, he is liable within 
the Iimits of Art. 65lh, para. 1 Civil Code. 
The regulation of limitation of Jiability in ARB item 9 and ARB item 12 meets 
with a great many objections. 
Under item 9, No. 2 gross negligence and intent on the part of the hotel or 
carrier is to be judged according to the regulations in force at the place of perfor-
mance. Such a limitation is possible only within the limits of Art. 65 lh, para. 2 
Civil Code261• 
Under item 9, No. 3 it is intended to limit liability for transportation services 
to the extent provided for in 'the officially approved regulations in the national 
and international spheres'. Here also, the Iimits of Art. 65lh, para. 2 were not 
taken into account262. 
Item 9, No. 4 aims at excluding any liability for adventure trips. This is an 
obvious infringement of Art. 11, item 7 AGBG and Art. 651h Civil Code263 • 
Item 12, No. 1, para. l provides for a limitation of liability to twice and, in the 
case of bodily injury, four times the price of the trip. Within the limits of Art. 
651 h, para. l the law permits limitation to three times the price of the trip. Any 
differentiation is impossible. If bodily injuries constitute a tort, any limitation 
of liability is inadmissible anyhow264 . 
255 (hh) Travel organisers' standard form contracts include throughout clauses 
imposing charges on the traveller if he cancels the contract: cancellation and 
damage clauses. These are usually given in percentage rates of the price of the 
trip and are the higher, the nearer the travel date draws. Also in the currently 
applicable standard form contracts, lump-sum claims vary between l 0% and 
50%, 75% or the full price of the trip being claimed very rarely265 • 
The officials' draft of 1973 aimed at solving the problem of cancellation 
charges in a concrete way by providing for maximum rates for lump-sum 
damages, graded by the time of cancellation266 . This regulation has not become 
law. Art. 651 i, para. 2 regulates what has tobe done if the parties failed to agree 
upon lump-sum damages in the travel contract. Accordingly, the travel 
organiser may claim adequate compensation if the customer withdraws from 
the travel contract, Art. 651i, para. 2, sentence 2. The amount ofcompensation 
is determined by the price of the trip less the value of the organiser's saved 
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expenditure and what he might otherwise gain from the use of the travel service. 
The burden of proof as to the amount of damage is on the travel organiser, since 
he is the one who wants to assert a claim267 • Art. 65li, para. 2 should not be of 
great practical importance, since standard form contracts of travel organisers 
usually provide for lump-sum damages. This type of case is regulated in Art. 
65li, para. 3. Accordingly, the travel organiser may fix a percentage rate ofthe 
price of the trip as damages in bis standard form contract. In computing the 
amount he must take into consideration the expenditure usually saved and the 
gain usually possible through use of the travel service. The statutory regulation 
requires of the travel organiser that he should make due allowance for the type 
of journey involved (by rail, ship or air). Depending on the type of journey, the 
travel organiser must then set forth and prove the typical course of the journey 
from experience268 • 
As lump-sum damages constitute contractual agreements, Art. 11, item Sb 
AGBG applies in addition to Art. 65lc, para. 3 Civil Code. Therefore the 
consumer has the possibility of proving that in a concrete case damage did not 
occur or was substantially less than the lump sum269 • A passage to that effect 
must be incorporated in the travel organiser's standard form contract270 • 
Item 5, No. 1 ARB requires ofthe consumer a written declaration of cancella-
tion. This infringes Art. 65li, para. l Civil Code which also admits of verbal 
cancellation271 • 
Item 5, No. 3 ARB regulates the settlement of claims in a lump sum. A sophis-
ticated system is planned, distinguishing by modes of travel and within the 
modes of travel by time of cancellation. The amount of cancellation charges is 
not fixed in the ARB, so that judgment is out of the question. 
256 (ii) Recently, clauses excluding the travel organiser's liability in the event of a 
strike on the part of hotels or carriers have gained great importance. 
The starting point is Art. 65 lj, which grants both the travel organiser and the 
consumer a right of cancellation if the trip is seriously impeded, jeopardised or 
impaired by force majeure not foreseeable at the time the contract was made. 
The term force majeure does not include strikes, so that it is quite clear that 
strikes on the part of hotels or carriers come within the organiser's sphere of 
responsibilitym. 
Art. 65 lj, para. 2 Civil Code regulates the legal consequences of cancellation. 
The organiser loses his claim for the price of the trip; instead he has a claim 
for compensation to be determined under Arts. 65lj, para. 2, 651e, para. 3, 
sentence 2 in such a way that the pro rata price of the trip up to the occurrence of 
force majeure and the return trip must be borne by the traveller. 
Difficulties are encountered if the parties want to cancel the contract before 
the commencement of the trip pleading force majeure. Art. 65 lj Civil Code does 
not expressly provide for such a type of case. As regards its legal consequences, 
para. 2 is tailored to cases where the consumer had already commenced the trip. 
Only interpretation to the effect that both parties ha ve a right of cancellation for 
force majeure before the commencement of the trip seems to be fair regarding 
the interest of either party273 • 
257 (jj) Since the coming into force of the amendment of the Code of Civil Proce-
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dure, Art. 38 Code of Civil Procedure,jurisdiction clauses have ceased to play a 
part. Against this a more recent decision274 should be noted according to which 
the place of business of the travel organiser's agency is the place of jurisdiction 
of the branch. Here the internaJ reJations to the centraJ agency do not matter, 
but only whether in relation to third parties the impression is created that it is an 
independent branch. lf court practice were continued consistently, law enforce-
ment would be facilitated substantially for the consumer if he made reservations 
at his domicile27s. 
257a (kk) The enactment of the Iaw of travel contracts means a further step towards 
improved consumer protection. The consumer's rights that cannot be 
contracted out have now been Iaid down. lt is tobe regretted, though, that the 
Act enables the travel organiser within certain limits to refer the consumer to the 
hotel or carrier concerning possible claims for damages. Difficulties regarding 
the question of whether the admissible exclusion of Jiability also includes claims 
in tort likewise seem pre-programmed. Not at all convincing from the con-
sumer's point of view is the regulation of cancellation charges. It would have 
been desirable if during the debates at least the possibility of whether or not the 
problem of lump-sum damages could have been solved in favour of the traveller 
by an appropriate duty placed on the organiser to take out insurance against the 
risk of loss of travel expenses276 had been discussed. 
(b) Correspondence course contracts 
258 The FernUSG, which was passed by the German Bundestag on 24 August 
1976, comprises two areas of regulation. To begin with, certain correspondence 
courses are subjected to the requirement of licensing. The provisions concerned 
have already been discussed277 • In addition, the Act comprises numerous provi-
sions relating to the contract itself which will be examined now. 
259 (aa) Art. 2, para. 1 FernUSG lays down the organiser's obligation to supply 
teaching material, inclusive of the envisaged learning aids, at the intervals 
agreed upon and to supervise progress by correcting papers sent in within a 
reasonable period of time and by giving the participant in the correspondence 
course the instructions he seems to require. In view of the many general clauses 
in the definition of the scope of the duty of supervision, disputes at law are tobe 
expected. Of special importance will be whether the organiser must offer assis-
tance in the event of a participant's failure to send in exercises over a longer 
period of time278 , or whether he may treat the participant as a filing card which is 
out of date until the latter cancels the contract, when the organiser may claim 
payment. The point at issue should be judged on the basis of pedagogical 
standards tobe set for correspondence courses. Under Art. 2, para. 2 Fern USG, 
payment of the course must be spread evenly over the entire term of the course. 
Certain exceptions are admissible, such as in the case of the payment of movable 
things which do not form part of the teaching material and also if the parties at 
the participant's request negotiated terms of delivery other than those stipulated 
in Art. 3, para. 3, item 1 FernUSG, Art. 2, para. 3 FernUSG. 
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260 (bb) The form and subject matter of the contract is regulated under Art. 3 
FernUSG. Accordingly, the contract must be in writing, i.e. must at least be 
signed in the participant's own hand. Any infringement of that requirement 
results in nullity, Art. 126 Civil Code. As regards the subject matter, Art. 3 
FernUSG distinguishes between facts that must be included and facts that 
should be included. Among the former are: (1) the name and address of the 
parties; (2) the object, goal, commencement, duration, and type and recog-
nition of the final examination of the course; (3) the total amount of payment, 
the amount apportionable to movable things being stated separately; (4) the 
amount, number and due dates of instalments payable towards the fee of the 
course; (5) typographically clear instruction as to the right of cancellation; (6) 
terms of cancellation. The contract shall include: (1) the construction of the 
correspondence course, statements as to the intervals at which the material will 
be supplied and the nature and frequency of the accompanying material; (2) 
statements as to additionally required learning aids; (3) an indication of the 
required educational background and, if necessary, the terms of admission to a 
public-law or other examination; (4) jurisdiction by act of law; (5) if necessary, 
provable references to the licence granted. 
lnfringements of the mandatory subject matter result in ineffectiveness, but 
the desired subject matter is also fixed within relatively narrow limits in that 
under Art. 4, para. 2 FernUSG the commencement of the period allowed for 
cancellation is contingent thereon. The same legal position exists with respect to 
the transmission of a clearly legible copy of the contract. The instruction as to 
the right of cancellation shall be signed separately by the participant. For no 
intelligible reason the Act does not provide for any direct sanction if the instruc-
tion has not been signed. While Art. 3 FernUSG lays down positively what must 
be included in the contract, Art. 2, para. 5 provides for agreements that cannot 
be made. Accordingly, agreements on contractual penalties, settlement of 
claims in a lump sum, exclusion or limitation of claims for damages and waiver 
by the participant of defences in the event of assignment by the organiser to a 
third party are all ineffective. As far as the FernUSG forbids settlement of 
claims in a lump sum and limitation of liability, it exceeds the scope of the 
AGBG, cf. Art. 11, item 5 and Art. 11, item 7 of the AGBG. The FernUSG not 
only deals with the subject matter of the contract, but also with the formation of 
a contract. Arts. 16 and 17 FernUSG aim at forbidding the organiser to use 
certain advertising methods in order to guarantee the participant's freedom of 
contract279 • 
261 (cc) The correspondence course contract may be cancelled in writing within 
two weeks of receipt of the first instalment of teaching material, Art. 4, para. 1 
FernUSG. Writing is only a means for perpetuating evidence, so verbal cancella-
tion is also effective280 • Irrespective of the receipt of teaching material, the 
period begins to run only if: (1) the organiser has delivered to the participant a 
copy of the contract; (2) the copy includes the statements required under Art. 3 
and an instruction as to the right of cancellation. If it is a point at issue whether 
and, if so, when the first instalment is deemed to have been received, the burden 
of proof is on the organiser, Art. 4, para. 1 FernUSG. If the contract is cancelled 
within the prescribed time, the performance under the contractual relationship 
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is re-exchanged concurrently, Art. 4, para. 4 FernUSG. Destruction, deteriora-
tion or any other impossibility of return of the teaching material does not 
preclude the right of cancellation. In the event of fault on the part ofthe partici-
pant, the latter has to compensate the organiser for the value or loss in value 
concerned, Art. 4, para. 4, sentence 3 FernUSG. 
In addition to the right of cancellation the participant has a right of notice to 
be exercised for the first time six months after conclusion of the contract (period 
of notice: 6 weeks), Art. 5, para. 1 FernUSG. After the expiry of the first six 
months the period of notice is three months. Notice must be given in writing to 
be effective, Art. 5, para. 2 FernUSG. Upon notice by the participant, the latter 
has to effect payment only in respect of the portion of the consideration corre-
sponding to the value of the organiser's performance during the term of the 
contract, Art. 5, para. 3 FernUSG. As in the case of other long-term contracts, a 
contract may be cancelled for serious cause, Art. 626 Civil Code. Art. 6 
FernUSG provides for a special regulation in respect of linked contracts for the 
supply of an article. If a participant cancelled the correspondence course within 
the prescribed period, he may two weeks after his notice takes effect withdraw 
from the accessory contract within two weeks provided the article supplied is no 
longer of interest to him on account of his having given notice of the corre-
spondence course contract. 
We regret to note that the participant has such a right only in the event of 
notice, but not in the event of cancellation of the correspondence course 
contract. lt would be worth considering whether Art. 6 FernUSG should be 
applied mutatis mutandis in view of the same situation as to w here the interests 
lie281 • To the right of rescission on the part of the organiser the provisions of the 
AbzG apply mutatis mutandis, Art. 6, para. 4 FernUSG. 
26la (dd) The FernUSG includes only courses in which instructor and student are 
for the most part or exclusively at separate locations (Nos. 197, 200). Thus it 
does not apply to the entire field of direct teaching, although the problems 
encountered in direct teaching may weil be compared with those encountered in 
correspondence instruction282. A participant in direct teaching can be protected 
only through recourse to several systems of standards, the AGBG, incidentally 
the AbzG, and possibly through the application mutatis mutandis of some 
provisions of the FernUSG. Details cannot be dealt with here283 • Meanwhile it 
should be noted that the consumer is protected inadequately as regards wide 
areas of private teaching, i.e. direct teaching. Only the legislator is able to take 
remedial action. For the time being an ~ver-increasing number of educational 
institutions will switch over to direct teaching in order to escape the provisions 
of the FernUSG. 
8 Evaluation 
262 The AGBG for the most part establishes court practice with respect to exemp-
tion clauses. The codification of court practice improves the consumer's legal 
position in that on account of the limits set by statute he is now better able to 
calculate his own risk. In addition, legislation extends the consumer's protec-
tion in some vital areas which were dealt with separately. But at the same time 
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the above statements have shown that an improvement in consumer protection 
in part was possible only through the extensive/supplementary interpretation of 
the law. The siding with the consumer's interests advocated throughout this 
study finds little support in court practice and jurisprudence. The reason for this 
attitude seems to lie in the fact that the protective purpose of the AGBG is 
largely ignored in the scientific discussion (No. 264). 
In addition to its weak points, which may be offset by extensive interpreta-
tion, the AGBG is also characterised by some significant loopholes. Thus used 
goods come within the scope of the Act just as little as standard form contracts 
under public law. The promising statements made by politicians have not nearly 
brought about an approximation of the limits of admissible exemption clauses. 
In addition to the AGBG as an instrument designed to check the use of exemp-
tion clauses, the legislator is increasingly trying to regulate certain contracts in a 
mandatory way by special legislation. The idea of freedom of contract is 
partially abandoned in favour of the necessary consumer protection. Charac-
teristically enough, special legislation - FernUSG and Reisevertrags-
gesetz - is tobe found in the field of contracts for the supply of services where 
freedom of contract has resulted in a hardly surveyable number of types of 
contract for which the statute law of the Civil Code merely functions as a model 
(No. 265). Obviously it is no longer possible in view of such variety to check the 
abuses of differences in power by the legislator limiting freedom of contract. 
For that reason legislation that lays down the subject matter of the contract in a 
mandatory way is required. 
For the effort which in itself is positive the Fern USO is a bad example in that 
the Act is very complicated. Even a complaisant organiser may make mistakes in 
drafting a contract. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Unfair Contract Terms 
1 INTRODUCTION 
263 The rights of the consumer as a contracting party of traders and suppliers 
throughout are not determined by the statutory provisions of the Civil Code. 
The rights and duties of the contracting parties 'are either unilaterally forced 
upon the consumer by his contracting party in the form of the latter's standard 
form contract conditions or are negotiated in each case between the contracting 
parties. The latter instance is of little importance to the relationship con-
sumer /trader or supplier, for basically contract terms can be negotiated only 
where there is a balance of power between the parties. Only there is it possible at 
all to speak of give and take and ajust spreading of contractual risks. However, 
as a rule the consumer is inferior to his contracting party in terms of economic 
power1• Contract terms are dictated to him. He can choose only from several 
similar types of preformulated contracts and has no influence on how the 
subject matter of the contract is designed. The consumer can be deprived of his 
rights by standard form contracts, because the entire law of contract comprises 
non-cogent law according to the maxim of freedom of contract. The consumer's 
contracting party who is superior to him in terms of economic power uses that 
power to upset the balance of the contracting parties' rights and duties estab-
lished in the Civil Code. The consumer is not only saddled with all the risks that 
may result from possible difficulties prior to the purchase of a thing - for 
instance problems of supply, changes in performance, terms of delivery - but 
through various exemption clauses is also robbed of the possibility of having 
recourse to his contracting party for inferior quality after receipt of the thing. 
The customarily uneven distribution of contractual risks results in the 
contracting party incurring few or no commitments, while the consumer is 
bound by the contract. The trader's economic superiority, which has been 
increasing for years, has enabled him to dictate more and more onerous terms to 
the consumer. Unfair contract terms are the inevitable result of this develop-
ment. lt was the task of legal writers and the courts to see to it that unfair 
contract terms were corrected, since the legislator failed to take remedial 
measures. The discussion focussed and continues to focus on the control of 
unfair clauses forming part of standard form contracts. The AGBG, which was 
promulgated in late 1976, is the logical consequence of that development, 
comprising as it does only contract clauses forming part of standard form 
contracts. 
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II UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS IN STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS2 
1 Control by the AGBG 
264 The Act marks the end for the time being of many years of discussion about 
the recording of unilaterally preformulated standard contract terms3• In part it 
adopts the Federal High Court's practice, regarding for instance the prohibition 
of surprise clauses (Art. 3 AGBG), construction (Art. 5 AGBG), control of the 
content by the standard of good faith, and the essential purpose of the contract 
and the principal duties of the contracting parties (Art. 9 AGBG). Apart from 
that it goes beyond previous court practice in that it introduces the collective 
action (Art. I3 AGBG) and lays down special provisions to protect the 
consumer, viz. the incorporation into the contract of standard form contract 
conditions (Art. 2 AGBG) and what are known as prohibition clauses (black-
lists) (Arts. 10 and 11 AGBG). 
The AGBG applies irrespective of whether the contracting party of a user of 
standard form contracts is a consumer or a trader. For that reason the AGBG is 
not a true consumer protection act. Efforts to influence the process of legis-
lation in that direction failed to win favour. However, from this the conclusion 
cannot be drawn that the AGBG's underlying idea is that it constitutes legis-
lation which does not take into account the personal status of customers subject 
to such legislation4 • This interpretation ignores the history of the Act just as it 
disregards its sophisticated design. According to the study group's proposal5 
and the officials' draft6, full traders should be excluded altogether from the 
scope of the Act. However, that restriction met with strong resistance, particu-
larly on the occasion of the 50th German Lawyers' Assembly in Hamburg in 
I 974, and the result was that full traders were included in the scope of protection 
of the Act7. The amendment does not negate the legislator's primary aim, which 
was an improvement in the protection of the ultimate consumer against 
standard form contracts8 • Considering this, the AGBG today serves a dual 
protective purpose9 • The general scope of protection is designed to protect 
against unfair standard form contracts: it extends equally to consumers, traders 
and to those rendering professional services. Additionally, the Act affords 
increased protection extending sof ely to the consumer. That dual purpose has 
manifested itself in the Actin that the AGBG contains special protective provi-
sions only for the consumer, viz. regarding the incorporation of standard form 
contract conditions (Art. 2 AGBG) and regarding what are known as prohibi-
tion clauses (Arts. 10 and II AGBG). 
(a) General c/ause of Art. 9 AGBG 
265 The general clause of Art. 9 AGBG is composed of two paragraphs based on 
different requirements as to content. In view of its significance the provision is 
quoted herein full: 
- Provisions in standard form contracts are ineffective if, contrary to the 
principles of good faith, they unreasonably prejudice the user's contract-
ing party. 
- In case of doubt, an unreasonable injury must be assumed if a provision 
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(1) is incompatible with the essential basic ideas of the statutory regula-
tion from which it deviates, or 
(2) restricts essential rights or duties arising from the nature of the 
contract so as to jeopardise the purpose of the contract. 
In line with its function, the general clause expresses the basis direction of 
impact of the Act. To that end the legislator has used the criterion of 'unreason-
able prejudice'. In the course of the legislative process it had initially been 
suggested that the effectiveness of standard form c9ntracts should be made 
contingent upon a fair balance of mutual interests10 • The requirement of a fair 
balance of interests was not incorporated into the wording of the Act, because it 
was feared that such a requirement would not make due allowance for the need 
for unequivocal and advance judgment of standard form contracts feit by those 
involved in legal relations 11 • 
The criterion of unfair prejudice applicable now presupposes a thorough 
analysis of the conflicting interests and a weighing of such interests. In ascer-
taining the interests of the contracting parties, the court must examine the 
nature and subject matter of the legal transaction, the requirements the 
contracting parties must satisfy in terms ofpersons protected, and theeconomic 
reasons underlying the drafting of the standard form contract 12 • The nature and 
subject matter of the legal transaction involved here and its underlying 
economic reasons are characterised by such diversity that it is impossible to go 
into details. As far as the personal characteristics of the contracting parties 
permit comment on their interests, it may be said quite clearly that in the case of 
contracts with final consumers the latter must basically be conceded a strong 
need for protection owing to their inferior business experience 13 • 
Art. 9, para. 2 AGBG serves the purpose of making the vague wording, 
offering little guidance as to how to put it into practice, more obvious. Para. 2, 
says the preamble, shall 'faci]itate the control of the content by indicating 
typical legal criteria' 14 • This is done in the form of a presumption. The Act pJaces 
two factors side by side: the essential basic ideas of the statutory regulation and 
essential rights or duties that result from the nature of the contract. Thus Art. 9, 
para. 2 AGBG assigns the non-cogent statutory provision a model function 
even if the term itself is not used 15 • This legislative statement raises the question 
of how far the non-cogent provisions of the Civil Code continue to have a model 
function at all. The two principal types of contract of the Civil Code, namely the 
contract of sale and the contract to manufacture, have been amended in so many 
ways in legal reality that we can talk neither of the contract of sale nor of the 
contract to manufacture16 • Instead, a !arge variety of types has developed which 
supersede the traditional model contracts and which consider the statutory 
provisions applicable to the respective contract at best to perform the function 
of a skeleton. In construing Art. 9, para. 2 AGBG, this development must be 
taken into account. The legislator's reference to the models of the Civil Code 
cannot mean that the effectiveness of those provisions shall be renewed 17 • 
Rather, the courts must continue standardising contracts in order to then bring 
out the individual rights and duties that are so important to each type of contract 
as to prevail over any amendment in standard form's. Art. 9, para. 2 AGBG 
now lays down that in caseojdoubtin theevent of anydeviation from the model 
so developed an unfair injury should be assumed. From the view taken here it 
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follows that the rule of presumption does not constitute a rule as to the burden 
of proof for procedural purposes 19 • Those opinions in legal literature that are 
based on a procedural rule of the burden of proof ignore that the facts of 
standard form contract cases are usually indisputable or easy to clarify. The 
determination of reasonableness or unreasonableness remains a question of 
law20 • Art. 9, para. 2 AGBG shall offer assistance as a standard of judgment in 
cases of doubt. This concept is based on the understanding that the judge may 
still entertain doubts regarding not only questions of fact but also questions of 
law. In the case of Art. 9 AGBG, it is a matter of the grey zone between definite 
reasonableness on the one hand, and definite unreasonableness on the other, 
with which the judge has to cope in coming to a conclusion. The argument about 
the decision in principle of Art. 9, para. 1 AGBG concerns the assignment of 
that grey zone to the advantage or disadvantage of the two parties and herein 
the final analysis the interests of the user of standard form contracts prevail. 
By comparison, from the recognition of a standardised model or minimum 
standard, Art. 9, para. 2 draws the consequence in favour of the contracting 
party that in the event of deviation from that model, the 'burden of proof' is on 
the party deviating from the model. However, especially in the event of 
deviation from item 2 an unreasonable injury is usually deemed to exist21 • 
(b) Inadmissible clauses, Arts. 10 and 11 AGBG22 
266 The prohibition of clauses in Arts. 10 and 11 AGBG lists examples of viola-
tions of the general clause. 
In terms of systematic arrangement, Art. 9 AG BG should actually follow the 
regulation of Art. 11 AGBG and precede the regulation of Art. 10, because 
Art. 10 AGBG presents merely concrete cases of application of the general 
clause where the general standards laid down therein are applicable 'in par-
ticular'23. In contrast to this, Art. 11 AGBG contains a !ist of 'prohibited 
clauses' without any possibility of judgment. The court merely has to examine 
whether the requirements as to the facts listed are satisfied in the case of the 
standard form contract tobe examined. In principle, there is no examination of 
reasonableness. Still the legislator has not handled the classification he chose in 
a uniform way. In isolated cases the !ist of prohibitions also contains provisions 
in the case of which in addition to grouping judgment is also required. In such 
cases the dividing line between mere grouping and an examination as to reason-
ableness is at least fluid, cf. Art. 11, item 5 AGBG (settlement of claims in a 
lump sum), Art. 11, item lOa (prior suing) and Art. 11, item !Ob (dispropor-
tionately !arge part). Arts. 10 and 11 are not special provisions in the sense that 
they supersede Art. 9 AGBG even if in a particular case the requirements of 
Arts. 10 and 11 AGBG have not been satisfied. Art. 9 AGBG therefore has the 
function of a provision yet tobe examined even if the lists of prohibited clauses 
provide no answer24 . 
Whether a clause is ineffective under Art. 10 AGBG depends on the circum-
stances of a particular case. Therefore the court must examine the matter in a 
similar way, as in the case of Art. 9 AGBG. This manifests itselfin the indefinite 
legal terms (unreasonable, reasonable, for no practical reason) contained in the 
various clauses. These indefinite legal terms can be given a definite meaning 
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only if the concrete circumstances of the contract in question are taken into 
account. By comparison, the prohibited clauses of Art. 11 AGBG are appli-
cable irrespective of the circumstances in a particular case. In the event of any 
violation the standard form contract provision involved is ineffective ipso 
jure. 
Chapter 6 deals extensively with prohibited clauses, which are closely 
connected with the limitation of the law of warranty (i.e. exemption clauses). 
267 (aa) The !ist of prohibitions of Art. 10 AGBG starts out with a prohibition in 
respect of those cases where a user reserves for himself unreasonably long or 
insufficiently specified terms for accepting or declining an offer or effecting 
performance, Art. 10, item 1 AGBG. Standard form contracts often include 
clauses through which the user's contracting party who is bound by bis offer is 
left in the air for a long time as to whether the user has accepted or declined the 
offer. Strictly speaking, it is not a matter of contract terms, but of a clause 
governing the formation of a contract. 
Art. 10, para. 2 AGBG forbids provisions under which the user contrary to 
Art. 326, para. l Civil Code reserves for himself an unreasonably long or 
insufficiently specified grace period in conjunction with the performance to be 
effected by him. Art. 10, item 2, supplements item 1, for here as weil as there 
reservations made by the user aim at postponing or avoiding as far as possible 
the consequences of default. 
Art. 10, item 3 AGBG forbids the user to free himself from his liability to 
perform without a justified reason stipulated in the contract; this does not apply 
to long-term contracts, though. The provision is of the utmost importance in 
travel contracts (No. 250). 
Under Art. 10, item 5 AGBG, with certain qualifications, provisions are 
ineffective pursuant to which upon the performance or omission of acertain act 
a statement by the user's contracting party is deemed to have or have not been 
made. For the purposes of legal terminology, fictitious statements are irrebutta-
ble presumptions, that is proof to the effect that the consequence in question 
was not intended is ruled out. The great <langer of fictitious statements in 
standard form contracts is that possibly far-reaching consequences are linked 
with an act or omission of which the party concerned is not aware, particularly 
since he may not, a relatively long time after the conclusion of the contract, 
remember the fiction laid down in standard form. From previous court practice 
in this connection, the prior knowledge clause in brokerage contracts or tacit 
approval in the banking business should be recalled25 • Lastly, the prohibition 
clause of Art. 10, item 6 AGBG concerns provisions under which the receipt of a 
statement of special importance by the user is simulated. In terms of its signifi-
cance and function Art. 10, item 6 AGBG is therefore closely connected with 
Art. 10, item 5 AGBG. The detailed regulation of receipt in Art. 4 of the 
FernUSG shows that consumer protection is needed especially in this area 
(No. 258ff). 
Under Art. 10, item 7 AGBG, provisions are ineffective pursuant to which, in 
the event of withdrawal from or termination of the contract by either party, the 
user may demand (a) an unreasonably high compensation for the benefit or 
use of a thing or a right, or for services rendered, or (b) unreasonably high 
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reimbursement of expenses. Since in a concrete case it is difficult to compute the 
compensation or expenses, users of standard form contracts have switched over 
to fixing rates in standard form upon conclusion of the contract. In addition to 
the clear overreaching of the user, such cla uses above all serve the purpose of 
obliging the consumer to perform the contract. 
Art. 10, item 7 AGBG must be differentiated from the prohibition of claims 
for lump-sum damages. In this connection the claim for lump-sum compensa-
tion (item 7a) must be distinguished from the claim for reimbursement of 
expenses in a lump sum (item 7b). Art. 10, item 7a AGBG was introduced for 
fear that the limited prohibition of Art. 11, item 5 AGBG might be circum-
vented by agreement of a specially high compensation. lt must be clarified in 
how far the provisions coincide or supplement each other. To begin with, it 
should be noted that Art. 11, item 5 AGBG takes effect also if the contractual 
relationship continues to exist and is tobe performed. Composition agreements 
which a user of standard form contracts uses to provide for withdrawal or 
cancellation must therefore be judged by Art. 10, item 7 AGBG. As far as that 
goes, Art. 10, item 7 AGBG is more specific than Art. 11, item 5 AGBG and 
therefore has priority over the latter26 • In contrast to that, it is difficult to decide 
when a claim for compensation constitutes a disguised claim for damages under-
lying Art. 11, item 5 AGBG. The legal nature or purpose of the claim asserted in 
each case is not helpful in this connection. However, a dividing line may be 
drawn in such a way that Art. 10, item 7 AGBG is applicable to lump-sum 
claims based on an actual assessment in a concrete case, while Art. 11, item 5 
AGBG concerns the case where damage is computed in a lump sum, that is irre-
spective of the damage that actually occurred27 • The discrimination of Art. 10, 
item 7b AGBG from Art. 11, item 5 AGBG presents the same problems. Here 
also Art. 10, item 7b AGBG takes effect only in so far as it is a matter of reim-
bursement of the expenses actually incurred28 • 
Art. 10, item 8 AGBG restricts the possibility for a user of standard form 
contracts of arbitrarily declaring in such contracts that foreign law shall be 
applicable. 
268 (bb} Price increase clauses that provide for increases in the prices of goods and 
services within four months of the conclusion of the contract are inadmissible, 
Art. 11, item 1 AGBG29 • As to content, the provision is shaped to accord with 
Art. 1, paras. 1 and 5 of the Preisangabenverordnung (Price Marking Order)30 • 
The Preisangabenverordimng (No. 4lff} was also issued to enable information 
to the customer of the price of a service. As the relevance of the Preisangaben-
verordnung in terms of civil law was and continues tobe a matter of argument31 , 
Art.11, item 1 AGBG aims at creating an equivalent in terms of civil law under 
Art. 1, paras. 1 and 5 Preisangabenverordnung to the effect that reservations as 
to price changes are ineffective32 (No. 32). 
The Act includes all price change clauses, price reservation clauses, reserva-
tions as to price determination, price escalator clauses and index clauses. Such 
clauses are tobe found especially in the area of building contracts, transactions 
by public utilities, travel contracts and contracts of sale in certain trades, 
particularly in the furniture and car trades33 • While according to the wording 
'increase' the provision is based on the assumption that a certain price had been 
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agreed upon, it also applies if there is only an agreement leaving the price open 
but permitting determination at the due date according to the indicated 
reference standards. Such cases must be regarded as circumventions within the 
meaning of Art. 7 AGßQ34. 
The prohibition does not apply to goods or services supplied under long-term 
contracts (insurance contracts - premium adjustment clauses, loan and credit 
agreements - interest adjustment clauses - contracts of loan for use - lease 
(Miete/Pacht))35• Lastly, the prohibition does not apply to the rates of the 
carriers (shipping companies and air corporations) specified in Art. 99, para. 2, 
item 1 GWB owing to the international interdependence in this field. To 
maintain uniformity of price structure, the government-approved transport 
charges specified in Art. 99, para. 1 GWB have been excluded. The question of 
whether changes in the V AT rate justify appropriate price adjustments had been 
a matter of argument. The Federal Supreme Court has made it clear that this is 
not possible by a standard form contract clause36 • 
Pursuant to Art. 11, item 2 AGBG, a provision is ineffective through which 
the right to refuse performance under Art. 320 Civil Code or the right of lien 
under Art. 273 Civil Code, as far as they result from the same contractual 
relationship, is excluded or restricted. Until the AGBG came into force, the 
courts and legal writers in most cases considered an exclusion in standard form 
of the right to refuse performance and the right of lien tobe admissible37 • The 
pleading of an exclusion clause was inadmissible only if the user had grossly 
contravened the contract. Here belongs the case where a user made the exercise 
of the right to demand repair of the defects contingent upon prior payment 
in fulP 8• By comparison, Art. 11, item 2 AGBG constitutes a considerable 
improvement of legal protection, since rights to refuse performance and rights 
of lien definitely cannot be restricted. To the protected rights to refuse perfor-
mance also belong the claim to demand repair of defects, if any, and the claim 
for subsequent delivery39 . Furthermore, it should be noted that Art. 11, item 2 
AGBG is not always inapplicable as soon as an obligation on the consumer to 
pay in advance has been agreed upon. For the right to refuse performance may 
accrue if the obligation to pay in advance is inapplicable according to the prin-
ciples of good faith40 . The relation of Art. 11, item 2 to Art. 11, item 1 Od AGBG 
has already been dealt with (No. 212). 
Under Art. 11, item 3 AGBG it is forbidden to deny the user's contracting 
party the right to offset against an uncontested or legally valid claim. The Act 
essentially remains within the limits set by legal writers and the courts. lt is 
striking, though, that restriction of the possibility of offsetting to the disadvan-
tage ofthe consumer under Art. 11, item 3 AGBG is permitted to a !arger extent 
than restriction of the right of lien, since offsetting may be restricted to uncon-
tested or legally valid claims. This seems to be problematical in that in the past 
the courts41 have based their considerations on the assumption that in the event 
of an exclusion of the right to offset, a right of lien is also excluded if the exercise 
of the latter would have a result similar to that achieved by offsetting which is 
excluded42 . 
Ineffective under Art. 11, item 4 AGBG is a provision releasing a user from 
the statutory obligation to dun the other contracting party or to give him agrace 
period. So far the courts have not yet decided the question as to whether a 
275 
reminder as a precondition of default may be waived43 • In contrast to that, the 
courts have permitted users of standard form contracts to waive the grace 
period44 • The AGBG now forbids any contracting out in standard form of a 
grace period required by law, because the legislator also considered the statutory 
duty to give a grace period a measure protecting the customer which was taken 
for considerations of justice. The grace period can be waived, though, if 
expressly provided for in the Civil Code and also in the cases developed by the 
courts45 • 
Art. 11, item 6 AGBG forbids penal bonds in standard form in four cases; 
namely, in the event of non-acceptance of performance, delayed acceptance, 
de fault in payment and withdrawal from the contract. The first three cases 
regulated by the Act are not very common46 • As regards the remaining case it 
must be clarified what is to be understood by conventional penalty within the 
meaning of Art. l 1, item 6 AGBG. The Civil Code enables the contracting party 
to stipulate the payment of a sum of money to provide for the case when the 
debtor fails to or does not perform in the proper manner, Art. 339 Civil C'ode. 
This so-called dependent penal bond (unselbständiges Strafversprechen) must 
be distinguished from the independent penal bond (Strafgedinge). The inde-
pendent penal bond gives rise to the obligation to pay a penal sum, without an 
underlying obligation to do or omit an act existing or to be secured. According 
to the dominant view, this instrument is not regarded as a contractual penalty47 • 
The AGBG first of all includes what are known as dependent penal bonds. 
Whether an independent penal bond should also be treated pursuant to Art. 11, 
item 6AGBG is an open question48 • At least it is not expressly stated. Much more 
important than this question is the problem of distinguishing a contractual 
penalty from lump-sum damages, which has already been dealt with49 • The 
much discussed problem of the possibility of applying a contractual penalty 
against possible damages is now clarified. In contrast to Art. 340, para. 2 Civil 
Code, it will no longer be possible in standard form contracts effectively to 
exclude the possibility of application. While this does not follow from Art. 11, 
item 6AGBG, it does follow from Art. 9, para. 2, item I AGBG, considering the 
judgments made in Art. 340, para. 2 Civil Code50 • 
Art. 11, item Sa AGBG forbids exclusion and restriction in standard form of 
the right to withdraw from the contract, if such a right exists under Arts. 325, 
326 and 636 Civil Code. Under Art. 11, item Sb AGBG it is absolutely inad-
missible to deny the customer the claim for compensation if the impossibility of 
performance within the meaning of Art. 325 Civil Code or default in perfor-
mance within the meaning of Art. 326 Civil Code is brought about wilfully or by 
gross negligence. Through Art. 11, item 8 AGBG the legislator gives new effect 
to the regulative standards of the general law of obligations which had been 
thrown out of joint. Users of standard form contracts always provided for the 
exclusion of any claims for compensation in the event of de fault in performance 
or impossibility of performance on their part 53 • Art. 11, item 9 AGBG supple-
ments the preceding item 8 by a regulation to provide for partial impossibility, 
or de fault in respect of apart of the performance due from the uS'er. Also in this 
regard the regulation of the Civil Code will again be applicable. 
Art. 11, item 12 AGBG declares to be ineffective pwvisions in long-term 
contracts that provide for a term of contract binding the consumer for more 
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than two years, for a tacit renewal of the contractual relationship by more than 
one year in each case or a period of notice of more than three months prior to the 
expiry of the initially planned or tacitly renewed term of contract. Despite the 
restrictive regulation - typical Iong-term contracts such as leases, Ieasing 
agreements, insurance contracts, contracts of employment and contracts for 
the installation of vending machines do not come within the scope of the 
Act - Art. 11, item 12 AGBG is one of those provisions that met with the 
fiercest opposition from users. The underlying reason may be that the regula-
tion is a typically consumer-related one in that it aims at keeping the consumer 
from concluding contracts binding him financially for a Iong term and in a 
manner the implications of which are difficult for him to judge. Art. 11, item 12 
AGBG includes contracts for the supply of services and contracts to manufac-
ture occurring in everyday life, including subscriptions to newspapers and 
magazines, memberships in book and record clubs, marriage agencies, corre-
spondence courses, and upkeep and maintenance contracts. The prohibition 
does not apply to contracts for the supply of things sold that belong together, 
Art. 23, para. 2, item 6, first instance AGBG. The reasons given list as an 
example the purchase of a dictionary comprising several volumes and considers 
the difference compared with contracts coming under Art. 11, item 12 to lie in 
the fact that in cases Jike this the customer incurs a commitment to purchase 
several things right from the start52• Furthermore insurance contracts and 
contracts with exploitation corporations for industrial property rights are 
excluded, Art. 23, para. 2, item 6 AGBG. 
In the first part of sentence 1, Art. 11, item 13 AGBG forbids a user to assign 
his contractual obligations to third parties; however, this prohibition is largely 
restricted in the second part ofthe sentence. The prohibition applies to contracts 
of sale, contracts of employment, contracts to manufacture and contracts for 
the de!ivery of work where such clauses used tobe common. 
The provision of Art. 11, item 14 AGBG puts an end primarily to those 
clauses in standard form contracts by which users tried to secure themselves a 
further debtor of their contractual claims. Item 14a contains a prohibition of 
joint Iiability in standard form, item 14b forbids the contracting out of Art. 179 
Civil Code. Clauses of the type coming within the scope of item 14 were found in 
the standard form contract conditions of contracts of sale, contracts to manu-
facture, Ioan agreements and brokerage contracts53 • 
Art. 11, item 15 AGBG forbids burden of proof clauses under which the user 
shifts the burden of proof to the detriment of the consumer. Items l 5a and b 
indicate two important cases as to subject matter. Except in the case of 
separately signed acknowledgements of receipt Art. 11, item 15 forbids shifting 
the burden of proof in standard form contracts to the detriment of the other 
contracting party. The strict prohibition of Art. 11, item 15 does not include 
fictions of declarations and fictions of delivery; these are found in the !ist of 
prohibitions of Art. 10, items 5 and 6 AGBG. Herein addition to the prohibi-
tion an independent judgment related to the case is required. Furthermore, Art. 
11, item 5 AGBG should also be noted. As far as clauses are admissible under 
that provision, they do not fail on account of Art. 11, item 15 AGBG, because 
the Act in Art. 11, item 5 AGBG sanctions shifts in the burden of proof 
connected with the respective clauses. 
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The last provision of Art. 11 AGBG, i.e. item 16, forbids the use of clauses 
through which notices or statements tobe made to the user or a third party are 
required to be made in a form stricter than the written form and are subject to 
special requirements of delivery. This provision was necessitated by the fact that 
in their standard form contracts users often stipulated that statements and 
notices were to be effective only if made in registered form. The aim of such 
regulations was to make it as difficult as possible for the customer to enforce his 
rights54 • 
(c) Scope of application of the Act 
269 The clauses prohibited under the AGBG afford the consumer protection only 
if the contract concluded by him comes within the scope of that Act. The legis-
lator hasset up numerous obstacles which must be overcome before the Act has 
the desired effect for the consumer. The clause inj uring the consumer must form 
part of a standard form contract. In respect of such a clause, Art. 1 of the Act 
includes the following legal definition: 
(1) Standard form contract conditions are all preformulated contractual 
conditions applying to a variety of contracts that one contracting party 
(user) imposes on the other contracting party upon conclusion of a 
contract. lt does not matter whether the provisions form a separate part 
of the contract or are incorporated into the written instrument itself, nor 
does it matter what scope they embrace, in what type they are set andin 
which form the contract is made. 
(2) lt is not a matter of standard form contracts if the individual terms of a 
contract were negotiated between the contracting parties. 
If it is a matter of standard form contract conditions within the meaning of 
Art. 1, they must be incorporated into the contract by an agreement to that 
effect, Art. 2 AGBG: 
(1) Standard form contract conditions become part of a contract only if 
upon conclusion of the contract the user 
(2) 
(a) expressly refers the other contracting party to them or, if such 
express reference is extremely difficult owing to the manner in which 
the contract is made, displays them in a clearly visible manner in the 
place where the contract is made; and 
(b) enables the other party to duly take note of them and provided the 
other party agrees to their validity. 
As a last limitation, Art. 24 AGBG restricts the group of persons protected: 
The provisions of Arts. 2, 10, 11 and 12 do not apply to standard form 
contracts that 
( 1) are used in relation to a trader if the contract pertains to the operation of 
his commercial enterprise; 
(2) are used in relation to a public-law entity. 
Art. 9 is also to be applied in cases provided for in sentence one in that this 
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makes the contractual provisions mentioned in Arts. 10 and 11 ineffective; 
due regard shall be paid to the established customs. 
270 (aa) Prior to the enactment of the AGBG, the legal concept of standard form 
contracts played only a minor role in the discussion. In the process of legis-
lation, though, the concept of standard form contracts has increasingly shifted 
to the focus of interest. Actually, it constitutes the juristic eye of the needle 
through which legal control instruments must be forced55 • The practical signifi-
cance of the definition becomes obvious if one considers that the closer the 
definition, the sooner will the AGBG fail as a means of control. The construc-
tion of the features mentioned in the Act must therefore take into account the 
objectives and the protective purpose of the AGBG. 
To begin with, standard form contract conditions are only those provisions 
whose validity is based on an agreement in the form of a transactionproducing 
legal effect. This requirement does not exist in the case of legal mies, which lay 
down the subject matter of the contractual relationship in advance without an 
appropriate agreement56• Among such legal rules57 are the Allgemeinen Strom-
und Gasversorgungsbedingungen, in the field of carriage of goods the KVO 
pursuant to Arts. 20a, 106 Güterkraftverkehrsgesetz, and in that of passenger 
traffic by trolley bus or regular service by motor vehicles the Verordnung über 
die Allgemeinen Beförderungsbedingungen (General Conditions of Carriage) 
of 27 February 1970. The Act applies without restriction to all standard form 
contracts that require official approval58 • 
Standard form contracts within the meaning of the legal concept of the 
AGBG are present only if the terms of the contract have been preformulated for 
a great numberof contracts. Legal writers are relatively agreed that use in no less 
than three cases suffices59 • Some of them even require only two60 • If standard 
form contracts are used for the first time for a specific stipulated purpose, 
it is decisive whether they have been preformulated for a great number of 
contracts61 • In the case of certain techniques of duplication this may as a rule be 
assumed. By comparison, the construction of the feature of preformu/ation and 
imposition is controversial. The controversy is stirred up by the question of 
which criterion should be taken as the central feature of a definition. Those who 
make the feature of preformulation the central element of the discussion make a 
merely formal criterion the pivotal point of a definition62 • Such a view makes it 
possible to define standard form contracts in a seemingly neutral way irrespec-
tive of the imbalance in power between the contracting parties. The dual protec-
tive purpose ofthe AGBG and the double objective are thus eliminated. All the 
more must attempts be rejected that aim at considering the criterion of prefor~ 
mulation to be satisfied only if the contracting party concerned is able to 
recognise such a preformulation62 • Accordingly, in the case of typing word 
processing machines it would be impossible to identify standard form contracts, 
because they cannot be recognised as such by an individual63. 
The criterion proper in terms of substantive law of the AGBG is that known as 
the imposition of conditions. This feature expresses the decisive reason why 
standard form contracts are treated in a special way. The imposition of standard 
form contracts means that the user unilaterally dictates preformulated contract 
terms to the other party64. However, quite a number of attempts have been made 
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to negate or modify the rank of that feature65 • The significance of the feature can 
be grasped only if the structures of economic power in the contractual relation-
ships involved are analysed. If contracts are concerned where one of the parties 
is a final consumer, the feature of imposition is generally considered to exist, 
since here the differences in economic power are due to structural causes. In 
these patterns the contracting parties do not meet on a par basis66 • The situation 
is different in those cases where both parties to the contract areenterprises. Here 
we cannot speak of a structural difference in power although among the enter-
prises medium-sized enterprises are in greater need of protection than large 
firms 67 • We cannot go into details here. The view taken in this connection also 
allows a decision on the burden of proof. Basically, the person pleading 
ineffectiveness of individual contract clauses must prove that it is a matter of a 
standard form contract68 • The final consumer is, however, helped by a great 
number of primafacie evidences. The feature of 'imposition' follows from the 
difference in power, preformulation may follow from the type of duplication, 
and lastly use in a plurality of cases is indicated in the case of preformulated 
contracts. 
271 (bb) Individual agreements under Art. 1, para. 2 which do not come within the 
scope of the AGBG must be distinguished from standard form contracts within 
the meaning of Art. 1, para. 1 AGBG. The question as to how standard form 
contracts may be differentiated from individual agreements has given rise to an 
animated controversy among the courts and legal writers69 • As to substance, the 
question is whether individual agreements exist as soon as there is apossibility of 
influencing control or whether the mutual willingness to negotiate must mani-
fest itself in true negotiation. The significance is obvious. If the mere possibility 
of influencing control suffices for the assumption of individual agreements, the 
scope of the Act is greatly narrowed. In its decision of 15 December 197670 , the 
Federal High Court explained itself to the effect that it is a matter of an indi-
vidual agreement if 'a user of standard form contracts or contract forms is 
willing to amend his terms and his business partner is aware thereof while the 
contract is being negotiated'. Legal writers refuse to accept such court practice. 
They criticise the departure from previous court practice without any reasons 
for such departure having been given, they criticise the Jack ofinterpretation of 
the feature 'negotiate', the selective presentation of the history of the Act and 
Jastly the failure duly to consider the legislative purpose. The Higher Regional 
Court of Celle has adopted the view held by legal writers and likewise demands 
the manifestation of influencing control71• 
Apparently, a decision by the joint divisions of the Court shall be 
endeavoured, Arts. 136 et seq. Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz (GVG, Administra-
tion of Justice Act). A striking thing is that the problems of delimitation are 
discussed among legal writers without a connection being established between 
para. 1 and para. 2. Precisely that connection must be taken into consideration 
in determining the significance of para. 2. lf contract terms are negotiated indi-
vidually, they are not imposed. The AGBG does not apply. Accordingly, Art. l, 
para. 2is important only as a burden ofproof rule. Basically, the final consumer 
must prove that a standard form contract is concerned in which case he may use 
primafacie evidence; the user has the opportunity of proving that in a particular 
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case the standard form contract had been negotiated. The extraordinary signifi-
cance of that controversy cannot be stressed too often. As early as two and a half 
years after the coming into force of the Act an interface developed whereby it 
will become apparent how seriously the courts take an improvement in 
consumer protection under the AGBG. 
Certain standard form contracts do not come under the Act, although in 
terms of substance they answer the definition given in Art. 1, para. 1 AGBG. 
These include price agreements and descriptions of performance in standard 
form which pursuant to Art. 8 AGBG escape the judicial control of the 
content72 • Furthermore excluded are all standard form contract conditions that 
are made the subject of contracts in the field of labour law, the law of 
succession, family law and company law, Art. 23, para. 1 AGBG. Art. 23, para. 
2 AGBG contains a number of quite heterogeneous exceptional provisions, 
distinguished by their requirements and legal consequences. They restrict the 
scope of application of prohibition clauses. As these are for the most part 
exemption clauses, their subject matter has already been dealt with in Chapter 6 
(No. 201 ff, 207ff). 
272 (cc) If it is a matter of standard form contract conditions within the meaning 
of Art. 1, para. l, they can be controlled by the AGBG only if such standard 
form contract conditions are incorporated into the contract by an agreement to 
that effect, Art. 2 AGBG. Art. 2, para. 1 AGBG deviates from the previous 
legal position on two points: implied reference to standard form contracts now 
suffices just as Iittle as the mere possibility of information73 • Rather, the user 
must expressly communicate the standard form contract to the consumer and 
must give him the opportunity of reasonably informing himself. With this in 
mind, one might think that the legislator has decisively increased the require-
ments of incorporation. This impression is wrong, though. The requirements to 
be satisfied in a cumulative way are decisively restrieted by the wording of the 
Act: express communication may be omitted and replaced by a clearly visible 
display if any express reference is unreasonab/y difficult. Lastly, the consumer 
need not know the standard form contract, but must merely have had an oppor-
tunity of reasonable information. The wordings chosen open the door wide to 
attempts at restrictive or extensive interpretation 74 • lt is for the courts to settle 
controversial questions. Any judgment must be based on the consideration that 
Art. 2 AGBG applies only to contracts with consumers, and for this reason the 
purpose of the Act requires extensive interpretation of the duties incumbent 
on the user and not the adoption of previous court practice without prior 
examination. 
Subject matters excepted from Art. 2 AGBG, apart from those generally 
excepted matters of labour law, the law of succession, family law and company 
law, Art. 23, para. 1, are to be found in Art. 23, para. 2, item 1, pursuant to 
which certain rates and implementing regulations of the railways and transport 
conditions of regular service by tramcar, trolleybus and motor vehicle, either 
officially approved or issued under statutory orders, do not require express 
incorporation into the contract to be effective. 
273 (dd) The requirements in terms of persons protected for the applicability of 
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the Act differ depending on whether general protection against standard form 
contracts concerning all those affected by standard form contracts, or special 
protection existing only in relation to consumers, is concerned. The dividing 
lines between the two fields of application are marked by Art. 24 AGBG. 
However, this standard does not define positively who is a consumer. Rather, it 
declares the principal items of the Act, namely the lists of prohibitions in Arts. 
10 and 11 and the provision on incorporation of contracts, Art. 2 AGBG to be 
inapplicable in case the standard form contract is used in relation to a trader. 
Basically, registered traders are equated with unregistered traders. In any case, 
the standard contract term must be imposed on traders in the operation of their 
business. Here the presumption of Art. 344, para. 1 Code of Commercial Law 
applies, under which legal transactions entered into by a trader in case of doubt 
occur in the course of operation of their business. The same exceptional regula-
tion applies to standard form contracts used in relation to a public-law entity or 
a separate accounting entity under public Iaw75. This double scope of applica-
tion must now be considered in the control of the content of standard form 
contracts. Thus the statutory regulation deviates from the previous practice 
followed by the Federal High Court which expressly made it clear that the 
control of the content must be exercised irrespective of whether traders, non-
traders or consumers are concerned76 • 
2 General prior control by the state 
(a) On the basis of the AGBG 
274 The Federal Government could not decide to introduce the official prior 
control of Standard form contracts under the AGBG. Therefore there is still no 
general official prior control of standard form contracts in German law. All 
relevant efforts and discussions77 during the process of legislation failed because 
general official prior control was allegedly incompatible with our liberal 
economic and private law system. The legislator, in accordance with the view 
held by most legal writers, was of the opinion that he had sufficiently counter-
acted the inadequacy of the present legal situation in terms of procedural law by 
introducing the collective action under Art. 13 AGBG. This question will be 
dealt with in detail later. 
(b) On account of the GWB 
275 (aa) To a certain extent the Federal Cartel Office is also able to afford admin-
istrative protection against unfair business conditions, particularly if several 
enterprises have agreed to use standard conditions of business, delivery and 
payment. Suchterms cartels must be reported to the Federal Cartel Office. As 
far as contracts with final consumers are concerned, a comment by the AGV or 
another consumer organisation must be attached to the notification78 • The 
Cartel Office may oppose the cartel if the cartel agreements constitute an abuse 
of the market position gained thereby, Art. 12, para. 1 GWB. In this connection 
the Office must take into account cogent law, for instance the provisions of the 
AGBG79 • Under Art. 22, para. 4 GWB, the Federal Cartel Office has a similar 
power regarding market-dominating enterprises which has been used very rarely 
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because of the weil known difficulties encountered in proving a market-domi-
nating position. lt is completely different in the case of supervision to prevent 
abuse under Art. 12, para. 1 GWB, although the majority of terms cartels 
examined and under objection did not concern consumers. Only in the case of 
the terms cartel formed by dry cleaners are consumer interests directly affected. 
Here the Federal Cartel Office succeeded in enforcing in favour of the consumer 
an increase in the limitation of liability in terms of amount, an increase in the 
time limit for claims for defects caused by a dry cleaner from three to five days 
and contemporaneously refused to accept a reversal of the burden of proof 
regarding exemption from fault caused by persons employed in performing 
obligations80. This example of an isolated case also goes to show that the Federal 
Cartel Office's supervision to prevent abuse is of importance to the consumer 
only here and there81 . 
276 (bb) Associations are not only allowed to form terms cartels but may also 
recommend the uniform application of standard conditions of business, 
delivery and payment. They were granted that power by the Second Amendment 
under the GWB82. The difference compared with terms cartels lies in the fact 
that those are created by a binding contract stipulating the contracting parties' 
actionable duties, while terms recommendations are non-binding and leave it to 
the discretion of the members of the vocational association concerned whether 
or not they wish to adopt the recommendation. The Amendment promotes the 
use of standard form contracts and their central recommendation. The new 
regulation closely follows the law of terms cartels. The subject matter is the 
'uniform use' of standard conditions of business, delivery and payment 
inclusive of discounts within the meaning of Art. 2, para. 1 GWB. The main 
difficulty of qualification and interpretation lies in the fact that recommended 
standard form contracts must not refer to prices or price elements. The associa-
tion must report the recommendation to the cartel authority and in so doing 
must submit the comment of the industrial and vocational associations 
involved, Art. 38, para. 2, item 3 in combination with para. 2, items 1 band 2b 
GWB. As far as in the course of the notification procedure or supervision to 
prevent abuse under Art. 12, para. l GWB obvious infringements of cogent 
private law, particularly of the AGBG, are noted, the Federal Cartel Office 
must eliminate such inadmissible clauses83 . This is often done as early as in 
the course of the notification procedure or in the preliminary talks with the 
Federal Cartel Office preceding that procedure84 . Terms recommendations of 
importance to the consumer exist with respect to travel contracts and contracts 
for repairs to and sale of motor vehicles; of late also in respect of repairs to and 
sales of radio and television sets as weil as of furniture85 . A recommendation 
concerning the purchase of second-hand cars has been submitted to the Federal 
Cartel Office (No. 216). 
In 1977 there was a precipitous rise in the number of terms recommendations, 
the greater part of them relating to contracts between traders86 • 
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3 Special prior control by the state 
(a) Control of insurance companies' general conditions 
277 Allgemeine Versicherungsbedingungen (A VB, general conditions of 
insurance) are subject to the control of the Bundesaufsichtsamt für das 
Versicherungswesen (BA V, Federal Supervisory Office for Insurance Compa-
nies)87. Insurance law in force offers the BA V numerous possibilities of 
influencing the design of general conditions of insurance of private insurance 
companies supervised by the BA V. Here measures aiming at indirect influencing 
control through the refusal of permits required by law can be distinguished from 
those aiming at direct intervention. The objective and limits of all measures 
taken by the BA V to influence the subject matter or form of general conditions 
of insurance either indirectly or directly can be paraphrased 'adequate protec-
tion of the interests of the insured '. All constituent facts for the purpose of 
approval of general conditions of insurance and official intervention in 
approved general conditions of insurance may be reduced to that heading. The 
BA V may enforce corrections by freedom-restricting administration. Much 
more often, though, disputes between the BAV and insurance companies are 
settled by way of negotiation. 
278 (aa) To operate, insurers require a licence by the supervisory authority, Art. 5, 
para. 1 V AG. Together with the application for a licence, the business 
programme must be submitted. That programme forms part of the general 
conditions of insurance on which the insurer plans to base future insurance 
contracts to be made. The licence to operate may be refused only if the require-
ments of Art. 8, para. 1 VAG are satisfied. Above all, the general conditions of 
insurance as a part of the business programme must satisfy certain require-
ments. Hence it follows that the licence to operate includes in particular the 
approval of general conditions of insurance. In practice, though, the approval is 
given even expressly in addition to a licence. 
A licence to operate may be refused only if according to the business 
programme, particularly the general conditions of insurance, the interests of the 
insured are not sufficiently protected or the obligations under insurance policies 
have not been adequately shown tobe capable of being fulfilled on a permanent 
basis, Art. 8, para. 1, item 2 V AG. Art. 8 V AG contains a conclusive enumera-
tion of reasons justifying the refusal of a licence88 . After a licence to operate has 
been granted, domestic and foreign insurance companies are subject to the same 
degree of current supervision by the BA V. This means that amendments to 
general conditions of insurance also require approval, Arts. 8, 13 VAG. 
279 (bb) Numerous provisions under the VAG empower the BA V to exercise 
direct influencing control over the design of general conditions of insurance. 
lt is within the BA V's due discretion 'to issue orders apt to keep the operation 
of a business in harmony with the statutory regulations or to remedy grievances 
that jeopardise the interests of the insured or set the operation of a business at 
variance with public policy', Art. 81, para. 2, sentence 1 VAG. Pursuant to that 
provision, an order may be issued if the state of affairs is apt considerably to 
impair the interests of the insured, i.e. a state of affairs involving the possibility 
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or danger of such an impairment89 • Art. 81 VAG is ageneral clauseof sorts in the 
law of insurance supervision as it is the underlying basis for most cases of inter-
vention in the operations of insurance companies90 • 
The supervisory authority may also require that a business programme (and 
along with it the general conditions of insurance) be changed prior to the conclu-
sion of new insurance contracts, Art. 8la, sentence I VAG. According to its 
wording this power is not subject to special requirements. lt serves to extend 
the rights stemming from Art. 81, para. 2, sentence 1 V AG. The supervisory 
authority shall also take preventive measures exceeding the scope of Art. 81, 
para. 2, sentence I V AG if there have not yet been any grievances that might 
jeopardise the interests of the insured. The admissible scope of measures under 
Art. 8la, sentence l V AG follows exclusively from the object, subject matter 
and purpose of the measures91 • 
Lastly 'the supervisory authority may amend or cancel a business programme 
affecting existing relationships or relationships not yet settled', Art. 81a, 
sentence 2 V AG. The supervisory authority itself may without the enterprise's 
cooperation and against the latter's will amend or cancel altogether previously 
approved general conditions of insurance. If an amendment has become legally 
effective, the general conditions of insurance in their new wording apply equally 
to existing contracts and contracts not yet performed or made thereafter92 • An 
order under Art. 8la, sentence 2 VAG has an effect under public as well as civil 
law. The business programme is amended directly for the future and existing 
contracts are redesigned. The only prerequisite to such an order is that 'it 
appears necessary to safeguard the interests of the insured', Art. 8la, sentence 2 
VAG. 
To avoid bankruptcy, the authority is empowered in addition to order 'what 
is necessary in this connection' if upon examination of the management and 
financial situation of an enterprise it turns out that in the long run it will no 
longer be able to meet its liabilities. All methods of payment may then be 
forbidden temporarily, Art. 89 V AG. 
Outside the ·VAG, above all the Verordnung über die Anwendung Allge-
meiner Versicherungsbedingungen (Order concerning the Use of General 
Conditions of Insurance) of 29 November 1940 allows direct influencing control 
to be exerted over the design of general conditions of insurance93 • The Order, 
which continues in force today94 , invests the BAV with the power to issue statu-
tory orders if this appears necessary to protect the interests of the insured95 • The 
Order of 1940 enables the supervisory authority to issue the same orders; that 
is, subject to the same requirements as those of Art. 8Ia, sentence 2 VAG. The 
decisive difference between the two regulations lies in their different legal 
nature: orders under Art. 8la, sentence 2 VAG may be issued only by way· of 
administrative action, while the Order empowers the BA V to issue statutory 
orders. 
280 (cc) In any and all measures, the BAV must always protect the interests ofthe 
insured. The concept is put into concrete terms under the V AG, but other provi-
sions under private law are also embodied in the definition. 
In addition to the basic regulation in Art. 8, para. 1, item 2, first alternative 
V AG, there are currently four provisions under supervisory law which either 
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exclusively or in addition to other provisions concern the subject matter of 
general conditions of insurance submitted for approval, i .e. Art. 8, para. l, item 
2, second alternative VAG, Art. 10, para. 1 VAG, Art. 21, para. 1 VAG, and 
Art. 4, para. l, sentences 2 to 4 PflichtversG. While Art. 8, para. 1, item 2, first 
alternative expressly refers to the interests of the insured to be protected, the 
second alternative puts the matter into somewhat more concrete terms, to 
ensure that obligations under insurance policies can be fulfilled on a permanent 
basis. However, the productive efficiency of an enterprise is contingent upon 
circumstances that are not connected directly with the subject matter of the 
general conditions of insurance used; here the decisive factors are capital equip-
ment, type of investment of free assets and moreover, whether, by whom and to 
what extent the company is taken over in reinsurance, whether business alien to 
the insurance business is transacted and whether several insurance lines are 
operated at the same time96 • The economic situation also has an indirect effect 
on general conditions of insurance, which after all reflect the insurer's willing-
ness to pay. 
Pursuant to Art. 10, para. 1 VAG, general conditions of insurance must 
include provisions on the objects specified. Here again it is a matter of a 
provision under supervisory law. Art. 10, para. 1 V AG is a directory provision, 
even if the supervisory authority is under no obligation to take into considera-
tion the directions issued to it. However, an indirect compulsion to apply the 
provision follows from the fact that the authority may refuse to approve the 
business programme as long as the requirements of the rule have not been satis-
fied. lt should be pointed out, however, that Art. 10, para. 1 VAG has largely 
lost its significance as a result of the fact that the VVG includes a statutory 
regulation concerning those sets of questions to be incorporated into general 
conditions of insurance97 • 
Finally, Art. 21, para. 1 VAG is also of importance. lt peremptorily provides 
that, in the case of mutual insurance companies, membership dues and benefits 
to members must be assessed by identical standards, provided the requirements 
are identical. Art. 21, para. 1 VAG is also a provision under supervisory law, 
although it is not uncontested98 . 
A particular special regulation under supervisory law is contained in Art. 4, 
para. l, sentence 2 PflichtversG. Pursuant thereto, the BA V has to examine 
whether the general conditions of insurance submitted for approval are in 
keeping with the statutory regulations. Among these are all regulations under 
private a,nd public law that affect the companies in their capacity as insurance 
companies. 
The interests of the insured are not sufficiently protected if the general condi-
tions of insurance submitted to the BA V for approval infringe mandatory 
provisions under private law. General conditions of insurance may above all be 
contrary to mandatory99 , and semi-mandatoryrno provisions under the VVG. As 
a rule, any deviation prejudices the insured's legal positionrn1• The legal position 
is more difficult if general conditions of insurance infringe non-cogent provi-
sions under insurance lawrn2 , precisely because the non-cogent law is intended to 
give insurance companies room for manoeuvre. From the administrative 
practice of the Reich or Federal Supervisory Office it may be gathered, though, 
that in particular cases approval was withheld for insufficient protection of the 
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interests of the insured if the terms deviated from the non-cogent provisions 
under the VVG and even if the terms were in keeping with such non-cogent 
provisions 103 • 
The provisions of the VVG apply mutatis mutandis also to civil-law provi-
sions. As far as general conditions of insurance infringe cogent civil law (Arts. 
134, 138 Civil Code) the clauses involved are void. By contrast, if general condi-
tions of insurance deviate from non-cogent civil law, the BA V in deciding upon 
their approval in recent years had to take into account the extensive Federal 
High Court practice concerning the lawfulness of general conditions of 
insurance 104 • With the coming into force of the AGBG, the legal position has 
changed considerably. Now the relationship between civil law and general 
conditions of insurance is governed by the relevant provisions of the AGBG105 • 
Efforts to exclude general conditions of insurance from the scope of the Act 
were not successful. For that reason above all, Arts. 9-11 AGBG are decisive, 
with the !ist of prohibitions in Art. 11, except for item 12, and Art. 23, item 6 
AGBG even being numbered among the cogent provisions. We cannot go into 
the details of the relationship between general conditions of insurance and 
provisions in standard form contracts 106• 
Tue standards of examination for newly reported general conditions of 
insurance apply to the same extent to general conditions of insurance already 
approved, Art. 13 V AG, for the supervisory authority can take action against 
approved general conditions of insurance only if it would not approve condi-
tions identical in substance in the event of a new notification. This applies also 
to the applicability of the AGBG. Officially approved general conditions of 
insurance are not privileged on account of Arts. 9-11 AGBG regarding the 
control of their content. The fact that the Act does not make any exception 
regarding its area of application in terms of things protected speaks against any 
privileged treatment. Official standard form contracts are even subject without 
restriction to the abstract action for injunction and retraction which follows 
from Art. 16AGBG 107. 
281 (dd) The extensive powers in terms of substantive law to take official action 
and the relevant requirements having been described, it has now tobe examined 
which possibilities of enforcement the BA V has and above all whether it 
exercises i ts rights. 
Basically, it can be said that the BA V uses its powers to take official action 
only very rarely. Under Art. 81, para. 2, sentence 1 VAG and Art. 89 VAG the 
BA V has not so far become active at all and under Art. 81a V AG only the Zonal 
Office of the Reich Supervisory Office has been active on one occasion108 • A 
somewhat more important role has been played by the Order dating from 1940. 
The BA V has applied that Order in some cases109. 
Ofmuch greater importance in practice is what is known as the BAV's simply 
administrativeactivity110 • This includes suggestions, recommendations, requests 
and legal opinions. The BAV performs administrative acts which do come 
within the scope of public law, but do not constitute acts of sovereignty as 
against third parties. 
Within the framework ofits simply administrative activity, the publication of 
the general principles of supervision must primarily be emphasised. Pursuant to 
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Art. 103, para. 1 V AG, the BA V is under an obligation to publish once a year 
special notices regarding its observations in the field of insurance, and pursuant 
to para. 2 its principles of administration on a current basis. In practice, the 
BA V influences the design of general conditions of insurance most importantly 
when new sets of conditions are fixed. Here the BA V is involved as early as at the 
stage of law making, before the set of mies is officially submitted for approval. 
In this way the insurance companies ensure that the provisions drafted jointly 
with the BAV will be approved without objection. 
The model conditions printed from time to time in the monthly publications 
of the BA V are also of importance. These serve as a model for insurance 
companies and guarantee that identically worded general conditions of 
insurance will be approved. On the other hand, insurance companies are not 
forced actually to adopt such model conditions. 
(b) Contra/ of credit institutions' standard form contracts (KWG) 
282 Credit institutions within the meaning of the KWG are subject to the super-
vision of the Bundesaufsichtsamt für das Kreditwesen (BAK, Federal Banking 
Supervisory Office), Art. 6, para. 1 KWG. The BAK's supervisory activity aims 
at ensuring if possible that the structural and regulative provisions of the KWG 
and its implementing regulations are observed and creditors of credit institu-
tions are protected against losses. To fulfil this function, Art. 6, para. 1 KWG 
includes a general power enabling administrative orders tobe made. In addition 
to that general power a great number of provisions of the Act contain special 
powers (e.g. Art. 1, paras. 2, 4, 10, 11, 13-16, etc.) 11 1 which form the legal basis 
of the BAK's special supervisory activities. 
The supervisory activity of the Office embraces the supervision of individual 
credit institutions. The activity is performed in line with the provisions of this 
Act. This must not be understood to mean that the BAK's sole function is to 
observe comp!iance with the KWG. Rather, it must comply with all the legis-
lation that is inseparably linked with the provisions of the KWG and other 
supervisory acts 112 , i.e. particularly commercial and company law. 
The KWG does not contain special powers to take official action for the 
purpose of contro!ling standard form contracts. Also, the general clause of Art. 
6, para. 1 KWG does not permit the conclusion that the BAK shall be granted 
powers to take official action concerning the control of standard form 
contracts. Neither does the AGBG belong to the provisions that are inseparably 
linked with the regulations of the KWG, nor can it be said that unfair standard 
form contract conditions are bound to conflict with the objective of the KWG. 
As far as that is concerned there is no reference in legal literature113 • 
Beyond bank supervision proper, which concerns the behaviour of the 
various credit institutions, under Art. 6, para. 2 KWG the BAK is charged with 
the additional task of taking steps against grievances in the credit system that 
jeopardise the security of assets entrusted to credit institutions, impair the 
proper handling of banking transactions or bring considerable disadvantages to 
the whole economy. Para. 2 means grievances affecting the country's economy 
as a whole114 • Whether any grievance affecting the economy as a whole may 
occur at all in the case of unfair contract terms - apart from extreme cases 
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(possibly Art. 46 KWG) - is very doubtful. For that reason reference may be 
made to what has been said regarding Art. 6, para. 1 KWG. Beyond that, Art. 6, 
para. 2 KWG as regards its legal nature is no rule of intervention, which is why 
the BAK in taking steps against grievances is restricted to instruction or 
information requests 115 • So far the BAK has not yet based any measure on Art. 
6, para. 2 KWG116 • 
Therefore there is no official control of credit institutions' standard form 
contracts within the meaning of the KWG. 
(c) Control of building societies' standard form contracts 
283 The official control ofbuilding societies' standard form contracts is regulated 
in the Bausparkassengesetz (BSpKG, Act on Building Societies) of 18 November 
1972117 • According to its legislative structure, the BSpKG is a supervisory act. lt 
was the legislator's intent to regulate the substantive supervisory law for private 
households and public authorities in standard form and to establish a uniform 
specialised supervision of private and public building societies through the 
BAK118 • Pursuant to Art. 1, para. 1 BSpKG, building societies are credit institu-
tions whose operations consist in the acceptance of deposits from building 
society savers (credit balances on savings account) and the granting of loans for 
housing measures (saver's building loan) to building society savers from their 
accumulated holdings (building society business). Pursuant to para. 2, a 
building society saver is any person who concludes a contract with a building 
society under which he acquires a legal claim to a building loan by effecting 
savings inpayments. 
The BSpKG offers the BAK numerous possibilities of exerting an influence 
on the design of the Allgemeine Bausparkassenbedingungen (ABB, general 
building society savings contracts) of public and private building societies under 
its supervision. As regards the powers to take official action, they are 
throughout very much like those of the BA V. This is explained by the fact that 
until the coming into force of the BSpKG the BA V was responsible for the 
supervision ofbuilding societies. The supervisory powers over building societies 
were largely adjusted to those over insurance companies und er the V AG, Arts. 
112 et seq. Therefore the following presentation will be based on the same 
structure as in the case of official control in the insurance sector. 
284 (aa) To operate, building societies require a licence from the BAK. This can be 
inferred indirectly from Art. 8 BSpKG. A licence may be granted only if the 
applicant in addition to his general business principles (corresponding to the 
business programme under the V AG) submits the general building society 
savings contract. Pursuant to Art. 8, para. 1, items 1-3 BSpKG, general 
building society savings contracts must in addition be drafted in such a way that 
they appear capable of being performed, and must provide for interest on 
savings deposits and redemption interest (Tilgungszinsen) that do not unduly 
defer the repayment of savings deposits plus the Joan granted to the saver, as 
weil as expressly protect the other interests of building society savers, for 
instance, by refraining from providing for unduly high charges or unjustified 
means for the society to recall savers' building loans. 
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After a licence has been granted, building societies continue to be subject to 
the supervision of the BAK. This manifests itself in the fact that amendments to 
general building society savings contracts also require approval, Art. 9, para. 1 
BSpKG. 
285 (bb) The general c/ause on governmental supervisory activity is contained in 
Art. 3, para. l, sentence 3 BSpKG. lt authorises the BAK to issue all orders 
'necessary to keep the operations of a building society in agreement with the 
general business principles and standard conditions of building society savings 
contracts '. The provision constitutes a general power t J issue administrative 
orders within the limits set to the BAK's supervisory authority by this 
provision 119. Power is granted under Art. 3 BSpKG for the observance of all 
provisions of the BSpKG and KWG. Thus the BAK's power of supervision falls 
considerably short of the universal right of supervision comprising 'all the 
operations' ofprivate building societies which belonged to the BAV under Art. 
112 V AG in combination with Art. 81 V AG120 . The restriction also applies to the 
powers of control regarding general building society savings contracts. Art. 3, 
para. l, sentence 2 BSpKG expressly mentions only orders 'to keep the opera-
tions in agreement with the general building society savings contracts'. This 
means only that the BAK may take only those measures required to observe the 
general building society savings contracts121 . 
A special power to take official action includes Art. 9, para. 2, sentence 1 
BSpKG under which the BAK may demand that general building society savings 
contracts be amended if the performance of the obligations assumed seems no 
Jonger guaranteed. The provision concerns only new contracts; thus, unlike the 
BAV under Art. 8la, sentence 2 VAG, the BAK cannot intervene in existing 
contracts by redesigning the parties' rights and duties. Apart from that the 
provision corresponds to Art. 8la, sentence 1 VAG. The Act gives no clues as to 
when a sufficient reason for impairment exists. However, an emergency is not 
required, as Art. 15 BSpKG is known to provicte122. Art. 9, para. 2, sentence 2 
BSpKG entitles the BAK to forbid the conclusion of new contracts if the require-
ments of sentence 1 are satisfied. This power existing in addition to Art. 46, 
para. 1 KWG may be exercised only by way of a transitory provisional measure. 
As a request pursuant to sentence 1 already amounts to the temporary refusal to 
conclude new contracts, sentence 2 may become important only in those cases 
where the BAK considers it necessary to forbid the conclusion of new contracts 
as an immediatemeasure before it comes to a decision whether a request for an 
amendment should be made or to what effect it should be123 • Art. 11 BSpKG 
contains the noteworthy power enabling the BAK to recall a manager if he 
culpably infringes the provisions of the general building society savings 
contracts specified in Art. 5, para. 3. Art. 15 BSpKG, like Art. 89 VAG, 
includes the possibility of forbidding all kinds of payments temporarily if the 
performance of a building society's obligations is endangered. While insolvency 
is not required, there must be considerable financial difficulties that may result 
in a concrete dang er to creditors 124. 
286 (cc) The BSpKG and private-law regulations determine the subject matter of 
general building society savings contracts. The decisive provisions are regulated 
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in Art. 5, para. 3 and Art. 8, para. 1 BSpKG. Art. 5, para. 3 BSpKGmerelypre-
scribes which subjects must be reguJated in general building society savings 
contracts. The provision is silent on the subject matter of generaJ building 
society saving contracts in terms of substantive law. All the same it is of impor-
tance inasmuch as only general building society savings contracts under Art. 5, 
para. 3 BSpKG are subject to the approval of the BAK, Art. 8, para. 1, Art. 9, 
para. l, sentences 1 and 2, Art. 18, para. 5 BSpKG. General building society 
savings contract provisions exceeding that scope only have tobe reported to the 
BAK, Art. 9, para. l, sentence 3 BSpKG. 
Therefore the decisive provision by which building societies must let them-
selves be guided in designing their general savings contracts is Art. 8, para. 1, 
item l BSpKG alone, while item 2 as weil as the examples of item 3 in the final 
analysis put into more concrete terms the concept of protection of building 
society savers' interests. The construction of that indefinite legal concept should 
present the most difficulties in practice. However, the decisive factor is not only 
where the interests of the individual building society saver lie, but rather 
building society savers as a whole who by virtue of their collective commitment 
have a special relationship to each other which in the consideration of their 
interests should be judged in a special way or against which the individual's 
interest must be much Iess important' 25 . Even if the interests of building society 
savers are the criterion by which building societies must act, compared with 
insurance law there is an important qualification. While in the latter field' it is 
important that the interests of the insured are protected in line with the business 
programme, which comprises all aspects of the insurance companies operations 
Art. 8, para. 1, item 3 BSpKG takes as a criterion only whether general building 
society savings contracts sufficiently protect savers' interests other than those 
mentioned in items l and 2. Thus there is no reason for refusal under item 3 if in 
a building society's activities that are not regulated in general building society 
savings contracts, because they do not belang to the statutory minimum subject 
matter, the savers' interests are not sufficiently protected126. 
Neither are the interests of building society savers sufficiently protected if the 
general building society savings contracts submitted for approval infringe 
mandatory private-law provisions. In addition to Arts. 134, 138 Civil Code, 
building societies and the BAK must above all comply with the provisions ofthe 
AGBQI27. 
287 (dd) The type of the BAK.'s controlling influence corresponds to the situation 
prevailing in the insurance business. Powers to take official action are used very 
rarely if at all, because the main emphasis is on a simply administrative activity 
(No. 281). 
(d) Contra/ of mortgage banks' standard form contracts 
288 The control of mortgage banks' standard form contracts is possible to a 
limited extent under the Hypothekenbankengesetz (HBG, Private Mortgage 
Banks Act) of 5 February 1963. 
Pursuant to Art. 1 HBG, mortgage banks are private-law credit institutions 
whose operations aim at mortgaging domestic properties and issuing bonds on 
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account of such mortgages or at granting loans to domestic public-law entities 
or institutions, or municipal loans to such entities or institutions against 
assumption of full liability, and issuing bonds (municipal bonds) on account of 
the claims acquired. 
The BAK supervises mortgage banks in accordance with the provisions of the 
HBG and KWG, Art. 3 HBG. Lastly, Art. 4 HBG regulates the supervisory 
authority's powers. lt may issue all orders necessary to keep the operations ofa 
bank in agreement with legislation, its by-laws and other binding provisions. 
Like Art. 3, para. 1, sentence 1 BSpKG and Art. 81 V AG, Art. 4 HBG is the 
general clause of the supervisory law. lts scope is much wider than Art. 3 KWG 
and even than Art. 3 BSpKG128 • Orders pursuant to Art. 4 HBG are necessary to 
keep the operations of a bank in agreement with the law: here belong, in addi-
tion to the KWG and HBG, the Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporation Act), UWG 
and HGB, the bank's by-laws and other binding provisions, e.g. above all the 
basic features of mortgage terms under Art. 15 HBG 129 • As in the building 
society system, the BAK may only issue orders that are required for compliance 
with standard form contracts. However, control of the content of mortgage 
banks' standard form contracts by the BAK is possible under Art. 15 HBG. Art. 
15 HBG obliges the bank to design the basic features of the terms of mortgage 
loans and reserves the supervisory authority the right to approve those basic 
features. The Act does not say anything about the content of such basic 
features. For all that, sentence 2 shows that it is considered essential and always 
necessary to determine what drawbacks a debtor may suffer in the event of 
notice of repayment not in due time and on what conditions a bank is authorised 
to demand anticipated repayment of the loan. In addition, Arts. 14 and 17-21 
HBG contain provisions that set Iimits to the banks' freedom of design. All the 
other clauses must be negotiated between the bank and the supervisory 
authority, without the HBG offering any clues130 • As in the insurance and 
building society business, here also the provisions of the AGBG must be 
complied with. 
(e) Control oj investment companies' standard form contracts 
289 Pursuant to Art. 1 Gesetz über Kapitalanlagegesellschaften (KAGG, Act on 
Investment Companies), investment companies are enterprises whose opera-
tions aim at investing money deposited with them in their own name, separate 
from their own assets, for the joint account of depositors, according to the prin-
ciple of the spreading of risk, in securities or properties and heritable rights of 
erecting and maintaining a building, and issuing instruments (investment certifi-
cates) in respect of the rights of depositors (holders of an investment certificate) 
arising therefrom. 
In addition to the KAGG, investment companies are also subject to the statu-
tory provisions governing credit institutions. Accordingly, the BAK is the 
decisive supervisory authority whose powers are determined by Art. 6, para. l 
KWG131 • Hence it follows that as in the case of banks there are no special powers 
to take official action against unfair standard form contracts. 
Pursuant to Art. 15, para. 2, sentence l KAGG, the contract terms deter-
mining the legal relationship between investment companies and holders of 
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investment certificates must be approved by the BAK. This approval is given 
only if the !ist of requirements in Art. 15, para. 3 KAGG has been satisfied. 
Para. 3 enumerates the provisions that must be included in standard form 
contracts. The precise content of such provisions is not fixed; it is only made 
clear on what subjects something must be said. The Act does not offer any 
further clues as to the definition of contract terms. Meanwhile the BAK has 
drafted model terms i 32, which, among other things, provide that amendments of 
contract terms also require the BAK's approval, another nexus of problems on 
which the Act is silent 133 • 
Owing to the lack of legislative clues, the BAK's possibility of exerting 
influence on the design of standard form contracts must be considered small. 
(f) Control of standard form contracts used by organisers of 
correspondence courses 
290 Correspondence course contracts must be licensed by the ZFU 197 • The ZFU's 
main function consists in examining the teaching material submitted as to 
whether a student will be able to achieve the indicated Iearning objective with the 
aid of the existing material. Such an examination includes a review of the 
contract terms the organiser intends to use. In particular, the ZFU must examine 
whether the standard form contracts include the mandatory contractual 
provisions provided by law. 
( g) Liability of the government jor breaches of duty by employees and 
officials oj the BA V, BAK and ZFU 
291 The state, here the Federal Republic of Germany, is liable pursuant to Art. 
839 Civil Code, Art. 34 Basic Law for culpable violation of official duties by its 
employees and officials. As the BAK and BA V are federal authorities, Iiability 
may theoretically arise if the authorities mentioned fail duly to fulfil their 
numerous supervisory duties. Government liability pursuant to Art. 839 Civil 
Code, Art. 34 Basic Law presupposes that the performance of supervisory 
duties exists as against bank customers and insurants. While the courts up to 
1978 had proceeded from the assumption that supervisory functions exist in the 
interest of the general public and do not give rise to any official duty as against 
an individual insurant - bank customer134 - the Federal High Court in two 
decisions dating from 1979 has recognised for the field of the credit business that 
basically the consumer may hold the government liable for breaches of official 
duty by employees of the BAK135 • lt remains tobe seen what effect such court 
practice will have on the insurance business. 
lt is still undecided whether the courts will prevail in the case of breaches of 
official duty by officials or employees of the ZFU. As far as could be ascer-
tained, the question has not yet been dealt with. As the FernUSG is a distinct 
consumer protection act, the assumption suggests itself that the duties 
incumbent upon the ZFU also exist in particular as against an individual 
consumer. 
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(h) Critical evaluation 
292 A thoroughly organised system of government control exists only in the 
insurance business and as regards building societies. In all the other areas the !ist 
of measures is so fragmentary that we cannot speak seriously of any control at 
all. 
That the V AG and BSpKG are not consumer protection acts136 may be shown 
consistently by their history. In essence, the VAG of 1901 made allowance for 
endeavours that aimed not at protecting the interests of the insured but at 
promoting trends of development in an industry. The insurance industry itself 
was interested in the enactment of a law because it brought the insurers freedom 
of trade in the then area of the German Reich. The many small states in the area 
of insurance supervision had been abolished, and there was a central admitting 
and supervisory agency. Contemporaneously the Act established the require-
ments to be satisfied in the operation of insurance business in future 137 • Thus it is 
not surprising that the Act at that time included what influential insurance 
companies considered necessary and reasonable. The insurance industry did not 
oppose the amendments of the Act either; it even worked towards additional 
government supervision 138 • Despite this easily recognisable historical back-
ground, authors of scientific papers and commentaries as a rule emphasise that 
it was the main object of the Act to protect the interests of the insured. lt would 
be wrong to claim that the Act did not pursue such objectives as well, but the 
emphasis was on the area just described. The judgment of the legislative purpose 
by legal writers in the field of insurance cannot even be confirmed by the 
practice the BA V has been following now for almost 80 years. The BA V has 
hardly made any use of the numerous powers to take official action granted 
under the Act. lt may be that this was prevented by the involved and undifferen-
tiated general clauses. At any event, they prevented the development of precise 
principles of supervisory law139 • Where there are no concrete powers, it suggests 
itself to enter into negotiations. This is why conditions are not supervised by 
way of freedom-restricting administration, but in sound harmony between 
insurance supervisory authority and supervised enterprises. As a rule, further 
developments are subject to mutual consent. For practical purposes consumer 
protection in terms of supervisory law extends as far as is acceptable to the 
enterprises 140• Thus the enterprises themselves become advocates of consumer 
protection. Hence to draw the conclusion that in the insurance business com-
prehensive consumer protection is ensured seems superficial. Rather, the 
consumer's interests are least protected where the degree of protection is deter-
mined by industry alone (No. 130). As regards this principle, the insurance 
industry is not an exception. Two examples may serve to corroborate the view 
expressed here. If consumer protection had been realised in the insurance 
industry to the extent claimed by that industry, it cannot be explained why it 
offered such fierce resistance to the incorporation of general conditions of 
insurance into the AGBG 141 • Today legal writers close to the insurance industry 
still try to justify the incompatibility of the lists of prohibitions under Arts. 10 
and 11 AGBG with the special circumstances prevailing in the insurance 
business. Furthermore, from the point of view of effective consumer protection 
the supervisory authority's attitude towards the uniformity of standard form 
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contracts is open to doubt. The BA V is known to consider uniform general 
conditions of insurance desirable, which is justified by enhanced market trans-
parency. At the same time, though, uniform general conditions of insurance 
result in a far-reaching cartel formation, since insurers offer almost identical 
benefits in their general conditions of insurance. lt is open to question whether 
or not in practice people infringe Art. 102 GWB under which the formation of 
terms cartels is permitted but which was not designed to completely exempt 
general conditions of insurance from any control under the GWB (No. 35). 
With this attitude the supervisory authority gets entangled in its own contra-
dictions, for to the advocates of free market economy workable competition is a 
pillar of consumer protection. Precisely such competition is restricted, however, 
by uniform general conditions of insurance. Even if it is assumed that despite 
standardised general conditions of insurance there is competition in the 
insurance business, the question arises whether such competition actually serves 
the consumer's interests. After all, through premiums the consumer must pay 
for the heavy expenditure incurred by these enterprises for the purpose of 
competition (advertising, commission agents). From the consumer's point of 
view it is necessary for him to include such considerations in his deliberations142 • 
In actual fact, the BA V interprets the supervisory provisions as a basically 
adequate principle. Suggestions for improvement always remain within the 
limits of the statutory regulations and the existing market system (No. 36). 
While a change of the entire insurance system with a view to bringing about 
more effective consumer protection is theoretically possible, since the 
provisions regulating the power to take official action are all of a general clause 
nature and offer wide scope for manoeuvre, implementation in practice would 
require a redetermination ofthe functions of the BA V which would also have to 
be reflected in legislation. 
The participation of consumer representatives in the activities of supervisory 
board bodies has not so far brought about any change in the practice described. 
By and !arge what has been said also applies to the control of building societies. 
In 1931 building societies were largely submitted to the supervisory regulations 
under the VAG. The reason given was the essentially identical starting position 
in the building society system 143 • The special legislation enacted in 1972 did not 
result in a fundamental change of the legislative purpose. A judgment of the 
Fern USO was given earlier (No. 200). 
4 Collective action pursuant to Art. 13 AGBG 
293 Under Art. 13 the AGBG introduced the collective action, the purpose of 
which is to enable the control of unfair standard form contracts tobe exercised. 
Under previous law, the control of standard form contracts was possible only by 
an action instituted by an individual (Individualprozeß). Any decision in favour 
of the consumer on the effectiveness of an unfair clause in a standard form 
contract was effective only between the parties to the lawsuit. Users of standard 
form contracts were able to continue using the clause in question even where 
there was danger that in a new lawsuit they would be defeated. The collective 
action now grants consumer associations an abstract power of control separated 
from a particular case. If the court declares a clause taken exception to by 
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consumer associations tobe unlawful, its decision has a certain broad effect in 
that it influences all individual actions brought thereafter. This is achieved by a 
restrictive injunction granted by a court, having effects on the defeated user of 
standard form contracts and individual consumers if the consumers concerned 
plead the affirmative judgment in a collective action cause. The legislator hopes 
that this regulation will free legal relations as far as possible from unlawful 
standard form contracts144 • That goal would have been achieved much more 
easily and much better by an official power of control, for such a power would 
have been exercised officially, while in the case of control by collective action it 
will in the final analysis be decisive to what extent consumer associations avail 
themselves of their rights. As a result, though, the degree of control in most 
cases is shifted to an extra-judicial area. Whether consumer associations 
become active is not determined just by the degree of rights granted to them. 
These rights are merely prerequisite to the associations becoming active in the 
first place. Rather, personal and capital equipment, the qualifications and 
employment of personnel and the organisation's conception of itself are of 
eminent importance here. We regret to say that the legislator has rejected other 
proposals to introduce official control145 , so that it is now the task of consumer 
protection associations to make optimum use of the new legal position. lt is all 
the same striking that the legislator has paid so little attention to the procedural 
regulation. This not only manifests itself in the present regulation which was 
negotiated shortly before the enactment of the law after a hectic discussion of 
the pros and cons 146 • As early as during the process of legislation the procedural 
complex was neglected dreadfully despite the jurisprudential discussions on the 
occasion of the 50th German Lawyers' Assemblyl 47 • Not even the experience 
gained in the law of the collective action under Art. 13 UWG could be turned to 
account, since the expert opinion commissioned148 was completed only much 
later than would have been necessary for a meaningful evaluation. The reason 
may be that the circles concerned had a great aversion to tackling this hot 
problem at all. 
(a) Associations' capacity to sue 
294 (aa) Art. 13, para. 12, item 1 AGBG grants consumer associations a right of 
action if they satisfy the requirements provided by law. Accordingly, it must 
first of all be an association capable of acting as a legal entity which means 
nothing eise but an incorporated association. As follows from the second part of 
sentence 1 of para. 2, item 1, that association may also consist of natural persons 
as members. Furthermore, 'it must be one of the association's functions 
according to its by-laws to protect the consumer's interests through education 
and guidance'. Since this wording is identical with the wording of Art. 13 UWG, 
the Federal High Court's leading decision passed on Art. 13 UWG must be 
consulted on interpretation149 • Pursuant thereto, only an association that has 
not incorporated consumer education and guidance into its by-laws just for the 
look of it, but actually performs such activities has the capacity to sue. This 
includes the association's not confining itself merely to the protection of the 
consumer interests of its members. Rather, it must take pains to guide and 
educate any private final consumer150 • For that reason associations whose 
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objective according to their by-laws is to exercise the right of action under Art. 
13 UWG and Art. 13 AGBG have no right of action. The legal position is prob-
lematic as regards trade unions that are members of the DGB151 • 
Trade unions, although not capable of acting as a legal entity, are capable of 
being aparty to a Iawsuit 152 • The trade union's main function is thesafeguarding 
of employees' interests. Through a recent amendment of their by-laws, trade 
unions have included therein as a subsidiary function the safeguarding of 
consumer interests. As trade unions actually protect consumer interests in 
certain sectors, they must be conceded a right of action 153 • A consumer associa-
tion may confine itself merely to certain sectors of consumer protection without 
thereby losing its right of action 154 • 
The second part of sentence 1 ofpara. 2, item 1 makes it clear that a consumer 
association may be organised as an umbrella organisation or may comprise 75 
natural persons as members. This requirement is to ensure that the association is 
backed by a sizeable number of consumers. In the event of any dispute as to 
whether the association satisfies the requirements of Art. 13, para. 2, item 1 
AGBG, the court must clear up doubts ex officio155 • 
A restriction of the consumer association's right of action follows from Art. 
13, para. 3 AGBG. Pursuant thereto, the right of action is inapplicable if the 
standard form contracts in question are used only in relation to traders and the 
contract is made within the framework of the operations of a trading enterprise 
or if standard form contracts are recommended for exclusive use between 
traders. 
295 (bb) Item 2 of Art. 13, para. 2 AGBG is almostliterally identical with Art. 13, 
para. 1 UWG. Pursuant thereto, 'all incorporated associationsfor the promo-
tion of Irade interests' have a right of action. The decisions issued und er Art. 13 
UWG and the legal literature in that respect may therefore be used in inter-
preting Art. 13 AGBG 156 • Accordingly, an industrial association need not 
necessarily intend to promote the full extent of trade and vocational interests of 
persons. Also, associations that apply themselves especially and exclusively to 
the task of fighting unfair competition 157 or, more specifically, unfair business 
conditions158 , are entitled to bring an action. Unlike a consumer association, an 
industrial association may protect only the interests of its members159 • The 
promotion of trade interests need not be the sole or the characteristic feature 
either160 • After all, industrial associations may take exception to all the viola-
tions of the AGBG that concern both the sphere of interests of a consumer 
association and areas outside that sphere. They merely have to occur within the 
sphere of interests defined in the by-laws 161 • Only regarding the requirements of 
capability of acting as a legal entity, of the functions defined in the by-laws in 
consequence of which the right of action is actually exercised162 , and of the 
restriction of functions as defined in the by-laws to problems ofstandard form 
contracts does what has been said about consumer associations apply also to 
industrial associations163 • If the statutory regulations of para. 2, item 1 and item 
2 are compared, it is striking that detailed requirements to be satisfied by 
consumer associations compare with some lax requirements to be satisfied by 
industrial associations. This statutory regulation may be based on the view that 
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it is much more the business of trade and industry and its self-regulatory institu-
tions to remedy grievances. 
296 (cc) Para. 2, item 3 expressly mentions chambers of industry and commerce 
only for the sake of clarity164 • Item 3 enumerates just examples of the associa-
tions mentioned in item 2165 • In addition to chambers of industry and commerce, 
bar and medical associations are also entitled to bring an action 166 • 
297 (dd) According to its wording, the AGBG does not entitle individuals to bring 
an action. By comparison, the bill prepared by the CDU/CSU parliamentary 
group did grant the individual consumer such a right of action. The adoption of 
a statutory regulation to that effect was rejected with reference to the fact that 
the consumer had no interest warranting protection in an isolated action, 
because he could plead ineffectiveness under his contractual rights 167 • Because 
of the history of legislation, the majority of legal writers deny the individual 
consumer a right of action168 • A judicial progressive development of the law is 
not excluded, though. A starting point could be the legal nature of the right of 
action pursuant to Art. 13 AGBG. In terms of substance, the law approximates 
the collective action to a tort. In that case, though, it suggests itself to grant the 
individual consumer a right of action 169 • 
(b) Claim for retraction and for injunction pursuant to Art. 13, para. 1 
AGBG 
298 Pursuant to Art. 13, para. 1 AGBG, any person who in standard form 
contracts uses provisions that are ineffective under Arts. 9-11 AGBG or 
recommends them for use in legal relations may be sued for an injunction and, 
in the case of a recommendation, for retraction. The law distinguishes between a 
claim for retraction and a claim for injunction. The crucial question of the 
collective action under Art. 13 AGBG is what the object of the claim for injunc-
tion or retraction is and which concrete requirements must be satisfied in the 
reasoning of the suing association170• The majority of authoritative writers base 
their views on the assumption that the concept of standard form contracts is the 
same for the purposes of the collective action as for the formulation of the 
question in terms of substantive law 171 • In the final analysis, the consequence of 
such a view would be that, irrespective of whether standard form contracts were 
used or only recommended, an action can be brought only if it can be proved 
that three consumers have been injured. Here it is overlooked that the concept 
of standard form contracts under Art. 13 differs from that under Arts. 1-12 
AGBG in that action may also be taken against a person who only recommends 
but does not use standard form contracts. The feature 'recommend' gains 
importance independently only where legal protection is afforded even before 
standard form contracts are used in legal relations. The interpretation of the 
concept of standard form contracts advocated by the majority of legal writers 
may, if at all, apply only to the element of use. But in that respect also there are 
objections, because the preventive function attributed to the collective action 
would thereby be reduced to absurdity. For that reason several commentators 
consider threatening use to be sufficient 172 , because only thus may unfair 
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standard form contracts be kept away from legal relations that are the object of 
protection of the collective action. This is the precise reason why it is advocated 
to Jet the concept of standard form contracts hold true even if they have not yet 
been used in a contract, but if the person drafting them gives to understand that 
he or a third party has such a use in mind 173 • Onlythe Iast-mentioned view makes 
allowance for the purpose of collective action. 
According to the wording of the Act, only the use of those standard form 
contract clauses that are ineffective 'pursuant to Arts. 9-11 thereof' gives rise 
to an obligation to refrain from doing something or to retract something. This, 
for one thing, makes it clear that individual clauses may already occasion the 
bringing of an action. It is not necessary that the entire standard form cohtract is 
unfair 174 • For another thing, standard form contracts within the meaning of Art. 
13 AGBG shall thereby be distinguished from those that do not become part of 
the contract, Arts. 2-4 AGBG. However, as the fields of application of Arts. 3 
and 4 AGBG, on the one hand, and Arts. 9-11 AGBG, on the other, overlap, 
the judgments contained in Arts. 3 and 4 AGBG may weil be included under a 
collective action 175 • The protective purpose of the procedural regulations, which 
is the avoidance as far as possible of the interference with and disturbance of 
legal relations, requires also that other cogent Iaw be used as a criterion, for 
instance the AbzG, FernUSG, the regulations governing travel contracts and 
Arts. 134, 242 Civil Code176 • At any rate, we do not see why a passage to that 
effect was not expressly incorporated in the Act177 • 
299 (aa) A person infringes the obligation to refrain from using unfair standard 
form contracts if he uses them all the same not only by concluding contracts, but 
in any form in which he appears on the market using such contracts178 • The same 
applies to any person who does not use standard form contracts himself but 
recommends their use. 
The duty to refrain from doing something must be distinguished from the 
duty to remove something. In the Jaw of competition it is understood as a 
principle that a claim for injunction also includes a claim for removal if any 
violation of the law of competition results in continual disturbances 179 • This 
principle cannot be applied to the Jaw of standard form contracts, though, for 
the AGBG has specifically regulated the claim for removal of disturbances and 
gives rise to such a claim in the form of a claim for retraction directed against the 
person recommending standard form contracts. A user of standard form 
contracts is obliged only to refrain from continued use, but need not inform 
customers of his own accord of the fact that the standard form contracts under 
objection are ineffective. This principle includes a certain restriction in the case 
of permanent acts 180 • Such a permanent act should be assumed if a user employs 
technical means to inform the public about his standard form contracts, for 
instance displays them on his business premises. Here a perpetual injunction 
may oblige him to remove such standard form contracts. As a prerequisite to the 
arisal of a claim for injunction, the legislator states only the use of ineffective 
standard form contracts, but not in addition the danger of repetition. All the 
same, the <langer of repetition is prerequisite to the existence of a claim. There-
fore, it remains to be seen whether the danger of repetition is the substantive 
basis of a claim181 or an element ofthe legitimate interest to take legal action182 • 
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lt is agreed that the use of certain standard form contract clauses for the first 
time renders the <langer of repetition so likely that further facts are not required 
to give rise to a claim. 
Basically, a user may avoid the <langer of repetition only by making a state-
ment that he will refrain from continued use and will incur a penalty if he fails to 
do so. By no means can the <langer of repetition be considered avoided if a user 
affirms that he has discontinued the use of the standard form contracts in 
question. Such affirmations offer no grounds for punishing fresh infringements 
in the manner intended by the legislator183 • 
300 (bb) A user is only a person in whose name contracts are made or are tobe 
made, with standard form contract conditions being incorporated. lt is the 
enterprise that is responsible if any of its employees uses standard form 
contracts without the management's knowledge. As far as that goes the enter-
prise may exculpate itself pursuant to Art. 831, para. 1, sentence 2 Civil Code184 • 
The only prerequisite is that the employee's activity consists in the initiation of 
negotiations for a contract or in the conclusion of contracts. 
301 (cc) The duty to retract ineffective standard form contracts is only placed 
upon a person recommending standard form contracts. That person need not be 
identical with the user, for a person recommending ineffective conditions does 
not necessarily use them himself. The claim for retraction arises in connection 
with a recommendation. lt is merely necessary that a statement suggesting the 
use of certain conditions has reached the person to whom it was directed185 • This 
is sensible because a recommendation can often be a non-recurrent act. The 
substance of the duty to retract is laid down in Art. 17, item 4 AGBG. Pursuant 
thereto, the person on whom that duty is imposed must publish the judgment in 
the same manner as the recommendation was spread. 
302 (dd) While it is relatively unequivocal who is to be considered a user of 
standard form contracts, a definition of the person recommending them is much 
more difficult. The Act offers a clue inasmuch as only a person recommending 
standard form contracts 'for use in legal relations' is responsible. However, as 
standard form contracts are recommended in principle for use in legal relations, 
this criterion seems tobe useless for legal purposes. Within the meaning of that 
provision authors of sets of clauses, even if they were lawyers and notaries, 
would not therefore be excluded right from the start as persons capable of being 
sued. That may even be true of jurists186 • Of course such a wide wording cannot 
be accepted. To begin with, only a person approaching users in his own name 
can be regarded as a person recommending standard form contracts. In 
addition, such a person must for commercial or vocational reasons be interested 
in certain clauses being used. After all, the legislator intended to embrace only 
those clauses that apply to a great number of persons. If these criteria are taken 
as a basis, jurists, lawyers and notaries should hardly number among the 
persons capable of being sued 187 • 
A problem is whether those recommending standard form contracts may also 
be public-law entities which through their authorities, such as the BA V and 
BAK, have model conditions drafted 188 • The main objection to the applicability 
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of the collective action to governmental approving authorities is that the AGBG 
regards as persons recommending standard form contracts only those that act 
at a level of coordination without having powers to take forcible measures 
(Zwangsbefugnisse). The Act does not offer any clues as to such a restrictive 
interpretation, largely because the procedural part was enacted in great haste 
and without adequate debate. 
(c) Warning (Abmahnung) 
303 Claims for injunction in regard to the use and recommendation of ineffective 
standard form contracts and the claim for retraction may be asserted by way of 
action or interlocutory injunction without the user or person recommending 
standard form contracts having to be threatened with such action or interloc-
utory injunction beforehand. The action cannot be dismissed for want of a 
legitimate interest to take legal action, because the user of standard form 
contracts had not previously been asked by the suing association to stop using 
or recommending certain standard form contracts190 • 
Although a warning is not prerequisite to an admissible action, commentators 
base their considerations on the assumption that in the case of the collective 
action under Art. 13 AGBG a warning is also called for. ·The principles 
developed und er Art. 13 UWG are applied throughout to the AGBG. As a rule 
no reasons are given i91. Apparently, the implicit assumption is made that the 
· similarity of the actions necessitates the application of principles developed 
underthe law of competition. Admittedly, the authors are correct in that Art. 13 
AGBG is modelled on Art. 13 UWG. This is not to say, however, that the 
situation in the law of standard form contracts resembles that in the UWG, for 
there is a decisive difference in the effect the actions have. Under the UWG, 
disputes are settled if the enterprise involved need not bring an action because of 
a successful warning. In the case of an action under the AGBG, the associations 
entitled to bring an action are bound tobe interested in obtaining a judgment in 
order that an effect on third parties may be produced (No. 293). lt is only the 
effect of the judgment on third parties that affords the consumer effective legal 
protection. There is no comparable situation in the area covered by the UWG. 
The application of the principles of warning cannot be justified by reference to 
the fact that under Art. 93 Code of Civil Procedure the successful association 
may be ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings provided the defendant had 
not occasioned the action, for Art. 93 Code of Civil Procedure contains only a 
general procedural principle. When a consumer association has to bear the costs 
of a successful action concerning•standard form contracts can be determined 
only on the basis of criteria tailored to the peculiarity ofthe action. The strongly 
formalistic principles of warning are not suitable for this 191•. 
(d) Interlocutory proceedings (einstweilige Verfügung) 
304 The AGBG includes no provision similar to Art. 25 UWG, so the admissi-
bility of an interlocutory injunction against unfair standard form contract 
clauses must be judged solely on the basis of Arts. 935 et seq. Code of Civil 
Procedure. 
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The application for an interlocutory injunction presents itself especially in 
two cases: the majority of ineffective clauses pursuant to Art. 13 AGBG could 
be eliminated by way of summary proceedings, and provisions finally declared 
to be ineffective in a control procedure could be removed promptly from 
standard form contracts of third-party users in the same trade 192 • The claim for 
an injunction within the meaning of Arts. 935, 940, 936 and 916, para. 1 Codeof 
Civil Procedure can comprise only the claim for injunction granted to associa-
tions under Art. 13, para. 2 AGBG. The claim for retraction is excluded a 
priori193 • 
On the admissibility of an interlocutory injunction alone, opinions are 
divided. While the majority of authoritative writers concede consumer associa-
tions the possibility 194 of having the unlawfulness of standard form contracts 
decided by way of summary proceedings, the Higher Regional Court of 
Düsseldorf has denied these associations that possibility in a much-noted 
decision 195 • The existence of a claim for an interlocutory injunction as weil as the 
question of whether such a claim has merit is a matter of argument. 
A claim for an interlocutory injunction would exist only if the suing associa-
tion were able to show satisfactorily that the challenged clauses actually infringe 
Arts. 9-11 AGBG or other mandatory regulations. The Higher Regional Court 
of Düsseldorf sees the way of the interlocutory injunction barred because this 
type of injunction has no merit. Hence it follows from the crucial passages of the 
decision that the court rather objects to the existence of a claim 196 : 
As a rule theinterest ofthe general public is served better by ajudgment given 
in general contentious proceedings (ordentliches Erkenntnisverfahren) 
because it offers the possibility of more thorough clarification of the facts of 
the case. Against this, the issuance of an interlocutory injunction cannot be 
justified by the consideration that the consumer's interests might be jeopar-
dised if a user of standard form contracts continues to use them despite 
pending litigation in general contentious proceedings. A factor to be 
considered here is that customers who feel aggrieved by such standard form 
contracts may themselves at any time take action against the user. What 
speaks above all against the issuance of an interlocutory injunction, though, 
is the fact that such an injunction issued as between an association and a user 
has no legal effect as against customers and therefore is of no use to them 197 • 
The reasons given are not convincing. lt remains unclear why the general 
public should be better served by general contentious proceedings. Trial and 
summary proceedings are distinguished precisely by the extent and accuracy of 
the finding of facts. The general public - more precisely consumers - are 
very much interested in unlawful standard form contracts being removed from 
legal relations as quickly as possible. Only thus can damage be avoided, which is 
the very purpose of the collective action regarding standard form contracts, and 
it is not contrary to that declared legislative purpose if the court refers con-
sumers to their option of going to court as individuals. lt is the very purpose of 
the collective action to relieve him of that burden 198 • Lastly, it is not clear why 
the Jack of binding force under Art. 21 AGBG and on top of it 'above all' may 
result in the dismissal of an application for an interlocutory injunction. Even if 
it is assumed that the binding effect of Art. 21 concerns only decisions given in a 
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triaJl 99 , the Jack of binding effect does not alter the fact that consumers are 
served substantially if a user is forbidden to continue using the ineffective 
clauses under penalty of Ordnungsmittel (judicial measures serving the purpose 
of forcing a certain act, default or sufferance from persons or of punishing dis-
obedience or contempt of court). In view of the sanctions he is threatened with 
in the event of contravention, the user concerned will refrain from continued use 
immediately, whereby he helps all future customers who will not be exposed to 
the ineffective clause under objection. lt is striking that the extension of legal 
force introduced in favour of the consumer serves as a means ofreasoning in the 
curtailment of his rights. 
In the examination of a claim for an interlocutory injunction, difficult 
questions of law may arise if the court has to construe the general clause or the 
!ist of prohibitions of Art. 10 AGBG. Since, in the past, actions were brought as 
a rule for violations of Art. 11 AGBG200 , the view the courts will take cannot be 
predicted yet. The courts may dismiss an application for an interlocutory 
injunction if a summary examination has shown that an infringement cannot be 
assumed with the probability required for a decision. In addition to the infringe-
ment of Arts. 9-11 AGBG, it must be shown satisfactorily that the standard 
form contracts in question would be used further unless an interlocutory injunc-
tion were granted. Usually, the mere fact that standard form contracts are being 
used sufficiently proves the danger of repetition201 • 
An interlocutory injunction has merit only if an arrangement by way of such 
an injunction seems necessary because 'significant' difficulties in law enforce-
ment would otherwise be encountered (Art. 935 Code of Civil Procedure) or a 
'significant' drawback would be suffered (Art. 940 Code of Civil Procedure). 
Consumer associations must substantiate the urgency, because the AGBG does 
not include a provision similar to Art. 25 UWG. The conflicting viewpoints are 
also reflected in the construction of the requirement of proof of urgency. In 
some cases it is claimed that an interlocutory injunction is destitute of merits202 , 
while in others it is demanded that standard form contracts should include 
particularly gross inequities or particularly far-reaching and involved effects203 • 
Both views must be rejected. They go beyond the wording of Arts. 935 and 940 
Code of Civil Procedure without giving convincing reasons. It is not clear why 
standards other than those applicable to the collective action regarding the 
UWG should apply to the collective action regarding standard form contracts. 
An interlocutory injunction has merits as soon as the associations are able to 
show satisfactorily that there is a claim for an interlocutory injunction204 • 
The interlocutory injunction merely aims at the preliminary settlement of a 
lawsuit. Basically, the suing associations must not be finally satisfied by the 
granting of an interlocutory injunction. For that reason, basically the claim for 
injunction must not aim at a user discontinuing the use of certain clauses. For 
the purpose of a preliminary settlement it suffices that hebe instructed to draw 
the contracting party's attention to the fact that certain clauses are currently 
being reviewed by the court. 
(e) Substance oj Arts. 14-21 AGBG 
305 Art. 14 AGBG contains a special regulation on jurisdiction over the subject 
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matter and on territorial jurisdiction. A regional court has jurisdiction over the 
subject matter irrespective of the value in dispute. The regional court in whose 
district the defendant has his place of business has territorial jurisdiction. By 
way of statutory order, the governments of the German Länder may refer 
lawsuits to one regional court for the districts of several regional courts. Art. 15 
AGBG contains provisions on the exact wording of the motion for judgment. 
Pursuant to Art. 16 AG BG, the court is obliged to hear the BA V and BAK if the 
objects of the action are the standard form contracts of building societies, 
investment companies, mortgage banks and ship mortgage banks Iisted in Art. 
16, para. 2 AGBG205 • Thus the foregoing procedure of approval is geared to the 
subs~quent court proceedings. Art. 17 AGBG prescribes the wording of the 
sentence to ensure that the tenor in the case of interlocutory injunctions satisfies 
certain requirements for the sake of safety and clarity206 • Art. 18 AGBG enables 
the plaintiff to publish the wording of the sentence in the Bundesanzeiger at the 
expense of the defendant, giving the name of the condemned user or person 
having recommended the standard form contracts. This possibility has no effect 
in terms of consumer protection: it would occur neither to consumers nor to 
businessmen to protect themselves by studying the Bundesanzeiger regularly207 • 
As far as the legislator intended thereby to enhance the broad effect of ineffec-
tive standard form contracts, he has chosen an unsuitable means. Offar greater 
importance is Art. 20 AGBG, which provides that all pending proceedings and 
final decisions must be registered at the BKartA. Pursuant to Art. 20, para. 4 
AGBG the BKartA must inform anybody upon request about whether an entry 
has been made. Anybody has a right to obtain information without having to 
give reasons208 • The purpose of this provision is to provide an association 
entitled to bring an action, or a customer of the user, with speedy and reliable 
information as to whether certain clauses have already been challenged in a 
supervisory procedure and whether the procedure has yet been completed. Art. 
20 AGBG thus creates at least the theoretical basis for consumer associations to 
gather the information they need. The right to information is largely under-
mined, though, by the fact that the BKA charges DM 1 for each page copied. 
Much more serious is the fact that the information furnished on the data 
recorded in the register pursuant to Art. 20, para. 4 AGBG does not explain 
pursuant to which statutory provisions the use of standard form contract 
clauses had been forbidden in each case, as the grounds of the decision are not 
entered in the register, so the recording of a judgment under a certain item ofthe 
AGBG does not necessarily mean that the court based its decision exclusively on 
that item. The gap of information created through legislation reduces the prac-
tical use of the register substantiaJly209• The purpose of Art. 19 AGBG is to 
enable the condemned user in the event of subsequent changes in the practice of 
the highest court to avoid further enforcement under a perpetual injunction. 
This is an important exception to the law of enforcement, where it is recognised 
that any change in court practice is not prerequisite to the bringing of an action 
to avert execution (Zwangsvollstreckungsgegenklage) under Art. 767 Code of 
Civil Procedure210. 
Pursuant toArt. 22 AGBG, the value in dispute must notexceed DM 500 000. 
The limitation of the value in dispute is of no importance to a reduction of the 
risk of liability and the risk of the costs of the proceedings21 1. Here the amount 
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would have had to be reduced to no less than DM 100 000 as suggested by the 
study group commissioned by the Federal Minister of Justice212 ifthe limitation 
of the value in dispute were to be considered a suitable means at all. lt would 
certainly be a step forward if the suggestion made by one author213 , namely to 
assume a value in dispute of DM 5000 in the case of a claim for injunction and of 
DM 10 000 in the case of a claim for retraction, gained acceptance. However, 
this is only a suggestion, the effects ofwhich on court practice remain tobe seen. 
In actual fact the risk of the costs of proceedings prevents consumer associa-
tions from exercising their right of action. The present regulation makes actions 
appear possible only i fit is practically certain before the action is brought that it 
will be successful2 14 • After all, under the Gesetz über Prozeßkostenhilfe (Act on 
Aid Concerning Costs of Litigation, see No. 370), consumer associations may 
receive aid if they cannot defray the costs and if the omission of prosecution 
would be contrary to the 'public' interest (Art. 116, item 2 Code of Civil 
Procedure, new version). 
The legal position could be improved by the application mutatis mutandis of 
Art. 23a UWG, which permits reduction of the value in dispute215 • 
During the process of legislation the Bundesrat (Federal Diet) had tried to 
incorporate a provision to that effect in the AGBG216 • It remains to be seen 
whether - in contrast to a warning - a comparable situation exists with 
respect to the reduction of the value in dispute which permits application 
mutatis mutandis: also concerning the UWG practical experience has shown 
that the reduction of the value in dispute is a suitable means of reducing the risk 
of the costs of proceedings to a very limited extent only. The amendment to the 
UWG is to remedy the situation for the benefit of the consumer (No. 118). 
5 Subsequent governmental control 
306 Institutions eligible to exercise subsequent measures of control are the courts 
and special supervisory authorities. A detailed account of the powers to take 
official action has already been given with respect to the relative offices in the 
insurance and banking businesses. In that connection the powers provided by 
law were regarded throughout as powers to take preventive measures. As far as 
the right of original approval in the granting of a licence to operate is concerned 
(possibili ties of indirect controlling influence) the state of facts is unequivocal. 
By comparison, problems arise if, as is the case primarily in the insurance 
business, the BA V also has the possibility of intervening in current operations 
provided the interests of the insured are impaired (possibilities of direct 
controlling influence). Powers to take official action such as these are of a 
double nature. They are retrospective, because they require the existence of 
unfair standard form contracts; at the same time, they are also preventive, 
because the competent supervisory authority need not wait until consumers 
have suffered a loss but may intervene as soon as there is merely an abstract 
danger which, however, must manifest itself in facts that can be pinpointed217 • 
The consequence of this double nature is that some powers to take official 
action are mentioned once again in connection with the measures of subsequent 
control. 
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(a) Prohibitions 
307 Within the scope of their powers, the BA V and BAK may forbid the further 
use of certain clauses. Contracts made despite that prohibition are not void by 
virtue of special statutory regulations. However, their ineffectiveness should as 
a rule follow from Art. 134 Civil Code. In addition to the prohibition of 
continued use, the authorities mentioned may even demand that standard form 
contract conditions be amended before new insurance contracts are made. This 
power includes the right to forbid the conclusion of new contracts for the time 
being, i.e. pending approval ofthe amended standard form contract conditions, 
Art. 8la, sentence 1 VAG, and Art. 9, para. 2, sentence l BSpKG. Contracts 
made in contravention of the prohibition are likewise void under Art. 134. But 
the BA V may also - and this is the most rigorous means - intervene in 
existing insurance contracts by reshaping the rights and duties thereunder 
and is thus able generally to eliminate the relative clauses, Art. 81, sentence 2 
VAG. 
In the event of the threatening bankruptcy of credit institutions or insurance 
companies the BA V and BAK may furthermore impose a prohibition on 
effecting any payments. With respect to the insurance business, this right 
follows from Art. 89 V AG; with respect to credit institutions Art. 46, para. l, 
item l KWG applies in general and Art. 15 BSpKG in particular. The prohibi-
tion on-effecting payments temporarily sets aside the parties' entire set of 
contracts. 
lf an association entitled to bring an action has been successful with a collec-
tive action pursuant to Art. 13 AGBG, the court either forbids further use or 
obliges the person who recommended the use of standard form contracts to 
retract them. Ifthe condemned user acts in contravention ofthe duty to refrain, 
according to the general mies of civil procedure that duty would not affect 
contracts concluded between the sued user and other individual consumers who 
are not parties to the Jawsuit, for judgments are effective only as between the 
parties. Another customer involved could at best draw the court's attention to 
the judgment in order to induce it to interpret the matter in a certain way. In Art. 
21 the AGBG extends the effects of a judgment. If the further consumer 
involved express!y pleads a perpetual injunction, the respective standard form 
contract clause must be considered void. In this way a perpetual injunction in 
derogation ofthe general rules will have a somewhat broad effect. However, the 
legislator was unable to decide to design the broad effect in such a way that in a 
lawsuit between a consumer and a user of standard form contracts the court had 
to examine officially whether it is a matter of a perpetual injunction. 
(b) Administrative and penal sanctions 
308 Administrative sanctions exist only in the insurance business and the building 
society system. The BA V and BAK may legally enforce all orders, i.e. also 
prohibitions to use unfair standard form contract clauses. The provisions of the 
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz (VwVG, Act on Agencies' Procedure of Adminis-
tration) are decisive. Of the sanctions available under Art. 19, para. 2 VwVG 
(substitute performance, administrative fine, direct compulsion) in reality only 
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an administrative fine is eligible in both industries218 . While Art. 46, para. l 
KWG, which also applies mutatis mutandis to building societies219, expressly 
refers to the VwVG, there is no such provision in the V AG220, HGB221 and 
KAGG222 • This does not alter the fact that the VwVG is appJicable, but the 
difference has an effect in that pursuant to Art. 50, para. 2 KWG an administra-
tive fine up to DM 50 000 may be imposed, whiJe the VwVG under Art. 11, para. 
2 provides only for DM 2000 as a maximum amount. 
Insurance companies that act in contravention of the prohibitions to use 
standard form contracis imposed by the BA V make themselves liable to a 
penalty (fine or imprisonment up to three months), since as far as that goes they 
operate an insurance business without the necessary licence223 • Fault is not 
necessary. Likewise punishable are contraventions of prohibitions on effecting 
payments, Art. 56, para. 1, item 7 KWG and Art. 144, para. 1, item 4 V AG. The 
KWG, Art. 56, and the VAG, Art. 144, para. 2 provide for an administrative 
fine of up to DM 100 000. A user of standardform contracts who acts in contra-
vention of a perpetual injunction does not incur a punishment. Provisions to 
that effect are not included in the AGBG. lt must be taken intoaccount, though, 
that via Art. 15 AGBG, Arts. 889and 890CodeofCivil Procedureareapplicable. 
If the condemned defendant acts in contravention of the legally enforceable 
obligation to refrain from an act - use or recommendation - forbidden 
thereunder, he m ust be fined (Ordnungsgeld, fine imposed by a court) or 
imprisoned (Ordnungshaft, arrest for disobedience to court order) for any 
contravention at the request of the suing association. The individual fine must 
not exceed the amount of DM 500 000 and the term of imprisonment must not 
exceed two years224. · 
All the sanctions and prohibitions that may be imposed under the VAG, 
KWG or BSpKG are of little practical importance. This does not apply to the 
various means provided for in the AGBG. lt will be decisive primarily to what 
extent consumer associations will make use of their right of action. 
6 Control of collectively negotiated standard form contract conditions 
309 The subject of examination is standard form contract conditions which have 
been drafted jointly by suppliers and consumers or their representatives. 
Participation of consumers in the drafting of standard form contracts can be 
imagined in the formation of terms cartels or terms recommendations. 
The BKartA has certain powers of control regarding terms cartels and terms 
recommendations which have already been dealt with (No. 276). Here we shall 
examine the influence consumers have actually exerted in the formation of the 
Dry Cleaners' terms cartel and the two terms recommendations by the German 
Travel Offices Association and the motor vehicle trade. We can refer to the 
participation of consumer organisations in the case of terms recommendations 
concerning conditions of repair of motor vehicles. Here the ADAC conducted 
the negotiations on behalf of the consumers concerned. However, doubts as to 
whether the ADAC is a consumer organisation are certainly called for (No. 8). 
After all, the ADAC was a negotiating party on a par basis beside the Zentral-
verband des Kraftfahrzeughandwerks (ZDK, Central Association of the Motor 
Vehicle Trade), the Verband der Automobilindustrie (VDA, Association of the 
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Car Industry) and the Verband der Importeure von Kraftfahrzeugen (VDK, 
Association of lmporters of Motor Vehicles). The associations of the car 
industry and the ADAC agreed on a uniform text of conditions under the short 
title of Conditions of Motor Vehicle Repairs 1974. Those conditions were 
reported to the BKartA as terms recommendations and after completion of the 
reporting procedure were recommended for use.by the ZDK in March 1975. In 
early 1977 the conditions were adjusted to the provisions of the AGBG, which 
came into force on 1 April 1977, and as from 1 April 1977 have been recom-
mended for use as Conditions of Motor Vehicle Repairs 1977 as amended. As 
regards their substance, the conditions satisfy throughout the minimum require-
ments of the AGBG. lt must certainly be considered a success if in the motor 
vehicle trade the provisions of the AGBG are complied with at least in certain 
sectors. But the ADAC was also given a test of the limits to its power when it 
tried to force acceptance of conditions concerning new cars which favoured 
customers to a greater degree and which by far exceeded the requirements ofthe 
AGB022s. 
As regards terms recommendations concerning the purchase of used cars, the 
ADAC has succeeded in making second-hand car dealers subject to a limited 
warranty although the courts permit the exclusion of any warranty (No. 216). 
7 Control of standard form contracts within the framework of individual 
actions 
310 After the codification of the AGBG this form of control should be by far the 
most important to the consumer, for the collective action is little suited to last-
ingly enhancing the consumer's legal position. Therefore the control of 
Standard form contracts will continue to be exercised within the framework of 
individual actions in which the issue of the action will be contingent upon the 
effectiveness of a standard form contract clause. 
(a) Method of control 
311 Under the AGBG roughly three stages of control can be distinguished: 
- standard form contract conditions as part of the contract pursuant to Art. 
2 AGBG; 
- construction of the AGBG pursuant to Art. 5 AGBG; 
- control of the content of contracts pursuant to Arts. 9-11 AGBG. 
Und er previous law, 'disguised control' of the content of contracts was often 
exercised in the first and second stages. Not only in the case of incorpora-
tion - i.e. through restrictive interpretation of a tacit submission to standard 
form contracts which does not apply to unreasonable and unfair clauses which 
the person submitting himself could not reasonably be prepared for - but also 
in the case of interpretation have the courts often avoided exercising overt 
control of the content226 . The disguised control of the content of contracts 
was exercised primarily through restrictive interpretation in the case of exemp-
tion clauses, limitations of liability and restrictions of warranty, as weil as 
the exclusion of rights to offset and of liens227 • Another important field of 
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application of disguised control of the content of contracts is officially 
approved Standard form contracts. Apparently the courts are reluctant openly 
to reject officially examined standard form contracts228 • The same may also be 
said about court practice concerning banks' standard form contracts. 
The AGBG rejects disguised control of the content229 • That follows not only 
from the three-stage system of control, but also from the legislative purpose: 
disguised control of the content of contracts does not afford effective protection 
if by way of alleged interpretation of highly objectionable standard form con-
tract clauses only restrictions are being made instead ofthe clause being rejected 
altogether and the statutory regulation being applied230 • Disguised control of the 
content via incorporation or interpretation would also be inadmissible because 
this would restrict the field of application of the collective action which requires 
overt control of the content pursuant to Arts. 9-11 AGBG231 • 
312 (aa) Standard form contract conditions become part of a contract only if the 
user upon conclusion of a contract expressly draws the customer's attention to 
them and enables him to take reasonable note of their subject matter, and 
'provided the other party to the contract agrees to their application'. 
Accordingly, two declarations of intent are required, one by the user and one by 
the consumer. The declarations of intent concern the question of whether both 
parties want to incorporate standard form contract conditions into the contract. 
For that reason the general principles of interpretation of declarations of intent 
apply, Arts. 133, 157 and 242 Civil Code. Consequently, the user's and the 
consumer's comprehension is of vital importance. This is modified only in that 
the contracting party concerned must accept circumstances to be put forward 
against him which he might reasonably have been prepared for. Objective 
standards do not apply, as within the framework of the examination under Art. 
2 AGBG it is not a matter of interpretation of standard form contracts them-
selves, but only a matter of whether standard form contracts have been 
stipu/ated. 
313 (bb) According to the dominant view232 standard form contracts are inter-
preted (Art. 5 AGBG) by objective standards. According to the Federal High 
Court's established practice233 any objective interpretation must be based on the 
understanding of the average customer and the typical meaning of standard 
form contracts must then be determined. Basically, the will of the parties and 
the circumstances of an individual case do not play a part234 • 
As a further maxim of interpretation, the principle of restrictive interpreta-
tion is common notably with respect to exemption clauses and clauses on limita-
tion of liability. However, that is a dependent factor of interpretation which 
according to how matters stand may be of importance within the framework of 
objective interpretation of the will of the parties235. Application of the principle 
of restriction must not result in disguised control of the content of contracts, 
though236 • In view of this <langer restrictive interpretation is rejected in principle 
in some cases237 • 
314 (cc) Prior to the AGBG coming into force, the control of the content of 
standard form contracts was exercised on the basis of objective criteria in a 
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similar way as in the case of interpretation. The courts and legal writers have 
pronounced themselves, though not as distinctly as in the interpretation of 
standard form contracts, for an approach above the individual level; that is, 
separated from the circumstances of an individual case. The reason given for 
such attitude is that standard form contracts are the object and outgrowth of an 
act related to the collective. Use in a concrete case is only part of a continued act 
typically repeating itse}f23B. 
As under Art. 11 AGBG there is only limited scope for judgment, the question 
of how to look at the matter arises primarily under Arts. 9 and 10 AGBG. All are 
in agreement that basically the control of the content of contracts pursuant to 
Arts. 9 and 10 AGBG must be based on considerations extending beyond the 
individual. However, previous court practice cannot be fully applied to the 
AGBG without hesitation: even the AGBG itself distinguishes between con-
sumers and traders as target groups. But these groups have different interests 
which has tobe taken into account on interpretation239 . 
(b) Legal consequences of ambiguous standard form contracts 
315 If on interpretation pursuant to Art. 5 AGBG it turns out that the standard 
form contract clause in question is not unequivocal, but unclear, ambiguous or 
incomplete, the consequence is that where the clause was meant to put the user in 
a position more favourable than the statutory position that clause is inappli-
cable wholly or in part and the legal position is determined solely in the way 
more favourable to the consumer. This does not follow, though, from Art. 6 
AGBG, for this article is not applicable, because it presupposes Jack of incor-
poration or nullity, that is to say facts which cannot be present in the absence 
right from the start of any regulation in the standard form contract providing 
for a certain conflict situation240. 
(c) Legal consequences of ineffective standard form contracts 
316 If standard form contract conditions infringe Arts. 9-11 AGBG, they are 
ineffective. So say the respective articles. The legal consequences of ineffective-
ness follow from Art. 6, paras. 1-3 AGBG. Pursuant to Art. 6, para. 1, the 
contract remains in force with the exception ofthe ineffective clauses. The will 
of the parties, particularly the frequently found continued validity clause, is not 
what matters. The gap created through ineffectiveness is filled pursuant to Art. 
6, para. 2 AGBG by the superseded statute law. This regulation is in line with 
previous court practice241 • 
This supposedly clear legislative regulation has given rise to a great number of 
doubts. In legal literature it is a highly debatable point how a judge should 
proceed if a Standard form contract clause is only partially compatible with the 
provisions of Arts. 10 and 11 AGBG. Many authors are of the opinion that in 
such cases the complete ineffectiveness of the debatable standard form contract 
clause should always be assumed242 • To reduce the debatable clause to its legally 
admissible contents is impossible, it is claimed, because Art. 6, para. 2 AGBG 
provides for the method of filling gaps. However, a minority of authors 
basically consider it admissible to uphold the effective part of a clause243 . Here 
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the authors plead the protective purpose of the AGBG to which such interpreta-
tion is at least not in contrast. Besides, the courts would have recognised such 
reductions prior to the coming into force of the AGBG. Art. 6, para. 2, they 
claim, does not say whether ineffectiveness is tobe assumed at all and, if so, to 
what extent. The Act only provides for what has to be done in case a clause is 
ineffective. Some authors also take middle-of-the-road views, according to 
which a partially ineffective clause will be completely ineffective only if as 
matters stand the suspicion suggests itselfthat the user knew that the clause was 
partially incompatible with the law244 . As far as could be ascertained, the courts 
have not so far taken a view on that problem. 
Once ineffectiveness pursuant to Art. 6, para. 1 AGBG has been established, 
it remains tobe clarified how Art. 6, para. 2 is to be understood. If the type of 
case where the statutory regulation filling the gap is unequivocal is disregarded, 
the problems repeat themselves if it is a matter of what has to be done where the 
non-cogent regulations then taking effect are ambiguous or where there is no 
regulation. Some people try to tackle this problem by way of interpretation245 , 
while others leave it at the incompleteness of the contract246. 
Pursuant to Art. 6, para. 3 AGBG, all standard form contract conditions are 
ineffective by way of exception if the continuation of the contract amended 
pursuant to para. 2 would constitute an unreasonable hardship to one of the 
parties. Unreasonableness should not have tobe assumed as soon as individual 
clauses are ineffective, for Art. 6, para. 3 AGBG is an exceptional provision 
which takes effect only if there are special reasons247 . As a criterion of unreason-
ableness previous court practice may be relied on. Accordingly, the entire 
contract is void if such a number of clauses is void that should they cease to exist 
or be replaced by statutory provisions this would alter the sum and substance of 
the contract24s. 
2 Critical evaluation 
317 The enactment of the AGBG constitutes an important step towards enhanced 
consumer protection against unfair standard form contract conditions. While 
the Act in its substantive law section largely takes up and establishes previous 
court practice, it contemporaneously goes beyond it, with the most important 
amendment being that the scope of application of the Act is different depending 
on whether consumers or traders are concerned. For with this the legislator has 
recognised that the consumer is in need of greater protection. The dual protec-
tive purpose ofthe Act (No. 263) permits the solution in a fairly satisfaccory way 
of the many questions that arose during the process of legislation from the 
conflicting interests and objectives249 - on the one hand advocates of a true 
consumer protection law, on the other hand advocates of the preservation ofthe 
unity of private law through general application irrespective of any require-
ments as to persons covered. No doubt, from the point of view of a committed 
advocate of consumer protection it would have been desirable if the AGBG had 
entered into force as a true consumer protection Jaw. Many controversies and 
questions could have been avoided. 
However, the significance of the AGBG is not exhausted in some improve-
ments of the consumer's legal position in terms of substantive law. Rath er, the 
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AGBG makes allowance for the development of the law, namely for the fact 
that the Civil Code has not succeeded in adequately balancing the interests of 
consumers and traders/craftsmen. The Act respects the imbalance in power 
between the parties and thus partially breaks away from the premise of equality 
of legal subjects underlying the Civil Code250 • The Act corrects this state of 
affä.irs by partially restricting freedom of contract, which is inseparably linked 
with the idea of equality of legal subjects. Freedom of contract is not re-estab-
lished, though, as some authors claim, as the means the legislator uses are 
precisely those the Civil Code repudiates on the basis of its premise251 • This 
consequence is overlooked by those who aim at a reintegration in the Civil 
Code252 • The premise of the Civil Code will be partially ignored should a reinte-
gration take place. However, more than merely a matter of form is hidden 
beneath the controversy; namely, the problem of a special civil law governing 
the relationship between consumers and entrepreneurs253 • Through the AGBG 
alone the legislator has not yet taken any view. He has enacted special legis-
lation, but he has not limited its scope to consumers. The dual protective 
purpose makes it clear that the AGBG leaves that question undecided. 
The procedural provisions of the AGBG - specifically the collective action 
- do not make for the desired progress, though: there are too many obstacles in 
the way of effective control. Doubts arise as early as in the design of the right of 
action which is tailored to consumer organisations based on representation 
(No. 6), alth(')ugh those are authorised by consumers to a limited extent only. 
The licensing or exclusion of organised interests that do not fit in with the 
existing notion of consumer organisations checks the development of new types 
of consumer organisation254 • Another point tobe criticised is the regulation of 
jurisdiction. The original jurisdiction of regional courts (instead of higher 
regional courts) prevents speedy decisions which might receive wide notice. The 
consequence of the general applicability of the provisions contained in the Code 
of Civil Procedure is that the court may review only those clauses that the parties 
allow it to review (Parteidisposition). Efforts to abandon this principle and to 
grant the judge a more comprehensive right of review in respect of the entire set 
of clauses failed during the process of legislation255 • Consumer organisations 
especial!y feel the risk of the costs of the proceedings with which they are 
burdened to be an insurmountable obstacle. On the whole, the design of the 
action for standard form contract conditions gives the impression that failure 
was preprogrammed. Its creation is essentially due to the fact that the legislator 
wanted to avoid more stringent means of control. By no means has the system of 
the collective action been thought out sufficiently or the experience gained with 
the collective action in the UWG been digested256 • However, the serious deficien-
cies in the procedural provisions should not obscure the fact that the devel-
opment reported in respect of the Civil Code through the introduction of the 
collective action has now also been introduced in the law of civil procedure. The 
law of civil procedure comprises the corrsistent transformation ofthe basic prin-
ciples of the Civil Code. The private Jaw system is upheld by the possibilities of 
law enforcement granted to the individual. Beneath that is hidden the liberal 
conception of the state: the sum total of individual interests reflects the interest 
of the general public257 • The introduction of the collective action goes to show 
that public welfare can (no longer) be ensured by the action of individuals, as 
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conflict situations experienced by the collective cannot be settled by indivi-
duals258. Even if the collective action - in the same way as the provisions of 
substantive law - undermines the principles, here the Code of Civil Procedure 
completely, and thus definitely, influences the development of the law, the 
present poor design of the collective action involves the great <langer that it is 
opposed to more effective types of control. The legislator and jurists will for the 
time being have to concern themselves with solving the problems of the collec-
tive action which they themselves created. The controversy about the admission 
of an interlocutory injunction or about the requirements of the danger of repeti-
tion are a meaningful example. 
III UNFAIR CLAUSES IN INDIVIDUAL AGREEMENTS 
1 Generalities 
318 Unfair clauses in individual agreements have hardly become evident so far in 
jurisprudential discussion and court practice259 . Problems of legal admissibility 
always concerned clauses which at the same time formed part of standard form 
contract conditions. The AGBG is the consistent further development of this 
historical trend in that it limits the scope of application of unfair clauses in 
standard form contracts. As far as there are special means of state control they 
relate but to such clauses. However, the previous legal position may be changed 
by the legal concept provided for in Art. 1 AGBG (No. 270), which is known to 
distinguish between individual agreements and standard form contracts. If the 
courts interpret the legal concept in a narrow sense, unfair clauses in individual 
agreements will increasingly shift to the focal point of interest. There have not 
been any court decisions yet from which to judge the development, but there are 
trade practices in the offing which indicate growing importance. Recently the 
Stiftung Warentest has reported on contracts of sale concerning radios and tele-
vision sets in which the seller confronted the buyer with the choice of getting the 
commodity cheaper but without any guarantee or at a higher price but subject to 
the relative guarantee260 . Thus suppliers' attempted evasion of the mandatory 
provisions on guarantee under the AGBG. Art. 7 AGBG, which aims at 
opposing these efforts, does not apply to such cases since according to 
unanimous opinion the prohibition of circumvention shall not serve to influence 
the definition of standard form contract conditions pursuant to Art. 1 AGBG 
and their discrimination from individual agreements pursuant toArt. 1, para. 2 
AGBG261 . According to the legislator's intent, circumventions by way of indi-
vidual agreements are admissible. Therefore control can be exercised only in 
accordance with the general rules of the Civil Code. 
2 Possibilities of control 
319 Clauses concerning liability for the quality of products are limited by the prin-
ciples developed by the courts under Art. 459, para. 2 and Art. 633, para. 2 Civil 
Code (liability for warranted qualities) and under Arts. 476 and 637 Civil Code 
(no exclusion of warranties in the event of fraud, Nos. 204, 205). In the event of 
fraud, rescission of the entire contract pursuant to Art. 123 Civil Code can also 
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be imagined. As the prohibition to exclude all warranties concerned only 
exclusions of warranties in standard form contracts, the admissibility of such 
exemption clauses must be reviewed solely on the basis of Arts. 138 and 242 Civil 
Code. Here it is of decisive importance whether there is such a disproportion 
between the contractual obligations of the parties that a correction via Arts. 138 
and 242 Civil Code is possible in the first place. In order that the disproportion 
may be determined, criteria are required that put the general clause into more 
concrete terms. The question arises whether or not the judgments included in the 
AGBG may exert an influence on individual agreements, as Art. 9 AGBG is 
nothing but a special version of Art. 242 Civil Code tailored to the use of 
standard form contracts262 • Arts. 10 and 11 AGBG in turn put the general clause 
into more concrete terms. Therefore it can be imagined that the judgments 
contained in the AGBG are taken into account if the consumer does not getan 
equivalent for the exclusion of all warranties - to continue with the example 
mentioned. With such cases the !ist of clauses in the AGBG may be said to have a 
general effect extending beyond the scope of application of the Act which might 
be used as a criterion of judgment263 • Here it must not be disregarded, though, 
that when reviewing the admissibility of the content of individual agreements 
the subjective will of the contracting parties must be taken into account to quite 
a different degree than when judicially controlling standard form contracts264 • 
3 Outlook 
320 lt is too early yet to predict whether unfair clauses in individual agreements 
will become a problem similar to that of standard form contract clauses. A 
decisive factor against such a development is that the rationalising effect enter-
prises want to achieve by using standard form contracts would be lost 
completely if the respective sales organisations were to switch over to making 
nothing but individual agreements. By comparison, such contracts should gain 
greater significance in the retail trade. The consequence of the retailer's inferior 
economic starting position may be that the example described above will find 
followers in one way or another. 
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CHAPTER8 
Consumer Credit 
1 INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEMS 
321 Consumer credit or Joan for consumption is winning growing popularity in 
the Federal Republic of Germany. In 1974, consumer credits totalled about DM 
50 billion, practically double the amount in the same period of 1969. In Iate 
1976, the aggregate of consumer credits was DM 69 billion as compared with 
about DM 106 billion in mid-1979. The average debt of households was DM 800 
per capita in Iate 1974, while in 1976 it increased to DM 1000. In the United 
States it runs to dou'ble that amount. In 1979, the average debt of households 
was reported at DM 5500. The net increase in the debt rate was for the first time 
higher than the net increase in savings. The reasons for the great expansion of 
consumer credit are primarily the general expansion of economic activity after 
the Second World War. Specifically, it is attributable to three causes. First of all 
manufacturers and traders, as weil as suppliers of services (particularly more 
expensive services), try to facilitate the sale of their products by offering 
financing. Certain consumer goods, for instance motor vehicles and furniture, 
may be sold only thro.ugh borrowing, since the customer is unable otherwise to 
acquire the object in question for Jack of sufficient cash funds. Another reason 
is the strong drive for expansion of commercial banks and savings banks. While 
the consumer credit business was formerly handled mainly by instalment credit 
institutions, in the 1960s most commercial banks, credit cooperatives and 
savings banks joined the consumer credit business on a considerable scale. As 
early as 1974 consumer c'redit business accounted for 10% of total business in 
banking (excluding housing). Through higher credit lines, simple forms of 
credit and cashless transfers, as well as through the introduction of cheque 
cards, consumer credit expanded even further. Lastly, the consumer's altered 
behaviour with respect to credit should be mentioned. While in the past credit 
was asked for only in exceptional cases, for instance to finance the construction 
of a hause, consumers nowadays are getting used to acquiring all types of goods 
of higher value with the aid of credit. Increasing incomes seemed to make the 
repayment of debts incurred by consumers easy. However, in view of stagnant 
real incomes and job insecurity this trend has been declining over the past few 
years. 
The credit behaviour of consumers also has consequences affecting the busi-
ness cycle and the distribution of wealth, particularly in periods of recession: the 
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loss of a job, for instance, often means that the consumer will be unable to repay 
the debts incurred by him and as a result will suffer social hardship even more 
than would otherwise have been the case1• From the point of view of social 
policy, consumer credit has obvious drawbacks. A low income often runs 
parallel with a high debt rate and 'tough' credit terms, for instance in the case of 
foreigners, elderly people and socially marginal groups2• Here even special types 
of credit developed, for instance credit brokerage (No. 342). 
There is a variety of types of consumer credit. In terms of its economic signi-
ficance, credit by banksfor unrestricted use plays a dominant part. This credit 
may be granted by way of an overdraft on a wage or salary account or by way of 
a special credit contract repayable in instalments. It is characteristic of this type 
of credit that the customer may dispose freely of the loan amount. The delivery 
of cheque forms and cheque cards constitutes an indirect form of consumer 
credit, although a cheque presupposes appropriate funds on an account 
(No. 340). Consumer credit by banks meanwhile accounts for about nine tenths 
of all forms of consumer credit. In addition there are still other types of credit 
which will bedealt with under legal aspects in the course ofthis study, e.g. instal-
ment transactions, debtor-creditor-supplier agreements, sales of services, and 
what is known as credit brokerage. 
With respect to the legal regulation of consumer credit.in the Federal Republic 
of Germany it is important that there is no uniform law•governing consumer 
credit unlike, for instance, in Great Britain or in the respective EC draft direc-
tives on consumer credit. Rather, depending on the legal form of the credit, 
there are different legal regulations that make allowance for the protective 
interests of the consumer in very different ways. This fragmentation of the law 
of consumer credit has Ient itself to numerous abuses and has given rise partic-
ularly to various forms of evasion. lt may be noted that in practice those types of 
credit regulated more strictly for the sake of protecting the consumer are 
avoided by creditors in favour of types regulated less strictly which appear tobe 
'more favourable' from both the economic and the legal point of view3 • So far, 
only the first step towards a reform has been taken in the Federal Republic of 
Germany. Therefore the following statements essentially reflect the legal status 
quo in legislation and court practice. 
II TYPES OF CONSUMER CREDIT IN LEGISLA TION (REGULATED 
AGREEMENTS) 
1 Instalment transactions 
(a) Concept of the instalment transaction 
322 Since 1894 there has been a special statutory regulation that tries to introduce 
into the law of contract considerations of consumer protection. The AbzG is the 
first consumer protection act in Germany and apart from amendments it has 
survived time and continues in force today4 • 
To apply the provisions on consumer protection included in the AbzG there 
must be an instalment transaction. According to court practice, for an 
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instalment transaction pursuant to Art. 1 AbzG only two things. are required: 
a contract of sale for a movable thing and an agreement on payment of the 
purchase price in instalments. The other features mentioned in the Act, namely 
delivery and reservation of the right of rescission, do not belong to the legal 
concept of an instalment transaction5• 
From this it may be deduced that in the first instance an instalment trans-
action is a bilateral relationship between seller and buyer. In what way 
'trilateral' relationships through the involvement of an instalment credit institu-
tion (debtor-creditor-supplier agreements) also come under the AbzG will be 
investigated later (No. 328ff). Lastly, the AbzG applies only to contracts of sale 
in the strict sense, and not to contracts for the supply of services, contracts to 
manufacture, brokerage agreements and contracts for professional services. As 
will be demonstrated later (No. 335), it is here that there are considerable gaps in 
consumer protection. There are certain exceptions with respect to mixed-type 
contracts which will be dealt with later. The contract must have been concluded 
for a movable thing, so that real property transactions and related financing 
agreements do not come under the AbzG. The sale must concern movable 
things, including aggregates of things (Sachgesamtheit)6• Payment of the 
purchase price in insta/ments must clearly be distinguished from cash trans-
actions, which do not come under the AbzG. In individual cases differentiation 
is difficult. lt is a cash transaction and not an instalment agreement if a down 
payment is made and the balance will be paid on delivery, either in cash or other-
wise, or if a cheque or bill of exchange is issued for the sum total of the purchase 
price or for a down payment and the residual amount 7• Und er Germ an law, an 
instalment payment is deemed to exist if the purchase price is paid in two or 
more instalments. If the customer effects a down payment and pays the rest 
later, the courts do not consider this to be an instalment transaction8 • How far 
the successive delivery of aggregates of things like an encyclopedia constitutes 
an agreement to pay in instalments is still highly controversial9 • In the case of 
delivery of a book in several volumes or several sets of bed linen at intervals 
against payment on delivery, the Federal High Court assumes that this does not 
constitute an instalment transaction, because each volume and each set can be 
acquired separately 10 • With respect to the purchase of an encyclopedia which is 
delivered and paid for volume by volume, there is no established court 
practice 11 • 
(b) Requirements as to form and information 
323 The AbzG in its original version did not initially include any provisions on the 
form of the contract and on the information the seller must give to the buyer 
upon conclusion of an instalment ~ale. However, since instalment transactions 
involve a special risk to the consumer, tie up his funds for a long time and 
involve specific costs, reform acts of 1969 and 1974 appropriately amended 
Art. la of the AbzG 12 • This is in conformity with the reform proposals sub-
mitted to the German Bundestag, for instance by theparliamentary group ofthe 
Social Democrats in 1964. The buyer's declaration to enter into a contract must 
now be in writing, i.e. it must be signed by him. The written instrument must 
include the following information to be furnished by the seller: cash price, 
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instalment price, instalment plan and total charge for credit. What is of special 
importance is that since 1974 it has been made a contractual obligation to state 
the total charge for credit, so as to enable the buyer (consumer) to ascertain the 
actual interest payable by him. The total charge for credit shall not only be 
computed from the normal rnonthly rates ofinterest charged by banks, but shall 
also cornprise costs, commissions and insurance incidental to the instalment 
agreement 13 • These statements are intended to enable the buyer to reconsider bis 
decision to enter into the contract and, if necessary, to look for more favourable 
credit terms. 
The legal consequences of infringements of the formal requirements and of 
omitted, misleading or false statements stem from Art. la of the Act. The con-
tract does not take effect immediately, but the consumer has the possibility of 
concluding a new contract without interest charges if he wants to keep the thing 
delivered to him 14 • The buyer continues to have a right to pay by instalments, but 
the instalments are reduced corresponding to the cash price. 
Art. Ja, paras. 4 and 5 ofthe AbzG contain exceptions to the applicability of 
this provision, particularly in the case of mail-order transactions and that of 
sellers engaged exclusively in instalment sales. 
(c) The right of cancellation of the consumer buying on the instalment 
system 
324 One of the central issues of consumer policy was the introduction of a right of 
cancellation (Widerrufsrecht) in instalment transactions, related transactions 
and door-to-door sales 15 • Door-to-door sales have already been dealt with 
(Nos. 11 lff). Here only the right of cancellation specific to instalment sales, 
which the legislator introduced by the Act of 15 May 1974, will be mentioned. 
Pursuant to the amended version of Art. 1 b AbzG, the buyer's declaration to 
enter into a contract becomes effective only if he does not cancel it in writing 
within one week. The Act then regulates in detail the requirements for the right 
of cancellation, the observance of the cooling-off period , the seller's duty to 
instruct the buyer as to his right of cancellation and questions of the burden of 
proof. The purpose of the statutory provisions is as follows. 
The right of cancellation first of all applies only to instalment transactions in 
the sense described above, to circumventing agreements (Umgehungsgeschäfte) 
that will be dealt with below, for instance debtor-creditor-supplier agreements, 
and to contracts for successive delivery, e.g. contracts for dictionaries, member-
ship in a book-of-the-month club, and magazine subscriptions16 • lt does not 
apply to debtor-creditor-supplier agreements for services and not to personal 
credits by banks. There is no right of cancellation in credit brokerage. lt does 
not matter whether the transaction is entered into on the doorstep or at the 
seller's business premises. 
The cooling-off period is one week. lt begins to run only after the written 
instrument with the instruction as to the right of cancellation has been submitted 
and signed by the consumer. The instruction must be unequivocal, which is not 
the case if it is combined with a waiver of the right of cancellation 17 • If there has 
been no instruction, the right of cancellation lapses only after delivery of the 
article bought and full payment of the purchase price. 
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Cancellation must be in writting; it has not yet been decided whether an 
implied act of cancellation is also possible, for instance by return of the thing 
purchased 18 • 
The Act likewise regulates in detail the onus of proof as to instruction and 
observance of the cooling-off period. The seller must furnish proof as to the 
time at which he delivered a copy to the buyer. The buyer must furnish proof as 
to the timeJy posting of the declaration of cancellation. 
Special regulations apply to the mail-order trade, since here the right to return 
a thing is 'offset' against the right of cancellation. This presupposes that no 
verbal contract negotiations were conducted between the seller and the buyer, 
not even through so-called 'omnibus orderers'. 
Under current German law the problem is how to prevent circumvention of 
the right of cancellation 19 • Same typical features are as follows. First of all it is 
claimed that a transaction does not constitute an instalment transaction or 
related transaction. Here the customer may be helped in so far as the burden of 
proving that the transaction is not an instalment sale is on the seller20 • Under the 
Jaw of unfair competition, it is meanwhiJe possible to prohibit such declarations 
by the seller as unfair and misJeading acts of competition21 • A second possible 
case of circumvention is that the seller effects delivery only after the cooling-off 
period has elapsed. In this case the customer cannot do anything, since the 
cooling-off period runs irrespective of the deJivery of the thing, but is contingent 
upon the delivery of the written instrument and instruction22 • The right of 
cancellation does not entitle the customer to use the thing so to speak 
gratuitously for one week. A third case of circumvention is manipulation con-
cerning the date, e.g. omitting the date, dating forward or dating back. In this 
case the customer is heJped by the reguJation on the burden ofproof, which does 
not take effect though if the written instrument was dated forward and the 
customer subsequently claims that this had been done unlawfully. The outward 
appearance of the instrument speaks against the buyer; often he will be unable 
to prove manipulation. A fourth case of circumvention may occur owing to the 
fact that the seller uses the services of a credit broker and concludes the contract 
through him. In such a case the customer may be heJped by the presumption of a 
circumventing agreement within the meaning of Art. 6 AbzG. A fifth case exists 
if a customer is forced to waive his right of cancellation. Such an arrangement is 
not permissible pursuant to Art. 1 b, para. 6 AbzG, but appJies onJy to the case 
prior to the conclusion of the contract. Subsequent waiver is, of course, 
possible. However, ifit is combined with the conclusion of acontract, it must be 
assumed in agreement with the regional court of Berlin23 that the buyer was not 
duly instructed as to his right of cancellation. Lastly, a sixth case exists if the 
seller claims that he did not receive the declaration of cancellation in time. Here 
is should be pointed out that the cooling-off period is deemed to have been kept 
if the declaration of cancellation was posted in time (which the customer has to 
prove), for instance by registered letter24 • The Jetter must have been received by 
the seller. 
The law cannot help the consumer where he fails to make use of his right of 
cancellation because of inactivity, ignorance of the law or other forms of 
indolence. Then the contract remains in force unless other conditions of 
avoidance or nullity exist. ' 
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By laying down the conditions ofreturn of objects in Art. ld, the Act tries to 
ensure that the buyer is not restrained indirectly from exercising his right of 
cancellation because of high compensation and replacement obligations. After 
having exercised his right of cancellation he is only liable to return the thing; he 
is not liable to make good a depreciation in value, he is merely liable to pay for 
the value derived from use. 
(d) Duties of the parties to return 
325 The AbzG in its original version regulated primarily the legal circumstances 
that prevailed if the seller terminated the contract by rescission or by any other 
means, particularly in consequence of default in payment on the part of the 
buyer. To this end Arts. 1, 2, 5 AbzG contain detailed regulations based on the 
fundamental idea that the buyer should not continue paying the purchase price 
if the article of purchase is taken away from him through rescission or other-
wise, i.e. that the article ofpurchase is not taken away on conditions less favour-
able than those permitted under the AbzG25 • We shall not go into the details of 
these provisions here, since they are hardly important in practice andin partic-
ular may be evaded through other means of providing security, e.g. by assign-
ment of wages. For the buyer, another drawback of the regulation under the 
AbzG is that he cannot enforce his theoretically existing claim for refund of the 
down payment and the instalment payments already effected as that claim con-
flicts with the seller's claim for compensation and decrease in value for use of 
the thing. Also, after withdrawal from the contract, the buyer as a rule remains 
liable for payment of arrears25•. 
(e) Jurisdiction 
326 Arts. 6a and 6b of the AbzG as amended in I 969 and I 974 forbid jurisdiction 
clauses and provide for jurisdiction at the buyer's domicile for disputes arising 
out of instalment transactions. This is to preclude that the buyer, in the case of 
disputes arising out of the contract or disputes about whether or not a right of 
cancellation exists or the contract is void, may be sued at the seller's domicile, 
which in actual fact would prejudice the buyer's rights. The jurisdiction regu-
lation also applies to summary procedures on bills of exchange26 • 
(/) Scope of protection 
327 Art. 8 AbzG lays down the scope of protection to the effect that buyers who 
are registered as traders are not protected. This has several consequences. Art. 8 
in the first instance formulates the principle of consumer protection, i.e. of 
putting the consumer (buyer) in a more favourable position. The concrete need 
for protection is not taken as a criterion, though, so that any person who carries 
on a trade or business or performs professional services and is not or cannot be 
registered in the commercial register is also given the protection of the AbzG27 • 
Furthermore, the AbzG does not include special regu/ations taking into account 
the position of the sei/er. lt applies no matter whether the seil er offers instalment 
transactions by way ofbusiness or on a private basis - a questionable provision 
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(No. 18) from the point of view of consumer protection, and its practical conse-
quences particularly in transactions between private parties28 • 
2 Debtor-creditor-supplier agreements 
(a) Economic significance and types of transaction 
328 A debtor-creditor-supplier agreement in terms of its economic purpose 
involves an instalment credit institution to finance the purchase price. The seller 
does not himself grant the buyer credit, as is usually the case in the instalment 
transactions described above, but uses an instalment credit institution that will 
pay the purchase price directly to him and obtain repayment from the buyer. 
Such an institution may be involved in different schemes. According to the 
historic development of instalment credit in Germany, the following types may 
be distinguished29 • 
In the so-called 'A' scheme, the instalment credit institution gives out 
Kaufschecks (an early type of cheque card) which the buyer may exchange for 
goods to sellers who have joined the system. This type of financing of the 
purchase price was very common between the two world wars, but is very rare 
now, so it need not be described any further. In the so-called 'B' scheme, the 
financing of a contract of sale through an instalment credit institution is 
arranged by the seller with two alternatives of repayment. In the case of the so-
called assignment scheme, the seller assigns to the instalment credit institution 
his claim for payment of the purchase price excluding defences under the law of 
sales, for instance Jack of merchantability, so that the instalment credit insti-
tution may then have recourse to the buyer under the assigned right. This 
pattern is no longer common either, at least not with regard to private con-
sumers, and therefore need not be described here. More common is the so-called 
loan scheme: an instalment credit institution grants the buyer a loan, but 
transfers the value directly to the seller. The claim for payment under the con-
tract of sale is satisfied, so that the buyer need no longer pay the purchase price 
to the seller. Rather, he remains liable for payment to the instalment credit insti-
tution under the legally independent loan agreement. Generally speaking, such a 
scheme of financing presupposes that the instalment credit institution and the 
seller cooperate in a certain way and that the seller should assume joint liability 
to the bank for repayment of the loan. Instead of the single contract between the 
seller and the buyer custoinary in regular instalment transactions, here three 
contracts should be distinguished from a formal point of view of contract law: a 
contract of sale between the seller and the buyer, a loan agreement between the 
instalment credit institution and the buyer and a skeleton agreement between the 
instalment credit institution and the seller. The last scheme is that known as the 
'C' scheme, in which the buyer, to secure the claim for repayment, issues bills of 
exchange to the bank which the bank may then use for purposes of its own 
refinancing. This scheme is found less in instalment transactions with private 
consumers, but more often in commercial transactions. 
Regarding the economic significance and frequency of debtor-creditor-
supplier agreements, in particular the 'B' loan scheme, no accurate data are 
available. lt may initially be assumed that debtor-creditor-supplier agreements, 
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which were very popular in the Federal Republic in the 1950s and accounted for 
the main business of instalment credit institutions, have since lost much of their 
significance3o. Much more common is credit by banks and credit obtained 
through credit brokerage. On the other hand, debtor-creditor-supplier agree-
ments continue to play a significant role with respect to the purchase of certain 
consumer goods of high value, for instance motor vehicles and furniture, and 
for this reason regulation in terms of consumer protection especially by the 
courts will be dealt with here. 
(b) The legal concept of debtor-creditor-supplier agreements 
329 The legal concept of debtor-creditor-supplier agreements is determined by the 
question of how far the AbzG applies mutatis mutandis to this type of contract 
under Art. 6, which covers forms of circumvention. Here the courts are guided 
by economic considerations31 . The legally independent contracts between buyer 
and seller and between buyer and instalment credit institution must constitute 
an economic unity; that is, there is no sense in concluding one contrac1 without 
the other. Definite criteriaof delimitation of debtor-creditor-supplier agreement 
from what is known as cash credit or personal loan have not been developed by 
the courts, but each case is assessed according to its particular circumstances. 
According to the German courts, the following circumstances are evidence of a 
debtor-creditor-supplier agreement, without their non-existence contempora-
neously suggesting that no debtor-creditor-supplier agreement is involved: 
transfer of ownership in the article of purchase to the instalment credit insti-
tution32, transfer of the value directly to the seller33 , disposition by the seller of 
blanks of the credit contract (without the seller having tobe the bank's agent). A 
permanent business connection between the seller and the instalment credit 
institution is not required for the purposes of a debtor-creditor-supplier agree-
ment as the courts used to assume in the past34 . Furthermore, there need not be 
any joint liability by the seller for repayment of the credit. According to more 
recent court practice, the thing purchased no longer needs tobe transferred as 
security to the bank35. 
lf a buyer acts 'on his own initiative' in obtaining credit, this does not con-
stitute a debtor-creditor-supplier agreement36• The courts have not yet clarified 
borderline cases where the bank knows about the use of the credit for buying 
purposes, either through its own knowledge or by employing a credit broker. In 
this context a distinction must be made depending on how the buyer informs the 
bank of the purpose of the credit: the more clearly the buyer points out to the 
bank that he intends to use the credit for a particular purpose and the more the 
bank accepts this intention, the sooner the courts will apply the law of debtor-
creditor-supplier agreements in contrast to that of personal loans37 • However, 
this is always a question of the individual case and cannot be clarified in 
advance. The bank fnust accept that the credit broker's knowledge is considered 
tobe the bank's knowledge pursuant to Art. 278 of the Civil Code. 
(c) Application of the AbzG 
330 If it is a debtor-creditor-supplier agreement and not a personal loan, Art. 6 
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AbzG as a legal consequence provides for the application of its protective pro-
visions in favour of the buyer. Such an analogous application is similar to that 
described above with respect to instalment sales. However, because of the so-
called trilateral relationship, there are some peculiarities. 
A debtor-creditor-supplier agreement is also subject to the formal require-
ments of Art. la AbzG. In the agreement the instalment buyer must be 
informed about the cash price, the instalment price, the instalment plan and the 
total charge for credit37 • In this connection, a question that has not yet been 
decided in detail is on whom the obligations as to information are placed, 
the seller or the instalment credit institution. lt may be assumed that these 
obligations are placed on the instalment credit in!>titution, since through its 
involvement the normal contract of sale becomes a debtor-creditor-supplier 
agreement39 • 
Furthermore, pursuant to Art. Ib, debtor-creditor-supplier agreements are 
cancellable. Here, too, there are open points regarding the details of cancel-
lation, since the Act does not expressly provide for this case. Basically, any 
cancellation must be made known to the person indicated in the written instru-
ment. In the absence of such an instruction, the instalment credit institution is 
the correct recipient. The seller and the instalment credit institution must notify 
each other of any cancellation, no additional obligations to notify being placed 
on the customer. Cancellation voids the entire transaction, i.e. both the loan 
agreement and the contract of sale40 • 
Finally, rescission of the contract on the part of the seller or the instalment 
credit institution results in the special duties to return pursuant to Arts. 1 and 2 
AbzG. For the purposes of protecting the buyer, the Federal High Court has 
mied that in assessing the duties to return between bank and buyer, the buyer's 
down payment to the seller must be taken into account, but not the value trans-
ferred to the seller by the instalment credit institution41 • 
(d) The consumer's dejences against an instalment credit institution under a 
contract ofsale (Einwendungsdurchgriff) 
331 lt is a highly controversial issue both in theory andin practice to what extent 
defences in the relationship between the seller and the buyer, for instance for 
non-delivery, inferior performance, non-merchantability of the goods, delay in 
performance, non-performance, fraudulent misrepresentation, etc„ affect 
the credit agreement between the buyer and the instalment credit institution. If 
the contracts were assumed to be separate agreements as is in line with the 
wording ofthe bank's standard form contract, there would be no room for such 
defences by the buyer against the instalment credit institution: both contracts, 
the contract of sale and the credit agreement, would legally be separate agree-
ments. Defects in one contraGt do not affect the other contract. This theory of 
strict separation is indeed advocated by some legal writers42 • lt is extremely 
hostile to buyers, though, and does not take into account that through the 
splitting of a uniform debtor-creditor-supplier agreement the buyer would be in 
a much worse position than in the case of a bilateral instalment transaction. 
That is why the courts have developed what is known as a 'modified theory of 
separation'. According to this theory, it is assumed that the contracts between 
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the buyer and the instalment credit institution and between the buyer and the 
seller are separate agreements, but because of their economic purpose and 
according to the rule of good f aith should in special cases be treated as a unit. In 
particular, the courts developed the rule that the buyer must not be deprived of 
his rights nor be discriminated against43 • However, they modify the results of the 
theory of separation, which is hostile to the buyer, not to the buyer's complete 
satisfaction. In court practice the following principles have evolved. 
The instalment credit institution is initially obliged expressly to point out to 
the buyer in the written instrument the special risks and hazards involved in a 
debtor-creditor-supplier agreement44 • lt must da so in a conspicuous way, for 
instance through bold-face type in the instrument, and must simultaneously 
indicate the legal consequences the buyer may face. This is particularly designed 
to prevent the buyer from giving the seller a blank receipt prior to delivery of the 
object and from running the risk of the object not being delivered, yet still 
having to repay the loan. A second case is that of fraudulent deception of the 
buyer by the seller; the bank must accept the blame for such a deception, since it 
cooperates with the seller who becomes active in the interest of the bank and not 
in the interest of the customer; the bank is not a third party within the meaning 
of Art. 123, para. 2 Civil Code. The customer may then also avoid the loan 
agreement45 • 
In the case of defective delivery (non-merchantability) the courts differentiate 
according to the following criteria: normally the buyer must hold the seller liable 
first of all if he wants to enforce claims under a warranty against the seller. He 
may not, for instance, refuse to repay the loan if the sel!er fails to meet his 
obligations. He must even institute proceedings against the seller46 • Only in the 
exceptional case of the seller becoming bankrupt or remaining untraceable may 
he refuse to repay the loan to the bank; by way of exception the bank then has to 
bear the risk of the supplier becoming bankrupt. The situation is similar if the 
bank is at fault 47 • However, in no case may the buyer have his instalments 
refunded from the bank48. 
Without expressly deviating from its form er practice, the Federal High Court 
has more recently considerably expanded the right of asserting defences against 
the contracting party. lt has developed a test of reasonableness concerning the 
assertion of defences by the buyer-debtor49 • If on the basis of good faith a buyer-
debtor cannot reasonably be expected to hold the seller liable, for instance 
because the Iatter contests his Iiability under a warranty or unduly delays repair 
of defects for which he is responsible, this defence may be set against the bank 's 
claim for repayment. In addition, the courts have tightened the duty to inform 
in such a way that now the mere information about the risks of a split trans-
action no langer suffices to preclude the right to assert defences against the 
bank49•. 
More recent court practice thus approaches solutions to the problem that 
have been suggested by legal writers for some time. These solutions in legal 
Iiterature are based on the recognition that the credit agreement and the contract 
of sale form a legal unit50 • Details of the reasoning of legal writers vary and 
cannot be described here. According to the author's conviction a sensible 
solution to the problems involved should be based on the law of standard form 
contracts51 • For in the event of defective delivery, at least so far as new goods are 
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concerned, the buyer has certain indefeasible rights against the seller (No. 226). 
He may, for instance, refuse to continue payment, demand redhibition, or 
reduce the purchase price, unless he can demand repair of defects. He cannot be 
deprived of those rights through the involvement of an instalment credit institu-
tion. This also means that he must be able to enforce his right to withhold or his 
defences under the law of sales against the instalment credit institution. In such 
case the bank must hold liable the seller, who is the party ultimately responsible 
for defective delivery and who is liable to the bank anyway because of joint 
assumption of Jiability. In line with the protective purpose of the Act, such a 
right of asserting defences against the bank cannot be excluded in standard form 
contracts, even if the risks involved in the transaction have been pointed out 
clearly to the buyer. 
(e) The 'C' scheme 
332 The so-called 'C' scheme differs from the 'B' scheme only in that bills of 
exchange are negotiated by the buyer to the instalment credit institution. For the 
bank, negotiation means additional security and another possibility of refi-
nancing. Of course, such contracts are not very common with private consumers 
although, on the other hand, they are not prohibited - a prohibition which is 
provided for by the EC Commission in its draft directive on consumer credit. 
The negotiation of bills involves an additional risk to the consumer: through the 
'abstractness' of the bill he may be held liable immediately on the negotiable 
instrument without the possibility of asserting his rights under the AbzG or his 
defences against the instalment credit institution. Here the courts are helpful in 
that they do not make it possible for the instalment credit institution to acquire a 
bill in good faith, even if the buyer negotiated the bill to the seller. Art. 17 
Wechselgesetz (Bills of Exchange Act) is not applicable here, so the buyer may 
raise defences against the instalment credit institution52 • In the final analysis, 
this type of contract involves considerable risks to the consumer, particularly if 
the bill is negotiated, and should therefore be prohibited. There is no need for 
any of the parties involved to stipulate besides the normal security additional 
security by way of a bill. 
(f) Proposals f or ref orm 
333 Legal writers are unanimous in that the problems mentioned, specifically with 
respect to defences against the instalment credit institution in the case of debtor-
creditor-supplier agreements, should be solved through legislative reform53 • 
Important proposals for reform are included in the Federal Government's bill 
on debtor-creditor-supplier transactions and brokerage contracts54 • A new 
Art. 607a Civil Coderuns as follows: 
(1) If a loan serves to acquire an object, the borrower may raise defences or 
claims under the contract of sale in as far as they would entitle him 
to refuse to effect performance to the seller or to claim a refund from 
him also against the lender if, in the circumstances, the contract for 
acquisition of the object and the loan agreement are to be considered 
parts of a uniform business transaction. This does not apply to defences 
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or claims based on an arrangement entered into by the seller and the 
buyer following conclusion of the loan agreement. The right to claim a 
refund may be asserted only up to the amount of repayments on the loan 
already made. 
(2) A uniform economic transaction is tobe presumed particularly if a buyer 
is granted a loan for the purpose of paying the purchase price through the 
joint effort of the creditor and the seil er in a particular case or on account 
of permanent business relations between the two. 
(3) Paras. l and 2 do not apply to a loan secured by a mortgage or land 
charge. 
(4) Paras. 1-3 apply mutatis mutandis to loans which are granted for the 
purpose of supplying a service. 
(5) Any contrary arrangement to the detriment of the borrower is void. 
As a purpose for the bill, the legislator refers to the prohibition of discrimina-
tion, which has also been developed by the courts. The proposal does not yet 
reflect more recent court practice which under the existing law largely permits 
the right of asserting defences against the creditor. In this connection the 
concept of the debtor-creditor-supplier transaction is based on the idea of a 
'uniform business transaction'. In contrast to court practice, a uniform business 
transaction is already enough to make the assertion of defences against the 
creditor possible54•. Para. 2of the new Art. 607a then puts the uniform business 
transaction into concrete terms when the seller and the creditor cooperate in a 
particular case or because of permanent business relations. Apparently, it shall 
not suffice that the creditor (the bank) knows about the intended use of the 
credit. According to the intention ofthe bill, the present law ~ill not be changed 
in that respect, so in this case the buyer-debtor cannot assert defences against the 
bank based on breach of the contract of sale or on warranty. 
lt also seems worth mentioning that the bill tries to arrive at a compromise 
between the different ideas about the right of the debtor to assert defences 
against the bank. Thus the bill does not endorse the theory of subsidiary quality 
of the right to assert defences advocated in jurisprudence and previous court 
practice which is held not tobe in line with the principle that, in a purchase trans-
action involving third-party financing, the buyer must not be put in a Iess 
favourable position than in a transaction where he is allowed credit for the 
purchase price by the seller. On the other hand, the draft does not assume joint 
and several liability between the creditor and the seller. The consequence is that 
the claim for refund is limited to the extent of repayments already effected to the 
bank, so that any further claims, for instance claims for damages, cannot be 
enforced against the creditor. This proposal seems quite acceptable in terms of 
legal policy, because there is no reason giving rise to joint and several liability 
between the bank and the seil er, and the buyer-debtor shall not be accorded 
more favourable treatment through third-party financing than under anormal 
instalment contract with the seller. 
334 
3 Hire-purchase and leasing agreements 
334 (aa) A need for protection in terms of consumer policy also exists where a 
buyer acquires something not under a contract of sale, but under a long-term 
lease, and for economic purposes the rent amounts to instalments on the 
purchase price by reaching the original value of the object including costs and a 
pro fit margin of the so-called 'lessor'. Art. 6 of the AbzG always applies to this 
type of contract if the purposes of an instalment transaction will be achieved by 
letting the thing out on lease. According to uncontested court practice, a hire-
purchase agreement is an instalment transaction55 ; all the protective provisions 
of the law of instalment transactions apply, but only mutatis mutandis. An 
express right to acquire the thing need not be granted to the 'lessee' (instalment 
buyer). lt is sufficient that payments effected by instalments may at least for 
economic purposes be regarded as payments towards the purchase price56 • Here 
it is also difficult to distinguish a genuine lease, which is not subject to the law of 
instalment transactions, from a hire-purchase agreement, particularly in the 
case of long-term agreements. 
(bb) Another special case to be described here is that known as leasing. By 
leasing we mean a type of contract resembling a lease under which the lessee is 
usually permitted to use a thing for its useful life, with the leasing instalments 
being computed to cover the purchase price in full including costs and a pro fit to 
the leasing institute. In the event of a leasing institute acquiring the object in its 
own name and allowing the lessee to use it, we speak of 'finance leasing' 57 • Of 
course, finance leasing is found mainly in commercial transactions and is not 
therefore relevant to consumer protection. If leasing agreements are also 
concluded with private consumers it may be assumed that the rules on hire 
purchase will apply mutatis mutandis and that the application of the AbzG is 
determined by the question of whether the buyer shall at least become a benefi-
cial owner, for instance in the event of a buyer's option58 • This, too, must be 
decided in each individual case. 
4 Debtor-creditor-supplier agreements for services 
335 While third-party financing of contracts of sale is losing importance, the 
financing of services is winning growing popularity. From an economic point of 
view this is attributable to a number of reasons: first of all, for the individual 
consumer many services involve amounts of money as high as in the case of 
goods, which he is unable to raise all at once and which therefore require the 
involvement of a financing institution, for example correspondence courses, 
holiday travels or house repairs. Moreover, certain enterprises try to 'seil' 
expensive services to the customer by offering appropriate financing, in which 
case the division of labour between the supplier of services and the bank proves 
to be particularly profitable to both of them. After all, the involvement of a 
bank serves at the same time to exclude the recipient's objections to the service59 • 
Overall, it must be said that the financing of services, apart from a few isolated 
cases, shows a tendency quite hostile to the consumer, since in contrast to the 
acquisition of a thing, it ties the consumer for a long term to a service. He is 
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often unable to judge the implications of the transaction, he may not know that 
his legal remedies are curtailed and his financial resources will be overtaxed. 
From the point of view of consumer policy, there is an urgent need for regu-
lation of debtor-creditor-supplier agreements for services. So far, there is no 
legal provision similar to the AbzG. Apart from the FUSG of 24 August 1976, 
there is no statutory regulation whatsoever of such agreements, so that here the 
courts must rely on the more or less problematic application of general civil-law 
principles. An additional factor is that such cases attract the attention of the 
Federal High Court only very rarely, so that legal progress through judge-made 
law seems difficult and has so far happened to a limited extent only. 
The problem at the centre of all debtor-creditor-supplier agreements for 
services turns out to be the right to assert defences against the bank 
(Einwendungsdurchgriff) originating from the contract for services. The 
problem in terms of consumer policy is much the same as we have learnt in the 
case of debtor-creditor-supplier agreements. Through the splitting up of a 
uniform contract for the supply of services, whether a contract to manufacture, 
a contract of service, a brokerage agreement or a contract for professional 
services, into two independent contracts, one of them being a credit agreement 
with an instalment credit institution, the consumer is denied objections to the 
financing institution which he would normally be entitled to raise to the supplier 
of services, particularly in the event of inferior performance, breach of contract 
and fraudulent misrepresentation to the party obliged to perform services. 
With respect to the scope of application of the FUSG (No. 258), Art. 8 
provides that Arts. 2-7 of that Act shall apply mutatis mutandis to contracts 
aiming at achieving the purpose of a correspondence course contract in a dif-
ferent legal form. These are in particular the protective provisions on the rights 
of the participant in a correspondence course, on the form and contents of the 
contract, on the participant's right of cancellation and his right of notice. Such a 
form of circumvention would exist specifically if a financing institution were 
involved. The customer will not lose his right of cancellation pursuant to Art. 4 
FUSG (No. 114). 
Since other services, apart from some provisions of the AGBG, have not so 
far been regulated in a mandatory way, rules on the consumer's defences against 
the bank are also lacking. This applies, for instance, to holiday travels, agree-
ments concerning marriage brokerage, home learning and repairs. Several lower 
courts put forward the rule of good faith according to which the consumer's 
legal position should not be weakened by involving a banking institution, which 
was developed in court practice with regard to debtor-creditor-supplier agree-
ments59a. lt would be more appropriate here to look for a solution on the basis of 
the AGBG: what cannot be excluded in standard form contracts cannot be 
achieved indirectly either through the involvement of a financing bank. Such a 
rule could curb some, if not all, manipulations at the expense of the customer by 
service-rendering companies associated with instalment credit institutions. Here 
the Federal High Court now advances duties to in form and holds the bank liable 
for fault and malice on the part of its agents59b. 
In this connection the reform bill on contracts involving third-party financing 
should be mentioned. The Federal Government's proposal to amend Art. 607a 
Civil Code provides for a para. 4 under which the right to assert defences 
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against the bank exists in the case of Joans granted for obtaining a service. This 
proposal includes a genuinely novel element, compared with the past unsatis-
factory and confused case law, as it completely puts aside the concept of an 
instalment transaction and protects consumers in the case of services in a similar 
way to that of contracts of sale. The bill correctly attributes this to the credit 
element in financed contracts for the supply of services which entice the 
consumer and make it difficult for him adequately to judge the commitments 
incurred through Jonger-term payment obligations. In the Federal Govern-
ment's view, according to past experience such contracts are in particular 
financed contracts concerning marriage brokerage, holiday travels and corre-
spondence courses. The question is, though, whether or not the bill should have 
gone a step further towards a joint and several liability of the bank and the 
supplier of services to the consumer. Because of the particular nature of 
services, third-party financing is possible only if, as is usually the case, there is a 
close business relationship between the supplier and the bank. Such cooperation 
would usually justify joint and several liability. Both parties pursue the same 
objective, namely the supply of a service to the customer on the basis of the divi-
sion of labour. The customer would therefore be entitled to raise claims, for 
instance for breach of contract or inferior performance, against both the 
supplier and the creditor, and such claims should not be limited to theamount of 
payments effected to the bank. This would ensure in particular better control 
over service companies by banks. 
III CREDIT BY BANKS 
1 Significance of consumer credit granted by banks 
336 Meanwhile the most common form of consumer credit is that granted by 
banks (including savings banks) without the Ioan being intended for restricted 
use only (purchase of goods, etc.). Banks and savings banks have greatly 
expanded that type of credit and engage in considerable advertising in this field. 
For the consumer, this type of credit has the advantage that it is easy to obtain 
and that he is entirely free to use the Ioan granted as he pleases. This accounts in 
no small measure for the popularity of this type of credit. The drawback is that 
the consumer is tied down to a certain bank, for generally this type of credit 
presupposes a wage or salary account with a bank or savings bank. Deposits and 
credit transactions are combined by the bank or savings bank. There are, of 
course, exceptions, for instance through advertising by banks engaging in mail 
order credit60 • 
From the point of view of consumer policy it is worth mentioning that this 
type of credit has so far been subject to little or no statutory regulation; 
generally speaking the AbzG does not apply for Jack of restricted use of the 
Ioan. The few civil-law provisions on loan agreements in Arts. 607 et seq. Civil 
Code are at the parties' disposal and are modified by banks in their standard 
form contracts. In actual fact, standard form contracts of banks form the 
relevant legal basis of the relationship between the bank and the consumer. The 
AGBG takes effect only indirectly. In addition, there are provisions of the law 
of unfair competition or of administrative law, particularly regarding the rate of 
interest which will be dealt with below (No. 353). 
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In this context only some problems in terms of consumer protection will be 
considered which are presented by the existence of standard form contracts of 
banks and savings banks. 
2 Shaping of the contract in standard form contract conditions 
337 (aa) In the area of consumer credit, standard form contract conditions also 
become part of the contract only pursuant to the general rule of Art. 2 AGBG 
(No. 311 ff). With respect to consumer credit in a particular case, two stages 
must be distinguished: all banks and savings banks use uniform standard form 
contract conditions, which are registered with the Federal Cartel Office as terms 
recommendations (Konditionenempfehlung)61 • Through the involvement of the 
Federal Cartel Office it is possible to eliminate illegal clauses through preventive 
control before they take effect (No. 275). The standard conditions of banks 
(apart from special cases) are not subject to the approval of a supervisory 
authority (No. 282). They regulate the business relationship between the bank 
and the customer only in a general way and are not limited to loans. The 
relationship in a particular case is then specified by the standard form contract 
agreed upon under an individual credit contract. This is effected in such a way 
that the consumer signs the bank's credit application form regulating the most 
important questions of Jaw concerning the credit arrangement. 
These, too, must be verified pursuant to the general principles of control of 
standard form contracts. As a general rule of law, individual agreements 
between the customer and the bank supersede standard form contracts. 
Under neither the statutory provisions nor the standard form contract condi-
tions does a customer enjoy a right of cancellation with respect to his application 
for credit. Upon formation of the credit contract, which need not be in writing, 
the customer is bound by the contract. He cannot unilaterally free himself there-
from but will usually be obliged to avail himself of the loan. If he does not want 
to use the loan, i.e. wants to withdraw from the contract, hecommits a breach of 
contract according to present court practice. The bank may then demand 
reimbursement of its expenses and may claim damages if the customer is at 
fault. Of course, the amount of damages is determined by the expenses incurred 
and the losses suffered by the bank. lt may not thereby force the customer 
indirectly to avail himself of the loan, and it may not charge the customer for a 
consideration in respect of a loan it did not make available to him. Detailsare a 
matter of argument in court practice and cannot be discussed extensively here62 • 
Clauses for reimbursement of expenses in standard form contracts are subject to 
control pursuant to Art. 10, item 7 AGBG. In particular, excessive expenses 
or unfair lump-sum settlements cannot be asked for63 • On the other hand, 
provisions on lump-sum damages by banks are to be found in numerous 
contracts, for instance by 'agreeing' on a certain minimum interest rate payable 
in the event of non-use of the loan by the customer. Pursuant to Art. 11, item 5 
AGBG, such clauses on lump-sum damages are possible only on certain restric-
tive conditions; they must not result in excessive lump-sum damages or make it 
impossible for the customer to prove that in actual fact the damage was smaller. 
338 (bb) Ifthecredit contract has beenconcluded in a legally effective way and the 
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value has been paid to the customer, the latter is liable under the terms of the 
loan agreement to repay the loan and to pay the interest agreed upon (No. 345). 
Of special importance to the consumer is what will happen in the event of bis 
default. The bank is, of course, interested in the consumer meeting his obliga-
tions, while on the customer's part there may be difficulties adversely affecting 
his repayment obligation (the exceptional case of a 'bad debtor' not being taken 
into account here). Possible reasons for default might be the consumer's 
temporary unemployment or disability, a change for the worse in his financial 
circumstances, problems concerning his family, etc. lt is an established principle 
of German law that difficulties in meeting his repayment obligation neither 
release the consumer from bis obligations nor allow him a temporary defence, 
Art. 279 Civil Code64 • Rather, the consumer is obliged by law in any event to 
fulfil his contractual obligations, regardless of any changes in bis financial and 
other circumstances. 
An additional factor is that, in the event of delays in repayment, the bank has 
a right to cancel the contract and to demand immediate repayment of the entire 
credit including interest. Pursuant to the general principles under civil law, such 
a right of cancellation exists only for serious cause (Art. 626) and is otherwise 
subject to special agreement65 • According to the standard form contracts of 
banks, such reasons for cancellation are66 • 
- incorrect information by the consumer about his financial circumstances 
(e.g. income, other commitments, value of the security given)67 ; 
- deterioration of property, specifically in the event of taking a 'poor 
debtor's oath', bill and cheque protests; 
- significant jeopardy to the customer's property, for example through 
execution by other creditors, transfer of property abroad; 
- default in effecting the interest payments and repayments agreed upon. 
What is not regulated is the number of loan instalments with which the 
customer must be in arrears and the sum total of arrears. In this context it is 
advisable to apply the legal idea of Art. 4, para. 2 AbzG mutatis mutandis: 
accordingly, the entire loan will fall due only ifthe customer is in default wholly 
or in part with no less than two consecutive instalments and the sum total of 
arrears is one tenth of the entire loan including interest68 • 
Another question not yet clarified in court practice is whether the bank may 
exercise its right of cancellation without further requirements or whether it must 
make an appropriate communication to the consumer beforehand, pointing out 
the legal consequences (so-called qualified warning pursuant to Art. 326 Civil 
Code). From the point of view of consumer protection the bank may be required 
to make use of its right of cancellation only after having warned the customer to 
that effect beforehand, so that he may ward off the consequences of cancella-
tion. Otherwise such cancellation is void. Under standard form contracts, no 
other regulation may be agreed upon as is shown by Art. 11, item 4 AGBG69 • 
Pursuant to a recent ruling by the Federal High Court70 , which was not made 
specifically with respect to consumer credit, there is no general obligation on the 
bank to give a warning. This is inferred by the Federal High Court from the 
application of Art. 626 Civil Code. Pursuant thereto, the loan may be cancelled 
for serious cause. It is possible, though, that without an appropriate warning 
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there is no serious cause, particularly if the consumer resumed payments 
following a warning or if he does not even know whether the bank considers his 
behaviour to be contrary to the contract. This is a matter to be decided in each 
individual case. 
The forms used by banks give still other reasons for cancellation, e.g. failure 
to provide or increase the security required, substantial threats to the security 
provided or other material violations of the contract by the customer. 
Another drawback for the customer is that in the event of his default he is not 
entitled to an extension of credit. Rath er, an extension of credit is entirely within 
the discretion of the bank, which it must exercise in accordance with good faith. 
Therefore, in the case of slight default or default for good cause the customer 
may have a right to an extension of credit on the basis of good faith. Here, too, 
there is no established court practice protecting the customer. 
339 (cc) In addition to unrestricted-use credit or personal loan in banking, another 
type of credit known as running-account credit has been developed. As regards 
its economic nature, it roughly corresponds to the overdraft on current account 
granted to traders. Credit is granted by way of allowing the consumer to over-
draw his wage or salary account up to a certain limit depending upon his income 
and the discretion of the bank (up to DM 10 000). The bank may at any time 
reduce or cancel the credit. If the business connection is discontinued, the 
running-account credit will fall due immediately71 • 
3 Granting of credit by means of cheque cards 
340 (aa) In addition to the 'normal' consumer credit by banks described above, in 
the Federal Republic of Germany there are various other types of credit granted 
in accordance with the rules of the law of negotiable instruments. Banks and 
savings banks have issued so-called Eurocheque cards, with the aid of which it is 
easier for consumers to dispose of their accounts by cheques. The cheque card 
guarantees the taker of a cheque that the bank will pay the cheque up to a certain 
amount, currently DM 300. The cheque card system has meanwhile spread to all 
EC countries; guaranteed cheques are paid reciprocally. 
The cheque card is not intended in the first place to grant credit, but serves to 
facilitate disposition of an existing account. lt cannot be overlooked though 
that a cheque card is also used f or the purpose of raising credit, particularly if 
the holder of the account and cheque card is allowed to overdraw his account. In 
such a case the legal relation to the bank is determined by the principles 
mentioned above. Furth er details of the cheque card will not be dealt with here, 
since in terms of the letter of the law it 'does not relate to a credit transaction, but 
to a transaction under the law of negotiable instruments, which in view of the 
stringency of the law of cheques 'differs from general civil-law and consumer-
protection principles. What is known as the right to assert defences against a 
bank can in this case be imagined even less than in the case of anormal credit by 
a bank. 
341 (bb) Special problems have recently been encountered in the event of loss and 
forgery of cheques. Under the standard form contract conditions of banks, the 
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risk of loss and forgery is imposed on the consumer72 • Banks are liable only for 
grossly negligent breach of their obligation to verify. C:ross negligence is not 
accepted by the courts if a bank pays a (forged) cheque despite the fact that the 
cheque card was not produced73 , as the cheque card is merely intended to make it 
easier for the holder to dispose of his account, but does not impose an obligation 
to verify on the bank. The same is to apply if the amount of a (forged) cheque 
substantially exceeds the balance on account or the credit line74 • Thus a cheque is 
practically treated as cash at the expense of the consumer, although because of 
the cases mentioned the bank was almost bound to suspect forgery. 
While the customer is protected by a special fund created by banks if he loses 
both his cheques and his cheque card, this does not apply if he loses his cheques 
only. Through the expansion of the Eurocheque system the consumer has been 
exposed to high risks in the individual case. 
4 Credit brokerage 
342 (aa) In recent years credit brokerage has gained significance in the Federal 
Republic of Germany in terms of both economic relevance and consumer 
policy, although this has not always occurred 'to the benefit' of the customer. 
Here it is not the bank itself that approaches the consumer or vice versa, but a 
credit broker promises to raise a credit for the consumer from an instalment 
credit institution with which he usually cooperates. The danger of such a 
transaction in terms of consumer policy is obvious: first of all, the interest 
charged is usually much higher than the normal interest rates on consumer 
credit, since the credit broker's commission must be financed as weil. In their 
advertisements, credit brokers themselves try to give the impression that they 
are in a position to make available to the customer the requested amounts of 
money without any difficulty, for instance by using terms such as 'cash credit', 
'immediate credit', etc. Generally speaking, advertising by credit brokers in 
many respects turns out to be unfair and misleading and should therefore be 
controlled by the general principles of the law of unfair competition75 • 
Moreover, the credit terms are usually much 'tougher' than in the case of the 
normal instalment credit, for instance on account of excessive lump-sum 
damages, clauses providing for excessive reimbursement of expenses, sanctions 
for default and the like76. 
Credit brokerage has so far been regulated in the law of the Federal Republic 
of Germany only in some provisions of the Industrial Code and in the Makler-
und Bauträgerverordnung (Order concerning Brokersand Builders) of 11 June 
1975. There is no statutory regulation77 concerning the civil-law relationship 
between customer, credit broker and instalment credit institution. In practice, 
forms are designed in such a way that the credit contract is concluded by means 
of a special agreement between the instalment credit institution and the 
customer through the agency of a credit broker. Provisions similar to those 
described above with respect to the consumer credit by banks apply to this 
contract. The liability to pay a commission is usually regulated in such a way 
that the commission charge is 'added to' the total credit and is to be paid from 
the credit instalments. The bank pays the credit broker his commission in 
advance. There are no regulations governing the amount of commission; rather 
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the general prohibitiol) of usury applies, which will be described later (No. 346). 
Unlike instalment transactions, the contract is not subject to a right of cancella-
tion. Possibly the defence of fraudulent misrepresentation applies, since the 
broker is not a third party within the meaning of Art. 123 Civil Code78 • If there is 
a circumventing agreement within the meaning of Art. 6 AbzG, for instance the 
credit broker at the same time arranging the sale of goods, the consumer by way 
of exception has a cooling off period79 • The Jack of a right of cancellation in the 
event of a dispute may result in the customer being held Iiable for damages in the 
amount of the broker's .commission if he does not use the loan. So far, there is 
no established court practice regarding that case80 • 
343 (bb) A special form of credit brokerage exists in the case of so-called accident 
helpers' rings8'. An accident helpers' ring is a group of enterprises, for instance a 
towing company, a rent-a-car service, a service station and a bank, cooperating 
in the handling of claims for damages arising from a road accident. By assigning 
his claims arising from the accident to the accident helpers' ring, the customer 
would be relieved of the settlement procedure and have at his immediate 
disposal a rented car, etc. At a superficial glance, the institution of an accident 
helpers' ring seems to favour the consumer, as it relieves him of the often diffi-
cult settlement of damages resulting from an accident. In actual fact, though, 
these are highly dubious types of business. Of particular disadvantage to the 
consumer was the possibility to hold him liable, if the accident helpers' ring was 
not repaid in full from the insurance of the party at fault in the accident. 
The courts have declared such contracts to be void, since they violated the 
prohibition of unauthorised legal advice82 • The instalment credit institution was 
unable to demand repayment from the consumer83 • 
344 (cc) The Government's bill on debtor-creditor-supplier transactions and 
brokerage contracts mentioned earlier strives to regulate partially the law of 
credit brokerage. Basically, the general provisions of brokerage law, which are 
now of a mandatory nature, apply to credit brokerage. In addition it is provided 
that the contract shall be in writing, a requirement weil known to us from the law 
of instalment transactions (No. 323). The written instrument must indicate the 
broker's commission as a percentage rate of the credit. Moreover, the contract 
must include the information known from Art. la AbzG, particularly the total 
charge for credit. This is especially designed to achieve congruency of public-
law price-marking provisions and private-law duties to in form. The Bundesrat 
has opposed this proposal, though, because the credit broker often has to Iook 
for a lender and might not be in a position to indicate the total charge for credit. 
This criticism is correct in that the total charge for credit must be indicated in the 
credit agreement and not in the agreement with the credit broker. As far as that 
goes, the bill suffers from a substantial weakness by regulating only the law of 
credit brokerage, but not that of credit granted by banks. 
Art. 655b includes additional requirements as to the consumer's duty to pay a 
commission. lt does not suffice that a promise of a Ioan has been made: the Ioan 
must already have been paid. Furthermore, the provision stipulates that 
advance payments on commissions must not be agreed upon and accepted. 
Consequently, lump-sum damages and conventional penalties in the event of 
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non-use of a promised loan are void, unless they come up to IOOJo of the 
remuneration as expressly made clear in Art. 655c. The meaning of the last 
provision is not intelligible though, since thereunder the customer is expected 
indirectly to effect payments for a service he has not used, a fact that restricts his 
freedom of decision whether or not to use the loan. 
Through these provisions the bill is intended to take steps against grievances 
that have become known in the field of credit brokerage. However, it disregards 
other central issues which will be described in connection with the regulation of 
interest rates and other control measures. 
IV REGULATION OF INTEREST RATES 
1 Commercial-law issues 
345 To the consumer, the interest rate is the main cost factor in the use of a credit. 
Under German -law there is currently no government-fixed interest rate. 
Pursuant to Art. 23 KWG, it is possible to prescribe maximum interest rates by 
statutory order; however, since 1967 the Federal Government has not acted on 
this power84 • lt leaves the parties to agree on the interest rate, strictly speaking 
allowing it to be determined by 'competition'. From the point of view of 
economic policy a principle prevails which is similar to the one we have come to 
know in price law (No. 23). The extent to which banks and savings banks 
through cartels, concerted action or recommendations may jointly fix interest 
rates on consumer credit, for instance by laying down minimum or maximum 
interest rates charged on consumer credit, is a highly controversial issue among 
legal writers in conjunction with the construction of Art. 102 GWB85 • Pursuant 
thereto, contracts and recommendations by banks in restraint of trade are 
exempted in so far as they are subject to the supervision of the Federal Banking 
Supervisory Office. Moreover, since interest agreements are not so supervised, 
it may initially be assurned that interest agreements, if any, are not exempted. 
According to a different opinion, interest agreements and interest recommenda-
tions do not general!y come under the ban on cartels and the Cartel Office is only 
entrusted with supervision to prevent abuse86 • In practice, though, this contro-
versial issue is of no relevance, since here there is keen competition and interest 
agreements or recommendations, unlike the case of interest on savings deposits 
mentioned above (No. 35), have not been made. Rather, banks, savings banks 
and other credit institutions court the consumer. 
2 Prohibition of usury 
346 In German civil law there are two provisions protecting the consumer against 
excessive interest rates. First of all, Art. 138, para. 2 Civil Code provides for the 
prohibition of usury which exists in all European laws. The article on usury in 
the Civil Code was reworded by the first Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der 
Wirtschaftskriminalität of 29 July 1976. Usurious lending is also a criminal 
offence, Art. 302a Penal Code. An agreement on usurious interest is void. In 
such a case the customer is merely liable to repay the loan; he does not have to 
pay interest87 • The excessive interest is not reduced to a reasonable level88 • Usury 
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presupposes two facts: firstly, there must be an obvious disproportion between 
the obligations pf the parties. In the case of usurious Iending, the limit of usury 
(Wuchergrenze) cannot be fixed once for all. The total chargefor credit is taken 
as a yardstick, i.e. all charges, commissions, disagios, etc., must be included89 • 
This obvious disproportion must, of course, be determined on the basis of the 
relative market situation; if the interest level is high, usury must be determined 
differently than in the case of a low interest level. Currently, a total charge for 
credit at the rate of 30% will be considered usurious90 • Of course, in this context 
the courts make allowance for the risk involved in a loan: interest charged on a 
little secured loan will be higher than on a loan provided with a normal 
security91 • 
Secondly, the fact of usury presupposes that the usurer exploits the 
consumer's need, inexperience, Jack of judgment or material Jack of will power. 
This must be ascertained in each individual case and means that particularly 
little-experienced consumers, for example minors, elderly people, socially weak 
classes and foreigners, may be protected92 • A bill which has been introduced by 
the Bundesrat suggests that the subjective element ofusurious !ending should be 
deleted and that only the objective disproportion should be taken as a 
criterion93 • Whether this provision will be incorporated in the existing law is still 
open to question. 
While, generally speaking, in the case of normal consumer credit by banks 
usury does not come into question, it p!ays a special part in credit brokerage as 
described above94 • An additional factor apart from the normal interest 
agreement is that the credit broker demands a commission which becomes part 
of the total charge for credit and agrees on a special residual debt insurance. 
Usury is reached much sooner than in the case of normal instalment credit. lt is a 
controversial question in court practice whether the broker's commission and 
residual debt insurance should be included in the total charge for credit for 
determining usury. With respect to residual debt insurance it is assumed that it 
belongs to the total charge for credit95 • With respect to the credit broker's 
commission this has been denied on most questionable grounds under a ruling 
by the higher regional court of Munich96 • The Federal High Court in a new 
decision computes the total charge for credit on the basis of the overall burden 
on the customer, thus including the broker's commission97 • 
According to new court practice the charging of excessive interest is not only 
measured by the special provision on usury, but also by the standard of unfair-
ness pursuant to Art. 138, para. 1 Civil Code. Generally the Federal High Court 
assumes unfairness if there is a striking disproportion between the credit value 
and the total charge for credit and the creditor intentionally or negligently takes 
ad van tage of the debtor's situation when fixing the contract terms unilaterally98 • 
The yardstick used for determining unfairly excessive interest rates is the 
average market interest computed by the German Bundesbank. If the services of 
a credit broker are used, these standards are rightly adhered to, since otherwise 
unfairly excessive interest rates could never be proved, but would have to be 
measured by the credit brokers' and instalment credit institutions' behaviour, 
precisely which must be controlled by law. To the consumer it does not matter 
whether he applies for credit to a 'normal' bank or to a credit broker affiliated 
with an instalment credit institution99 • 
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Recent court practice has created an important additional standard of 
control, without the standard of unfairness having been Iaid down in general. 
The regional court of Stuttgart tried to arrive at such an objective standard in a 
ruling of 24 April 1979, which received wide attention100. The court tried to 
advance an economic interpretation ofunfairness under Art. 138, para. 1 Civil 
Code. Unfairness is said to exist ifthe total charge for credit exceeds the average 
market interest computed by the German Bundesbank by 100%. Accordingly, 
the court makes a difference between unfairness, which it assumes to exist if 
there is a 'flagrant' disproportion, and usury, which it deems to exist already if 
there is merely a 'striking' disproportion, but additionally requires a subjective 
element, i.e. exploitation of a state of distress. Whether such distinctions are in 
line with the letter of the law is open to question. I would consider more 
convincing a solution based exclusively on the element of usury and starting 
from the hypothesis that if the market interest is exceeded by 100% the subjec-
tive element of usury exists as weil, because it is incomprehensible how such an 
agreement could be made without a situation of distress having been exploited. 
Below such a rigid limit, each individual case could be treated separately, so 
that, for instance, interest exceeding the normal rate by 50% could be usurious 
where a situation of distress is exploited, for instance in the case of elderly 
people. 
A credit agreement which is null and void owing to usurious interest or 
because it is against public policy will be handled in accordance with the provi-
sions of the law of unjust enrichment. In German law it is an accepted fact that 
only an interest agreement, not the granting of a loan, gives rise to an infringe-
ment of public policy 101 . The customer is not forced to pay interest as saved 
expenditure, but has to repay the value in instalments. If the loan is not paid 
directly to the customer, but to the credit broker or a third party, the courts 
admit the claim for unjust enrichment only against the recipient, but not against 
the consumer102. 
3 Consumer's right of notice in case of excessive interest rates 
347 Another civil-law provision protecting the consumer is laid down in Art. 247 
Civil Code. This provision has recently gained importance and has given rise to 
intense controversies on legal policy. Pursuant to Art. 247 Civil Code, the 
debtor may, after the expiry of six months, give a six months' notice if a higher 
interest rate than 6% per annum is agreed upon. This is of special importance in 
the case of credit contracted at interest rates higher than those currently 
obtainable in the market 103 • The German Bundesbank has demanded that Art. 
247 be deleted, because the workability of the credit market would otherwise be 
endangered104. Such an initiative should be rejected, since it fails to recognise the 
protective character of Art. 247 Civil Code against excessive interest rates. 
Other proposals want to restrict the right of cancellation to true consumer 
credits, which are characterised by a certain upper Jimit104a. 
4 Obligation to indicate interest rates 
348 Another important provision in terms of consumer protection is the obligation 
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on a credit institution, an instalment seller or a credit broker to indicate the total 
annual charge f or credit. The underlying basis is Art. 1, para. 4 Preisangaben-
verordnung (No. 40). The obligation to indicate exists above all if the aspect of 
interest is advertised in the first place. In the case of a mere boosting of credits, 
there is no such obligation. According to the new practice of the courts, an 
exception is made only ifthe lender or credit broker makes offers which, in line 
with generally accepted standards and the way in which they are made, demon-
strate the willingness to conclude a contract; there need not be an offer that is 
effective under civil law104b. The total charge for credit is the percentage rate of 
the credit for the year arrived at on the basis of the overall term of the loan, the 
amount paid, the amount repaid, the interest rate, brokerage and other costs. 
This concept of the total charge for credit is especially designed to enable the 
customer to get a clear picture of the expenses incidental to a loan, for instance 
fees payable on conclusion of the contract, commissions and residual debt 
insurance. In addition, the obligation to indicate the rate ofinterest enables the 
customer to compare interest rates. 
The civil-law consequences of a violation of the obligation to indicate the 
total charge for credit are not clear. The legal consequence under the law of 
instalment transactions has alreadybeen dealt with (No. 323): it results in nullity 
of the contract or in transfer of the object of purchase without any obligation to 
pay interest. The Preisangabenverordnung does not itself regulate the questions 
of civil-law effectiveness in the case of violations; most courts assume that a 
violation of the Preisangabenverordnung does not affect the contract in terms 
of civil law 105 • The higher regional court of Celle has recently assumed that the 
idea of Art. la, para. 3 AbzG applies mutatis mutandis to instalment credit by 
banks 106, but this decision was not upheld by the Federal High Court. The first 
decision also guarantees the protective purpose of the Preisangabenverordnung 
in terms of civil law and should therefore be welcomed in the interest of the 
consumer. 
V PROVISION OF SECURITY 
349 Consumer credits, as other credits, are usually granted only against appro-
priate security. The appropriate statutory regulations of savings banks in any 
case provide for an express obligation tö take security. The law of security for 
credit is tobe found in the general civil law andin the bank's standard terms107 • 
Regulations protecting the consumer have so far been issued by legislative act in 
exceptional cases only. The following examples should be noted. 
1 Regulation of assignment of wages 
350 The most important type of security for consumer credit today is the assign-
ment of wages by the customer to the bank. This assignment is legally 
permissible, for instance, also in such a way that the customer's claims for wages 
to which he is entitled in the future will be assigned to the bank. This is known as 
disguised assignment (stille Abtretung) for the future, which need not be 
communicated to the debtor of wages or salary, i.e. the employer, tobe valid. lt 
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does not restrict the consumer's right of disposition of his salary or wage. 
However, in the event of default in payment, the bank will communicate the 
assignment to the consumer's employer and will demand that salary or wages 
due be paid to it to the extent of the attachable amount (pfändbarer Betrag). As 
the customer has approved thereof, he is unable to take action against such a 
measurerns. 
For reasons of social policy, the legislator has limited the assignable amount 
in order not to deprive the consumer of a subsistence level. That is why pursuant 
to Art. 400 Civil Code assignment is permissible only at the rate of the amount 
attachable at any time which is laid down in Arts. 850a et seq. of the Code of 
Civil Procedure as amended. We shall not go into details here. The legislator's 
effort to adapt the subsistence level to the relative trend of income is worth 
mentioning. The 4th Pfändungsfreigrenzengesetz (Act on Attachment Exemp-
tion Limits) of 28 February 1978 increased the basic amounts exempt from 
attachment considerably. The Act also protects bank accounts of consumers in 
two ways from action on the part of creditors: Art. 835, para. 3, sentence 2 Code 
of Civil Procedure lays down a two-week blocking period. Before the expiry of 
that period the financial institution may not effect payment to the creditor. 
Protection until the next pay day is afforded under a new Art. 850k Code of 
Civil Procedure 109. 
2 Other security 
351 (aa) Another instance of security is a guarantee (Bürgschaft) or joint liability 
(Mithaftung) of a member of the family. To make the giving of a guarantee by a 
non-merchant valid it is necessary, though, that it be given in writing, Art. 766 
Civil Code. Further protective provisions do not exist under German law, apart 
from some very minor obligations on the part of the bank to furnish informa-
tion 110 • In particular, it is possible that the guarantor waives the claim for prior 
execution against the pi"incipal debtor, i .e. can be sued immediately. In the case 
of consumer credit it is common practice by banks that members of the family 
are jointly liable for the amount of the Ioan to the extent of the arrears at any 
time, i.e. including arrears of interest and costs. 
(bb) What is known as security by means of movables is provided either 
through transfer of ownership by way of security (Sicherungsübereignung) or, 
in instalment sales, through reservation of title. There are no formal require-
ments regarding the provision of security which may, as has meanwhile been 
decided by the courts, also comprise non-attachable objects 111 • We shall not go 
into the details of giving security here. 
A certain measure of debtor protection exists in case the consumer defaults 
and the credit institution proceeds to realise the security. Under the law of instal-
ment transactions and debtor-creditor-supplier agreements, it is not possible for 
the instalment seller or instalment credit institution to claim the purchase price 
and at the same time take back the ownership reserved to him/it. In the case 
of transfer of ownership, the bank may realise the security only to the extent 
of the secured claim including interest and costs 112 • Banks' standard form 
contract conditions include appropriate provisions which are designed to allow 
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the bank almost free play in the realisation of a security. Under the new AGBG 
these clauses may be unfairly prejudicial to the customer and are therefore 
voict11J. 
(cc) Banks have secured themselves a special means of security by reserving a 
lien on all claims and objects of the consumer which come into their possession 
or power of disposal, for instance securities, cheques and saving accounts114. 
Art. 19 of the standard form contract conditions of banks and the corre-
sponding provision of Art. 21 of the standard form contract conditions of 
savings banks provide for a comprehensive right oj lien to which as yet no 
objections have been raised in court practice115 . The practical result of this is that 
the customer's property coming into the bank's power of disposal is subject to a 
sort of general lien created by the bank. However, pursuant to the principles of 
the law of standard form contracts, such a lien may be inadmissible. There is no 
established court practice yet. 
Meanwhile, trends moving in an opposite direction may be noted. In their 
new standard form contract conditions, which have been registered as terms 
recommendations, the banks have waived the so-called blanket Iiability clause 
which subjected all of a bank's claims against a customer to the Iien. Attach-
ment of a salary account and thus the bank's lien on the account kept by it has 
also been possible since 1 April 1978 pursuant to Art. 850k Code of Civil Proce-
dure subject only to certain restrictions116 . 
(dd) Bills of exchange may also be used in providing security for credit. Under 
the law of bills there are no restrictions on the provision of security for consumer 
credit by means of bills. However, this type of providing security is unusual in 
the case of consumer credit and may in a particular case be contrary to public 
policy. Nevertheless, the consumer's liability on the bill to third parties is uncon-
ditional and unlimited; it is this which makes the provision of security by means 
of bills particularly dangerous, since the consumer is denied the defences he may 
raise against an instalment credit institution. Therefore it is worth a thought 
whether in line with the English model and the EC draft a ban on the provision 
of security by means of bills should be considered. Initiatives in terms of legal 
policy pointing in that direction are evolving in the Federal Republic of 
Germany117 • 
VI STATE CONTROL OF CONSUMER CREDIT 
1 Generalities 
352 As outlined above, consumer credit is subject to the general regulations under 
civil law; there is far-reaching freedom of contract, as regards both the conclu-
sion and the contents of consumer credit agreements. There is practically no 
state control of consumer credit in the law of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
regarding the contents of the contract, the regulation of interest rates or the 
provision of security. Here, workable competition and the consumer's 
'prudence' are relied upon which must be ensured by appropriate legal 
regulations. 
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2 Admission to the trade 
353 State control exists practically only with respect to admission under trade law 
and the law of bank supervision of certain institutions to the consumer credit 
business. 
(aa) Institutions that operate in the banking line require an appropriate licence 
by the Federal Banking Supervisory Office. The granting of credit by way of 
business is a banking transaction and thus subject to Iicence. There are, 
however, two important, though not readily intelligible, exceptions: the credit 
brokers' business is not subject to the supervision of banks, since credit brokers 
do not transact credit business themselves but only arrange such business. 
Leasing institutions (as weil as instalment sellers) do not operate in the banking 
line either, since they lease objects acquired by them and do not provide credit. 
That is why Ieasing institutions are not subject to licence under the KWG 118 • 
(bb) With respect to credit brokers, Art. 34c of the revised Industrial Code 
provides for the obligation to apply f or a licence. A licence may be withheld only 
for Jack of reliability or in the case of financial disorder, Art. 35 Industrial 
Code. As the burden of proving unreliability or financial disorder is on the local 
industrial inspection board, the obligation to apply for a licence is hardly of 
practical importance to credit brokers. Now, as before, practically any person 
who does not have a previous conviction for fraud or has not been adjudged 
bankrupt may be admitted. Art. 34c Industrial Code affords effective consumer 
protection only in some extreme cases. Pursuant to Art. 35 Industrial Code, 
subsequent prohibition to pursue the trade of a credit broker is possible. lt 
presupposes unreliability and is restricted by the principle of reasonableness. 
Cases of cancellation of a licence happen very rarely119 • 
3 Other provisions 
354 Other restrictions on the business activity of credit institutions and credit 
brokers stem from the general provisions under the law of unfair competition 
and trade law. Advertising by credit institutions and credit brokers must not be 
misleading (No. 80ff). Unfortunately, deceptive advertising may often be 
observed in the credit brokerage business (f.i. on the total charge for credit). 
Here the courts, not always along uniform lines, try to fight abuses in 
advertising120• Under trade law it is prohibited to procure loans through 
itinerant peddling (No. 112). The civil law consequence of forbidden loan 
brokerage through itinerant peddling was for a Iong time a matter of argument, 
until the Federal High Court in a ruling of 22 May 1978 assumed nullity 
pursuant to Art. 134 Civil Code121 • In this connection the Federal High Court 
advances as a reason that the consumer must be protected against incurring any 
commitments carelessly. Here what matters is not the need for protection in a 
particular case, because the consumer's difficulty of furnishing proof is other-
wise not sufficiently taken into account. The prohibited trade practice is 
construed widely. lt includes any activity of the broker outside his own business 
premises, for instance on the occasion of an advertising drive by the creditor or a 
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third party for the purposes of soliciting and counseling the customer as well as 
preparing the ground for the conclusion of a credit agreement. The trade 
practice is not prohibited if a sales transaction is linked with a loan agreement 
(No. 112); this exception is interpreted by the Federal High Court in a narrow 
sense. The borrower's duty to return is determined by the law of unjust enrich-
ment (No. 346). Through court practice, far-reaching effective protection ofthe 
customer against door-to-door transactions arranged through credit brokers, 
which is known to exist in other countries and which is demanded by the EC 
directive on consumer credit, has been achieved. 
Credit institutions are subject to a certain supervision by the Federal Banking 
Supervisory Office, which essentially aims at protecting the depositor and saver, 
but not the debtor, even less the consumer. The Federal Supervisory Office sees 
to it that the obligation to indicate the total charge for credit is complied with by 
the credit institutions. lt also tries to encourage banks tobe more consumer-
minded in cooperating with credit brokers. 
Pursuant to Art. 23, para. 3 KWG, the Federal Supervisory Office may raise 
objections to abusive advertising by credit institutions, for instance in the case 
of aggressive consumer credit advertising and misleading statements, but has 
made little use of these powers122 • Indirectly, the Federal Supervisory Office 
tries to control credit brokers by charging banks with the task of seeing to it that 
credit brokers cooperating with them comply with the obligation to indicate 
interest rates and engage in objective advertising. 
VII CREDIT REFERENCE AGENCIES AND COLLECTING AGENCIES 
1 Credit reference 
355 Often the consumer will receive a promise of credit only after his credit 
standing has been checked. This may be done by the bank itself, but also by what 
are known as credit reference agencies. 
Credit reference agencies are of great practical importance in the area of 
consumer credit in the Federal Republic of Germany. Banksand savings banks 
are affiliated with the 'Schufa', a credit reference agency on debtors, including 
consumers, which stores data on all debtors and supplies them to credit institu-
tions upon request; conversely, the affiliated credit institutions communicate all 
relevant data on debtors and their credit behaviour to the Schufa. The 
importance of the Schufa is revealed by the fact that in 1977 it collected data 
about 24 million people involved in trade and industry and supplied information 
in 22 million cases. To the consumer wanting to obtain credit it is important that 
he should know the contents of the stored data on his credit standing, so that he 
may demand that they be erased if incorrect or eventually claim damages. 
The law of storage and communication of data by credit agencies has mean-
while been regulated by the Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (BDSG, Federal Data 
Protection Act) which came into force on l January 1978. The decisive basis is 
tobe found in Arts. 31 et seq. BDSG123 • Art. 32 BDSG permits in principle the 
storage of data on credit standing and the like if there is no reason to presume 
that this will impair the interests warranting protection of those concerned. The 
communication of such data to credit and similar institutions is permitted if the 
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recipient has satisfactorily shown his legitimate interest in knowing them; in the 
case of an application for credit by a consumer this should always be the case. 
The regulation in Art. 34 BDSG is important to the consumer. Pursuant 
thereto an obligation to notify exists if data are transmitted for the first time; 
storage need not be notified 124 • The customer may request information about his 
personal data stored, but has to pay a fee, even if the information was useless to 
him. 
Art. 35 BDSG regulates the consumer's claim for correction of personal data 
if these are incorrect. The data are blocked, if their correctness is contested by 
the consumer and if neither their correctness nor their incorrectness can be 
established. After the expiry of five years, there is likewise an obligation to 
block data and to erase them at the consumer's request. To preclude the exercise 
of these rights, the Schufa cannot plead that the data were supplied to it incor-
rectly by credit institutions, for it is 'master' of the data it stores and supplies: 
otherwise the consumer's rights would be practically ineffective. 
In addition to the special claims under the BDSG, there are the provisions of 
the law of torts on account of which the party concerned may be asked to refrain 
from storage and transmission of data infringing the consumer's personal right 
or credit, Arts. 823, para. 1, 824 Civil Code. There is also a claimfor damages, 
although it is doubtful in how far the consumer can be said to have suffered a 
loss as a result of his application for credit having been rejected. We shall not go 
into further details of these provisions which are of little practical importance. 
The Schufa is not Iiable in tort for communications with respect to which the 
affiliated banks failed to check the identity as required 126 • 
From the point of view of both civil law and data protection, a clause in loan 
forms of banks permitting them to pass on to the Schufa information origi-
nating from the customer's application for a loan has recently been a matter of 
heated argument 127 • Though the consumer when signing the contract has 
'consented' to this clause, since it is included in all loan forms, he has no choice 
other than to 'accept' the clause in order to get the credit. Often he fails to grasp 
the importance of the clause, so it is possible to regard it as being unfairly 
prejudicial to the customer within the meaning of Art. 9, para. 1 AGBG (No. 
265). lt may also infringe the mandatory provisions of the BDSG which permit 
transmission of data only in a particular case and only with the interests ofthose 
concerned in each case being weighed carefully. Lastly, it should be examined 
whether or not the clause can be challenged on grounds of antitrust law, since it 
is used in a uniform way in all loan forms and thus is equivalent to the case of an 
unreported and consequently forbidden terms recommendation. 
2 Debt-collecting businesses 
356 In the event of pecuniary difficulties, credits raised by a consumer will often 
be collected not by the lender himself, but by a collecting agency. The regulation 
underlying the business of such an agency is Art. 1, para. 1 of the Rechts-
beratungsgesetz (RBG, Legal Advice Act) of 1935 (No. 358). Pursuant thereto 
the business of a collecting agency requires a /icence12s. This is granted only as a 
part licence and does not include the initiation of court proceedings by way of an 
action 129 • The debtor need not have collection without permission enforced 
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against him; in this respect the assignment of debts is ineffective. 
The involvement of a collecting agency may entail additional costs to the 
consumer which are, however, limited by the statutory regulation on compensa-
tion for default in Arts. 286 et seq. Civil Code. He is not liable to pay a commis-
sion for collection to the collecting agency130 , but has to pay costs equivalent to a 
lawyer's fees 131 • A passing on to the consumer of the overall collection costs by 
the credit institution in standard form contract conditions infringes Art. 9, 
para. 2, item l AGBG. 
VIII REFORM OF TUE LA W OF CONSUMER CREDIT 
356a The law of consumer credit in the Federal Republic of Germany - unlike the 
law in many other countries within and outside the EC132 - is a patchwork of 
regulations which relate only to certain marginal aspects of consumer-policy 
problem's and besides are easy to evade. In principle, there is unshakeable 
confidence in the workability of competition andin the well functioning of the 
doctrine of freedom of contract1JJ which only now and then in the case of 
usurious interest (No. 346) or control under the AGBG (No. 338) results in state 
intervention. The enforcement of provisions on consumer protection - of 
which there are only a few - is characterised by special deficiencies particularly 
where socially weak consumers are concerned134 • 
The German legislator encounters difficulties in his attempt to reform the 
law, because in the law of consumer credit he continues to start from the instal-
ment credit, i.e. from the AbzG. This becomes evident in the amendment of Art. 
607a (No. 333), where a detailed reguiation of the Einwendungsdurchgriff 
(defence of the consumer against the bank originating in the contract of sale or 
contract for services) is proposed, which is hardly important any more135 , while 
the actually acute problems of regulating the consequences of default or fighting 
usurious lending are left to the courts. 
In an expert opinion delivered by v. Marschall 136 to the German Ministry of 
Justice, the question of comprehensive regulation of consumer credit is put up 
for discussion for the first time in German law. Many proposals for reform are 
based on the existing law, for instance in applying the rule of Art. 1 a AbzG (No. 
323 above) to all credit agreements. With respect to the right of cancellation, the 
expert does not favour regulation pursuant to Art. lb concerning all credit 
transactions (No. 324 above), but only concerning special provisions applicable 
to door-to-door sales as exist in English and Belgian laws. Worth mentioning are 
his considerations concerning reform of the consequences of default. Under the 
existing law there is freedom of contract (No. 338) - with the exception of the 
AbzG (No. 325 above) - and thus freedom of prosecution on the part of the 
creditor. The expert makes a difference between temporary de!ays in repayment 
and ultimatefailure. In the case of temporary irregularities he wants to furnish 
the creditor with additional means to compel the debtor to effect repayment, for 
instance by temporarily taking the security 137 • He rejects the idea of allowing the 
consumer a 'delai de grace' - in contrast to many foreign laws. This issue is 
sure to require further discussion. In the event of ultimate failure he demands 
Settlement of the credit relationship without delay, with the security being 
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realised, to avoid a decrease in value and an accrual of interest and costs 138 • A 
period of three months allowed for realisation is to urge the creditor to speed up 
the matter. 
More far-reaching proposals for reform culminating in a bill on consumer 
credit have been made by Reifner139 , who pleads in particular for the introduc-
tion through legislation of a compulsory delay in the event of financial 
difficulties on the part of the debtor. 
An EC draft directive of 27 March 1979140 aims at regulating consumer credit 
uniformly within all countries of the EC. Art. 6 provides for writing including 
comprehensive obligations to furnish information, distinguished by credits for 
restricted and for unrestricted use, and credit card agreements. There will be no 
right of cancellation. Bills of exchange may not be signed to provide security or 
to effect payment. The consumer may enjoy more favourable treatment. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Legal Advice and Law 
Enf orcement in Consumer Law 
1 TUE PROBLEM 
357 Our description of consumer law · has shown that in recent years a !arge 
number of regulations and court decisions have been issued which either directly 
improve the consumer's position in the market or in law or at least indirectly 
make a positive contribution in terms of consumer policy to the regulation of 
market mechanisms. lt cannot be overlooked, though, that there are still consid-
erable gaps, that resistence on the part of suppliers has tobe overcome, that the 
structural deficiencies of the market and the law which we have analysed in 
Chapter l have hardly been offset so far by legal regulations and court 
decisions. Yet it cannot be denied that there are positive developments in 
consumer law and it remains to be studied here how they are translated into 
reality. 
To begin with, the problem of law enforcement is nothing specific to 
consumer law, but is a phenomenon concerning all fields of law. However, 
within the framework of consumer law it is a specific issue precisely because 
apparently here there are great deficiencies in law. enforcement and because 
often the individual consumer neither knows what his rights are nor is in a 
position to exercise them. lt seems to us that the law certifies the consumer a type 
of prudence which is often in contrast to social circumstances and with respect 
tO the poor consumer may result in almost a denial of justice. However, so far 
these are mere hypotheses which have to be verified on the basis of legal 
measures. 
As outlined by us in detail, consumer law in the Federal Republic of Germany 
is essentially enforced at three levels: by governmental authorities, through the 
activity of associations (collective action against unfair trade practices and 
illegal standard form contract conditions), and by individual consumers within 
the framework of legal relationships under civil law. Another factor on a 
growing scale is the establishment of so-called organs of self-control, for 
instance in the area of advertising, which, however, often do not serve the 
interest of consumers, but are intended to protect suppliers against state inter-
vention (No. 126). Unlike the situation in labour law, the bargaining power of 
consumer organisations plays hardly any role since there is almost no member-
ship-based organisation of consumers and possible activity on the part of trade 
unions is characterised by too narrow a conception of themselves and by 
possible conflicts with their interests proper (No. 7). 
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Two instruments of consumer policy play hardly any role in the Iaw of the 
Federal Republic of Germany and may therefore be disregarded: the instru-
ments of criminal law are used only in extreme cases, for instance in that of 
fraudulent trade practices, and so far operate in a retrospective way only', and 
in the Federal Republic of Germany there is no centralised institution of 
consumer protection, such as the Consumer Ombudsman in the Scandinavian 
countries. Whether such a consumer ombudsman would be desirable and 
admissible under our constitutional Iaw will not concern us any further here, 
since no initiatives pointing in that direction can be identified2• 
To continue the description, we start from the hypothesis which in many 
respects is, however, rather doubtful, that the supervisory activity of authorities 
within their competence and the right to bring a collective action basically work 
in a positive way. We have already said where we consider the gaps in enforce-
ment to be (No. l l7ff; No. 274ff). We shall now turn to the individual 
consumer. How does he know his rights, how can he enforce his rights in as 
speedy and inexpensive a way as possible and without personal commitments, 
and how can he refuse to accept unjustified claims of suppliers? 
The individual consumer's protection passes through three stages: 
- Above all, the consumer must know his rights and duties in the first place. 
The existing civil Iaw assumes that any subject of rights and duties has complete 
knowledge of the law and is aware of his contractual obligations for the very 
reason that they are created only with his intention. However, this liberal model 
is in contrast to reality, specifically in the case of socially weak consumers. A 
possible remedy may be for the law to impose on suppliers special duties to 
fiirnish information, for instance concerning the right of cancellation in the case 
of door-to-door sales and instalment transactions or concerning the content of 
standard form co.ntract conditions if they are incorporated in the contract3• In a 
more general way, the problem for the consumer is where to find opportunities 
of advice enabling him to know his rights and duties, especially in a conflict 
situation. 
- Knowledge of the law means a first step towards its enforcement, but 
requires further measures. A decisive step in this direction will be made if in the 
event of disputes between consumers, of the one part, and traders and 
craftsmen, of the other part, proceedings out of court are available which allow 
speedy enforcement possibly by amicable agreement and without major 
. formalities and costs. 
- Should it be impossible to settle a dispute 'by amicable agreement', under 
Art. 19 para. 4 Grundgesetz (German Basic Law) an independent court has to 
decide the matter in the last instance. The que~tion is whether the present court 
procedure suffices or whether it calls for improvement. 
II LEGAL ADVICE TO THE CONSUMER 
1 The significance of the RBG of 1935 
358 (aa) In the Federal Republic, there is no act that deals specifically with legal 
advice to the consumer. Rather, advice to consumers, in so far as it is legal 
advice, is regulated by the general provisions ofthe RBG of 1935, which is still in 
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force, and the compliance of which with constitutional law is not called in 
question4• 
The Act forbids the handling by way of business of somebody else's legal 
matters (geschäftsmäßige Besorgung fremder Rechtsangelegenheiten), irre-
spective of whether for a consideration or gratuitously, by any person who is not 
licensed to do so. The Act and the two implementing regulations issued there-
under then regulate the basis, procedure and extent of the licence to give legal 
advice. Section 1, Art. 3 of the Act exempts from its scope legal advice and the 
handling of legal matters by authorities, public-law entities within the frame-
work of their competence, Iawyers and cooperatives. Pursuant to Art. 7, no 
Iicence is required if associations or agencies formed on a trade, professional or 
on any similar basis provide advice and assistance in legal matters to their 
members within the scope of their functions. 
The significance of the Act in terms of legal advice to consumers is revealed 
only if we take a closer and more critical view of the interpretation of the 
provisions mentioned above. 
The concept of legal advice is formulated in very broad terms, the require-
ment being that the advice should relate to a particular case. According to estab-
Iished practice such particular cases are5 : 
- information on the legal position in a Iaw case of everyday life; 
- guidance as to the possibiJities of setting up claims in a legal Situation; 
- advk~e to the person seeking advice to behave in a certain way; 
- assistance in acting on such advice, in so far as the adviser's identity is not 
disclosed to third parties, hence particularly the preparation of a draft 
contract, draft dunning letter, letter of request or draft petition to a court 
or any other authority. 
The concept of legal ad vice is also considered to exist if a newspaper or broad-
casting or television corporation within the framework of its freedom of 
information as protected under constitutional law provides judicial assistance in 
a particular case by means of so-called question and answer columns6 • The 
courts differentiate according to whether the discussion of the legal side of the 
problem involved is most important, whether the main emphasis of the ad vice is 
on the legal side, and whether the important factor is general instruction on 
juristic issues given to all readers7 • According to the dominant view of legal 
writers, unlawful legal advice does not become admissible by the fact that the 
information is made public. However, this view, as we shall demonstrate, is a 
matter of argument for constitutional reasons (Art. 5 Basic Law). 
Legal advice also embraces the handling of legal matters. This will be any 
activity through which another person 's legal affairs are promoted directly8 • 
Such activity may also concern the drafting of contracts, e.g. the wording of a 
contract of sale, lease, credit agreement, contract of service or contract to 
manufacture, or the modification of a certain contractual relationship, for 
instance by the drafting of a notice of termination. Activity directed at the 
handling of legal matters is also to comprise law enforcement, namely the 
clarification of existing legal relationships and the safeguarding and enforce-
ment of existing rights and claims. This is expressly Iaid down in the Act 
regarding the collection of claims. 
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Legal advice and the handling of legal matters must be distinguished from 
general advice, specifically with respectto economic relations9• The boundaries 
are hard to fix in a particular case. The courts take as a criterion whether the 
emphasis of the activity is on the field of economics or of law10• Legal commen-
taries define legal advice in a wider sense and assume it to exist as soon as the 
advice initially concerning economic issues also gives rise to legal conse-
quences11. This opinion will have to be reviewed from the point of view of 
constitutional law. 
Legal ad vice and the handling of legal matters are subject to a licence irrespec-
tive of whether they are provided for a consideration or not, whether they are 
egoistic or altruistic, and whether or not they are provided by perscins qualified 
in the profession 12 . The activity must be carried on only by way of business 
(geschäftsmäßig), be it full-time or part-time. The Act does not cover occasional 
legal advice. For instance, if a professor of law occasionally gives legal advice, 
he does not infringe the RBG. However, if the activity is characterised by some 
duration and regularity, this constitutes an infringement of the RBG 13 . 
This wide interpretation of the concepts of 'legal advice or the handling of 
legal matters' and 'by way of business' entails severe restrictions on legal advice 
to consumers. Legal advice to consumers is practically a monopoly held by 
lawyers, unless a licence has been granted or the exceptions to the Act are 
applicable. If, by contrast, it is maintained that the Act serves the purpose of 
consumer protection 14, this is nothing but a superficial justification of the 
monopoly of the Bar exclusively to furnish legal advice, which was created by 
that Act. In this context it is not taken into consideration that consumer protec-
tion is required only in so far as persons insufficiently familiar with legal matters 
should not be allowed to give legal advice. Conversely, it must be assumed that 
any person who completed law studies inclusiVe of practical training is qualified 
to give legal advice as laid down in the Act with respect to the lawyer. -
359 (bb) As regards the handling of consumer affairs in practice, the Act has 
extremely adverse consequences. In principle there are three alternatives to 
avoid the restrictions under the Act on legal advice to consumers: 
(l) lt is initially assumed that the general advice given by Consumer Advice 
Centres (Verbraucherzentralen - No. 6) does not constitute legal advice but 
merely economic advice and assistance in deciding matters relating to everyday 
life, housekeeping and the like15 . Thus the regular consultative activity of 
consumer advice centres comes within the law. Cases including both economic 
and legal elements, specifically in the case of services and credit, are prob-
lematic. Sensible economi~ advice is impossible without discussing the legal 
aspects, without considering the legal alternatives and referring to the legal 
consequences. For instance, if a consumer wants to know which life insurance 
or which credit is most favourable to him, not only the 'economic value', 
but also the contract terms and the possibilities of termination are of deci-
sive importance to him. Here it is impossible to follow legal commentaries 
assuming legal advice whenever the advice also involves legal consequences. 
Rather, in keeping with court practice it must be assumed that the emphasis of 
the advice is on the economic side. In view of the fact that many consumer 
problems involve legal aspects, economic advice connected with legal advice 
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does not infringe Section 1, Art. 1 of the RBG. 
Neither is it a matter of legal ad vice if a consumer ad vice centre participates in 
complaints or conciliation boards as will be described below. In this case it is not 
a matter of legal advice or the handling of legal matters, but of participation in a 
procedure aiming at the speedy enforcement of consumer complaints 16 • 
(2) Pursuant to Art. 7, consumer organisations on a membership basis may 
within the scope of their functions provide advice and assistance to their 
members in legal matters. Since German consumer organisations are not 
organisations on a membership basis 17 , this possibility does not come into 
question, particularly not in the case of regional or local consumer advice 
centres. At best it can be imagined whether or not it would be possible in view of 
the structure of consumer advice centres, whose members are usually only 
corporate bodies, to give legal advice to members of such corporate bodies and 
thus to indirect members of the consumer advice centre. As far as can be ascer-
tained, this case has not so far occurred in practice. lt depends on the definition 
of the term 'member'. lt can be imagined quite easily that indirect membership 
also suffices 18 • 
On the other hand, legal advice to members may already be given by 
consumer-oriented organisations which safeguard consumer interests in specific 
areas 19 , particularly tenants' organisations and associations of motorists. 
Tenants' organisations actively furnish legal advice to their members, while 
associations of motorists seeing themselves less as consumer organisations than 
as a 'motorist lobby', as indicated in Chapter l, do not make use thereof, but at 
best offer their members legal expenses insurance. The extent to which trade 
unions may give their members legal advice in consumer affairs is a matter of 
their position in general as consumer organisations (No. 7). As far as can be 
ascertained, they have not yet made use of this opportunity. 
360 (3) In the most common model of advice by c;onsumer advice centres a 
licence pursuant to Art. 1 of the RBG is required. Most of the consumer ad vice 
centres have mean while applied for such licences and following resistance by 
local bar associations have in most cases been granted licences. In its Second 
Consumer Report, the Federal Government has held the foUowing view: 
'Consumer advice centres, provided they are sufficiently staffed and qualified, 
should therefore be permitted to handle legal matters. The grant of licences to 
give legal advice comes within the German Länder Governments' competence, 
though20 '. A licence, usuaUy granted to a person versed in law employed in the 
consumer advice centre, is restricted to the field of activity of the consumer 
advice centre and is usually limited to three years21 • 
On account of such a licence, the consumer advice centre of Lower Saxony, 
for instance, in 1976 gave advice in 2100 cases, in Bavaria in 750 cases. In 
Hamburg an increase by about one third to a total of 4000 cases was recorded in 
1977. Legal advice shows a clear upward movemem22. In view of the many cases 
of conflict the consumer faces in business and legal transactions, this number is 
extremely small related to the area served by the consumer advice centres 
concerned. lt has proved a particular impediment in practice that pursuant to 
Art. l, para. l of the second implementing regulation concerning the RBG of 3 
April 1936, consumer advice centres are subject to a ban on advertising, i.e. that 
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they are forbidden to make reference in public notices and communications to 
their giving legal advice23 • 
361 (cc) The analysis of the construction of and practical experience with the RBG 
is not satisfactory from the point of view of consumer policy. There is an urgent 
need for its modification. The AgV and the Verbraucherbeirat attached to the 
Federal Minister of Economics have therefore demanded that, through an 
amendment of the RBG, consumer associations be granted the statutory power 
to give legal advice24 • Against this the Federal Government has given to 
understand that it desires the present legal situation tobe retained and that only 
in individual cases will a licence to give legal advice be granted to consumer 
advice centres2s. 
Present practical experience with the RBG must be critically evaluated from 
the point of view of constitutional law26 • Here a distinction must first be made 
between legal advice for a consideration and gratuitous legal ad vice. As far as it 
is a matter of legal advice for a consideration, the basic right of freedom to 
choose a profession as laid down in Art. 12 Basic Law is concerned. Here it has 
for a long time been established practice that for reasons of public interest the 
pursuit of a profession may be limited27 • lt is therefore constitutionally possible 
that lawyers should monopolise legal advice and the handling of legal matters 
for a consideration and that apart therefrom such an activity, for instance by 
debt collecting agencies, is subject to licence. A construction such as this also 
satisfies the interests of consumer protection since unqualified persons or 
'profiteers' are tobe kept away from legal ad vice. 
The situation is different in the case of gratuitous legal advice. Here the 
constitutional freedom of action as laid down in Art. 2 Basic Law, and freedom 
of opinion, freedom of information and of the press as laid down in Art. 5 Basic 
Law are concerned. According to general constitutional principles, intervention 
must be within the scope of reasonableness28 • The requirement of reasonable-
ness is no doubt satisfied if unqualified persons are tobe kept away from gratu-
itous legal ad vice. This, however, does not apply to gratuitous legal ad vice given 
by qualified persons, specifically trained jurists. It is admissible to introduce a 
licencing procedure, so that unqualified or unreliable persons are kept away 
from gratuitous legal advice by way ofbusiness. On the other hand, if aperson is 
reliable and qualified, a claim tobe granted a licence belongs to him pursuant to 
Section 1, Art. 1 RBG29 • The present practice, according to which a licence is 
granted by the presiding judges of district and regional courts, which creates· 
restrictive conditions in this area, is not tenable under the Constitution. In 
particular, arguments of competition with existing lawyers even in disguised 
form must not be introduced nor should any considerations of professional 
ethics of lawyers be made an element of the licence. The Iicence is merely to 
ensure that legal advice is duly given, so that, for instance, it may be demanded 
that a liability insurance be taken out. This point of view is apparently also 
winning favour with the legislative bodies. In a draft amendment ofthe RBG of 
20 June 1980 (BT-Drucks. 8/4277) Art. 1 §3 is planned tobe supplemented by 
item 8. Pursuant thereto the extrajudicial handling of legal matters involving 
consumers by consumer advice centres is exempted by statute from the require-
ment of a licence. 
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The ban on advertising of legal advice for a consideration may be tenable 
under the Constitution as a regulation on the pursuit of a profession, because it 
is known to apply equally to Iawyers and to other professions concerned with 
legal adviceand legal representation. As regards gratuitous legal advice, there is 
no reason for a ban on advertising. Rather, the constitutionally protected 
freedom of action implies the possibility to advertise a lawful, constitutionally 
protected activity. Advertising is merely subject to the general limitations under 
the law of unfair competition (No. 79). lt is impossible to put the same limits of 
professional ethics on gratuitous authorised legal advice as on legal advice for a 
consideration. 
A special problem emerges with respect to legal .advice given in the press or 
over the radio by way of question and answer columns and the like, which 
according to present practice is said to infringe the RBG. It is true that the con-
stitutionally protected freedom of opinion may be restricted through general 
legislation, but the Federal Constitutional Court has also pointed out that statu-
tory restrictions have tobe interpreted in the light and within the meaning of the 
constitutional guaranty of freedom of opinion and of the press30 • This results in 
a much narrower interpretation of prohibited legal advice than is the current 
practice. Thus newspapers must be entitled to instruct and inform about cases of 
everyday life as this is one aspect oftheir constitutional mandate. In this cont.ext 
it does not matter whether this is done by means of general explanations or in the 
light of a particular case. In what way this particular case must be treated anony-
mously is but a matter of protection of the individual and not of the RBG. 
According to the view held here, there is no reason why newspapers or radio and 
television corporations should not advise and assist consumers in legal matters 
by taking up a particular case, describing possible solutions and indicating legal 
consequences. Special permission is not required, since it is not a matter of legal 
advice subject to a Iicence in the first place (No. 358). 
Finally, a last aspect of the view held here may be mentioned: gratuitous legal 
advice is generally interpreted as being a function of the welfare state (Sozial-
staat), as laid down in Art. 20 of the Basic Law. Schoreit, for instance, has taken 
this view in several publications31 • The Federal Constitutional Court has taken a 
similar view with respect to legal aid32 ; there is no reason why this should not be 
extended to gratuitous legal advice preceding the actual proceedings. The 
welfare state idea gains importance in the construction of acts in compliance 
with constitutional Iaw which considerably restrict or even monopolise a 
function the welfare state is required to perform. To the extent outlined here, 
these restrictions on legal advice do not correspond to the conception of the 
welfare state and are therefore either directly contrary to the constitution or by 
way of construction in line with the constitution have to be reduced to a level 
appropriate to the welfare state. 
2 Reform endeavours 
362 For the above-mentioned considerations of the welfare state, legal advice in 
the Federal Republic of Germany in recent years has become a highly contro-
versial matter33 • The discussion relates not only to consumer protection, but 
generally speaking to legal advice to the poor, for instance concerning family 
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and probate law, matters of landlord and tenant, and problems of labour and 
social law. We shall describe this discussion only so far as matters relevant to 
legal advice to consumers are concerned. 
363 (aa) There have been in existence for some time various legal advice institu-
tions which also, even if not primarily, give information and legal adyice on 
consumer matters, for instance in conjunction with instalment transactions. In 
Hamburg a public legal advice bureau has been in existence since about 1947, 
which in 1974 furnished advice in more than 11 OOOcivil cases34 • Similar bureaux 
have been established in Elmshorn and Lübeck35 • The objections to these 
bureaux raised by lawyers under the RBG are not convincing, since public 
corporations, particularly local authorities, have a comprehensive duty to 
provide social assistance and under Sect. 1, Art. 3 RBG are therefore also 
empowered to give genera11egal advice. 
Other German Länder opted either for mixed-type models or model experi-
ments. In Berlin, for instance, legal ad vice is given by bar agencies (legal advice 
centres of the bar association) and by legal advice centres attached to district 
offices. According to the empirical investigations of legal advice conducted in 
West Berlin, the benefits of public legal advice are taken mostly by the poor, 
while ad vice by bar associations is rather geared to the middle classes36 • A person 
seeking advice incurs no costs, or costs to only a modest extent. Lawyers are 
usually called upon to give advice in order to institute or conduct litigation, 
while this is not so in the case of public legal advice. About one fifth of all cases 
handled· by public ad vice centres or by bar associations are consumer protection 
cases. 
In Hesse, three models have been tested37 • In the case of model 1, local bar 
associations in cooperation with the judicature established legal advice centres 
in the district courts (Amtsgerichte). These centres are staffed by lawyers during 
certain consultation hours. In the case of model 2, the advice centres are staffed 
by retired judges as advisers. In the case of model 3, persons seeking ad vice may 
obtain from the application office of the district court a warrant for ad vice by a 
lawyer. By means of this warrant, the person seeking ad vice may call on a lawyer 
of his choice who, if necessary, will also undertake legal representation. All 
models have in common that they include an agency for preliminary examina-
tion. In the case of advice by lawyers, a small charge is payable by the person 
seeking advice. Past experience has shown that three fifths of all cases originate 
from the area of consumer protection. These figures reveal that there is 
apparently a great need for legal advice to consumers, which is not furnished 
satisfactorily by the existing institutions. However, the figures ascertained to 
date are far too few for a probability analysis. 
There are still other model experiments and alternatives of legal advice to the 
consumer which have not so far produced any exact figures concerning their 
activity and therefore provide hardly any indications of the need for and inten-
sity of advice. The consumer often does not even know of the advice centres 
unless, as in Hamburg, they are long-standing institutions. 
364 (bb) The reform discussion in the Federal Republic of Germany has soon 
focused on the issue of whether gratuitous legal advice should be provided by 
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lawyers or public advice centres. Various models have been submitted. The 
German Bar Association has suggested extrajudicial legal aid38 • According to 
that model, legal advice is to be furnished exclusively by lawyers. Persons of 
moderate means are free to use it and may upon presentation of a warrant 
obtain legal advice from a lawyer oftheir choice. Legal fees are paid by the state. 
The test of whether the applicant needs ad vice is performed by a lawyer. Ad vice 
is then given in central information bureaux of lawyers (in big cities) or in law 
firms. 
According to other proposals the existing public advice centres should be 
extended throughout the Federal Republic. These advice centres are planned to 
be set up and paid for by local authorities. Advice may be given by people 
working in an honorary capacity, ·which reduces the cost. Public legal ad vice 
aims more at offsetting social inequities39 • Its intention is not the preparation of 
a lawsuit and representation, but social assistance to the person seeking advice. 
365 (cc) Meanwhile a bill by the Christian Democratic Union concerning extra-
judicial legal advice and representation of low-income citizens and a govern-
ment bill on Legal Advice have been submitted to the Federal Parliament40 • It is 
worth mentioning that both bills are based on a model of advice by lawyers, so 
that here the professional interest of lawyers prevailed over the concern of 
public advice centres to offset social inequities. 
The government bill of 17 August 1979 on a Beratungshilfegesetz (Legal 
Advice Act) tries to summarise the present discussion42 • The bill defines extra-
judicial advice as a task of the welfare state. Legal advice is not limited to 
matters of consumer protection. Institutionally it shall be provided by govern-
mental agencies (district courts) in cooperation with lawyers. Legal advice is 
usually to be given by lawyers, unless the district court is able to handle the 
matter. The public advice centres of the city states of Hamburg, Berlin and 
Bremen will be retained. Usually governmental agencies, namely the clerk ofthe 
district court, will decide whether or not to grant gratuitous legal advice. The 
person seeking advice receives a warrant with which he may call on a lawyer of 
his choice. He has to pay a lump sumof DM 10, while the other costs will be 
refunded to the lawyer by the state according to a scale of fees. The standard 
lawyer's fee is DM 50, which serves to facilitate accounting. In urgent cases the 
lawyer himself may establish the entitlement. 
Art. 2 of the bill defines 'Beratungshilfe' as advice to a person seeking help 
and, so far as this is necessary for appropriate assistance, representation. Repre-
sentation includes all fields of civil law, i.e. also the civil-law provisions on 
consumer protection and, in addition, the law of unfair competition which, in 
line with the ideas about reform, is to be revised to afford better consumer 
protection (No. 123). Moreover, Beratungshilfe is granted in matters relating to 
administrative law which also comprise many areas of consumer protection. 
Beratungshilfe may be claimed only by such private persons as owing to their 
financial circumstances cannot reasonably be expected to use their own funds in 
paying for the services of a lawyer. Art. 3 then specifies the basis of computation 
applicable to Beratungshilfe (double the standard rate of social assistance plus 
surcharges). 
The bill must be criticised in that it conforms too much to the model of advice 
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by lawyers and puts too great an emphasis on the consideration due for legal 
ad vice. Legal advice aiming at offsetting social inequities is not intended43 • The 
status quo of the present public legal advice centres is not affected, but other 
models of public legal advice are contemporaneously rendered impossible 
thereby. We regret to say that gratuitous altruistic legal advice is not dealt with 
in the bill at all, but remains subject to a licence within the narrow limits of the 
RBG. 
The bill was passed on 18 J une 1980 (BGBl I 689) with minor amendments (the 
lump-sum consideration was raised to DM 20). lt came into force on 1 January 
1981. 
III CONSUMER COMPLAINTS 
1 Generalities 
366 If a consumer wants to make a complaint connected with the purchase of a 
product or the use of a service, he may of course turn to his contracting party 
asking him to remedy the cause of the complaint. The more he is advised and 
experienced in legal matters, the greater the emphasis with which he will assert 
his claim and the greater his chances of success. Whether the entrepreneur will 
accept the complaint, take notice of it in the first place, cooperate with the 
consumer, and offer or refuse to settle the matter at his expense is entirely within 
his discretion. In a conflict situation (such is the logic of German law) it is the 
consumer who has to enforce his rights in court. Generally speaking, he cannot 
use the services of a governmental authority to safeguard his interests. 
However, this liberal model of law enforcement in practice amounts to the 
consumer de facto being deprived of his rights44 , for two reasons. The consumer 
is isolated as regards his problems and complaints and is usually faced with an 
entrepreneur who commands expert knowledge and is versed in law and who in 
addition can take the advice of and may be represented by his associations, 
chambers and other organisations. The alleged equality of rights results in an 
inequality and asymmetry of law enforcement. On the other hand, it is a legal 
fiction in Germany that all conflicts have to be taken to court and be finally 
decided in court. A result similar to that may be achieved through complaints 
procedures and conciliation schemes, as have been in existence for the settle-
ment of disputes for a long time in the area of trade and industry. 
Consumer complaints outside court proceedings - which as an ultimate 
measure must of course be retained - can be dealt with effectively only if the 
consumer is freed from his role as an isolated individual, if representatives of his 
interests participate in procedures for the settlement of a dispute, and if a 
speedy, low-cost and effective procedure out of court is made available. Thus 
the effective handling of consumer complaints requires a developed complaints 
and conciliation system with consumer representation on the principle of parity. 
In its Second Consumer Report the Federal Government says: 'The Federal 
Government welcomes this establishment (complaints and conciliation boards) 
helping the consumer in many cases to enforce his claims without subjecting him 
to the risk of court fees. In its view the most expedient model of such concilia-
tion boards is that comprising one representative each of the suppliers' and 
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consumers' part and one neutral chairman'45 • lt is regrettable, though, that the 
Federal Government should consider the staffing of these boards an the 
principle of parity to be only expedient, but not a prime necessity of consumer 
protection. 
2 Practical significance of complaints and conciliation boards 
367 There are a !arge number of conciliation and complaints boards in the Federal 
Republic, whose activities have not so far been studied systematically46 • 
Chambers of industry and commerce have set up these complaints boards for 
their districts. A similar thing has happened in the area of chambers of handi-
crafts (Handwerkskammern), for instance in the case of dry cleaning and the 
motor vehicle craft. Schoreit reports that in February 1976 there were 42 com-
plaints boards attached to 36 chambers of industry and commerce47 • According 
to the statements of von Falckenstein in mid-1977, there were 46 such boards in 
40 districts served by chambers48 • The German Industrial and Trade Association 
in mid-1978 reported that in 1977 20 000 consumer complaints had been 
handled by these complaints boards49 • 
The organisation of these institutions varies. To standardise their structure, 
the German lndustrial and Trade Association developed some models which 
provide for an institutionalisation of complaints boards in various patterns. 
They range from the assignment of a clerk to handle complaints including 
unilateral negotiation with the trader and the consumer, to a talk with both 
contracting parties present, to a stronger institutionalisation by a three-member 
conciliation board. These conciliation boards often, though not imperatively, 
include consumer representatives as advisory members. Reportedly, these 
boards achieved amicable settlements in 700/o of all cases. Complaints relate 
primarily to questions of quality, warranties and liability. 
In the services sector, the associations or chambers and guilds concerned have 
set up complaints boards. The German Länder associations of the Association 
of Dry Clearters together with consumer advice centres have set up in the 
majority of the German Länder 'Complaints Boards for Dry Cleaning 
Complaints', which are for the most part staffed by representatives of consumer 
ad vice centres and dry cleaners and by one sworn expert. They are able to handle 
complaints in a speedy and expert way. The consumer may be given his right 
without having to obtain an expensive laboratory opinion. Such complaints 
boards exist, for instance, in Hamburg, Berlin, Bavaria and Hesse (the latter 
handles 2500 complaints annually). 
Another system of complaints boards exists in the motor vehicle craft50 • 
Apparently most of the regional guilds have set up such complaints boards. 
Following unsuccessful negotiations between consumer and trader, negotia-
tions are conducted before a commission of five which consists of one 
chairman, one representative each of the ADAC, DAT, KfZ-lnnung and the 
TÜV. The awards are binding upon guild members. However, not all 
workshops are members of the guild. The extent to which the awards imply a 
binding decision at the expense of the consumer has not yet been clarified. In the 
standard form contract conditions (No. 228) of the motor vehicle craft it is 
assumed that complaints boards may take a binding decision on the existence or 
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absence of defects. Thus the complaints board practically acts as an arbiter. 
Such a clause curtails the customer's possibility of enforcing his rights under 
contract law and may be ineffective under the AGBG (No. 264)51 • This legal 
issue has not so far been clarified. 
Lastly, we may refer to reform endeavours within the framework of the law of 
unfair competition. The bill to amend the UWG (No. 123) is intended to 
introduce a new Art. 27a providing for the set-up of conciliation boards 
attached to chambers of industry and commerce for the settlement of infringe-
ments of the law of unfair competition52 • If a consumer or consumer association 
appeals to a conciliation board, it shall be staffed by one chairman who must be 
a qualified lawyer, while the other members must be appointed from among 
traders and consumers on a par basis. In the Federal Government's view this 
initiative is based on the positive experience gained with conciliation boards 
attached to chambers of industry and commerce53 • As, under the law of unfair 
competition, in future an individual consumer shall also be entitled to make a 
claim for damages (No. 123), the Federal Government deems it necessary to 
allow also consumers and their associations access to conciliation boards. At the 
same time this is intended to back up the boards in recognition of their 
successful activity. This initiative is certainly a step in the right direction, 
although in a very confined sector of consumer law. For the bulk of consumer 
complaints this initiative is of no practical consequence. 
Overall, it may be noted that in the Federal Republic the handling of 
consumer complaints in accordance with more recent trends of consumer 
protection is characterised by very wide gaps, lack of uniformity and fragmenta-
tion. In many areas there are no institutionalised conciliation schemes at all. 
Existing complaints and conciliation boards are staffed on a genuine par basis in 
very few areas only, for instance in the dry cleaning trade. Often the consumer is 
not familiar with the activities of complaints and conciliation boards and, 
moreover, these boards are locally and functionally separated. Under the 
existing law they lack jurisdiction anyhow, unless they act as arbitrators which, 
however, results in a curtailment of the consumer's legal position. 
Overall, it seems necessary to check the disorderly development of complaint 
procedures and conciliation boards and to strive for a unification ofthe boards 
staffed on a par basis. Moreover, it seems necessary that the state gives appro-
priate financial support to these conciliation boards. This is the only way they 
can be independent as institutions. 
IV JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER CLAIMS 
1 Principles 
368 We have seen that a consumer is compelled to enforce his claims in court if he 
has no other way to get his right or to achieve a satisfactory compromise with the 
entrepreneur. Formally, anyconsumer has access to the civil courts havingjuris-
diction in these matters, provided that his rights are affected. In the case of 
breach of contract, claims under a guaranty, questions of the law of torts and 
similar problems he may go to court. As the value in dispute in consumer 
complaints usually does not exceed DM 3000, the consumer must bring an 
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action in the district court (Amtsgericht) where there is no compulsion to be 
represented by a lawyer. 
This formal protection of legal rights has a very different effect in practice if 
we follow sociological studies of the actual working of the civil procedure54 • To 
begin with, a striking fact is that in matters relating to consumer law consumers 
practically never act as plaintiffs, but in about 95% of all cases as defendants. 
Suppliers obviously use court proceedings as an instrument to enforce their 
justified or unjustified claims against the consumer. While in the proceedings a 
consumer may plead his rights and may, for instance, set up defective delivery or 
breach of contract as a bar to an action for payment, we have already seen that 
these rights are often denied to him or restricted by means of exemption clauses 
(No. 203) or specific types of financing (Nos. 331, 335). Practically, the courts 
are used as <lebt collecting agencies by suppliers who naturally may bring their 
superior economic power and better legal 'know-how' to bear on the consumer 
who is isolated here. 
Furthermore, for the consumer law enforcement and prosecution is compli-
cated by a number of legal and factual problems. One such bar is the risk of 
Iitigation costs55 • lt is a principle under German procedural law that the losing 
party in addition to his own costs has to bear all the costs incurred by the 
opposing party, for instance such party's lawyer's fees. If the services of an 
expert are engaged and the case is taken to a lower as weil as to a higher court, it 
is very likely that the litigation costs the consumer will have to bear will be 
approximately equal to the claim prosecuted. Only if he is successful is he not 
liable for costs, and even then he has to bear the risk of collection; if the 
condemned debtor fails to pay, the consumer is not only unable to enforce his 
claim, but is also left to settle his costs. Even if he is successful in the first 
instance, for example before the district court, he may also against his will be 
forced tobe a party to proceedings before the court of appeal. If he loses the case 
then, he has to bear all costs inclusive of those of the lawsuit he won in the first 
instance, unless it is an exceptional case as provided for in Art. 97, para. 2 Code 
of Civil Procedure, which is applied in practice very rarely. 
As was mentioned before, the consumer need not consult a lawyer before the 
district court, but will require a lawyer's assistance precisely if he is not himself 
versed in law or if the other party is represented by a lawyer. Before taking the 
case, the lawyer will usually request a fee, which he is entitled to do under the 
existing law. Initially, the conduct of litigation is entirely at the consumer's risk. 
This selective effect of the liability to pay the costs practically means that the 
consumer will not only refrain from instituting proceedings himself, but will 
often not enter into proceedings instituted against him and therefore will give in 
of his own 'free will', particularly in cases of doubt which cannot be resolved 
through legal advice. Thus, the existing law of civil procedure bars consumers, 
especially poor consumers, from access to the courts, which is in sharp contrast 
to the idea of social justice56 • We may be inclined to interpret the introduction of 
legal aid (Armenrecht) as a certain correction. And so it happened that the 
Federal Constitutional Court emphasised that legal aid is an expression of the 
care of the welfare state for the socially weak plaintiff or defendant57 • In reality, 
the practical handling of legal aid intensifies and aggravates social discrimi-
nation in civil proceedings. Such legal aid is available only to poor persons who 
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are unable without detriment to their own and their family's subsistence to bear 
the costs of the proceedings. Before legal aid is granted, the chances of success 
of an action are examined. If they are denied, legal aid will not be granted and 
prosecution is practically impossible. Legal aid means only that the assisted is 
exempted from his costs and that a lawyer is assigned to him for provisional 
gratuitous safeguarding of his rights. As such a lawyer, the so-called Armenan-
walt (poor men's lawyer), is paid a Jower fee than the normal lawyer 
representing a party in proceedings, successful and experienced lawyers are, of 
course, not interested in taking such a case. Pursuant to Art. 116a, law students 
having passed the first state examination may be assigned. The grant of legal aid 
does not affect the Iiability to reimburse the costs, so that if the poor man loses 
his case he has to bear the costs incurred by the opposing party, Art. 117 Code of 
Civil Procedure. A reform has taken effect as from 1 January 1981 (No. 370). 
On the whole, a consumer seeking ad vice or being in need of legal protection 
is in a very disadvantageous situation: on a true assessment ofthe cost situation 
and the risk of having to pay them, he must generally be advised against legal 
proceedings. Adequate complaints and conciliation boards are available to him 
in exceptional cases only. He may obtain legal advice only on restrictive condi-
tions. The most serious gap in consumer protection in the Federal Republic of 
Germany seems tobe in this area and is apparently not attributable to the Jack of 
consumer protectioh acts. The reform movement has tried to remedy some of 
the most flagrant grievances without any striking success so far. 
2 Prohibition of jurisdiction clauses 
369 In the past, prosecution had been rendered difficult for consumers on account 
of the use of so-called jurisdiction clauses (Gerichtsstandsklauseln). In civil 
proceedings as in the general Jaw of contract the principle of freedom of 
contract applied concerning the agreement of local jurisdiction. In Standard 
form contracts, companies used to agree that the courts at their place of business 
should have jurisdiction even if the consumer's domicile was elsewhere or the 
contract had been concluded or had tobe performed in a different place. Owing 
to the grievances that occurred and the actual curtailment of the consumer's 
possibilities of enforcing his rights, the legislator issued a prohibition of juris-
diction clauses under Art. 38 Code of Civil Procedure effective 1 April 197458 • 
Provisions similar thereto are included in Arts. 6a and b AbzG with respect to 
instalment sales and contracts coming under the law of instalment transactions 
(No. 326). Jurisdiction agreements are no longer admissible unless one of the 
parties is a trader or a public-law entity. Thus, according to the consumer 
protection concept we have developed above, all consumers are protected 
against such jurisdiction clauses (No. 18). In addition, small traders (Minder-
kaufleute) also come under the protection of the law. Thus the general 
provisions on local jurisdiction which cannot be changed by contract remain in 
force for the benefit oftheconsumer. If theconsumer is sued, theaction must be 
brought either at his domicile or at the place of performance of the contract, 
Arts. 13 and 29 Code of Civil Procedure. In the case of torts, the law of unfair 
competition or product Iiability, the court in whose district the act was 
committed has jurisdiction, Art. 32 Code of Civil Procedure, Art. 24 UWG. lf a 
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consumer is the plaintiff, the court at the contractual place of performance has 
jurisdiction. A contractual arrangement concerning the place of performance to 
the detriment of the consumer is not possible. However, the Iaw itself does not 
designate the place of performance. Rather, this follows from the type of 
contractual obligation59 • Contracts of sale usually have tobe performed at the 
buyer's domicile, unless fulfilment of the debt at the seller's address has been 
agreed upon by way of exception. Hence, in the case of mail-order purchases the 
place of performance is the consumer's domicile. In the case of services the place 
of performance is the place where the service is to be performed, for instance 
motor vehicle repairs in the place where the motor vehicle is repaired, also if this 
is not at the consumer's domicile, andin the case of travel contracts in the travel 
organiser's place of business (No. ·257), because this is where the travel services 
are tobe performed. In the case ofinstalment transactions the situation is more 
favourable to the consumer, since the consumer's domicile is always the place of 
jurisdiction irrespective of the place of performance. In the case of other types 
of consumer credit, there is no uniformity60 • Assuming that the credit is tobe 
repaid at the bank's location, the place of jurisdiction for such actions will be 
the bank's place of business, not the borrower's domicile. By contrast, 
assuming that pursuant to Art. 269 Civil Code the place of performance is 
usually the debtor's domicile, that is in this case the consumer's domicile, and 
that Art. 270 only speaks of payment but not place of performance, the court at 
the debtor's domicile has jurisdiction. With respect to insurance contracts, Art. 
36 of the VVG includes a special provision. The place of performance for the 
premium is the insured's domicile, so that he must be sued for payment of 
overdue premiums in that place. The insurance payment, however, must be 
effected at the insurance company's place of business. 
On the whole, the prohibition of jurisdiction clauses has resulted in an 
improvement of the consumer's rights, particularly since the courts must ex 
officio pay attention to this prohibition in debt enforcement proceedings andin 
the main procedure. However, the legal position is not completely satisfactory, 
since in view of the regulation on the place of performance a consumer may be 
compelled to prosecute a claim, he it as a plaintiff or as a defendant, also in 
places other than his domicile. 
3 Other reform endeavours 
370 Under procedural law there are some reform endeavours that are not directed 
at consumers. The intention of the so-called Vereinfachungsnovelle (Amend-
ment to Speed Up Civi~ Procedures), which will not be dealt with in detail here, 
was primarily to speed up court proceedings and to make hearings a central issue 
again61 • Such speeding up of procedure also, of course, benefits the consumer's 
interest in law enforcement. Debt enforcement proceedings (Mahnverfahren) 
which in the past were handled by suppliers mostly for debt collectiori have been 
mitigated in that the former term 'order for payment' (Zahlungsbefehl) was 
changed into· 'dunning note' (Mahnbescheid) whereby the misleading 
impression is avoided that the debtor (the consumer) is bound by law to effect 
such payment. Moreover, the instruction as to the right to object has been 
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worded more clearly and a form to exercise such a right has been attached62 • 
Another reform is beginning to appear in outline in the Iaw of unfair competi-
tion (Chapter 4, No. 123). In line therewith, consumer associations shall be 
enabled to judicially enforce combined claims for damages in competition 
litigation. The proceeds - expenses deducted - shall be distributed to those 
concerned who assigned their claims. Pursuant to Art. 13c UWG bill, the 
association does not require special permission under the RBG (No. 358), but is 
subject to supervision· to prevent abuses and may advertise the possibility of 
assignment of claims only to a limited extent. 
Interested circles have severely criticised this type of collective action for the 
sake of improving law enforcement by individuals63 • lt is feared that it will 
denature legal proceedings, invite abuse by dubious associations and have a 
denouncing effect as a result of the advertising of collective enforcement by 
assignment. Such criticism is not convincing, though. lt disregards that 
consumer claims are often not asserted owing to the insignificance ofthe loss or 
the Jack of knowledge of those concerned. That is why there is a need for 
col/ective enf orcement. Rath er, it is feared that the proposals of the bill are little 
practicable, for instance because of the requirement of written assignment, the 
difficulty of ascertaining the damage and the problems involved in the burden of 
proof64 • Also, collective enforcement fails in the most imporrant loss-entailing 
event, namely damage resulting from entering into a contract (No. 119). Here 
the association should be able collectively to enforce claims for rescission 
of contract and for repayment. That would be a genuine reform of law 
enforcement. 
Further reforms, the outlines of which have meanwhile become quite clear, 
relate to the matter of who is to pay the costs. There is agreement among those 
discussing legal policy to the effect that the present legal aid should be improved 
by procedural assistance65 • Precisely how this claim is to be designed is still 
uncertain. Moreover, it is being considered whether the bars to access to the 
courts originating particularly from liability to pay the costs should be 
abolished. Thus, it is being discussed whether to carry on legal proceedings at a 
'free-fare tariff' or to introduce a legal expenses insurance66 • Both proposals 
were rejected, though, because of the cost avalanche that it is feared would be 
caused, and have no chance of being realised. The German Lawyers' Associa-
tion in 1976 examined possible alternatives and suggested only very few 
amendments67 • While it suggested some changes of the law regulating litigation 
costs in the interest of more effective law enforcement, a free-fare tariff and 
comprehensive legal expenses insurance were rejected. The present system of 
legal aid is to be replaced by a system of Verfahrenshilfe (aid in proceedings 
including financial assistance). 
A bill by the Federal Government of mid-1979 on an Act on Aid concerning 
Costs of Litigation (Prozeßkostenhilfe)68 puts the present legal aid system on a 
new basis. For one thing, access to legal protection will be facilitated. Financial 
assistance in bringing actions is put on a broader basis. Also persons earning a 
higher income will be entitled to claim aid concerning costs of Iitigation in 
accordance with their means. If they are unable to defray the costs of litigation 
incurred from their income or property, they will be granted aid concerning 
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costs of litigation concurrently with an order for payment by reasonable instal-
ments (right to pay by instalments). Another point is that the risk of litigation 
costs is tobe reduced to a reasonable measure if the case is lost. Regardless of the 
amount of deferred or advanced fees, the obligation to pay by instalments is 
limited to 48 months. Overall, everyone will enjoy legal protection irrespective 
of the value in dispute and without the need to exercise undue restraint by a 
thrifty though appropriate way of life. 
Overall, the bill is a step in the right direction even if it concerns only to a 
Iimited extent problems of consumer protection; all civil-law disputes come 
under the bill. However, in two instances the bill is open to doubts. The old 
regulation is retained (No. 368) according to which, if a case is lost, the person 
entitled to claim aid concerning costs of litigation as the losing party has to 
refund the winning party's full costs. This can involve a considerable risk to the 
consumer, particularly in disputed legal issues. Also, the assigned lawyer 
receives lower than normal fees. In actual fact this amounts to discrimination 
against the 'poor' party to the litigation. The competent parliamentary bodies 
have meanwhile passed the bill; the Act was promulgated on 13 June 1980 
(BGBL 1 677) and took effect as from l J anuary 1981. J udicial examination of 
the chances of success of an action will be continued, which practically results in 
a curtailment of legal rights. 
4 Further considerations regarding consumer protection in court 
proceedings 
371 The present reform discussion has still taken too little account of the special 
interests of consumer protection. Here new ideas are necessary which are known 
to us from the Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries. As these matters are 
hardly being discussed at all yet, we can note down a few key words only. 
- lt should be considered whether or not consumer complaints can be dealt 
with in simplified legal proceedings without appeal69 • lt should not be prohibited 
to consult a lawyer but, as in labour law, there should be no reimbursement of 
lawyer's fees. This would mean the introduction of a stnall-claims procedure 
into German law which does not exist so far. 
- I t should be considered how far the staffing of a district court in consumer 
matters could be extended similarly to that of a labour court to include one 
member each oftraders and consumers. This would ensure equal representation 
of consumers in the procedure70 • 
- The procedure should be preceded by conciliation proceedings to enable 
settlement out of court. If conciliation boards staffed on a par basis do exist, the 
court should of its own initiative refer the dispute to such boards. 
- In the case of intricate technical questions, it should be possible to consult 
an expert at the expense of the state and not at the expense of the losing party. 
- lt should be considered how far consumer associations are able to take up 
consumer actions71 • This has been impossible so far because ofthe provisions of 
the RBG72 • If debt-collecting agencies may obtain licences for the benefit of 
traders, a similar possibility should be considered for the sake of legal symmetry 
with respect to the prosecution of consumer complaints. This concerns in 
particular more intricate cases of basic significance to legal progress. Collective 
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law enforcement under the law of unfair competition and under the law of 
standard form contract conditions could be supplemented in a meaningful way 
at the level of individual law enforcement which often involves matters of a 
similarly complex nature. 
NOTES 
1. Cf. on this especially concerning the UWG Schricker, GRUR Int. [1973], 
p. 694ff, as well as the legal facts in v. Falckenstein, Die Bekämpfung 
unlauterer Geschäftspraktiken durch Verbraucherverbände [1977], pp. 
50ff, 99ff, and in the Entwurf einer UWG-Novelle, ET-Drucksache 
312145, p. 9ff. 
2. Simitis, Verbraucherschutz - Schlagwort oder Rechtsprinzip? [1976], 
p. 301; Hummel-Liljegren, 'Der Bundestag sollte einen Verbraucher-
beauftragten haben', in Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 24/78, p. 24ff; 
Reich/Tonner/Wegener, Verbraucher und Recht [1976], p. 210 (scepti-
cally); Däubler, 'Konsumentenombudsmann und Verbraucherselbsthilfe', 
in Duden, Gerechtigkeit in der Industriegesellschaft [1972], p. 57ff. 
3. Reich, NJW [1978], p. 513ff. 
4. Schoreit, Rechtsberatung unentgeltlich, ed. 2 [1976], p. 67ff; Reich/ 
Tonner/Wegener, op. cit. (note 2), p. 232ff; Altenhaff/Busch/ 
Kampmann, Kommentar zum Rechtsberatungsgesetz, ed. 4 [1978], p. 7f 
and below item 361. Reifner JZ [1976], 509ff. 
5. Altenhoff, op. eil. (note 4), p. 11. 
6. Altenhoff, op. cit. (note 4), p. 13. 
7. BGH NJW [1956], p. 591. 
8. Altenhoff, op. cit. (note 4), p. 15. 
9. Schoreit, ZVP (1977], p. 117. 
10. BGH NJW [1956], p. 591; Bayr OLG AnwBl [1964], p. 143. 
11. Altenhoff, op. cit. (note 4), footnote 7, p. 16f. 
12. Altenhoff, op. cit. (note 4), p. 27. 
13. Altenhoff, op. eil. (note 4), p. 26. 
14. Altenhoff, op. cit. (note 4), p. 8. 
15. Cf. Schoreit, ZVP [1977], p. 117f. 
16. Cf. Schoreit, ZVP [1977], p. 114. 
17. Cf. above No. 6 as weil as Schoreit, ZVP [1977], p. 119. 
18. Objections are raised by Altenhoff, op. cit. (note 4), footnote 7, p. 155f. 
19. Objections are raised by Altenhoff, op. cit. (note 4), p. 158 with reference 
to the feature of an association established 'on the basis of professional 
interests'; against this Schoreit ZVP [1977], p. 120. 
20. BT-Drucksache 7/4181, item III 5.9. 
21. Cf. Schoreit, ZVP [1977], p. 120. 
22. Schoreit, ZVP [1977], p. 118. 
23. Altenhoff, op. cit. (note 4), p. 26lf. 
24. Schoreit, ZVP [1977], p. 121. 
25. 2. Verbraucherbericht, ET-Drucksache 7/4181, item III 5.9. 
375 
26. Cf. Schneider, MDR [1976], p. lff; Reifner, JZ [1976], p. 509. 
27. Cf. Reich, Markt und Recht [1977], p. 94ff. 
28. Reich, op. cit. (note 27), p. ! !Off. 
29. Undecided Altenhoff, op. cit. (note 4), p. 6lf. 
30. BVerfGE 7, 198; 12, 113; 25, 256. 
31. Schoreit, op. eit. (note 4), p. 88ff. 
32. BVerfG NJW [1974], p. 229ff; Eike Schmidt, JZ [1972], p. 681. 
33. On this Baumgärtel, Gleicher Zugang zum Recht für alle [1976]; Rasehorn 
(ed.), Rechtsberatung als Lebenshi/je [1979]; Schoreit (note 4), through-
out; Reifner/Gorges, Alternativen zur Rechtsberatung [1978), unpub-
lished manuscript of the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin from a general 
viewpoint. 
34. Schoreit, op. cit. (note 24), p. 113ff. 
35. Schoreit, op. eit. (note 24), p. 131 f. 
36. Reifner, 'Unentgeltliche Rechtsberatung in West-Berlin', in: Rechts-
bedürfnis und Rechtshi/je, ed. by E. Blankenburg [1978), p. 43ff; 
Schoreit, op. eil. (note 24), p. l 18ff. 
37. On this Löber, ZRP [1977], p. 44ff. 
38. In Baumgärtel, op. cit. (note 33), p. 35. 
39. Cf. Schoreit, op. eit. (note 4), p. 107. 
40. BT-Drucksache 8/1713. 
41. BR-Drucks. 404179; on this Baumgärtel, ZRP [1979), p. 302ff. 
42. A critical evaluation showing an alternative proposal is included in: 
Blankenburg et al., Beratungshilfegesetz (Kritik am Gesetzentwurf der 
Bundesregierung und Alternativentwurf mit Begründung) [ 1980). 
43. On this Reifner/Gorges, op. cit. (note 33). 
44. On this Wassermann, Der soziale Zivilprozeß [1978). 
45. BT-Drucksache 7/4181, item II 3.10. 
46. On this in general v. Hippe!, Verbraucherschutz, ed. 2 [1979], p. 130ff; 
id., RabelsZ [ 1976), p. 531 f; a sceptical view is taken by Similis, Verbrau-
cherschutz [1975], p. 167f. 
47. Schoreit, ZVP [1977], p. 413f. 
48. v. Falckenstein, Die Bekämpfung unlauterer Geschäftspraktiken durch 
Verbraucherverbände [ 1977), p. l 69ff. 
49. FAZ of 19 September 1978. 
50. v. Falckenstein, op. eit. (note 48), p. 175, cf. also the report by 
Nöthe/Nordwig, 'Die Arbeit der Schiedsstellen des Kfz-Handels und 
Gewerbes', Mitt. der VBZ/NRW 5-6 [1978), p. IOff. 
51. Ulmer/Brandner/Hensen, Komm. z. AGBG, ed. 3 [1978], appendix 
§§9-11, ref. 615; Schoreit, ZVP [1977], p. 114. 
52. BT-Drucksache 8/2145, p. 30. 
53. op. cit. (note 52). 
54. Wassermann et al., Menschen vor Gericht [1979). 
55. Grunsky, Gutachten Azurn 51. DJT [1976], p. A 7ff; Baumgärtel, op. cit. 
(note 33), p. 121ff. 
56. Rasehorn, Recht und Klassen [1974]; Wassermann, Der soziale Zivil-
prozeß [1978]; Bender/Schumacher, Erfolgsbarrieren vor Gericht [1980). 
57. BVerfG NJW [1974], p. 229; NJW [1979], p. 2608 (2609). 
376 
58. Löwe, NJW [1974], p. 473. 
59. On this in detail the legal commentaries. 
60. v. Marschall, Gutachten zur Reform des finanzierten Abzahlungskaufes 
[1978], p. 209ff - including an evaluation under legal policy aspects. 
61. Hartmann, NJW [1978], p. 1457. Cf. also the criticism of Blankenburg 
under legal sociology aspects, JZ [1979], p. 216ff. 
62. Franszki, NJW [1979], p. 9 (14). Büchel, NJW [1979], p. 945. 
63. Michaeli, GRUR [1979], p. 8ff. 
64. Reich, ZRP [1978], p. IOOff; Stein, ZVP [1979], p. 29ff. 
65. Trocker (note 55), p. B 67ff. 
66. Cf. Gutachten Grunsky, 51. DJT ( 1976], pp. A 22ff, 51 ff. 
67. NJW [1976], p. 2004. 
68. BT-Drucksache 8/3068; on this Kollhosser, ZRP [1979], p. 297ff. 
69. v. Hippe!, op. cit. (note 46), p. 105ff. 
70. Cf. Reich/Tonner/Wegener (note 7), p. 255. 
71. Cf. in the UWG the reform endeavours, Nos. l l 9ff, 370 which do not 
apply, though, in relation to the majority of cases. 
72. Stürner, JZ [1978], p. 699. 
377 
List of Important Acts and 
Orders 
Numbers given are paragraph numbers. 
Abzahlungsgesetz (Act on Instalment 
Sales), 17, 103, 112, 116, 226, 298, 
322-330, 334, 335, 338, 344, 348, 356a, 
369 
Arzneimittelgesetz (Drugs Act), 58, 66, 
98, 100, 110, 124, 128, 131, 134, 137, 
147-158, 163, 164, 180-183, 185, 186, 
190, 191, 193 
Auslands-Investmentgesetz (Act on 
Foreign Investments), 126 
Außenwirtschaftsgesetz (Foreign Trade 
and Payments Act), 163 
Bausparkassengesetz (Act on Building 
Societies), 283-286, 288, 307, 308 
Beratungshilfegesetz (Legal Advice Act), 
365 
Brotgesetz (Bread Act), 55 
Bundesdatenschutzgesetz (Federal Data 
Protection Act), 355 
Bundesfernstraßengesetz (Act on Federal 
Trunk Roads), 102b 
Bundessozialhilfegesetz (Federal Act on 
National Assistance), 189 
Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (Civil Code), 
24, 68, 71-74, 103, 115, 122, 132, 134, 
165, 173, 175, 177, 17\1, 180, 183, 185, 
187, 188, 194, 201-205, 208, 210, 212, 
213, 216-219, 233, 236, 237, 240, 243, 
245-248, 252-256, 259, 261, 268, 280, 
286, 291, 298, 300, 307, 312, 317, 319, 
329, 331, 333, 335, 336, 338, 342, 344, 
346, 347, 350, 351, 354, 355, 356, 356a, 
369 
Butterverordnung (Butter Order), 47 
Diätverordnung (Diet Order), 53 
378 
Eichgesetz (Weights and Measures Act), 
40, 42, 64, 65, 67, 68, 85, 127 
Energiegesetz (Energy Act), 33 
Fertigpackungsverordnung (Act on Pre-
packed Goods), 42, 64, 65, 67 
Fleischverordnung (Meat Order), 49 
Fruchtsaftverordnung (Fruit Juice 
Order), 51 
Geflügelhygienegesetz (Poultry Meat 
Hygiene Act), 47 
Gerätesicherheitsgesetz (Act on Safety of 
Appliances) 59, 128, 159-164, 171, 180, 
196 
Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb 
(Act Prohibiting UnfairCompetition), 6, 
16, 21, 22, 30, 41, 68, 70, 79-87, 89, 90, 
92-94, 97, 101, 103-105, 107, 108, 114, 
115, 118, 119, 122, 123, 125-127, 239, 
288, 293-295, 303-305, 317, 324, 367, 
369 
Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschrän-
kungen (Act Prohibiting Restraints of 
Competition), 25-30, 33-35, 37, 39, 72, 
91, 126, 227, 25 l, 268, 275, 276, 292, 
345 
Gesetz über das Kreditwesen (Act on 
Supervision of the Banking Business), 
124, 188, 282, 307, 308, 345, 353 
Gesetz über die Werbung mit Heilmitteln 
(Act on Advertising of Drugs), 98, 100, 
101, 110 
Gesetz über Kapitalanlagegesellschaften 
(Act on Investment Companies), 289 
Gesetz über Prozeßkostenhilfe (Act on 
Aid concerning Costs of Litigation), 370 
Gesetz über Reiseveranstaltungsverträge 
(Travel Contract Act), 62, 103, 194, 247, 
248, 262 
Gesetz zum Schutz der Teilnehmer am 
Fernunterricht (Correspondence Course 
ProtectionAct), 61, 100, 103, 113, 116, 
194, 197-199, 258-262a, 267, 298, 335 
Gesetz zur Bekämpfung der Wirtschafts-
kriminalität (Act to Fight Economic 
Criminality), 24, 346 
Gesetz zur Regelung des Rechts der 
Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen 
(Standard Form Contracts A(:t), 6, 9, 
16-18, 20-22, 30, 32, 118, 173, 194,203, 
206, 208-216, 218, 219, 223-226, 
228-234, 236-238, 250, 251, 254, 
255-260, 261a-274, 286, 292-299, 301, 
305, 308, 309, 311-319, 335, 337, 338, 
355, 356 
Gesetz zur Sicherung der Stabilität und 
des Wachstums der Wirtschaft (Act on 
Stability and Economic Growth), 23 
Gewerbeordnung (Industrial Code), 112, 
113, 131, 353 
Grundgesetz (Basic Law), 7, II, 31, 43, 
70, 72, 78, 81, 122, 138, 291, 358, 3()1 
Hackfleischverordnung (Minced Meat 
Order), 201, 273, 288 
Hypothekenbankengesetz (Private Mort-
gage Banks Act), 228, 308 
Kakaoverordnung (Cocoa Order), 50 
Käseverordnung (Cheese Order), 47 
Konsummilchverordnung (Milk Order), 
47 
Kraftverkehrsordnung (Order concern-
ing general conditions of carriage by 
tramway and trolley bus and motor cars 
running regular services), 234 
Lebensmittel- und Bedarfsgegenstände-
gesetz (Food and Consumer Goods Act), 
17, 45, 97, 100, 102, 102a, 110, 128, 131, 
134-146, 157, 158, 163, 164 
Lebensmittelkennzeichnungsverordnung 
(Food Labelling Order), 46, 49, 55, 64, 65 
Lohnfortzahlungsgesetz (Continued 
Wage Payment Act), 192 
Margarinegesetz (Margarine Act), 48 
Milchgesetz (Milk Act), 47 
Nährwertkennzeichnungsverordnung 
(Order concerning Labelling of Nutri-
tional Values), 52, 97 
Personenbeförderungsgesetz (Carriage 
of Passengers Act), 34, 234 
Pflichtversicherungsgesetz ( Com pulsory 
Insurance Act), 36 
Preisangabenverordnung (Price Marking 
Order), 40-42, 85, 268, 348 
Preisgesetz (Price Act), 31 
Preisstopverordnung (Price FreezeOrder), 
33 
Rabattgesetz (Discount Act), 26, 103, 
107, 109 
Rechtsberatungsgesetz (Legal Advice 
Act), 356-361, 363-365, 370 
Strafgesetzbuch (Penal Code), 24, 103, 
139, 346 
Straßenverkehrsordnung (Road Traffic 
Regulations), 102b 
Textilkennzeichnungsgesetz 
Labelling Act), 56 
(Textile 
Verordnung über kosmetische Mittel 
(Order on Cosmetics), 57 
Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz (Insurance 
Supervision Act), 36, 124, 278-281, 283, 
285,288,292, 307, 308 
Versicherungsvertragsgesetz (Act on 
lnsurance Contracts), 63, 369 
Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (Act on the 
Constitution of and Procedure in 
Administrative Courts), 134 
Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz (Act on 
Agencies' Procedure of Administration), 
308 
Währungsgesetz (Currency Act), 23 
Warenzeichengesetz (Trade Marks Act) 
81 
W echselgesetz(BillsofExchangeAct), 3 32 
Wirtschaftsstrafgesetzbuch (Code of 
Penalties for Economic Offences), 24 
Zivilprozeßordnung (Code of Civil Pro-
cedure), 17, 253, 257, 303-305, 308, 317, 
350, 351, 361, 368, 369 
Zugabeverordnung (Order concerning 
Collateral Gifts), 108 
379 
Index 
Numbers given are paragraph numbers. 
abusive prices, 28-30, 35, 39 
action against administrative authorities 
for taking the necessary steps, 134, 
188 
advertising, 3, 5, 10, 43, 61, 62, 64, 78, 
103-127 
against public policy 68, 90-93, 101, 
108, 118, 121, 127 
camouflaged, 74, 90, 102 
comparative, 76, 88, 91, 95 
control of, 5, 11, 20, 21, 22, 78, 93, 100, 
124, 126 
corrective, 119, 122, 123 
deceptive, 60, 78, 80, 97, 98, 124 
health-related, 83, 84, 86, 92, 93, 97, 98, 
100, 101, 102a 
media, 78, 81, 82, 90, 100, 102, 106, 124, 
126 
misleading, 20, 41, 60, 68, 76, 78, 
80-89, 92-101, 105, 109, 118, 119, 
121, 127' 154 
of an exclusive position, 83, 86'; 88, 93 
of drugs, 78, 98, 100, 101, 110, 124 
ofthe quality, 86-88, 97-99 
prohibition of, 78, 92, 101, 102, l02a, 
102b, 360, 361 
restrictions on, 17, 77, 78, 97, 100, 102, 
102a, 102b, 124 
self-control in, 1, 11, 21, 97, 100, 102b, 
124-126, 357 
suggestive, 64, 78, 81, 90, 92, 95, 97, 99 
101, 102a, 105 
using expert opinions, 83, 84, 88, 89, 93, 
97 
after-sales service, 5 
appeal to boycott, 70, 74 
approval of prices, 33, 34, 36-39 
380 
ban on cartels, 26, 30, 34, 35, 38, 76 
branded goods, 27, 28, 56, 72, 78, 83, 103, 
123 
building societies, 283, 284, 292, 305 
burden of proof, 28, 29, 35, 68, 85, 90, 
93-95, 105, 115, 116, 180, 201, 209, 
213, 215, 324, 353 
prima facie evidence, 168 
proof of causation, 68, 166, 168, 170, 
174, 179, 180 
proof of damage, 68, 170, 174 
proof of fault, 166, 167 
proof of incorporation of Standard form 
contracts, 270, 271 
proof of fraud, 204, 217, 226 
burden of proof clauses, 268, 275 
car repairs, 8, 196, 227, 276, 309, 367 
car sales, 8, 18, 26, 28, 32, 36, 72, 74, 109, 
208,209,211,216-218,221,226,237, 
242,268, 276, 309,321, 328, 369 
cash discount, 109 
catalogues, 41, 42, 56, 247, 254 
claim for injunction 
advertising, 80, 83, 134, 280, 298, 299, 
303, 305 
competitive practices, 104, 119 
claim for injunction and claim for retrac-
tion regarding standard form con-
tracts, 299, 301~303 
classes of quality, 54, 75 
collateral gifts, 78, 103, 107-110 
collective action, 8, 20, 30, 123, 370, 371 
§13 AGBG, 6, 9, 16, 21, 30, 264, 274, 
293-305, 307, 308,317, 357 
§13 UWG, 6, 16, 30, 31, 79, 107, 118, 
123, 294-304, 312, 357 
comparative goods tests, 4, 6, 8, 43, 72, 73, 
75, 76, 194 
competition, 14, 21, 28, 29, 70, 73, 74, 80, 
81, 103, 105-127 
against public policy, 41, 104-115, 127 
coordinated action in restraint of trade, 
26, 30, 35 
misleading competition, 13, 19, 41, 76, 
324, 342 
price competition, 85, 88, 90, 93, 119 
unfair competition, 10, 13, 20, 22, 109, 
118, 119, 324 
competitive bidding, 26 
complaint procedures, 6, 8, 359, 366-368, 
371 
complaints, 6, 8, 366, 367 
composition of products, 13, 44, 45, 49, 
51, 55-57 
concept ofdefect, 166, 167, 170, 173, 180, 
182, 201, 208, 213, 216 
concept ofthe consumer, 2-5, 17, 18, 21, 
33, 41, 94, 109, 116, 273 
consumer counselling, 6, 7, 10 
consumercredit 10,30, 116,282-289,291, 
292, 308, 321-356c 
charge forcredit (total), 35, 39, 323, 336, 
342, 344-348 
cheque cards, 321, 340, 341 
credit brokerage, 4, 112, 321, 324, 328, 
329, 333, 342-344, 346, 348, 353, 354 
indication of interest rate, 41, 116, 323 
interest, 35, 39, 116, 323, 330, 336-338, 
342-345 
personal loan, 321, 324, 328-330, 
336-338, 344, 369 
repayment, 323, 330, 338, 343 
running-account credit, 321, 339, 340 
security, 329, 350, 351 
under a contract of sale, 331-335, 340, 
351, 356a 
usurious lending, 4, 24, 115, 345, 346, 
348, 356a 
consumer education, 6, 8, 10 
consumer law as an independent field of 
law, 1, 2, 4, 12, 19, 22 
consumer policy for the middle classes, 4, 
6, II 
consumer protection off setting some of the 
social inequities, 24 
consumer reports of the Federal Govern-
ment, 10, 69, 75, 360, 366 
consumer representation, 1, 6-12, 15, 16, 
21, 30, 126, 133, 138, 161, 259, 292, 
366, 367, 371 
control of advertising, 126 
control of competition, 126 
control of standard form contracts, 1, 
11, 309, 359 
price control, 30 
standardisation, 1, 6, 10, 11, 75, 76, 161, 
164 
consumer research, 3, 4, 6, 43 
Consumer Advisory Councils, 10, 28, 93, 
109, 361 
consumer associations, 1, 6, 8, 20, 21, 28, 
30, 43, 70-74, 76, 81, 90, 92, 93, 101, 
118, 119, 120, 122, 127, 128, 134, 293, 
305, 317, 357, 359-361, 366 
contract clauses, unfair, 4, 10, 20, 23, 32 
clauses concerning the shortening of 
periods of warranty, 213, 214, 252, 
253, 257, 275 
exemption clauses, 116, 194, 201-210, 
215-221, 223-232, 234, 237, 254, 
262, 263, 266, 271, 311, 313, 368 
intermediary clauses, 220, 248 
jurisdiction clauses, 17, 257, 326, 369 
price escalator clauses, 23, 41, 268 
reservations as to price, 41, 251, 268 
reservation of alterations, 215, 250, 267 
settlement of claims in a lump sum, 226, 
255,257a, 260,267, 268, 337, 342 
third-party service clauses, 248 
vicarious liability clauses, 224, 237, 257a 
writing clauses, 216, 219, 252, 268 
contracts for repairs, 8, 196, 227, 276, 309, 
335, 367, 369 
contractual rights, 
abatement of the purchase price, 201, 
204,205, 208,209,211,238,252,254, 
331 
cancellation (Anfechtung), 103, 115, 
119, 121, 217, 331, 335, 342 
cancellation (Widerruf), 61, 82, 90, 102, 
103, 115, 116, 121, 122, 260, 261, 298, 
301, 303, 305, 324-326, 330, 335, 337, 
342, 354, 357, 365a 
damages, 68, 119-125, 201, 202, 204, 
205, 210, 252, 268 
exchange, 238 
lien, 268 
notice, 61, 223, 256, 261, 268, 338, 347, 
348 
offsetting, 268 
381 
redhibition, 201, 204, 205, 208, 209, 238, 
254, 331 
refusal of performance, 212, 268 
repair of defects, 202, 204, 205, 208, 
209-212, 216, 228, 235, 238, 254, 268, 
331 
subsequent delivery, 201, 202, 268 
withdrawal, 68, 115, 121, 125, 132, 205, 
209, 251, 255, 256, 268, 325, 330, 331, 
338 
control of competition, 20, 21 
conventional penalties, 116, 226, 260, 268, 
344 
correspondence tuition, 6, 8, 10, 17, 61, 
100, 103, 113, 116, 131, 194, 197-200, 
258-26la, 267, 268, 290-292, 298, 
335 
cosmetics, 10, 42, 45, 47, 55, 57, 58, 64, 65, 
68, 86, 92, 97, 135, 140, 141-144, 175, 
201 
costs of litigation, 118, 123, 368, 370, 371 
countervailing power of consumers, 11, 
.J2, 133 
damages, 30, 68, 71, 115, 118-120, 123, 
134, 171, 173, 183' 188, 334, 337' 343 
collective enforcement by consumer 
associations, 370 
damage arising from entering into a 
contract, 119, 122, 370 
damage to persons, 173, 177, 181, 225 
damage to property, 119, 173, 225 
for consequential damage resulting from 
defects, 173, 204, 205, 218 
for differential damage, 119, 122 
holiday time spent to no avail, 254 
pain and suffering, 173, 183, 193 
dangers emanating from products, 44, 75, 
128 
dealer's brands, 78 
debtor-creditor-supplier agreements, 321, 
328, 329, 333, 335, 351 
debtor-creditor-supplier agreements for 
services, 321, 322, 324, 325 
discounts, 26, 27, 31, 41, 78, 85, 103, 107, 
!09 
door-to-door sales, 78, 82, 103, 105, 
115-116, 119, 121, 226, 324, 354, 
356a, 357 
drugs, 10, 15, 18, 20, 21, 29, 55, 58, 66, 78, 
79, 86, 96, 98, 100, 101, 103, 110, 
124, 126-128, 131-133, 135-137, 
382 
147-158, 164, 175, 179-186, 188, 
189, 190 
compensation fund, 180, 189, 191 
duty to furnish information, 58, 66, 78, 
98, 100 
perm1ss1on to manufacture, 131, 
150-152, 157, 180 
permission to seil, 110, 154, 157 
procedure of prior approval, 128, 131, 
147-153, 157, 163, 195 
proof of effectiveness, 20, 152, 195 
registration procedure, 147, 149, 152, 
156 
strict liability, 147, 179, 180-182 
duty ofcare, 128, 166-168, 172, 179, 186, 
187' 193 
duty to furnish information (see also 
labelling; indication of price) 43, 
60-63, 78, 84, 98, 100, 116, 182, 198, 
217, 261, 324, 330, 331, 344, 348, 351 
on contractual rights, 82, 90 
on intended use, 142, 182 
on product dangers, 142, 166, 167, 182 
energy supply, 31, 33, 39, 224, 270 
exclusion of liability (see also contract 
clauses, unfair), 172, 173, 176, 181, 
201, 202, 204, 205, 208-210, 216, 217, 
220,223,225, 234,240,254 
exemption clauses (see unfair contract 
terms) 
exemption from antitrust law, 21, 33-35, 
37-39, 44, 76, 126, 130, 345 
Federal Banking Supervisory Office, 35, 
l88, 231, 282-289, 291, 302, 305, 307, 
345, 353, 354 
Federal Health Authority, 58, 128, 
137-139, 152, 156, 163, 164, 188 
Federal Cartel Office, 26, 28-30, 35, 44, 
46, 76, 124, 126, 127, 130, 195, 216, 
227,231,275, 276, 305,309, 337 
Federal Constitutional Court, 31, 43, 70, 
78 
Federal Supervisory Office for Insurance 
Companies, 36, 188, 277-281, 283, 
285, 291, 292, 302, 305-308 
Food Codex, 131, 133, 138 
foodstuffs, 10, 15, 16, 18, 20-22, 42-55, 
58, 64, 65, 67, 68, 75, 78, 79, 83, 86, 
92, 97, 100, 102, 109, 124, 126-128, 
131-133, 135, 136, 157, 163, 188, 201 
German Advertising Council, 126 
German Bundesbank, 23, 35, 133, 161, 
347, 348 
German Institute for Standardisation, 75, 
133, 161, 240 
government sanctions, 
ban on imports, 163 
ban on sale, 20, 41, 83, 132, 139, 142, 
145, 162, 164 
fines, 68, 140, 143, 146, 148, 158, 162, 
163, 308 
penal sanctions, 124, 125, 140, 143, 146, 
155, 158, 162, 163, 308 
prohibition to manufacture, 136, 137, 
142, 145, 150, 162 
seizure of goods, 132, 157 
guarantee contracts, 237 
hire purchase, 207, 222, 223, 224, 268, 322, 
334, 353 
household appliances, 75, 209 
indication of price, 17, 40-42, 64, 69, 85 
in formation, 
claim for retraction, claim for correc-
tion, 71-74 
criticism (see public criticism) 
liability, 43, 70-74, 335, 357 
recommendations as to where to buy, 
70, 73 
right to reply, 71, 73, 122 
voluntary information systems, 43, 75 
informative value, 43, 78 
instalment sales, 17, 27, 82, 90, 103, 112, 
116, 226, 259, 261, 261a, 298, 321, 
329, 330, 332, 334-336, 338, 342, 344, 
348, 351, 353, 356, 357, 363, 369 
instcilment transactions, 112, 322, 323 
instructions for use, 45, 142, 182 
insurances, 3, 6, 24, 31, 36, 63, 82, 91, 124, 
126, 232, 277-280, 368, 369 
interest (see consumer credit) 
interest cartels, 345 
interest recommendations, 35, 39, 345 
interlocutory proceedings, 119, 303, 304 
intermediary (see also loan for consump-
tion; contract clauses, unfair) 36, 41, 
112, 220, 233, 248, 335 
investment companies, 289, 305 
itinerant trade, 6, 17, 62, 103, 111, 112, 
114, 116, 220, 247-250, 257a, 267, 
268,276, 309, 335, 354, 350 
jurisdiction clauses (see contract clauses, 
unfair) 
labelling, 1, 6, 14, 19, 20, 42-58, 69, 81, 
83, 84, 97, 98, 100, 127 
of composition, 44, 45, 47-58 
of perishability, 45-49 
of production (place/date), 45-51, 53, 
58 
of quantity, 42-44, 46, 47, 64-67 
of the intended purpose, 45 
of the manufacturer, 45, 46 
voluntary labelling agreements, 21, 44, 
55-69, 75-77, 126 
law enforcement, 6, 8, 9, II, 15-17, 
20-22, 30, 62, 103, 111, 112, 114, 116, 
119, 120, 220, 247-257a, 268, 276, 
309, 335, 354 
leasing, 207, 222, 223, 268, 322, 334, 353 
legal advice, 6, 343, 356-368 
Leistungsvorbehalte (see contract clauses, 
unfair) 
liability (see also information), 
for advertising promises, 14, 21, 22, 74, 
81, 119, 120, 125, 218, 239, 240, 242, 
245, 246 
for contributory negligence, 172 
for fault, 125, 166-168, 170, 171, 173, 
180-187, 193,202,205,210,225,229, 
231, 254, 331 
for fault of another party, 254, 256 
for malice, 202, 204, 217, 319 
for negligence, 71, 125, 210, 217, 254 
for obligations existing prior to the 
formation of a contract, 210, 214, 
217, 220 
for secondary obligations under a con-
tract, 128, 173, 187, 210, 214 
for warranted qualities, 201, 204, 205, 
218-220, 237, 240, 242-244, 246, 
254, 319 
government, 188, 193, 291 
manufacturer's, 
for defects, 134, 166, 167, 170, 237, 
351 
quasi-contractual, 166, 179 
of the importer, 178- 180 
strict, 147, 166, 170, 173, 179-183, 186, 
189, 190, 193 
Iimitation of claims under the law of torts, 
166, 175, 183 
limitation of contractual claims, 166, 201, 
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